Part I. The Foundation of the Plan

A Plan for Countering China

Part I. The Foundation of the Plan

Mar 28, 2023 21 min read

A strategic competition is defined by a contest of action and counteraction between determined and capable foes. From military brinksmanship in the South China Sea to sparring over international trade standards, China and the U.S. are locked in an intense competition to shape the global operating system of the 21st century.

To be clear, the U.S. respects the Chinese people and their rich history and storied culture. U.S. disagreements are with the communist autocracy that not only acts belligerently abroad but oppresses the Chinese people. It is worth recalling the wisdom of President Ronald Reagan, who repeatedly insisted that the United States took issue with the Soviet government while supporting the Russian people in their quest for freedom and human dignity.

Strategic and conventional military deterrence, as well as the terrible consequences of military escalation, have to date restrained both sides from engaging in traditional armed conflict. Nevertheless, the China–U.S. relationship is at its most acrimonious and volatile stage in decades.

All signs point to a continuing worsening of the rivalry in the years ahead. Crafting a balance of power in favor of the U.S. and its allies and partners requires understanding the critical strengths and weaknesses of both competitors as a prerequisite for determining which offensive and defensive actions are most advisable and consequential.

China: Assessment and Implications

This assessment is informed by two major research papers by Heritage Foundation analysts that offered a deep dive into analyzing Chinese behavior and offering policy recommendations, many of which were adopted by the previous Administration.This assessment also draws from The Heritage Foundation’s China Transparency Index project, which gathered a coalition of researchers from around the world to conduct high-quality open-source analysis of China’s domestic and international activities.9 This plan also draws from The Heritage Foundation’s 2022 Index of Economic Freedom, the 2023 U.S. Index of Military Strength (which also assesses Chinese military power), and the Atlantic Council’s 2022 Freedom and Prosperity Index.10 The plan was further informed by Heritage analysis of the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022 in Beijing, which cemented General Secretary Xi Jinping’s hold on power for a third term,11 and by prior research conducted by co-editor and Heritage Senior Fellow for China Strategy Michael Pillsbury.12 Finally, this plan is the product of direct contributions from over two dozen reputable experts both inside and outside The Heritage Foundation (listed under “Contributors”) as well as consultations with a wider range of national security professionals and regional experts.

China hopes in the near-term to offset America’s military advantages in the Indo–Pacific and significantly improve the strategic balance (nuclear weapons and delivery systems) between the two countries. The CCP also seeks dominance over what may prove to be the defining commodities of the 21st century: information and technology. It continues to make substantial investments in cutting-edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, while pursuing greater technological self-sufficiency to reduce Washington’s ability to exert leverage in times of crisis, especially over “chokepoint technologies.”13

SR270 Map 2

As general secretary, Xi has further cemented his control over the Communist Party and all organs of the Chinese state, eliminating term limits and purging opposing factions. It is likely that Beijing will increasingly resemble an echo chamber where political expediency and fear of disappointing Xi drive policymaking, resulting in groupthink and raising the potential for miscalculation. Xi’s success in circumventing the informal precedent that limited Chinese party leaders to two terms has also raised longer-term questions about political stability. With no successor in place, Chinese politics could be highly destabilized if Xi were abruptly incapacitated. However, in none of the foreseeable scenarios does the CCP abandon its long-standing goal of supplanting U.S. global leadership.

For now, Xi will continue to dominate the Politburo as the key decisionmaker and position the Communist Party at the center of politics, culture, the economy, and the military. His government will continue to crack down on civil society and deprive Chinese citizens of basic political and religious freedoms. While measures will be taken in the short term to reinvigorate an economy battered by nearly three years of strict pandemic controls, the long-term focus will continue to be on enhancing the party’s control rather than enacting liberal reforms or expanding private enterprise. While this focus is unlikely to lead to large-scale nationalizations or a return to Mao-era communes, these measures will make the Chinese economy progressively less growth-oriented and more hostile for foreign businesses that operate there.

The Chinese leadership also believes that it can drive the pace of “decoupling” from the United States and other Western powers, eventually creating a self-sufficient mercantile market of resources, production, and consumers. In the near term, however, China will need continued access to foreign capital, markets, and expertise, while seeking to establish economic dominance in key strategic sectors.

