The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (PRC) announced on March 4, 2007, that it would increase the country's military budget by 17.8 percent in 2007 to a total of $45 billion-by far the largest acknowledged amount that China has ever spent on its military.1 The Chinese government went out of its way to reassure the world that this spending hike was normal and need not worry anyone. "China is committed to taking a path of peaceful development and it pursues a defensive military posture," a spokesman said.2
As the Chinese aphorism goes, "listen to what they say, but observe what they do," and what Beijing is saying is quite different from what it is doing.
The resources that Beijing devotes to its armed forces put China in the top stratum of global military powers. With China's 2006 gross domestic product (GDP) in excess of $2.5 trillion (about $10 trillion in purchasing power parity terms) and its military spending estimated by the Central Intelligence Agency at 4.3 percent of GDP,3 China's military spending is more accurately pegged at about $430 billion than at $45 billion.
While China's declared military budget primarily includes personnel costs (and a 17.8 percent military pay hike is reasonable), the declared budget is only a small part of overall Chinese military spending. The exact methodology that U.S. intelligence agencies use to estimate the military's share of China's GDP is classified, but it reportedly accounts foreign arms purchases, subsidies to military industries, China's space program (which is under the absolute command of the Central Military Commission), the 660,000-man People's Armed Police, provincial militias, and reserve forces-all of which are excluded from official military budget figures.4
Defense spending in some sectors that are not counted in the defense budget appears to be increasing at a much faster rate than the official military budget. For example, China's National Defense in 2006 (China's 2006 Defense White Paper) noted that:
In 2005, the output value, added value and gross revenue of the entire spectrum of defense-related science, technology and industry increased by 24.3 percent, 20.7 percent and 21.6 percent, respectively, over the previous year.
The Chinese military budget does not include the bulk of the defense-related science, technology, and industry sectors or overseas military procurement or provincial spending on militias and reserves.
Despite the Chinese Communist Party leadership's espousal of China's "peaceful rise," the facts tell a different story. The unprecedented peacetime expansion of China's military capabilities can no longer be viewed as though some benign force animates it. China's military expansion is already sufficiently transparent that one can discern Beijing's intention to challenge the United States in the Western Pacific and establish itself as the predominant military power in the region-in the name of anti-hegemony and to promote a "multipolar international system."
China's Rise as a Military Power
Chinese leaders are not seized by self-doubt about the direction of their regime. The declared strategy of the Chinese leadership has been to turn its economic growth into military power by means of the "four modernizations" (agricultural, industrial, science and technology, and military) and the "prosperous nation, strong military" (fu guo, qiang bing) model.
Ironically, after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union-China's only existential threat-China increased military spending, while the United States and virtually all of its allies immediately set about reaping a "peace dividend," with U.S. defense expenditures dropping over 10 percent from $298 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1992 to $268 billion in FY 1997. During the same period, Chinese defense spending sustained annual double-digit increases. This pace of Chinese military spending increases has continued to this day. The Pentagon estimates total Chinese defense-related expenditures in 2005 at between $70 billion and $105 billion, which places China third in nominal dollar defense spending after the United States and Russia.
American intelligence analysts in both Republican and Democratic Administrations have been surprised in recent years at the breathtaking pace and scope of China's military development. A 2006 Department of Defense report on China's military power notes that the transformation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has included new doctrines, reform of military institutions and systems, improved exercise and training standards, and the acquisition of new foreign and domestic weapons systems. China's military expansion has already altered regional military balances. The long-term trends in China's military have the potential to pose credible threats to modern militaries.
Nuclear Forces. The most ominous of China's military advances has been in the PLA's strategic rocket forces, the 2nd Artillery, which includes nuclear and conventional ballistic missile commands and anti-satellite units. In the mid-1990s, the 2nd Artillery embarked on a modernization program designed to improve the reliability, survivability, response times, and accuracy of its ballistic missiles to state-of-the-art standards. Since 1996, it has more than doubled-and in some years has tripled-the annual production of solid-fuel short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
China has also deployed at least 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted at the United States. The road-mobile DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) has been operational since 1996, and the 2nd Artillery is now introducing road-mobile ICBMs, including the DF-31. The DF-31A, which has a range of 10,000 kilometers, is expected to become operational by 2008. Given the known rapid growth in SRBM production, production of MRBMs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and ICBMs has likely increased at the same rate. Thus, by 2006, DF-31 output could easily have reached 10-20 new missiles per year.
China's current Xia-class ballistic missile submarine is already loaded with Julang-1 (JL-1) solid-fuel missiles, and a longer-range JL variant submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 8,000 km will be deployed on China's new Jin-class (Type-094) nuclear ballistic missile submarine in three years.
In addition, the PLA will have "several new conventional and nuclear variants of MRBMs and IRBMs for regional contingencies and to augment its long-range missile forces."
Logically, the strategic aim of this rapid expansion of China's nuclear force, particularly the deployment of DF-31s and DF-31As and a durable submarine-based nuclear capability, is to reduce China's nuclear vulnerability substantially and develop a robust nuclear deterrent focused on the United States.
While Beijing purports to have a nuclear "no first use" (NFU) policy, some U.S. experts believe that the Chinese leadership reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against Taiwan or Taiwan's defenders. The unmistakable implication is that U.S. forces defending Taiwan would be targets. This position was explicated on the record by a senior Chinese strategist in 2005. There are indications that the PLA is contemplating the use of a high-altitude nuclear detonation to generate a powerful electromagnetic pulse that would fry microcircuitry in U.S. weapons systems during a conflict. Rather than trying to reduce instability in such a strategic environment, internal PLA military writings treat NFU as a constraint on nuclear operations and reflect considerable resistance to NFU in the PLA.
Hence, China's NFU declaration appears to be intended primarily for propaganda advantage and possibly to encourage complaisance in American decision-making. At least one study shows that Chinese nuclear doctrine seems to make little distinction between conventional ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles with respect to how they are deployed and used.
