Disclaimer: This analysis was conducted during the early stages of modeling to identify the most critical levers shaping conflict intensity. Although the final simulation represented fuel differently to account for platform movement between combat zones, the findings of this analysis remain essential for understanding both how and why we determined and adjusted specific levers across the four scenarios.

Key Judgment

Heritage assesses with high confidence that U.S. maritime interdiction and refinery strikes are the most decisive levers for fuel exhaustion in the PLA. These actions, particularly when combined, reduce PLA sustainment by up to five months depending on the level of interdiction. On the Chinese side, civilian fuel redirection and refinery output are the most important levers for sustaining operations.

There is a moderate likelihood that increased redirection can delay collapse by up to 6 months, particularly under moderate U.S. pressure. However, strategic reserve size, while critical for buying time, has a low likelihood of preventing collapse, adding three to four months of buffer under sustained fuel shortfalls. These judgments are based on sensitivity analysis using simulation data across all relevant levers.

Reason 1: U.S. Levers—The Decisive Factors in Fuel Collapse

Heritage assesses with high confidence that U.S. maritime interdiction and refinery strikes are the primary levers responsible for fuel exhaustion in the PLA. These two U.S. actions, when combined with other factors like port distribution and tanker attrition, have a cumulative effect in depleting the PLA’s ability to sustain its operations over time.

1. U.S. Maritime Interdiction
   • Simulation Insight: Maritime interdiction consistently proves to be the most significant U.S. action in degrading PLA fuel endurance. By blocking up to 75 percent of crude imports, U.S. interdiction directly limits the feedstock available to PLA refineries, leading to fuel shortages and eventual exhaustion.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario A (High China/High U.S.), 75 percent import interdiction caused fuel exhaustion by Day 155, compared to Day 562 when no interdiction was applied, giving a ~400-day reduction in endurance. In Scenario B (Low China/High U.S.), similar levels of interdiction resulted in fuel exhaustion by Day 84.
   • Evidence Source: The simulation results from the Simulation Output Results tab clearly show the breakdown of reserve depletion in scenarios where interdiction was active, reinforcing the direct link between reduced imports and earlier fuel exhaustion. The pattern holds across scenarios with varying levels of U.S. pressure (e.g., 50 percent → 25 percent throughput reduction in import volume).
   • Sensitivity Insight: Adjusting the import throughput from 50 percent → 25 percent through higher U.S. interdiction causes a ~100-day reduction in PLA endurance, as shown in the sensitivity analysis. This further underscores maritime interdiction as the primary limiting factor in PLA fuel sustainability.
2. U.S. Refinery Strikes
   • Simulation Insight: U.S. strikes targeting key Chinese refineries—such as Zhenhai, Dalian, and Maoming—have an enormous impact on fuel production. Even moderate refinery degradation (e.g., 50 percent capacity reduction) accelerates the rate of fuel depletion, compounding the net fuel deficit.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario A, a 30 percent refinery degradation caused a ~228-day reduction in PLA endurance, resulting in a collapse ~7 months earlier than the baseline. In Scenario B, 50 percent refinery degradation resulted in exhaustion within 3 months due to severe fuel shortages.
   • Evidence Source: The sensitivity analysis from the project files reveals that refinery degradation leads to accelerated depletion. The data shows that simulated refinery degradation directly compounds the effects of maritime interdiction, significantly accelerating fuel exhaustion by ~7 months when both factors are in play.
   • Sensitivity Insight: Even partial refinery disruption has a profound impact on PLA sustainment. Strikes on key refineries can effectively remove substantial portions of fuel production, especially when compounded with maritime interdiction. Therefore, attacks on these refineries have a major impact on the fuel system’s ability to sustain PLA operations.
3. U.S. Port Distribution Loss
   • Simulation Insight: While port distribution loss (i.e., disruption at key fuel terminals) does have an impact on PLA endurance, its role is secondary compared to U.S. interdiction and refinery strikes. Delays in fuel distribution slow the speed at which the PLA can move fuel to units but do not, by themselves, lead to collapse.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario A, 50 percent port distribution degradation resulted in a −228-day reduction in PLA endurance, but this was insufficient on its own to cause collapse. Port disruptions only become critical when coupled with U.S. interdiction or refinery attacks.
   • Evidence Source: The simulation data clearly shows that port distribution delays can cause temporary fuel shortages, but these delays are less significant compared to disruptions to imports or refinery output. This highlights port loss as a secondary lever, meaning that it is less likely to independently collapse PLA operations.

