America’s venerable B-2 stealth bomber fleet is in its twilight years. As part of America’s bomber fleet since the 1990s, it serves both conventional and nuclear missions. Over the next 10 years, the B-2 stealth fleet will be gradually replaced by the next-generation stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider, which is currently in production.
Under the current plan, the B-2s will be retired to the “Boneyard” at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base outside of Tucson, Arizona, where over 4,000 aircraft currently sit after decommissioning. Many have been and are still cannibalized for spare parts.
Every aircraft retired to the Boneyard carries a financial burden. While the exact cost of decommissioning the B-2 remains uncertain, it is reasonable to assume that retiring such an advanced strategic stealth bomber would come at a significant expense, far more than the cost of retiring a simple B-52 bomber or a cargo aircraft. Given the still state-of-the-art stealth technology and secretive nature of the stealth bomber, it will require extra security and maintenance.
Each B-2 costs over $2 billion to develop and build. Rather than prematurely retiring these valuable assets, the United States should consider transferring all 19 of the B-2s to an ally, free of charge.
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Key allies in Europe or Asia would benefit from such a transfer, whether they took all or part of the fleet. But there is one option that offers intriguing possibilities: gifting the total fleet to Australia.
Granting the stealth bomber in its totality to Australia would allow the bombers to live out the full extent of their operational lifespan. Indeed, the B-2s can probably operate until 2040. By gifting the B-2 fleet to Australia, these aircraft could keep flying and provide increased allied resilience at the edge of a contested region, and complicate Chinese decisionmaking at the same time.
Canberra has recently invested heavily in its defense posture, including long-range missile systems, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS, and cutting-edge cyber capabilities. What it lacks is an airborne strategic strike platform. The B-2 would fill the gap immediately and extend its ability to carry out long-range conventional land attack missions.
A fleet of stealth bombers capable of striking deep into contested zones from Australian soil would dramatically change the strategic calculus for China. It would force Beijing to contend with potential multiple axes of attack not only from U.S. bases to its north and east but also from the south. Australia could dispatch bomber strikes from the northern part of the country. Such a development would force China to shift air and missile defenses to cover its southern and southeastern flanks, thereby diluting its ability to concentrate forces elsewhere.
Northern bases like RAAF Tindal are already undergoing upgrades to support long-range U.S. bombers. From those runways, a B-2 can reach virtually any target in the Indo-Pacific within a matter of hours.
There are, of course, many ways to bolster Australia’s deterrence posture—to include increased rotational deployments of American servicemembers, larger numbers of Australian and American cruise missiles, increased intelligence sharing between the United States and Australia, and modernized Australian maritime capabilities—and all of these should be pursued. However, these efforts still fall short of addressing the absence of a long-range airborne strike platform.
In fact, Australian defense strategists are already considering how such capabilities can be integrated as part of a modern long-range power projection capability. This aligns closely with Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy, which explicitly calls for enhanced long-range strike capabilities as part of a more lethal and integrated force structure.
Some Australian voices have identified the B-21 Raider as a potential long-term solution, offering a faster and more flexible option compared to nuclear submarines, with the capability to carry multiple weapons due to its stealth. Unlike submarines, which have longer deployment and resupply cycles, the B-21 can conduct multiple sorties in a shorter timeframe, allowing for sustained operations. The B-21’s range also allows it to operate from bases deep within Australia, reducing vulnerability to adversary strikes and logistical challenges.
However, given the B-21’s current developmental status and slower rate of production, acquiring the B-2 bombers could serve as an effective interim measure until the Royal Australian Air Force can acquire the B-21s in the 2040s.
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In addition, transferring the B-2 to Australia would further demonstrate that Western allies are willing to share technologies and capabilities that remain lethal and strategically relevant in support of their shared national interests.
The transfer would also open new opportunities for joint training with the United States and Pacific allies. Australia’s vast, sparsely populated interior provides ideal airspace for the kind of training required for low-observable aircraft—training that is increasingly difficult to conduct in the crowded skies over the continental United States.
By integrating B-2s that were adjusted to carry only conventional—not nuclear—munitions into Australia’s defense strategy, the United States can strengthen regional stability while empowering its allies with relevant, credible, and lethal capabilities needed to project strength.
Beyond the immediate benefits, such a transfer would pave the way for a deeper cooperation between the United States and Australia on next-generation strike capabilities. By servicing and operating B-2s, the Royal Australian Air Force could learn valuable lessons and acquire the skills required to potentially operate B-21 Raiders in the 2040 timeframe, exactly when the B-2s will reach the end of their operational lifespan.
An Australian fleet of B-2s would be a signal. It would signal to China that the United States and its closest allies can strike with precision from great distances, and that any Chinese aggression will be met with force. Anything less would be a gamble with the balance of power in the region.
This piece originally appeared in The National Interest