Another serious facet of China's nuclear doctrine is that the Central Military Commission deploys nuclear and conventional warheads on the same classes of ballistic missiles and co-locates them near each other in 2nd Artillery units. This doctrine is apparently designed to shorten the escalation fuse in an effort to further complicate U.S. and Japanese responses during a crisis.
Moreover, this modernized and sophisticated nuclear force is clearly well in excess of any mere Taiwan contingency. It involves new power projection capabilities that give Beijing two advantages: "area denial" strength, which is achieved by placing forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, and Guam at risk, and coercive diplomacy instruments to resolve other territorial disputes, such as in the East China Sea with Japan and the South China Sea with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Indeed, China's new nuclear weapons systems present grave implications for U.S. power projection in the Western Pacific, the security of U.S. allies and friends in democratic Asia, and regional military balances in general.
Nuclear Proliferation. The United States also needs to pay far more attention to China's tacit direct and indirect support for nuclear weapons programs in Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Strategic planners in Washington need to consider whether or not China calculates that a nuclear strike launched by Iran on the United States or by North Korea on the United States or Japan might actually be in China's ultimate interests. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States weakened the United States, distracted U.S. policymakers from Asia, and diverted foreign investment flows from the U.S. to China for several years thereafter. A scenario in which Iran or North Korea inflicts major damage on the United States or its allies with a nuclear device could be an underlying motivation for China to give rogue states diplomatic support against U.S. and European pressures to abandon their nuclear programs.
As China refines its missile guidance capabilities, forward-deployed U.S. forces in the Western Pacific will become vulnerable to Chinese missiles. For example, U.S. carrier battle groups could face theater ballistic missiles with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving ships at sea. The hyperspeeds of these MaRVs make them virtually impossible to defeat with current missile defense technology.
Chinese advances in land attack cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles will also place U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, and Guam within their range.
Anti-Satellite Weapons.Given the American military's highly advertised reliance on space systems, an equally unsettling development is the 2nd Artillery's experimentation with various anti-satellite (ASAT) systems-capabilities that are targeted exclusively at U.S. space assets. On January 12, 2007 (Beijing time), a Chinese DF-21 missile lifted a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) into an intercept track for a Chinese weather satellite in polar orbit. The missile warhead then fired the KKV at the satellite (perhaps guided by ground-based targeting laser) and successfully destroyed it. U.S. space trackers have monitored but did not publicize at least two previous ASAT tests in July 2005 and February 2006. In the February test, the KKV was maneuvered into close range of the target satellite but suddenly veered away.
Given the grievous risks to low-orbit satellites presented by a debris cloud from the January test, why the U.S. did not confront the Chinese following the earlier tests is a mystery. No doubt some Administration officials did not want to antagonize China's space efforts.
In April 2006, shortly before Chinese President Hu Jintao's official visit to Washington, China's Deputy Space Agency Administrator Luo Ge evidently found a receptive audience in the White House for his proposals for joint U.S.-China space cooperation. Mr. Luo requested that the U.S. agree to Chinese participation in the International Space Station (ISS), including making modifications on the orbiting station that would allow Chinese spacecraft to dock, and President Hu and President George W. Bush did discuss Chinese participation in the ISS and cooperation on a future lunar landing effort- an initiative that might explain some of the U.S. hesitation. Some observers speculate that U.S. officials were holding out the prospect of space cooperation to persuade China to accept space launch rules of the road. In fact, China's People's Daily touted U.S. interest in manned lunar mission cooperation with China, an obvious propaganda ploy, but the PLA rejected Washington's rules-of-the-road initiatives.
Some enthusiastic support for U.S.-China space cooperation persisted in the White House until August 2006, when the PLA attempted to blind (or illuminate) a U.S. reconnaissance satellite, but that support was resisted by the Pentagon and NASA and by Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph. By the end of September, NASA Administrator Michael D. Griffin was expressing deep frustration that the PLA had blocked any reciprocal access to Chinese space launch facilities or engineering centers. Without transparency in China's programs, especially given China's refusal to coordinate launch information and space debris data, cooperation remained impossible. While senior U.S. military commanders debated on China's ASAT intentions even into October 2006, all but the most ardent apologists admitted that China simply was not prepared for serious international cooperation in space.
The Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party approved a September 28, 2006, commentary in Beijing's Huanqiu Shibao that declared: "The United States' exaggeration of China's counter-satellite technology is only an attempt to seek an excuse to justify its development of space weapons." In retrospect, however, whatever the United States was doing regarding China's counter-satellite technology, it was not exaggerating it. The January 12, 2007, ASAT test irrefutably confirmed that China was interested solely in scoring propaganda points and not in space cooperation, as China did not seem to feel any obligation to give international notification that it intended to fill a polar orbit 530 miles up with thousands of particles of space debris, each with the potential to damage or destroy space craft orbiting at or below that altitude.
The following week, the State Department filed a démarche with the Chinese government protesting the ASAT test but received no response. A week later, the Pentagon briefed journalists on the test. It was the first time the Department of Defense had reported on China's KKV-ASAT program, although the Defense Department had described other Chinese ASAT efforts in its annual China military power reports. Subsequently, the Chinese foreign ministry, while not publicly admitting that an ASAT weapon test had taken place, dryly observed that Beijing has shown a "responsible attitude" by offering "explanations" to the U.S. and Japan and insisted that Beijing has all along "upheld the peaceful use of outer space." "China opposes the weaponization of space and any arms race," the foreign ministry added, pledging reassuringly that "The test is not targeted at any country and will not threaten any country." Judging from the clueless reaction of China's foreign ministry to the angry démarches and complaints from several nations with space programs, few outside the PLA chain of command or the Communist Party Politburo were informed of the tests ahead of time or were briefed afterward.
