Certain recent proposals to ostensibly expand health care
"choice" and "competition" would have exactly the opposite effect.
One such recent proposal is to create a national health care
"market" through a congressionally designed "national health
insurance exchange" where a government health plan would compete
directly with private health plans.[1]
The declared purpose of this arrangement is to give those
Americans who were not enrolled in employment-based health
insurance coverage, or those with insecure coverage, the
opportunity to get stable, affordable health insurance that would
have a guaranteed set of government standardized benefits (such as
Medicare or a version of Medicare) calibrated for a younger
population. Usually, this kind of proposal is accompanied by an
employer mandate, whereby employers who do not offer private
coverage are required to pay a tax that would, in turn, help to
finance coverage in the competing public program.
Government as Player and
Umpire
In the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), the
unique consumer-driven health program that covers federal workers
and retirees--and which many cite as a functioning version of a
"national health insurance exchange"--the United States Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), the agency that administers the
program, does not field an "OPM Health Plan" to compete with the
hundreds of private health plans around the country. In the FEHB,
competing health plans offer a variety of different benefit
packages, from managed care offerings to health savings accounts
plans. And in the FEHBP, the private health plans, not the
taxpayers, assume the financial risks.
But the proposal for a national health insurance exchange with
the government as a direct competitor is very different. The
government would not only set the rules for the competition, but it
would also enter into the competition as a player. The incentives
governing the government plan and its powerful board of
directors--presumably Congress--would not only be economic but also
political. As a result, the role of consumers personally choosing
value for their dollars would be dramatically diminished.
The likely incentives for government officials would be to set
rules to advantage the government's own health plan and to
disadvantage the private health plans, including setting the
government's health plan premiums artificially low, reducing or
eliminating cost-sharing requirements, or more heavily subsidizing
certain benefits to make the government health plan more attractive
than the private health plans. These plans would operate without
incurring any of the normal financial risks that private health
plans must bear.
One could easily imagine a massive crowd out of private
coverage, as employers dropped private coverage and paid the
requisite tax. Likewise, lobbyists for businesses or private
insurance industry executives may see the government health program
as a convenient "dumping ground" for high-risk individuals or
families, which would reduce business and insurance industry costs
but would amount to massive adverse selection against the
taxpayers.
America's entire health care economy would become an arena for
special interest lobbying on a scale previously unimaginable. In
such a political environment, the value of personal choice and
anything at all resembling free market competition would mostly
likely be rendered meaningless.
Government Debt
At the very outset, the prospects for such a "fair" competition
seem remote. Private health plans would compete for consumers'
dollars and would bear financial risks and absorb financial losses.
The public plan, however, would be subsidized by the taxpayers, and
the taxpayers would assume the risks and the liabilities. If the
federal Medicare program itself served as the government competitor
in the "national health insurance exchange," then whatever
liabilities would be incurred by the new part of Medicare would be
added to the current long-term debt of the Medicare program, which
now amounts to an enormous $36 trillion.[2] In that case, the proposal
would simply increase the already hideously high Medicare burden on
current and future taxpayers that Congress thus far seems either
unwilling or unable to address. If the program would be entirely
separate from Medicare, and not "Medicare-like" in its financing,
then Congress would have to discover some way to spare taxpayers
yet another huge addition to their entitlement bills. It is fair to
ask how Congress would handle the inevitable liabilities of the new
public plan.
Government Micro-Management
Congress would determine the government health plan's benefit
offerings with a high degree of specificity (if Medicare were the
model for such a plan) and would also set the premiums,
co-payments, and deductibles that enrollees would pay. In order to
preserve some modicum of "fairness" for the competition to work,
Congress would have to make sure that the health benefits and
payment schedules for the private plans are comparable, thus
standardizing the health benefit offerings of both the government
and the private sector. This would make the offering to the public
either identical or largely identical. The result: a centralized
federal standardization of health benefit offerings on America's
private health plans.
It is not enough to say that the public plan's benefits package
would be just a "basic" package. In theory, that would be
desirable; in practice, what is or is not "basic" invariably
becomes a political decision regardless of personal wants, needs,
or desires of enrollees. In state legislature after state
legislature, lawmakers have altogether imposed more than 2,000
mandated health benefits on private health plans. "Basic" means
many different things to many different people, including provider
organizations that insist their medical practices must be legally
required in health insurance offerings. This is yet another reason
why health insurance rules, including rules governing health
benefits, as well as risk-adjustment among radically diverse health
insurance markets, should be left to the states.[3]
Medical science and technology constantly advance and generate
new medical treatments and procedures that are incorporated into
private health coverage. Assuming the proponents of "government
competition" are sincere about maintaining fair competition between
public and private insurance, they would have to either
automatically add such new benefits to the government plan or
somehow limit their adoption in the private sector. There is a way
to accomplish that, however, and it is thoroughly undesirable: Add
the benefit and thus make it "formally" available, in black and
white, as part of the government plan's offerings but then control
the costs through caps on reimbursement or price controls. Medicaid
is a prime example of how this process plays out, with doctors
limiting or foregoing their Medicaid practice altogether.
It is easy to imagine, then, Congress imposing health care price
controls on the private sector as well as the public sector. This
would import the annual congressional warfare over Medicare payment
for doctors and other medical professionals into what is now left
of the private sector. With government controlling the benefits as
well as the price of the benefits, whether or not the payer is
singular or plural, the result would be a government-run
system.
Not the Right Prescription
Proponents of government competition in a "national health
insurance exchange" claim that it would enhance personal choice and
health plan competition. That is highly unlikely. Rather, such a
system would impose federal control over virtually every aspect of
private health insurance, rendering it virtually indistinguishable
from government insurance except for its direct financing. Congress
would become increasingly prescriptive over benefits, the adoption
of medical technology and new medical procedures, the pricing of
these items, and the mechanism that plans may or may not use to
manage health care risks. In other words, hardly any aspect of
private health plans' business operations would be free from
government regulation and control. That is not a prescription for
health care choice or competition.
Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D.,
is Director of the Center for Health Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.
[1]
This is very different from a state-based health insurance
exchange, which is designed to promote personal ownership of
portable health plans, purchased tax-free through an employer-based
defined contribution arrangement. The proposal for a national
health insurance exchange, with a government health plan to compete
with private health plans, is embodied in Senator Barack Obama's
(D-Ill.) health plan and is outlined in greater detail in the
national health policy reform offered by the Commonwealth Fund. See
Cathy Schoen, Karen Davis, and Sara Collins, "Building Blocks for
Reform: Achieving Universal Coverage with Private and Public Group
Health Insurance," Health Affairs, vol.27. no. 1 (May/June
2008), pp. 646-657.
[3] It
should be noted that in the FEHBP, for example, there is no federal
risk adjustment mechanism at all. Risk-adjustment--carefully
calibrating payments for different enrollees based on age, risk, or
health status--is a formidable enterprise best left to the
experimental capacities of innovative state legislators. For a
discussion of this issue, see Edmund F. Haislmaier, " State Health
Reform: A Brief Guide to Risk-Adjustment in Consumer-Driven Health
Insurance Markets," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2166, August
1, 2008, at www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/bg2166.cfm.