Operational control and maritime domain awareness in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, the stretch of sea between these countries, remains critical to NATO’s ability to maintain freedom of action in the Atlantic, as it faces a resurgent Russia. Key European allies with national security interests in the region must make targeted investments to strengthen their position and secure NATO’s warfighting capacity in the GIUK Gap.
Russia, like China, has already made its ambitions in the Arctic known. They are also well aware of the region’s strategic importance.
The Russian Northern Fleet enjoys year-round, ice-free access to the Atlantic through the GIUK Gap from Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula. Moscow is building and upgrading bases on remote Arctic lands, including Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya, deploying air defenses, and conducting regular naval exercises to normalize operations in the High North and Arctic.
Notably, Russia supports this posture with a large fleet of icebreakers capable of operating in the Arctic. Meanwhile, NATO operates only a handful, giving the alliance an extremely limited capability in ice-covered waters even as the United States turns to the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland to jump-start icebreaker fleet renewal.
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Moreover, Russian Yasen– and Borei-class submarines are designed to slip past traditional detection and are armed with advanced cruise and hypersonic missiles to endanger NATO assets. As Europe gradually comes to terms with the obligations of deterrence, Russia is already fielding the necessary tools and platforms to contest the alliance.
Though NATO has not been ignorant of the threat, its efforts are fragmented and underpowered. Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) regularly patrols the GIUK Gap and High North, with the recent rotation led by Denmark, followed by the Netherlands. Exercises like “Dynamic Mongoose” and “Northern Viking” test anti-submarine warfare capabilities among surface ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters.
Recent Royal Air Force P-8 Poseidon deployments to Iceland have heightened the strategic value of forward operating locations for antisubmarine operations. Yet these measures fall short of a coherent, theater-wide plan to harden the barrier against Russia’s increasingly capable undersea fleet.
The path forward rests on a group of frontline allies: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. A German presence would also be critical. All are investing in new vessels and aircraft suited for North Atlantic operations, but require fine-tuning and acceleration.
The UK has begun reinforcing an “Atlantic Bastion” with new contracts for acoustic sensors and autonomous vehicles, while RAF P-8 Poseidons routinely patrol the Gap and Norwegian Sea. Denmark and Norway are modernizing their surface fleets, procuring Arctic-capable vessels, and committing assets to SNMG1 rotations. And the Netherlands, while procuring an Arctic-capable surface vessel, lacks any capable maritime patrol aircraft, which is essential for a future high-end conflict in the region.
Germany, too, has become critical to efforts in North Atlantic security, aiming to become a regular participant in GIUK Gap patrols.
Berlin has received and begun fielding its new fleet of P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to bolster NATO’s undersea surveillance, with the intention of operating alongside British, Norwegian, and American P-8s. In parallel, Germany and Iceland signed a defense cooperation agreement in October 2025, allowing German frigates, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft to operate out of Icelandic ports and Keflavik Air Base. This establishes a forward presence that strengthens NATO’s early-warning posture and ensures more persistent patrols of the North Atlantic.
Given its strategic location, Keflavik Air Base in Iceland must be the epicenter of this renewed effort. During the Cold War, Keflavik was NATO’s anchor to monitor Soviet submarines transiting the GIUK Gap. Today, it must renew this role with frequent P-8 Poseidon and other maritime patrol aircraft rotations, providing uninterrupted surveillance of Russian submarines from the Barents Sea into the greater Atlantic.
Pairing air patrols with regular SNMG1 deployments at sea would form a layered detection network, forcing Russian vessels to operate under constant pressure and reducing the risk of their movements into the Atlantic going unnoticed.
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Such a posture will not be cheap, but it is far less costly than granting our adversaries free access to the transatlantic and Arctic connections. Arctic NATO members have already surpassed the prior 2 percent of GDP defense-spending benchmark, moving towards a 3.5 percent core defense, with an additional 1.5 percent for defense-related spending. For these countries, 5 percent should be viewed as a floor, not a ceiling.
Credibly defending both the GIUK Gap and the broader Arctic theater must remain a priority for NATO. This means more investments in antisubmarine warfare platforms, seabed sensors, ice-capable patrol vessels, icebreakers, and dual-use infrastructure from Greenland to Norway.
The danger is not that Europe lacks capability, but that it continues to disperse its capabilities across too many missions and regions.
After the Cold War, European navies prioritized low-end expeditionary tasks and peace support operations over blue-water warfighting. Hull numbers decreased, antisubmarine skills degraded, and critical infrastructure was neglected. Reversing this trend demands leaders willing to acknowledge what force planners already know: if Europe loses the GIUK Gap, it will lose controlled access to the Atlantic, and with it, the confidence that American reinforcements could cross in a crisis.
European leaders still have time to act. By concentrating new investments on anti-submarine warfare, revitalizing Keflavik as a permanent hub, and committing more capable ships and aircraft to a standing North Atlantic posture, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Germany can, with targeted U.S. assistance, make the North Atlantic safe for NATO.
This piece originally appeared in The National Interest