Like many regimes lacking democratic legitimacy, the CCP seeks international prestige and influence in international organizations. While the United States remains, by far, the largest donor to key international organizations,14 in recent years the CCP has proven adept at co-opting multilateral institutions, populating their leadership with loyalists determined to advance standards and norms that are to China’s advantage.15

In sum, trends to expect from China in the years ahead include:

  • Ever-greater party control over all aspects of domestic politics, culture, and economics.
  • Continued movement away from free-market reforms and decelerating economic growth.
  • Increased efforts to establish dominance over information, data, and cutting-edge dual-use technologies.
  • Ongoing and systemic attempts to steal American commercial secrets and intellectual property at a devastating cost to the American economy.
  • Continued efforts to dominate international organizations and set global standards and laws in opposition to the democratic, free-market norms that undergird the U.S.-led international system.
  • Continued efforts to establish spheres of economic dominance and control in the Indo–Pacific and beyond.
  • Continued use of economic coercion tactics to punish and coerce capitals that fall afoul of Beijing.
  • Continued expansion in qualitative and quantitative terms of China’s conventional and strategic forces.
  • Increased domestic oppression and gross human rights abuses, including the ongoing genocide against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, draconian restrictions on Christians, and mass violations of political and religious freedom in Tibet.
  • Continued efforts to harass and intimidate Chinese citizens and dissidents abroad, including through the establishment of overseas Chinese police stations and programs, such as Operation Fox Hunt.16
  • Increased pressure on Taiwan and other countries embroiled in territorial disputes with the PRC, including India, Japan, and the Philippines.

Some of these developments represent potential vulnerabilities for the regime. Xi’s China is at growing risk of strategic overreach, particularly in an era of structurally declining economic growth17 and substantial demographic challenges resulting from the one-child policy that Beijing adopted between 1980 and 2015.18 China now faces a demographic timebomb with a drastically shrinking working-age population and an expanding cadre of senior citizens while Chinese families refuse to have more children despite the elimination of the one-child policy.19 These trends will confront Beijing with more difficult policy choices in allocating scarce resources while limiting the capital at its disposal to support overseas investments and other foreign policy objectives.

Meanwhile, Xi’s controversial domestic policies have already generated some consternation among Chinese elites and common citizens, as witnessed by the unprecedented protests that seized multiple Chinese cities in November 2022, in part to protest draconian lockdowns under Beijing’s “zero-COVID” policy.20 While such discontent is unlikely to present a real challenge to Xi’s rule, particularly after his further consolidation of power at the 20th Party Congress, China may witness an increase in the flight of Chinese elites and capital from this increasingly repressive environment.

In addition, the increasingly aggressive tenor of Chinese foreign policy has provoked a backlash abroad, alienating free nations and anxious neighbors21 and increasing scrutiny of China’s predatory economic policies.22 The backlash is generating greater criticism of Chinese overseas investments, its military intimidation tactics, espionage activities, and coercive practices. A growing number of foreign capitals are considering greater restrictions on Chinese inbound investments and outbound exports to China of advanced, sensitive, or dual-use technologies.

These developments further exacerbate one of China’s key strategic weaknesses: its relative paucity of allies and strategic partners. At the same time, these weaknesses present America with opportunities to leverage one of its greatest strengths: building coalitions with like-minded partners and allies, from the Philippines to South Korea and Canada to Europe, from the AUKUS initiative involving Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., to the Quad grouping joining Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.

United States: Assessment and Implications

The assessment of the state of the U.S. and the China–U.S. relationship is based on a wide breadth of research and consultations with a broad range of experts. The assessment was informed by the recognition that the United States is a global power with global interests and responsibilities. Any U.S. strategy toward China must consider and respect other vital American interests and the prime imperative to keep the American people free, safe, and prosperous.23 Thus, an effective China plan must adequately safeguard the full spectrum of America’s vital interests.24

This assessment proceeds from the understanding that the economic and military competitions with the PRC are both relevant and intertwined. To be successful, the United States must produce sufficient “guns” (military capacity and capability) and “butter” (economic power) to prevail. The United States currently faces headwinds on both fronts.