Reason 2: China Levers—Key Drivers of Fuel Sustainment

Heritage assesses with high confidence that China’s fuel endurance is primarily influenced by its ability to redirect civilian fuel, maintain refinery output, and manage strategic reserves. These three internal levers interact with external factors (like U.S. actions) to determine how long the PLA can sustain high-tempo operations under wartime conditions.

1. China’s Civilian Fuel Redirection
   • Simulation Insight: Civilian fuel redirection is the most critical internal lever for maintaining PLA fuel sustainability. By redirecting civilian fuel stocks to military use, China can mitigate the impact of U.S. interdiction and refinery disruptions.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario C (Low China/Low U.S.), a 30 percent → 15 percent redirection resulted in a net fuel surplus of 1.1M bpd, allowing the PLA to continue operations indefinitely. This surplus is crucial when U.S. pressure is relatively low, enabling PLA operations to persist without running out of fuel.
   • Evidence Source: Simulation data from the Simulation Output Results tab indicates that even under low U.S. interdiction, civilian redirection maintains fuel supply and prevents exhaustion. The net surplus generated by redirection stabilizes fuel reserves.
   • Sensitivity Insight: Increasing redirection from 15 percent → 30 percent significantly extends PLA endurance by ~6 months. However, without redirection, PLA fuel exhaustion would occur much sooner, particularly in moderate U.S. pressure scenarios (e.g., Scenario B).
2. Refinery Output Continuity
   • Simulation Insight: Refinery throughput is the second-most important internal lever for sustaining PLA fuel supply. The ability to process crude into usable military fuel determines how efficiently the PLA can replenish stocks. Refinery degradation—whether from U.S. strikes or other disruptions—directly impedes the PLA’s fuel flow.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario D (High China/Low U.S.), where refinery output is maintained, the PLA avoids exhaustion and sustains high-tempo operations. In Scenario B, refinery degradation (30 percent) shifted fuel exhaustion by −228 days, showing the significant effect refinery output has on operational sustainability.
   • Evidence Source: The sensitivity analysis clearly indicates that refinery degradation directly correlates with a faster rate of fuel depletion. In scenarios where refinery capacity is disrupted, the PLA faces a steep decline in fuel availability, significantly affecting sustainment.
   • Sensitivity Insight: Even moderate refinery degradation (e.g., 30 percent → 50 percent capacity loss) accelerates fuel depletion by up to 7 months. Maintaining refinery output is thus essential to counteract U.S. interdiction and sustain PLA operations in high-tempo environments.
3. Strategic Reserve Size
   • Simulation Insight: Strategic reserves play a buffering role, providing China with extra fuel stockpiles that can be drawn upon when other supply channels are disrupted. However, reserve size does not prevent collapse under sustained fuel shortages; it only delays the inevitable when imports and redirection fail.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario A, a 1.2B barrel reserve extended PLA endurance to Day 562 compared to Day 84 when reserves were limited to 600M barrels in Scenario B. However, in Scenario B, even with large reserves, the PLA collapsed in less than 3 months, emphasizing that reserves alone are not sufficient to counteract high levels of U.S. pressure.
     • Evidence Source: The simulation results from the Simulation Output Results tab show that reserve size provides a buffer, but exhaustion occurs much faster when imports are blocked or refinery output is reduced. Increasing reserves by 600M barrels only adds ~3–4 months to the endurance timeline, which is insufficient in high-deficit scenarios.
   • Sensitivity Insight: Doubling reserves from 600M to 1.2B barrels provides a buffer of ~3–4 months but cannot prevent fuel exhaustion under sustained U.S. interdiction and refinery disruption. This highlights that reserve size alone is not enough to sustain the PLA indefinitely.

Reason 3: The Interaction of U.S. and China Levers—Key Drivers of PLA Fuel Sustainability

Heritage assesses with high confidence that the combined effect of U.S. actions (interdiction and refinery strikes) and China’s internal levers (redirection, refinery output, reserves) is what ultimately determines the PLA’s ability to sustain operations. While individual levers are important, it is the interaction between these factors that ultimately drives fuel exhaustion or sustainment.