This does not mean that Beijing's foreign ministry does not have a vital role in China's ASAT program. Chinese diplomats have the important mission of getting the United States to adhere to a Chinese draft statement, "Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space" (PAROS), that Beijing has circulated in the United Nations. Although U.S. negotiators have tried to engage Chinese counterparts on Beijing's thoughts on verification of a PAROS regime, the Chinese have uniformly insisted that they will consider verification issues only after the U.S. has first signed a PAROS agreement. However, this point seems lost on most of America's allies. China and Russia managed to isolate the United States 160-1 on the PAROS statement in the last meeting of the U.N. First Committee. Israel abstained, while Japan, Britain, and Australia voted for it. The United States needs to be wary of the disastrous potential for Beijing's public relations campaign on the PAROS statement to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies.
In this, the Chinese have learned much from Soviet arms control negotiators, who realized by the 1980s that they did not have to rely on verification when dealing with the United States. Once the U.S. signed an arms control agreement, it was self-enforced by America's democratic processes. Moreover, as evidenced by the Soviets' construction of the Krasnoyarsk anti-ballistic missile (ABM) battle-management radar in direct contravention of the ABM Treaty, the Soviets could openly cheat, deny inspections, and confound verification without fear that the U.S. would abrogate the treaty. China appears similarly intent on violating any PAROS agreement by forming covert ASAT units in the 2nd Artillery.
Since the January 12 test, U.S. media reports from the Pentagon have reflected alarm among U.S. space strategists over several other Chinese space weapon initiatives including ground-based lasers and radio frequency weapons. They are particularly concerned about the launching of small Chinese satellites into orbits very close to key U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications spacecraft. Such parasitic microsatellites are presumed to be time bombs that could blind and cripple American military operations and financial communications. "These things aren't being sent up there to be space rocks," one military source said. All these programs bespeak an anti-satellite development program that is very broad and sophisticated.
While official U.S. government speculation that China's political leaders may not have known of the ASAT tests is not credible, it is certainly PLA practice to withhold information from civilian departments. The PLA's refusal to inform health authorities about the 2003 SARS epidemic in military hospitals across China is a clear example of this. It is possible that the PLA believed that the January 12 ASAT test would go unnoticed, although for 18 months before the test the Pentagon had extended a standing invitation to China's 2nd Artillery commanders to visit U.S. Strategic Command to discuss the dangers of space debris and how the U.S. tracks it. Few doubt that the PLA is fully aware of U.S. Strategic Command's and Air Force Space Command's space tracking capabilities and fully appreciates that the U.S. would detect the debris cloud immediately after a successful ASAT test. While low-level officials in China's foreign ministry have admitted that they knew nothing of the ASAT tests, most observers agree that the civilian party and government leaders, at least at the Politburo level, are extensively briefed on important military advances.
Naval Forces. China is now the world's largest commercial shipbuilder, and its naval ship production has slipstreamed behind the civilian sector. President Hu's speech to the PLA Navy on December 27, 2006, indicated clearly-if not explicitly- that China is preparing to confront the United States at sea and under the sea. China's navy is also upgrading its naval aviation and power projection capacities. China's naval modernization, Hu reported, "has made great strides, comprehensive combat capabilities have strengthened visibly, and we have achieved new heights and made new contributions to the various missions which the Party and the people have bestowed."
A few days later, China's Defense White Paper declared: "The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks." China has already assembled a modern submarine fleet of 29 advanced diesel-electric submarines, including 12 super-quiet Russian-made Kilo-class subs and 14 Chinese-made Song-class and Yuan-class boats. At least 10 more conventional and nuclear submarines are under construction in Chinese shipyards, with another five new nuclear ballistic missile and attack subs on the drawing boards.
 Edward Cody,
"China Boosts Military Spending: Senior U.S. Official Presses
Beijing to Clarify 'Plans and Intentions,'" The Washington
Post, March 5, 2007, p. A12, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/04/
AR2007030400401.html (April 23, 2007). This was certainly the biggest increase in yuan terms. China has announced the following annual percentage increases: 1.5 percent in 1987; 2.6 percent in 1988; 12.6 percent in 1989; 15.4 percent in 1990; 12.0 percent in 1991; 12.0 percent in 1992; 12.5 percent in 1993; 20.3 percent in 1994 (the yuan was devalued from Y6.10 to the dollar down to Y8.28 to the dollar); 14.6 percent in 1995; 11.3 percent in 1996; 12.7 percent in 1997; 12.8 percent in 1998; 12.7 percent in 1999; 12.7 percent in 2000; 18 percent in 2001; 17.7 percent in 2002; 9.6 percent in 2003; 11.6 percent in 2004; 12.6 in 2005; 14.7 percent in 2006; and 17.8 percent in 2007. China also increased military spending by 20 percent in 1979 to pay for its February incursion into Vietnam. Data compiled by June Teufel Dreyer, Ph.D., University of Miami.
 Jim Yardley and David Lague, "Beijing Accelerates Its Military Spending," The New York Times,March 5, 2007, p. A8, at www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/world/asia/05military.html (April 23, 2007).
 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007 (Washington, D.C., 2007), s.v. "China," at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (April 23, 2007). The latest World Bank figures for China's GDP indicate a purchasing power parity (PPP) of $7.634 trillion in 2004, while using a nominal exchange rate yields a GDP of $1.938 trillion, producing a PPP ratio of 3.94. However, according to the Penn World Table, China's PPP ratio was 2.14 in 2004. World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, 2006), Table 1.1, at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Table1_1.htm (May 15, 2007), and University of Pennsylvania, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices, Penn World Table, s.v. "China," at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php (May 15, 2007).
 Mark Magnier, "China Announces Military Budget Hike," The Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2007, p. A1, at www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-china5mar05,1,5200670.story (April 23, 2007). Other studies indicate that provincial reserves and militias absorbed the bulk of the 200,000 troops, which the 2006 Defense White Paper says were demobilized between 2003 and 2005. In addition, the military seems to have generated large amounts of income from land rentals and sales in major cities. Dennis Blasko, "PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway in All Military Regions, Preparing for a Variety of Missions," presented at the 2006 PLA Conference at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., October 6-8, 2006, pp. 11-12.