The most recent Index of U.S. Military Strength for the first time rated the American Armed Forces as “weak.”25 Part of this score results from insufficient investments in defense by the U.S. government, but also reflects the growing relative power of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

America is an open society and the CCP leverages that openness to its geostrategic advantage. High levels of interdependence between the two economies create strategic vulnerabilities that the CCP has been eager to exploit. While America remains a leading economic power, powered by a U.S. dollar that remains the global reserve currency of choice, decades of irresponsible fiscal policies and reckless government spending have pushed the U.S. national debt past $30 trillion and to 124 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022.26 While more than two-thirds of that debt is held by U.S.-based institutions and actors, China owns just under $1 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds, roughly 15 percent of all foreign-owned debt, although China’s holdings of U.S. Treasury bills have steadily declined since peaking at more than $1.3 trillion in 2013.

More concerning, the CCP has marshalled considerable government resources toward an unprecedented corporate espionage campaign targeting the intellectual property of foreign competitors. While virtually all of China’s major trading partners have been subjected to this campaign, arguably no country has suffered more than the United States, with even conservative estimates suggesting that trillions of dollars have been siphoned out of the U.S. economy as a result of Chinese intellectual property theft over the past few decades.27

The CCP routinely forces U.S. companies seeking access to the Chinese market to share intellectual property with domestic partners.28 Often that intellectual property is transferred to a domestic Chinese alternative only to have the American company squeezed out of the market, either through underhanded administrative tactics or non-market pricing by local competitors.

While selective decoupling has already begun, China remains one of America’s top three trading partners. In 2021, U.S. bilateral goods trade with China reached roughly $650 billion, just below the $660 billion in goods traded with Canada and with Mexico. America’s next-largest trading partner was Japan, at $210 billion in goods trade.29

Chinese exports account for nearly 20 percent of the goods imported by the U.S.,30 the single largest source of imports for the U.S.31 The top three U.S. imports from China are machinery and electrical goods, industrial imports, and consumer goods.32 While China has strong incentives not to interrupt this lucrative trading relationship, which accounts for a significant share of China’s GDP and millions of jobs,33 it confronts the U.S. with potential vulnerabilities on the scale of U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil in the 1970s.

For example, the United States relies on China for a range of mining, electronic, and pharmaceutical products that could cause vulnerability in the event of armed conflict or enforced disruptions in bilateral trade. These dependencies pose risks even outside conflict scenarios, given the disruptions that companies already routinely face in China due to COVID-19 lockdowns,34 workplace safety incidents,35 and environmental inspections,36 injecting uncertainty and unreliability into the supply chain.

On the other hand, China is also dependent on the U.S. economy. Many Chinese goods, for both domestic consumption and export, depend on critical U.S. inputs, such as higher-end microchips or software. For example, American software accounts for more than 94 percent of China’s computer and smart phone operating systems.37 The United States still has the deepest capital markets in the world, and access to those markets reduces financing costs for Chinese firms.

The United States has a far healthier demographic pyramid than China, in part due to higher birth rates and in part due to net gains through immigration. Of late, the latter has become a double-edged sword, as it also reflects a massive spike in illegal immigration, particularly during the Biden presidency as the result of an increasingly chaotic open border. During prior periods of accelerated immigration in the 19th and 20th centuries, the U.S. made a concerted effort at all levels of government to assimilate immigrant communities to American laws, customs, and traditions. When immigration is legal and consistent with these principles, it has made a healthy contribution to U.S. population growth. The United States has always been a more attractive immigration destination than the PRC and will remain so for all people immigrating to the country legally.

The United States is also an energy superpower with abundant natural resources, yet current climate policies prioritize a transition to electric vehicles, and electricity generated by wind and solar power, which is more costly and less efficient. These technologies also make the United States progressively more dependent on Chinese supply chains, with the PRC increasingly dominating “green energy” technologies, manufacturing, and exports. This is an imprudent approach. At current usage rates, the United States’ recoverable petroleum reserves are large enough for two centuries of supply38 and U.S. firms continue to make new discoveries and improve technology to access and use resources more efficiently.39 The increase of natural gas use made a far greater contribution to the reduction in U.S. carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions than the introduction of any green technology. The United States also has the capacity and expertise to safely and cleanly expand the use of nuclear power; it requires only the political will.40

