Executive Summary

Heritage judges with moderate confidence that China would likely be able to redirect 25 percent to 30 percent of its civilian fuel consumption to military use during a high-intensity conflict. Under full mobilization, this reallocation—equivalent to approximately 4.0 million to 4.8 million barrels per day (bpd)—could sustain the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for 60 to 100 days.

This estimate presumes effective enforcement of wartime control laws, operational logistics, and reliance on China’s estimated 684-million-barrel Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) as a temporal buffer. Legal frameworks, including the National Defense Mobilization Law of 2010 and integration mechanisms under Military-Civil Fusion doctrine enable centralized fuel requisitioning from state-run enterprises such as Sinopec and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).

This assessment employs a four-part methodology framework designed to support anticipatory simulation modeling of China’s ability to reallocate civilian fuel consumption to military use during a high-intensity conflict scenario.

Key Judgment

Heritage judges with moderate confidence that, under full wartime mobilization, China would likely be able to redirect 25 percent to 30 percent of its civilian fuel consumption—equivalent to approximately 4.0 to 4.8 million barrels per day—to sustain PLA operations for a limited period of 60 to 100 days, assuming strict central enforcement, logistical functionality, and pre-existing reserve buffers. Redirection beyond this window would almost certainly induce cumulative economic degradation, civil transportation paralysis, and rising social instability.

Reason 1: Legal Frameworks and Strategic Reserve Buffer Enable Short-Term Redirection

• China’s National Defense Mobilization Law of 2010 and its 2020 amendments authorize the requisitioning of civilian fuel and logistics assets under state control, specifically for national defense purposes.1
• China’s SPR holds approximately 684 million barrels (total crude oil storage capacity likely reached up to 1.8 billion barrels when factoring in commercial capacity) provides a temporal buffer enabling redirection, with internal models suggesting that each 300 million barrels equals ~100 days of coverage at ~3M bpd net deficit.2
• The National Defense Mobilization Commission (NDMC) and China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) doctrine ensure logistical coordination between SOEs (e.g., Sinopec, CNPC) and the PLA during wartime fuel reallocation operations.3

Reason 2: Independent Modeling Estimates Support Feasible 25–30 Percent Redirection

• The Naval War College Review (2018) models a 33 percent reduction in civilian gasoline use (~1M bpd) as sufficient to lower total product demand by 8 percent, freeing fuel for defense and critical internal transport.4
• The Baker Institute (2024) simulates a 35 percent cut in civilian oil use as extending strategic survivability by up to 8 months, depending on interdiction and distribution conditions.5
• The Council on Foreign Relations (Kelanic, 2013) estimates that PLA air forces could be sustained if civilian aviation fuel is reduced by ~75 percent, equal to ~250K bpd, underscoring China’s capacity for sector-specific prioritization.6
• Heritage assumes China’s central authorities would initiate fuel redirection between Day 60 and Day 90 of a protracted conflict, once strategic fuel depletion becomes imminent and external resupply remains interdicted.

Total National Demand (Baseline): 16 million bpd

Civilian Share (~80 percent): ~12.8 million bpd

Redirectable Range (25–30 percent of civilian use): 4.0–4.8 million bpd

Estimated Duration of Sustainable Redirection: 60–100 days, before systemic degradation limits output and distribution reliability

Analytic Tradecraft Summary

1. Key Intelligence Question:

What volume and duration of China’s civilian oil consumption could plausibly be redirected to military use under full wartime mobilization, and how would such redirection affect strategic sustainment and national stability?

This question directly supports strategic objectives articulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy, which identifies the People’s Republic of China as the pacing threat and mandates anticipatory understanding of China’s wartime capabilities and resilience.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 2023 Annual Threat Assessment emphasizes PRC domestic-military integration and logistics sustainment as core elements in assessing the risk of high-end conflict. This topic further intersects with statutory direction from the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which requires analytic outputs supporting strategic posture, Indo-Pacific logistics, and warfighting sustainability.

Finally, INDOPACOM’s theater campaign objectives and PACOM J5 guidance prioritize intelligence that anticipates PRC adaptive behavior under denied logistics conditions, including internal fuel redistribution, sectoral prioritization, and civil-military fuel mobilization.

2. Confidence Level and Source Summary

The confidence level assigned to the primary judgment is moderate. This reflects a strong but indirect evidence base composed of multi-source modeling, policy analysis, and strategic reserve estimation, without historical precedent or directly observed implementation. Six independent sources—ranging from the U.S. Department of War and the International Energy Agency to the Naval War College, Baker Institute, CFR, and CASI—were used to triangulate fuel reserve levels, redirection feasibility, and mobilization doctrine. These sources align on the legal and logistical feasibility of civilian fuel redirection but differ slightly in their modeling assumptions, suppression timelines, and risk thresholds.

