The necessity of overhauling European transport infrastructure was laid bare by the European Transport Commissioner’s frank assessment of its state in 2025 as “unfit for war.” It was therefore a positive development that, in 2025, NATO allies agreed—at President Trump’s encouragement—to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Of this, 3.5% should go toward essential military expenses, while 1.5% should be used for infrastructure related to national security.

While defense spending under the traditional 3.5% requirement is clearly understood, the new 1.5% spending target remains nebulous, and without clear definition risks certain NATO members spending on projects with no relevance to national security.

While other NATO members may have good intentions, they often find it challenging to select projects that best meet both their own national interests and those of the alliance. Fortunately, upgrading today’s inadequate transport infrastructure and securing European telecommunications networks provide clear opportunities to channel 1.5% investments toward strengthening collective deterrence in Europe.

>>> Flexible Response 2.0: Rebuilding NATO’s Deterrence Architecture

So how have NATO allies responded so far? One European ally proposed a bridge to nowhere which failed to provide dual-use value for NATO. Other European NATO members pinned their hopes on Brussels’ next multi-annual budget process, further delaying overdue investments. This confused response matters because Europe’s transportation networks currently lack the dual-use infrastructure required for full-scale military operations.

Furthermore, the timeline for action is shrinking. European intelligence officials have warned that Russia is preparing for a war on the continent by 2029 or 2030. Given this timeline, waiting until 2028 to strengthen transportation networks would be a strategic mistake.

The northern Baltic region is particularly vital for ensuring NATO deterrence. One relevant infrastructure project there is Rail Baltica, which will enable troop mobility for 200,000 soldiers between Poland and the Baltic region. Without the project, Baltic forces could be more easily isolated in a future conflict.

Separately, in March, Belgian and Dutch leaders expressed their intentions to build the 3RX Rhein—Ruhr Railway, an echo of the historic Iron Rhine route, connecting Antwerp, Belgium, to Germany’s Ruhr region. Building additional such projects with 1.5% spending would enhance NATO’s defensive posture by connecting key logistical hubs to speed follow-on forces’ access to potential conflict front lines.

In addition, many of Europe’s roads must be reinforced or widened to support military-grade use. Reinforcing Europe’s roads in this manner would require substantial reengineering at a likely cost of €100 billion spread across 500 hotspot projects. As a result, remedying these identified deficiencies is an immediate opportunity to put national government spending to work under the 1.5% target.

NATO allies must also secure Europe’s 5G telecom networks. Between June 2024 and July 2025, EU member states faced nearly 4,900 cyber-attacks, with government administration absorbing a third of these attacks. It is therefore critical that Europe adequately resource digital security.

The core issue is that Europe’s 5G network relies on high-risk suppliers such as those connected to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). High-risk suppliers, such as Chinese telecom companies Huawei and ZTE, operate in 17 European partners’ 5G network infrastructures, and 14 of these countries have no restrictions on Chinese vendors.

Furthermore, Europe risks intelligence breaches as Chinese companies must surrender internal data to the PRC under China’s National Security Law. Huawei’s concerning access to the calls of some 6.5 million Dutch citizens reported in 2021 only confirms the need for 5G security in Europe and raises the question of where else Huawei might be conducting similar actions.

>>> NATO’s 1.5 Percent Infrastructure Target

One study estimated it will cost around €3.5 billion to replace these risky suppliers, but the investment is well worth it. With only around €1.5 billion to digital security so far, and given the demonstrable threat, NATO countries should fill the remaining €2 billion gap to secure these shortfalls.

Beyond supplier risk, NATO members should appropriate 1.5% of funds towards implementing zero-trust architecture for 5G security. Currently, 5G networks in Europe are shifting to an Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) transition which increases their flexibility by embracing modular configurations. To mitigate the expanded attack surface risk of modular systems, European NATO nations should invest in zero-trust architecture alongside the O-RAN transition.

Today, European dual-use infrastructure projects remain stalled because of limited political will in the face of loosely defined targets. Yet given Russia’s projected military capabilities by 2030 that could fuel aggression against the Baltic states and adversarial access by the Chinese government, NATO members must act now by investing in projects like Rail Baltica, securing Europe’s 5G networks by replacing high-risk suppliers, and implementing zero-trust architecture.

If directed toward these priorities, spending NATO’s 1.5% target funds could be the difference between a vulnerable and a defensible Europe.