U.S. Actions—How They Interact with China’s Internal Levers

1. Maritime Interdiction (CC1) + Civilian Redirection
   • Simulation Insight: Maritime interdiction (up to 75 percent import denial) drastically impacts PLA fuel availability. However, when China redirects civilian fuel (up to 30 percent → 45 percent of civilian stocks), it can offset the worst effects of interdiction, buying the PLA extra time to adjust its operations.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario C (Low China/Low U.S.), 15 percent civilian redirection allowed for a net fuel surplus, enabling indefinite PLA sustainment despite U.S. maritime interdiction.
   • Sensitivity Insight: 30 percent redirection extends PLA operational timelines by ~6 months under U.S. pressure, emphasizing redirection as a buffer when facing partial or delayed U.S. actions.
2. Refinery Strikes + Civilian Redirection
   • Simulation Insight: Refinery strikes that degrade output by 30 percent → 50 percent directly reduce fuel supply, accelerating depletion. However, redirection capacity can help slow depletion by compensating for reduced refinery output.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario A (High China/High U.S.), 30 percent refinery degradation accelerated exhaustion by −228 days. But with 30 percent redirection, the PLA was able to extend its operational endurance to Day 562 (compared to 84 days without redirection).
   • Sensitivity Insight: Increasing redirection from 15 percent → 30 percent offsets refinery disruptions and provides buffer time for PLA operations, preventing collapse under sustained U.S. interdiction.

China’s Internal Levers—How They Buffer Against U.S. Actions

1. Strategic Reserve Size + U.S. Interdiction
   • Simulation Insight: While strategic reserves provide a critical time buffer, they alone cannot prevent collapse under high U.S. pressure. Larger reserves (1.2B → 1.5B barrels) buy an additional 3–4 months, but the net deficit will eventually overtake PLA fuel supply unless redirection and refining continue uninterrupted.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario A, 1.2B barrels of reserves extended PLA endurance to Day 562, compared to Day 84 in Scenario B with 600M barrels.
   • Sensitivity Insight: Even with expanded reserves, the PLA’s endurance is capped once U.S. interdiction reaches 75 percent, demonstrating that reserves can delay but not prevent collapse.
2. Refinery Output + Strategic Reserves
   • Simulation Insight: Refinery output is the most critical internal factor for maintaining PLA fuel supply. Refining capacity ensures fuel is processed and available for military operations. However, when refinery output is degraded (e.g., 30 percent → 50 percent), reserves alone cannot compensate for the loss.
   • Simulation Outcome: In Scenario D (High China/Low U.S.), refinery continuity allowed the PLA to maintain a net fuel surplus and avoid exhaustion. In Scenario B, the loss of refining capacity led to rapid exhaustion.
   • Sensitivity Insight: When refinery output is preserved, China can offset external interdiction and sustain operations indefinitely, even with small reserves. The interaction between refining capacity and strategic reserves is synergistic, allowing China to operate without fuel collapse.

Interpretation

• Increasing redirection from 15 percent → 30 percent doubles PLA endurance from ~4.3 to ~8.5 months.
• Going from 30 percent → 45 percent buys an additional 4.3 months.
• Redirection is a powerful sustaining lever, though it still requires reserves and/or imports.

Interpretation

• Doubling the reserve (600M → 1.2B) roughly doubles endurance under sustained deficit.
• Gains are linear: each 300M barrel increment buys ~38–78 days depending on net drawdown rate.
• SPR acts as a time buffer, but without redirection or imports, it simply delays collapse.

Interpretation

• Increasing production from 0.5M → 1.0M bpd extends endurance by nearly 6 months.
• Cutting production to 0.25M accelerates collapse by ~2 months.

Interpretation

• Refinery degradation has an enormous nonlinear effect—a 50 percent cut drops endurance by over 7 months.
• Conversely, protecting refineries extends PLA sustainment by over 3 years.

Interpretation

• Port throughput has a major but secondary effect: it constrains how fast fuel reaches PLA units even when reserves and production are available.
• A 50 percent cut in distribution reduces sustainment by nearly 8 months.
• However, unlike import interdiction, port disruption alone does not cause collapse unless fuel inputs are already constrained.

Interpretation

• Maritime interdiction is a dominant strategic lever—each 25 percent increment of crude denial shaves weeks to months off PLA endurance.
• Dropping throughput from 50 percent → 25 percent cuts lifespan by over 4 months.
• Even 90 percent interdiction doesn’t cause immediate collapse—but it accelerates exhaustion sharply and exposes China to compounding internal shortfalls.

Interpretation

• Tanker degradation has minimal effect on systemwide endurance under high-deficit conditions.
• Improving PLAN tanker throughput buys less than one week.
• Unless the PLA is already near sustainability, CC3 alone does not shift exhaustion timelines meaningfully.

Interpretation

• U.S. refinery strikes are a high-leverage lever, nearly as decisive as maritime interdiction.
• Raising refinery degradation from 30 percent → 50 percent shortens PLA endurance by 7.5 months.
• Refinery attacks compound with maritime interdiction to accelerate collapse.