 Chinese State
Council, Information Office, China's National Defense in
2006, December 2006, in China Daily, December 29, 2006,
_771191.htm (May 3, 2007). See especially chap. VIII.
 Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), pp. 49-51, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/hist.pdf (March 27, 2007). The U.S. State Department lists China's annual military expenditures as second only to those of the United States. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1999-2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 38, at www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rpt/wmeat/1999_2000 (April 23, 2007).
 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," May 23, 2006, at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf (April 23, 2007).
 Kurt Campbell,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, noted: "You look back
on those studies, and it's only been a decade, China has exceeded
in every area military modernization that even the far-off
estimates of the mid-1990s predicted." Mike Shuster, "Growing
Chinese Military Strength Stirs Debate," Morning Edition,
National Public Radio, October 17, 2005, at www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4961290
(April 23, 2007). Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman
noted that "we are caught by surprise by the appearance of new
systems that suddenly appear fully developed." Peter Rodman, in
hearing, China's Military Modernization and U.S. Export
Controls, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
U.S. Congress, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 16-17, 2006, p. 32, at
7/March_16-17_FINAL.pdf (April 23, 2007).
 The Pentagon already assesses that the "pace and scope of China's military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk." U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 29, at www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (April 23, 2007).
 SRBMs were deployed against Taiwan at a pace of 50 per year between 1996 and 2002. Bill Gertz, "Missiles Bolstered Opposite Taiwan," The Washington Times, April 29, 2002, p. A12. By the end of 2006, new SRBM deployments had reached a rate of at least 100 per year. The Pentagon estimates that deployments of M-9 and M-11 missiles increased from 500 to 690 in the Taiwan Strait theater between 2003 and 2004. U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," p. 3.
 Wendell Minnick, "China Speeds ICBM Plans to Debut Missiles with Longer Reach in 2007," DefenseNews, July 10, 2006, p. 1, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1934631 (April 23, 2007; subscription required).
 For a comprehensive look at China's missile industry, see Evan S. Mede iros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon, A New Direction for China's Defense Industry, RAND Corporation, 2005, pp. 51-108, at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG334.pdf (April 11, 2006).
 U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006,"p. 27.
 "The Chinese
delegate to the U.N. disarmament talks has asserted that since
Taiwan is Chinese territory the Chinese no-first-use pledge does
not apply." Michael Nacht and Tom Woodrow, "Nuclear Issues,"
Session 6, in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds.,
Strategic Trends in China (Washington, D.C., National
Defense University Press, 1998), at www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201998/
chinasess6.html (April 23, 2007).
 On July 14, 2005, at a briefing of foreign journalists, Major General Zhu Chenghu, dean of foreign students at the PLA National Defense University, said that "if the Americans are determined to interfere [then] we will be determined to respond" and that "we Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all of the cities east of Xi'an. Of course the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds…of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese." Danny Gittings, "General Zhu Goes Ballistic," The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2005, p. A13.
 See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2005," July 2005, p. 40, at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf (April 26, 2007). The PLA's eagerness to understand the vulnerabilities of U.S. military radiation-hardened microcircuits is evident from the case of a Chinese scholar who illegally shipped a number of such microchips to a Chinese military research institute in 2001. Spencer S. Hsu, "Scholar Says U.S. Unharmed: Gao Defends Human Rights Efforts, Appeals for Sympathy," The Washington Post, November 28, 2003, p. A6.
 For example, see U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," p. 28. Larry Wortzel notes a significant but subtle difference in terminology in the 2006 Defense White Paper: "The 'White Paper' declares 'China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances.' However, the next sentence of the 'White Paper' tells the reader 'it unconditionally undertakes a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.'" Dr. Wortzel notes that "a 'firm commitment to policy' is not as strong a position as an 'unconditional' pledge." Larry M. Wortzel, China's Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007).
 Wortzel describes a conventional missile target set that is identical to a nuclear target set. Ibid.
 John D. Negroponte, "Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 11, 2007, p. 10, at /static/reportimages/79156DF3619AAB2776005B4D64D90132.pdf (April 26, 2007).
 Ronald O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated February 7, 2007, pp. 5-6, at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (April 26, 2007).
 Craig Covault, "Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon," Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 22, 2007.
 Private conversations with U.S. analysts.
 The New York Times reports that the Bush Administration pondered how to respond, but that the suggestion that Washington ask Beijing "to forgo the test had been broached by some Pentagon officials" but "was rejected for several reasons," including that "China was unlikely to cancel the test and that there were few good options to punish China if they ignored an American warning." Additionally, "American intelligence agencies were loath to let the Chinese know they were aware of the state of their preparations." Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, "U.S. Knew of China's Missile Test, But Kept Silent," The New York Times, April 23, 2007, p. 1.
 See John J. Tkacik, Jr., "To the Moon," The Asian Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2006, p. 18, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114712364365647008.html (April 26, 2007; subscription required).
 These conclusions are based on private correspondence with U.S. experts on China's space programs. On May 1, 2006, the Chinese press reported that "US space experts believe that China will launch spacecraft to the Moon in 2017" and that "the United States will send astronauts to the Moon in 2018" so "the two countries have a 'coincident' landing time." "China, US to Join Hands in Lunar Probing?" People's Daily Online, May 1, 2006, at http://english.people.com.cn/200605/01/eng20060501_262542.html (April 26, 2007). China wants the world to believe the next manned lunar mission will be a joint China-U.S. program.
Pasztor, "U.S. Asserts a Military Option Is Needed to Guard Space
Assets," The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2006, p. A6,
(April 26, 2007; subscription required), and Marc Kaufman, "Talk of
Satellite Defense Raises Fears of Space War; U.S. Says Attacks on
Crucial Systems Are Possible, Warns It Would Respond Forcefully,"
The Washington Post, December 17, 2006, p. A12, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
12/16/AR2006121600791.html (April 26, 2007).