Similarly, there is growing evidence that Beijing is co-opting divisive environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives to undermine U.S. competitiveness and bipartisan will to take decisive action against the CCP’s malicious behavior. Indeed, China has a history of using environmental causes to extract concessions from the U.S. and other Western countries, dangling the prospect of vague, intangible cooperation on climate issues in exchange for the U.S. and others acceding to its geopolitical demands.41 The CCP also uses both official state organs and covert methods to amplify political divisions in the U.S. and spread disinformation about legitimate national security initiatives.42

Finally, while American universities lead the world by a significant margin in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields, China exploits America’s open academic environment and world-class expertise in critical technologies. It has effectively purchased influence with countless universities through gifts and grants, establishing Confucius Institutes and other forms of academic exchange that it can use to access key researchers and labs, in some cases embedding intelligence officers in U.S. institutions as students or researchers. Universities often turn a blind eye to China’s expanding reach on their campuses, afraid of jeopardizing funding.

In summary, key factors to consider are:

  • The United States is progressively losing its once-decisive advantage in the balance of strategic and conventional military forces.
  • China has proven adept at exploiting America’s openness and dynamism to advance its own intertwined industrial policies, military expansion, and geopolitical objectives.
  • Under current forecasts, U.S. economic growth is likely inadequate to prevent China from continuing to narrow the gap between the two countries.
  • The U.S. economy is hamstrung by an increasingly poor regulatory and business environment and unsustainable levels of spending and debt.
  • The United States remains reliant on strategic supply chains that are vulnerable to disruption by China.
  • China is likely to continue to whittle away America’s edge in technology superiority, now producing nearly twice as many STEM doctoral graduates as the U.S. annually.
  • U.S. research and educational institutions are vulnerable to exploitation by the CCP.
  • Counterproductive climate, DEI, and ESG policies are negating some of America’s inherent advantages vis-a-vis China.

Key efforts to shore up American vulnerabilities must include the following. The U.S. must:

  • Better synchronize defense requirements with broader security and economic policies and procurement strategies, especially in resuscitating a capable and robust defense industrial base.
  • Address the growing need to reform regulations, social programs, fiscal and tax policies, and infrastructure regulations restricting U.S. growth.
  • Address the urgent need to pursue more sustainable public spending and debt policies, including entitlement reform.
  • Make necessary reforms to climate policies that are obstructing responsible efforts to develop energy resources.
  • Address inadequate intellectual property protections, infrastructure resilience, and safeguards in U.S. higher education.
  • Seize opportunities to build wider coalitions, including in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo–Pacific to address common economic and security threats posed by China.
  • Work with partners to address malicious CCP actions in international organizations and standard-setting bodies.

The assessment concludes that for the plan to counter China to be effective, it must consider the strengths and weaknesses, advantages and vulnerabilities, of the United States and China, as well as their relationships and networks of allies and partners. Overall, the plan must mitigate the potential of escalating armed conflict through conventional and strategic deterrence in combination with eliminating critical vulnerabilities wrought by economic interdependence.

The plan must protect the U.S. economy from malicious exploitation by China. The United States must pursue energy independence and maintain a decisive edge in critical technology sectors. The United States must resist attempts by China to dominate international organizations that can infringe on U.S. sovereignty or establish global norms and standards that are at odds with U.S. interests. The United States must establish and lead coalitions with like-minded partners to protect the free and open commons, and the U.S. must expand “reshoring,” “nearshoring,” and “friendshoring” to move sensitive manufacturing industries out of China and back to the U.S., to countries in the Western Hemisphere, and to partner or allied nations.


8.Dean Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power: A Blueprint for the U.S. Response to China over the Next Decades,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 221, February 10, 2020, -decades, and Dean Cheng and James Jay Carafano, “Responding to the China Challenge: Blueprint 2.0,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 253, September 29, 2022,

9. Walter Lohman and Justin Rhee, eds., 2021 China Transparency Report (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2021), http://thf_media.s3

10. Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2022), https://; Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2023),; and Dan Negrea and Matthew Kroenig, Do Countries Need Freedom to Achieve Prosperity? Introducing the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2022), .pdf (accessed February 14, 2023).