Confidence is increased by the consistency across U.S. strategic modeling institutions and energy-focused research centers, all of which conclude that fuel redirection is plausible under military-civil fusion, and that China’s reserve posture supports short-term PLA sustainment. The presence of sector-specific suppression estimates and convergence around the 25–30 percent reallocation range strengthens this judgment. However, confidence is moderated by the absence of direct Chinese government documentation detailing wartime redistribution plans and by limited insight into the political or social friction that may accompany prolonged domestic energy suppression. No single source confirms redirection intent or implementation thresholds. The estimates also depend on open-source modeling and inferred SPR draw schedules, which are not officially verified by PRC institutions. Overall, source strength is high, but confirmation of implementation thresholds remains limited, supporting a moderate confidence classification.

3. Assumptions

We assumed that China’s central government, under conditions of full mobilization, would exercise its legal authority to compel large-scale fuel reallocation from state-owned civilian enterprises to the PLA. This assumption is grounded in the 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law and Military-Civil Fusion doctrine but lacks real-world testing under combat conditions.

We assumed that the estimated 684-million-barrel Strategic Petroleum Reserve would be functionally accessible and usable at scale by the PLA without friction, loss, or delay. We assumed that China’s internal logistics systems—pipeline, rail, and road—could support redistribution to military hubs at a sufficient rate to match redirected volumes, at least in the initial 60–100 days.

We assumed that domestic political and social tolerance would remain high enough to permit at least partial sectoral fuel suppression, especially in civilian aviation and long-haul freight. We assumed interdiction of external oil imports would occur early, thus necessitating drawdown of internal fuel and reallocation measures.

If any of these assumptions were to fail—such as if strategic reserves are degraded, enforcement mechanisms fail, or civilian unrest accelerates—then the projected 25–30 percent redirection range and 60–100-day sustainment window could collapse significantly. These assumptions undergird the redirection estimate but are subject to uncertainty in execution under wartime conditions.

4. Alternative Judgment

An alternative and plausible judgment is that China would be unable to redirect more than 10–15 percent of civilian fuel consumption, resulting in PLA fuel shortfalls within 30–45 days of a high-intensity conflict. This could occur if strategic reserves are smaller than reported, partially unusable, or concentrated in areas vulnerable to disruption. It could also reflect breakdowns in enforcement or coordination between the PLA and civilian fuel distributors. Political risk may also inhibit full execution of the National Defense Mobilization Law if urban protests or logistical backlash occur in major economic centers. Furthermore, if external resupply (e.g., via Russia or Iran) continues during conflict, Beijing may delay redirection to avoid disrupting economic normalcy.

Indicators that would support this alternative include public signs of political resistance to mobilization orders, supply chain bottlenecks near SPR sites, PLA requisition failures, or reduced SOE compliance. Additionally, divergence in regional fuel suppression patterns—especially if wealthy coastal provinces resist fuel diversion—would support this lower-end outcome. If confirmed, this alternative would reduce China’s strategic endurance and force earlier prioritization tradeoffs across services and theaters.

5. Information Gaps

Several key information gaps constrain the analysis. First, there is no open-source visibility into the internal operational plans of the National Defense Mobilization Commission or PLA logistics command regarding fuel reallocation schedules or thresholds.

Second, China does not publicly report real-time SPR drawdowns or location-specific accessibility, leaving open the possibility that reserves may be segmented or operationally constrained.

Third, there is limited understanding of China’s intra-national pipeline and fuel movement infrastructure under disrupted conditions, such as port or terminal degradation.

Fourth, modeling of civilian behavioral and political responses to energy suppression is sparse, making it difficult to project how long social stability can be maintained under forced fuel redirection.

Lastly, we lack intelligence on real-time PLA fuel planning exercises or redirection drills under war-game conditions. These gaps limit the robustness of long duration estimates and increase the dependency on assumptions. Targeted collection on SPR accessibility, NDMC planning cycles, and regional mobilization command authority would significantly increase confidence in future estimates.

6. Future Research

Future research should focus on three critical areas: first, refining strategic reserve depletion timelines under interdiction, drawdown inefficiencies, and PLA burn rates; second, mapping internal fuel distribution chokepoints—including interprovincial transfer authority, port fallback nodes, and storage vulnerabilities; and third, assessing indicators of central-regional divergence in mobilization compliance or civilian suppression. Collecting open-source, satellite, or ISR-based estimates of real-time SPR drawdowns or SOE compliance patterns would enhance the reliability of redirection modeling.

Additional effort should be directed toward modeling PLA decision thresholds for initiating redirection, as well as the legal-military sequencing required to suppress sectoral consumption. Longitudinal tracking of fuel rationing laws, emergency stockpile replenishment, or PLA fuel adaptation behavior across exercises may serve as precursors to wartime logic. Moreover, research into regionalized political risk and economic fragility would help disaggregate where redirection is more or less enforceable. Finally, future simulation should explore multi-node degradation under airstrike or cyber disruption scenarios to determine when internal fuel flow—and thus redirection feasibility—collapses.