 Warren E. Leary, "NASA Chief, on First China Trip, Says Joint Spaceflight Is Unlikely," The New York Times, September 28, 2006, p. A7, at www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/science/space/28nasa.html (April 27, 2007).
 See Vago Muradian, "China Tried to Blind U.S. Sats with Laser," DefenseNews, September 26, 2006, p. 1, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2125489Americas (April 27, 2007), and Elaine M. Grossman, "Top Commander: Chinese Interference with U.S. Satellites Uncertain," Inside the Pentagon, October 12, 2006, p. 1.
Mingqi, "Duifu Weixing Youjizhao (xiangxi baodao)" (A few ways to
counter satellites (detailed report)), Huanqiu Ribao,
September 28, 2006, p. 8, at http://paper.people.com.cn/hqsb/html/2006-09/28/
content_11461231.htm (April 27, 2007).
 William J. Broad, "Orbiting Junk, Once a Nuisance, Is Now a Threat," The New York Times, February 6, 2007, p. D1.
 For example, see U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," p. 35.
"explanations" the Chinese may have given to American interlocutors
were apparently lost in translation. Marine General Peter Pace,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that during his March
2007 visit to Beijing, he received no explanation: "I don't know
what their policy is…. So I am still, as are others,
confused about what their intent is." Peter Spiegel,"Review Ordered
into Vulnerability of U.S. Satellites," Los Angeles Times,
April 22, 2007, at www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/washingtondc/
la-na-satellite22apr22,1,3289845.story (May 7, 2007).
 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press conference, January 23, 2007, at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t291388.htm (April 27, 2007).
 James Mulvenon, "Rogue Warriors? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test," Hoover Institution China Leadership Monitor No. 20, Winter 2007, at /static/reportimages/5387C29B76CB462D631AA51C89D8CCAC.pdf (April 27, 2007).
 For a comprehensive review of the problems inherent in PAROS negotiations with China, see The Honorable Jon Kyl, "China's Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 990, February 1, 2007, at www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/8378FF766E48885FAFF2C1F44B29528A.pdf.
 Press release, "Disarmament Committee Approves Text Reaffirming Urgency of Preventing Outer Space Arms Race, Need for Reinforcing Existing Legal Regime," GA/DIS/3334, U.N. General Assembly, October 25, 2006, at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gadis3334.doc.htm (April 27, 2007).
 Michael P.
Pillsbury, "An Assessment of China's Anti-Satellite and Space
Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines," U.S.- China Economic and
Security Review Commission, January 19, 2007, pp. 21-47, at www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2007/FINAL_REPORT_1-19-2007_
REVISED_BY_MPP.pdf (April 27, 2007).
 For example,
see Reuters, "Satellite Surprise Highlights U.S.-China
Gap-Official," DefenseNews, February 1, 2007, at
www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2525587 (April 27, 2007),
and Bill Gertz, "Officials Fear War in Space by China," The
Washington Times, January 24, 2007, at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20070124-121536
-8225r_page2.htm (April 27, 2007). For descriptions of Chinese ASAT programs, see U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," pp. 34-35.
 Vago Muradian, "China's Mystery Satellites; U.S. Gauges Beijing's ASAT Strategy," DefenseNews, February 5, 2007, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2528099 (April 27, 2007).
 General James E. Cartwright told a Senate panel on March 28, 2007, that "they [the Chinese] have-they have undertaken a what we would call a very disciplined and comprehensive continuum of capability against space-our space capabilities, okay-all the way from temporary and reversible effects that could be-examples would be GPS jamming, things like that, COM jamming, all the way through direct ascent ASAT. And eventually, they'll probably be looking at co-orbital. And then, the one that you really worry about is introducing weapons of mass destruction into space on a missile." General James E. Cartwright, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 28, 2007.
 David E. Sanger and Joseph Kahn, "U.S. Officials Try to Interpret China's Silence over Satellite," The New York Times, January 22, 2007, p. A3.
 See Richard
Lawless, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, February 1, 2007, at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/written_
statement.pdf (April 27, 2007).
 Mulvenon speculates that the ASAT program was approved by the civilian leadership, but "the civilians should be faulted for not maintaining closer oversight of the program and not calculating the possible negative international diplomatic repercussions of a successful test." Mulvenon, "Rogue Warriors?" pp. 2-3.
 See "China
Tops Korea Again for New Ship Orders," Chosun Ilbo, March
20, 2007, at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200703/20070
3200009.html (April 27, 2007). During the first two months of 2007, Chinese shipyards accounted for almost half of the total tonnage of all new ship orders worldwide, up 48 percent from 2006 levels and outpacing South Korea as the world's top vendor.
 Cao Zhi and
Chen Wanjun, "Hu Jintao zai huijian Haijun di shice dangdaihui
daibiao shi qiangdiao; anzhao geminghua, xiandaihua, zhengguihua
xiangtongyide yuanze; duanzao shiying wojun lishi shi ming yaoqiude
qiangda renmin haijun; Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Xu Caihou canjia
huijian" (Meeting Navy representatives at the 10th party congress,
Hu Jintao stresses that integrating principles of
revolutionization, modernization, and regularization to forge a
strong People's Navy fulfills the requirements of our historic
mission. Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan and Xu Caihou present),
Renmin Ribao, December 28, 2006, p. 1, at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2006-12/28/
content_12168965.htm (April 27, 2007).
 Chinese State Council, China's National Defense in 2006, chap. II.
 China seems to have at least 10 Kilo-class submarines now: four Kilo 877s, six Kilo 636s, and two additional Kilo 636s that are no longer in Russian shipyards but are not yet necessarily deployed by the PLAN.
 Bill Gertz,
"Commercial Photos Show Chinese Nuke Buildup," The Washington
Times, February 16, 2006, at www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060216-
020211-7960r.htm (April 27, 2007).
 Audra Ang,
"Admiral Downplays China Sub Incident," The Washington Post,
November 17, 2006, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/17/
AR2006111701469.html (April 27, 2007). Private conversations with U.S. analysts indicate that the submarine was spotted accidentally by an F-18.