11. See, for instance, Michael Cunningham, “Xi Jinping’s Power Grab Is a Gift to the United States,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 15, 2022,, and Michael Cunningham and Ilan Hulkower, “Life of the Party: Xi’s New Politburo and China’s Technological ambitions,” The Washington Times, November 30, 2022, /2022/nov/30/life-party-xi-jinpings-new-politburo-and-chinas-te/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

12. See Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon; Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, rev. edition (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998) (accessed March 11, 2023); and Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), /pdfs/ADA421925.pdf (accessed Marcy 13, 2023).

13. For such proclamations by Beijing, see Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, “China’s Leaders Vow Tech ‘Self-Reliance,’ Military Power and Economic Recovery,” The New York Times, October 29, 2020, (accessed February 14, 2023).

14. For the data showing that the United States was the top donor to the U.N. in 2021, see United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, “Revenue by Government Donor,” (accessed December 7, 2022). For American contributions to the International Monetary Fund and its status as the largest shareholder of that organization, see Martin A. Weiss, “The International Monetary Fund,” Congressional Research Service, In Focus, updated March 7, 2022, p. 1, (accessed February 14, 2023).

15. On how China has managed to subvert international organizations to its will, see U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “China’s Manipulation of International Organizations,” November 30, 2020, (accessed February 14, 2023).

16. Sebastian Rotella and Kirsten Berg, “Operation Fox Hunt: How China Exports Repression Using a Network of Spies Hidden in Plain Sight,” ProPublica, July 22, 2021, (accessed February 14, 2023).

17. Mary E. Lovely and Tianlei Huang, “China Has Few Options to Revive Lagging Economic Growth,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 24, 2022, (accessed February 14, 2023).

18. Stella Yifan Xie, Jason Douglas, and Lingling Wei, “China’s Shrinking Population Is Deeper Problem Than Slow Growth for Its Economy,” The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2023, (accessed February 13, 2023).

19. Dexter Tiff Roberts, “Can China’s Communist Party Defuse Its Demographic Time Bomb?” Atlantic Council, December 21, 2021, https://www (accessed February 14, 2023).

20. For protests against the zero-COVID-19 policy hitting multiple Chinese cities in November 2022, see John Ruwitch, “China’s Lockdown Protests and Rising COVID Leave Xi Jinping with ‘2 Bad Options,’” NPR, November 29, 2022, -protests-xi-jinping-zero-covid-policy (accessed February 14, 2023). For a broader timeline of discontent revolving around the zero-COVID-19 policy that precedes November, see “A Timeline of Covid-related Protests in China,” Barron’s, November 28, 2022, /a-timeline-of-covid-related-protests-in-china-01669626906 (accessed February 14, 2023).

21. For how China’s once-positive image has collapsed globally due to its “warrior wolf” diplomacy and its economic coercion of state and non-state actors, see Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Collapsing Global Image: How Beijing’s Unpopularity Is Undermining Its Strategic, Economic, and Diplomatic Goals,” Council on Foreign Relations Discussion Paper, July 2022, _ChinasCollapsingGlobalImage.pdf?_gl=1*1z0q7i5*_ga*MTU2MzA5Mzc3OS4xNjcwNTMxNjcz*_ga_24W5E70YKH*MTY3MDUzMTY3Mi4xLjAuMTY3MDUzMTY4MS4wLjAuMA (accessed February 14, 2023).

22. For examples of Chinese malpractice in trade and denouncements of Chinese practices, see Titli Basu, “Securing Japan from Chinese ‘Predatory Economics,’” The Japan Times, July 20, 2020, -chinese-predatory-economics/ (accessed February 14, 2023); Bonnie S. Glaser, “Time for Collective Pushback against China’s Economic Coercion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 13, 2021, -coercion (accessed February 14, 2023); and “Pompeo Says China Trade Policies ‘Predatory,’” Reuters, July 18, 2018, -usa-trade-pompeo/pompeo-says-china-trade-policies-predatory-idUSKBN1JE2QK (accessed February 14, 2023).

23. James Jay Carafano, “A Conservative’s Guide to Getting Foreign Policy Right,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 6, 2022, https://www.heritage .org/conservatism/commentary/conservatives-guide-getting-foreign-policy-right.