 "Gencong Xiaoying, Ding Yiping zuozhen zhihui; Haijun zhongda xingdong zhihuiguan zhiyi 2003 nian yin qianting shigu bei jiangzhi; jinnian 8 yue beige jinsheng fusilingyuan; yuji sannian hou geng shang cenglou" (Shadowing the Kitty Hawk, Ding Yiping in personal command; one of commanders of the major naval operation was demoted because of a 2003 submarine accident; promoted to deputy commander of the navy this August; predicted for another step up within three years), Shijie Ribao, November 16, 2006, p. A1 at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq_id=1445428 (April 27, 2007).
 The article describes the work of Dr. Jin Donghan, a Chinese naval propulsion engineer, and his team at the 722 Institute in perfecting a new marine engine and overcoming problems of "high pressure combustion" in "small spaces," "gas recirculation," and other technical challenges that sound suspiciously like an air independent propulsion (AIP) system. The author goes out of his way to insist that the technology is "entirely Chinese intellectual property" to "overcome the blockade of foreign technology." Qi Yao, "Wei Woguo Xinxing Jianchuan tigong Qiangjingde 'Zhongguo Xin'" (Providing our country's new warships with a powerful 'Chinese heart'), Keji Ribao (Science and Technology Daily), March 14, 2007, at www.stdaily.com/gb/stdaily/2007-03/14/content_643783.htm (May 8, 2007).
 See Jonathon Weng and Richard Scott, "China Develops Stirling AIP Technology for Submarines," Jane's Navy International, April 1, 2007.
 "Waijiaobu: Zhongguo Qianting we isui Mei 'Xiaoying' hao hangmu baodao bu shi" (Foreign Ministry: Report of Chinese submarine tailing 'Kitty Hawk' carrier not fact), Xinhua, November 16, 2006, at http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/5052209.html (April 27, 2007).
 A Federation of American Scientists blog says that the U.S. detected only two PLAN submarine patrols in 2006 and none in 2005. Hans Kristensen, "Chinese Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol Rate," Federation of American Scientists Strategic Security Blog, February 6, 2007, at www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/post_2.php (April 27, 2007).
 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006 Report to Congress, November 2006, p. 135.
 O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization," pp. 7-11.
 Some observers consider the Yuan-class submarines under construction in Wuhan to be an improved version of the Song class. See "Songji Gailiang Qianjian, Haijun Weilai Zhuli, Waigou Eluosi K ji Qianjian, Tianbu Changgui Zhanli Kongxi, Bing Jiji Yanshi Xinjian" (Improved Song-class submarine is main force of future Chinese navy, with Russian Kilo-class, to buttress conventional force posture in region, actively research and develop new vessels), Shijie Ribao, June 1, 2005, p. A8.
Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing
Submarine Force," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4
(Spring 2004), at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/written_testimonies
/04_02_06wrts/goldsteinmurray_us_china_commission.htm (April 27, 2007), and Weng and Scott, "China Develops Stirling AIP Technology for Submarines."
 Bill Gertz,
"China Expands Sub Fleet," The Washington Times, March 2,
2007, p. A1, at www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070302-
012440-4462r.htm (April 27, 2007). Little is reported about the Type-095 except that design work is apparently completed. Some reports describe it as an improved attack submarine, while others indicate that it will be a ballistic missile boat. See U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," pp. 26 and 27. For a graphic of China's current submarine fleet, see Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Leased Akulas Advance India's Blue-Water Plans," DefenseNews, March 5, 2007, p. 12.
 Including at least five Type-94 Jins, five Type-093 Shangs, five Type-095s, one Yuan, 13 Songs, and 13 Kilo 877s and 636s. For the higher estimates, see hearing, China's Military Power, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., July 27, 2005.
 The United States will soon experience a depletion of its submarine fleet, which will drop below 48 by 2020 (probably sooner, given the heightened operational tempo) and below 40 by 2027, despite an optimal fleet size of 68 and an absolute minimum of 58. The U.S. Navy's submarine fleet can now fulfill only 62 percent of its mission requests-a percentage that drops every year. See testimony of Vice Admiral John J. Donnelly, Commander U.S. Submarine Forces, et al., in hearing, Submarine Force Structure and Acquisition Policy,Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., March 8, 2007.
 Nabi Abdullaev, "Russia Sends 4th Destroyer to China," DefenseNews, October 9, 2006, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2152422 (April 27, 2007).
 U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," pp. 4, 5, 26, and 48.
 O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization," p. 12.
Yao fazhan hangmu jiandui, zhuan jian zaiji, fushu jianting kuai
wancheng, keneng xian zhuangbei Nanhai" (Military: China will
develop aircraft carrier group, sources say carrier-based planes
and escort ships almost complete, will probably first deploy in
South China Sea), Shijie Ribao, March 10, 2006, at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_
seq_id=1323694 (April 27, 2007).
Hangmu 2010 nian qian zhicheng; Renda Jiefangjun daibiaotuan
zhongjiang: Zhongguo you quanli, you shili, taguo wu quan guowen"
(China will complete construction of aircraft carrier by 2010;
lieutenant general in People's Congress PLA delegation: China
has the right, and the power, and other nations have no right to
question it), Shijie Ribao, March 7, 2007, p. A4, at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq
_id=1497958 (April 27, 2007).
 John Ward Anderson, "Turks Keep Ship Going Round in Circles; It's No Longer a Carrier, Not Yet a Casino," The Washington Post, July 22, 2001, p. A18.
 Ruan Leyi, "Wayagehao mujian hu yanmi" (Varyag carrier under heavy security), Zhongguo Shibao, May 13, 2002, and Ruan Leyi, "Zhonggong gouru wei wangong Ezhi hangmu rinei tongguo Taiwan dongbu" (Unfinished Russian-built aircraft carrier purchased will transit east of Taiwan in next few days), Zhongguo Shibao, February 19, 2002.