24. Carafano et al., “Foreign Policy: Strategy for a Post-Biden Era,” p. 7.

25. For the weak ranking of the overall state of American military power, see Wood, 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, p. 21. Also see Julia Musto, “US Military Ranked ‘Weak’ for First Time: Heritage Foundation Report,” Fox News, October 19, 2022, -ranked-weak-first-time-heritage-foundation (accessed February 14, 2023).

26. U.S. Department of the Treasury, FiscalData, “What Is the National Debt?” (accessed February 3, 2023).

27. The White House, “National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2018, p. 2, -content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). For estimates of the annual costs of (mainly Chinese) intellectual property theft from the United States, which runs from $225 billion to $600 billion that would amount to trillions of dollars in theft over a period of a decade or more, see The National Bureau of Asian Research, “Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy,” 2017, p. 1, _Commission_Report_Update.pdf (accessed February 14 2023).

28. See Jethro Mullen, “How China Squeezes Tech Secrets from U.S. Companies,” CNN, August 14, 2017, /economy/trump-china-trade-intellectual-property/index.html (accessed February 14, 2023). On reports about the practice of the Chinese state transferring such intellectual property to Chinese companies and/or Chinese state-owned enterprises, see Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, March 22, 2018, pp. 37 and 38, (accessed February 14, 2023).

29. U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Japan,” (accessed February 3, 2023).

30. For overall U.S. imports from China, see Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The People’s Republic of China: U.S.–China Trade Facts,”,was%20 %24285.5%20billion%20in%202020 (accessed December 8, 2022).

31. Trading Economics, “US Imports by Country,” 2021 figures, (accessed December 19, 2022).

32. For top imports from China, see ibid.

33. Chinese goods exports to the United States amount to about 3 percent of Chinese GDP. See Derek Scissors, “US and China 2021 Trade Numbers,” America Enterprise Institute, February 9, 2022, %20the%20macroeconomic%20level%2C%20China‘s,2%20percent%20of%20our%20GD (accessed February 14, 2023). For claims about millions of Chinese jobs being related to their trade to the United States, see Michelle Toh, “Tariffs Could Cost Millions of Chinese Jobs, Boost US Prices,” CNN, August 2, 2019, (accessed February 14, 2023).

34. For the adverse economic impact of the zero-COVID-19 policy, see Min-Hua Chiang, “China Paying a Price for Xi’s Zero-COVID-19 Policy,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 13, 2022,

35. For the high number of workplace safety incidents and the lax culture of inspection and lack of follow up when businesses are cited for violations, see China Labour Bulletin, “Work Safety,” last modified September 2021, (accessed February 14, 2023).

36. “Lockdowns and Inspections Disrupt China’s Plans to Ramp Up Coal,” Bloomberg, March 23, 2022, -03-23/lockdowns-and-inspections-disrupt-china-s-plans-to-ramp-up-coal?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 14, 2023).

37. For the exact distribution of shares from January 2022–January 2023, see GlobalStats Statcounter, “Operating System Market Share China,” https://gs (accessed December 8, 2022).

38. See Rob Wile, “The US Is Sitting on a 200-Year Supply of Oil,” Business Insider, March 19, 2012, -oil-2012-3 (accessed February 14, 2023).

39. Nicolas Loris and Coleman Raush, “How the Shale Revolution Became the MVP of U.S. Energy Production,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 8, 2020,

40. Adrian Cho, “U.S. Department of Energy Rushes to Build Advanced New Nuclear Reactors,” Science, May 20, 2022, /article/us-department-energy-rushes-build-advanced-new-nuclear-reactors (accessed February 14, 2023).

41. On China’s attempt to exchange possible climate-change reforms in exchange for a softening or silencing of American concerns over Chinese human rights violations, see Kenneth C. Brill, “China Needs to Collaborate, Not Seek Political Concessions at Glasgow,” The Hill, October, 26, 2021, https:// (accessed February 14, 2023), and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Advocates Fear US Weighing Climate vs. Human Rights on China,” Associated Press, September 18, 2021, /article/business-religion-china-environment-and-nature-united-states-92243b29f1161b4cd4eb30fd8aa84b35 (accessed February 14, 2023).

42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on April 14, 2022,” April 14, 2022, (accessed February 14, 2023).