 "China to
Buy Su-33 Carrier-Based Fighters from Russia?" Defense Industry
Daily, November 17, 2006, at www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2006/11/china-to-buy-su33-
carrierbased-fighters-from-russia/index.php (April 27, 2007).
 Ruan Leyi,
"Zhonggong yi neng dazao hangmu, xiang wei dingan poban" (PRC now
capable of building carrier; decision not final), Zhongguo
Shibao, January 10, 2007. For a comprehensive look at China's
aircraft carrier program as of 2002, see Richard D. Fisher,
Jr., "China's Carrier of Chance," Jamestown Foundation China
Brief, Vol. 2, Issue 6 (March 14, 2002), at www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume
_id=18&issue_id=646&article_id=4621 (April 27, 2007).
 The official media in China appear to be encouraging Chinese readers to believe that China is, in fact, moving toward deployment of a carrier fleet. For a series of images in a blog on a People's Daily Web site, see "Haiwai kan Zhongguo: Zhongguo goumaide Su-33 ji jiang zai hangmushang shifei" (How China is seen abroad-China buys Russian Su-33 fighters for carrier test), Qiangguo Shequ (powerful nation community), December 29, 2006, at www.military.people.com.cn/GB/42969/58519/5228125.html (April 27, 2007).
 Ruan Leyi, "Yao bu yao hangmu, qu jueyu zhanlue xuyao" (An aircraft carrier or not-depends on strategic demand), Zhongguo Shibao, January 10, 2007.
 O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization," p. 15.
 Richard Fisher, Jr., "China's New Large Amphibious Assault Ship," International Strategy and Assessment Center, January 8, 2007, at www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.136/pub_detail.asp (April 27, 2007).
 Cao Zhi and Chen Wanjun, "Hu Jintao zai huijian Haijun di shice dangdaihui daibiao shi qiangdiao."
 Kevin Lanzit, "PLAAF Transformation-a Midpoint Review," paper presented at conference, "Exploring the 'Right Size' for China's Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organizations," Carlisle Barracks, Pa., October 6-8, 2006, p. 4.
 See Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam, "Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force," paper presented at conference, "Exploring the 'Right Size' for China's Military," p. 8. Some estimates of the production run are as high as 300. Taiwan's defense ministry apparently believes it will be capped at 120. Agence France-Presse, "China Looks to New Fighters, Sparking Regional Arms Race: Report," DefenseNews, January 31, 2007, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2521412 (April 27, 2007); Rich Chang, "China Deploys Advanced Fighters," Taipei Times, January 22, 2007, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/01/22/2003345791 (April 27, 2007); and Chua Chin Hon, "China Unveils New Fighter Jet Amid Fanfare," Straits Times, January 5, 2007, at www.taiwansecurity.org/ST/2007/ST-050107.htm (April 27, 2007).
 Wendell Minnick, "China Fields Indigenous J-10 Fighter Aircraft," DefenseNews, January 6, 2007, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2460838 (April 27, 2007).
 "Kongzhong jiayou, Jiefangjun zuodao; yanchang zhandouji daikong shijian; zengqiang yuancheng gongji nengli" (PLA achieves midair fueling, prolongs fighter loiter time, strengthens long-distance attack capabilities), Shijie Ribao, April 24, 2005.
 "Junyan jieshu, jungou kaishi, Zhonggong xiading, caigou yunshuji jiayouji" (After China-Russia military exercise, arms buys begin, PRC contracts purchase of cargo and refueling aircraft), Zhongguo Shibao, August 29, 2005.
 Chinese journals refer to the Su-27 and Jian-10 as "third generation" fighters.
 U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," p. 4.
Private conversation with U.S. official. A Taiwan request for over 400 new AIM-120 air-to-air missiles and Maverick air-to-ground missiles was approved by the Pentagon on March 1, 2007. News release, "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States-AMRAAM and Maverick Missiles," Defense Security Cooperation Agency, February 28, 2007, at www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Taiwan_07-10.pdf (April 27, 2007).
 For a depiction of the "notional coverage provided by China's SA-10, SA-20 SAM systems, as well as the soon-to-be acquired S-300PMU2," see U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2005," p. 32, Figure 8.
 See Chinese State Council, China's National Defense in 2006, chap. IV.
 The 2006 Defense White Paper says that the PLA numbers 2.3 million, but this apparently includes the 660,000 in the People's Armed Police (wuzhuang jingcha). U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006 Report to Congress, November 2006, p. 134, at www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/annual_report_full_06.pdf (April 29, 2007).
 Blasko, "PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway."
 See Chinese State Council, China's National Defense in 2006, chap. IV.
 The Type-98 is protected by reactive armor and armed with a fully stabilized 125-mm 50-calibre smoothbore gun with autoloader and is controlled by a laser rangefinder, wind sensor, ballistic computer, and thermal barrel sleeve. Dual-axis stabilization ensures precise targeting and firing on the move. The Type 98's 125-mm cannon can fire a Russian A-11 laser-guided anti-tank missile (ATGM). Both the commander and gunner have roof-mounted stabilized sights with daylight and infrared channels. The gun system reportedly outclasses the Abrams. See Jane's Armour and Artillery Yearbook.
 See Fisher, "China's New Large Amphibious Assault Ship." Blasko suggests that only 400 have been deployed. Blasko, "PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway."
 Fisher, "China's New Large Amphibious Assault Ship."
Zhou Ye, "Jiefangjun Zixunhua budui jinnian chengjun" (PLA cyberwarfare units deployed this year), Zhongguo Shibao, March 15, 2003.
 For an
overview of China's cyberwar strategies, see James C. Mulvenon,
Ph.D., "Chinese Information Operations Strategies in a Taiwan
Contingency," testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Commission, September 15, 2005, at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_
testimonies/05_09_15wrts/mulvenon_james.php (April 29, 2007).
 See Dow Jones Newswires, "Taiwan Military-China Cyber War More Likely Than Invasion," December 14, 2004; "Chinese Hacker May Be PLA," Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 2004; "NK Hands Suspected in Cyberattacks," Korea Times, July 15, 2004; and CNET News.com, "Flaw in Microsoft Word Used in Computer Attack," The New York Times, May 20, 2006, at www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/technology/20zero.html (April 29, 2007).
 Nathan Thornburgh, "Inside the Chinese Hack Attack; How a Ring of Hackers, Codenamed Titan Rain by Investigators, Probed U.S. Government Computers," Time, August 25, 2005, at www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,1098371,00.html (April 29, 2007).
Paller, Director, SANS Institute Research, quoted in Bill Brenner,
"Titan Rain Shows Need for Better Training,"
SearchSecurity.com, December 13, 2005, at http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/
0,289142,sid14_gci1151715,00.html (April 29, 2007). See also Bradley Graham, "Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites; U.S. Agencies' Networks Are Among Targets," The Washington Post, August 25, 2005, p. A1, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2005/08/24/AR2005082402318.html (April 29, 2007).
Warren, "Smash and Grab, the Hi-Tech Way," The
Guardian, January 19, 2006, at http://technology.guardian.co.uk/weekly/story/0,
,1689093,00.html (April 29, 2007).
 CNET News.com, "Flaw in Microsoft Word Used in Computer Attack."
 Lian Junwei, "Weiruan chengnuo yu Zhonggong xiang yuanshima" (Microsoft commits to giving source codes to PRC), Gongshang Shibao, July 18, 2002.
 Warren, "Smash and Grab, the Hi-Tech Way."
 Dawn S. Onley and Patience Wait, "Red Storm Rising; DOD's Efforts to Stave Off Nation-State Cyberattacks Begin with China," Government Computer News, August 21, 2006, at www.gcn.com/print/25_25/41716-1.html (April 29, 2007).
 Ted Bridis, "State Dept. Suffers Computer Break-Ins," Associated Press, July 11, 2006.
France-Presse, "U.S. pulls Lenovo PCs from State Department,"
The Washington Times, May 19, 2006, at www.washingtontimes.com/world/20060518-
104316-9737r.htm (April 29, 2007), and Associated Press, "U.S. to Restrict Use of Computers from Lenovo," The New York Times, May 20, 2006, p. C9, at www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/business/20computer.html (April 29, 2007).
Sipress, "Computer System Under Attack; Commerce Department
Targeted; Hackers Traced to China," The Washington
Post, October 6, 2006, p. A21, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
10/05/AR2006100501781.html (April 29, 2007).
Gertz, "Chinese Hackers Prompt Navy College Site Closure," The
Washington Times, November 30, 2006, p. A11, at www.washingtontimes.com/national/
20061130-103049-5042r.htm (April 29, 2007).
 Mark A Kellner, "China a 'Latent Threat, Potential Enemy': Expert," DefenseNews, December 4, 2006, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2389588 (April 29, 2007).
 Defense Science Board Task Force, High Performance Microchip Supply, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2005, p. 1, at www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final.pdf (January 4, 2007).
 Ibid., p. 17.
Chuang, "Ex-TSMC Employee Suspected of Selling Secrets to
Shanghai," Taipei Times, March 7, 2002, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/03/07/story/
0000126662 (April 29, 2007). See also Stephanie Low, "Government Drafts Law to Fight High-Tech Espionage," Taipei Times, March 31, 2002, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/03/31/story/0000129898 (April 29, 2007), and Dan Nystedt, "Top Secret Report Sets Off Alarms in the Tech Sector," Taipei Times, July 4, 2001, p. 17, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2001/07/04/92739 (April 29, 2007).
 Jason Dean and Don Clark, "China Clears Intel Chip Plant, Marking a Potential Milestone," The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2007, p. A4.
 Defense Science Board Task Force, High Performance Microchip Supply, p. 30 (emphasis added).
 John Markoff, "Attack of the Zombie Computers Is Growing Threat, Experts Say," The New York Times, January 7, 2007, at www.nytimes.com/2007/01/07/technology/07net.html (April 29, 2007).
 Mulvenon, "Chinese Information Operations Strategies in a Taiwan Contingency."
 Chinese State Council, China's National Defense in 2006, chap. 2.
 For a colorful discussion of China's impact on the Russian Far East, see Burt Herman, "Chinese Presence Grows in Russian Far East," Associated Press, August 24, 2005. See also "Zhongguo yimin daju zhuanru, Eguo fangdu; Mosike nian sunshi 71.9 yi meiyuan; jiang tuichu xilie zhendui cuoshi, shi jushi zhengchanghua" (Russia seeks to stem flood of Chinese immigrants, Moscow loses US$7.19 billion each year, will take measures to address this problem and normalize this trend), Shijie Ribao, March 17, 2006, at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq_id=1327123 (April 29, 2007).
Ambassador to India Claims 'Whole of Arunachal Pradesh Is Chinese
Territory,'" CNN-IBN News (India), November 13, 2006, at
territory-envoy-minces-no-words/26108-3.html (April 29, 2007).
 For an expanded look at this issue, see John J. Tkacik, Jr., "How the PLA Sees North Korea," in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Shaping China's Security Environment: The Role of the People's Liberation Army (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), pp. 139-172, at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub709.pdf (April 29, 2007).
 For an excellent summary of the problem, see Wendell Minnick, "China Rising: East Asia Braces as American Influence Fades," DefenseNews, March 19, 2007, pp. 11-12, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2623660 (April 29, 2007). Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reportedly believes that, "distracted by problems elsewhere, the U.S. isn't paying enough attention to Southeast Asia, losing its regional influence to a rising China and potentially weakening antiterrorism cooperation." Yaroslav Trofimov and Paul Beckett, "Singapore Prime Minister Urges U.S. to Bolster Its Ties in Asia," The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2007, p. A9, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117679618020172427.html (May 7, 2007; subscription required).
 Or "disrupt his alliances" (fa jiao). Sunzi Bingfa III. 5. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 78.