The
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food
Programme (IIC) is due to release its interim report in February
2005. The committee was appointed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan in April 2004 following calls for a Security
Council-backed inquiry into the Oil-for-Food scandal. The
three-member inquiry is chaired by former Federal Reserve Chairman
Paul Volcker and includes South African Justice Richard Goldstone
and Swiss Professor of Criminal Law Mark Pieth. The committee's
60-member staff, which includes three support personnel on loan
from the U.N., operates on a $30 million budget drawn from the U.N.
Oil-for-Food escrow account.
The
interim report will be published at an extremely sensitive time for
the United Nations. There is little doubt that the scandal has done
immense damage to the reputation of the world
organization.1 Secretary-General Annan has come under
fire for what is arguably the biggest scandal in the history of the
organization and the biggest financial fraud of modern times.
Embarrassingly for the U.N. chief, Benon Sevan, whom he picked to
run the Oil-for-Food program, is alleged in the report of U.S.
weapons inspector Charles Duelfer to have received a voucher
for 13 million barrels of oil from Saddam Hussein.
Annan is
facing growing calls for his resignation from Capitol Hill, where
Senator Norm Coleman (R- MN), chairman of the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, and 60 Members of Congress
have called for Annan to step down.2 Among them are nine
members of the House Appropriations Committee, which provides
22 percent of the U.N. operating budget each year, and eight
members of the House International Relations Committee.3
Several more Senators are expected to support Coleman's call for
Annan's departure.[1][2][3]
In
addition, the Bush Administration has begun to harden its stance
toward Annan. Outgoing Secretary of State Colin Powell warned
the embattled Secretary-General that he will be held accountable
for management failures in the Oil-for-Food program.[4] President George W. Bush has so
far refused to express his confidence in Annan, declining to meet
with him in December when the Secretary-General visited
Washington.
Outside
the oil-for-food scandal, Annan's problems are also mounting.
He has acknowledged and accepted organizational responsibility for
a major scandal involving U.N. personnel and peacekeepers in
the Congo. The U.N. stands accused of human rights violations
against refugees on a scale that dwarfs the Abu Ghraib scandal. In
addition, internal unrest within the U.N. continues to mount in the
wake of a series of harassment scandals involving senior U.N.
managers. The threat of a U.N. staff revolt looms large. If 2004
was Kofi Annan's "annus horribilis," 2005 threatens to be even
worse.
It is
amidst this highly charged atmosphere that Mr. Volcker will unveil
his eagerly awaited report. His report undoubtedly has the
potential to bring down the U.N. Secretary-General. The U.N.
leadership has placed so much political capital on this report
that the stakes are extremely high: A damning report would almost
certainly seal Annan's fate.
Regrettably,
those expecting a hard-hitting expose of U.N. corruption and
feckless leadership could well be disappointed by Volcker's report.
As Chairman Volcker stated to The New York Times, his report
will produce no "smoking gun."[5] While the IIC
interim report will probably contain valuable information of
considerable interest to congressional investigators, some of
which may be damaging to the U.N.'s reputation, it is unlikely to
paint a detailed picture of corruption and mismanagement at
the highest levels of the world body.
With the
possible exception of one or two officials, a whitewash of
most of the U.N.'s leadership, including the Secretary-General, is
a strong possibility. Indeed, there is widespread suspicion on
Capitol Hill that the Volcker Committee will instead focus heavily
upon the supposed role of the Security Council in overseeing the
Oil-for-Food program-especially the United States, even though it
is not the main charge of the inquiry.[6]
The
Volcker Committee may fail to deliver an exhaustive account of U.N.
failings and possible criminal activity by U.N. officials for
several reasons, including a lack of investigative power and
an absence of real independence from the U.N. Indeed, the five
congressional investigations[7] now underway are far more likely
to prove effective in uncovering the full story of the Oil-for-Food
fraud that allowed the Saddam Hussein regime to enrich itself at
the expense of the Iraqi people.
The
Volcker Committee's Lack of Credibility
The
Independent Inquiry Committee is severely handicapped by its dearth
of investigative power. Even if it wanted to, the committee clearly
does not possess the means to fully investigate this gigantic
scandal. As outgoing U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Danforth has
pointed out, the IIC is not equipped with the necessary tools to
conduct a thorough investigation:
The fact
that [Volcker] doesn't have subpoena power, he doesn't have a grand
jury, he can't compel testimony, he can't compel production of
documents and witnesses and documents that are located in other
countries might be beyond his reach….
Those
are tremendous handicaps…. [W]hat is possible, is that his
focus would move from the bad acts, from the criminal offenses to
something that he will view as more manageable-namely the
procedures and was it a tight enough procedural system, which might
be interesting but not the key question to investigate.[8]
At the
same time, there are also major questions regarding the
independence of the Volcker Committee. So far, the names of
just 10 senior staff have been released, including Reid Morden,
former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
and Swiss magistrate Laurent Kasper-Ansermet.[9] However,
no details have been released regarding the remaining staff of
investigators that are actually doing the investigating and
handling the huge volume of documents. It remains unclear how many
former U.N. employees are involved with the committee. It is
self-evident that a truly independent inquiry into U.N.
corruption should not be staffed either by former U.N. employees or
by any other people with significant ties to the
U.N.
Without
any kind of external oversight, the Volcker Committee is
clearly open to U.N. manipulation. Paul Volcker, handpicked by
Annan, is under immense pressure from the U.N. to clear the
Secretary-General and restore the reputation of the United
Nations. Refusing to hand over to Congress the 55 highly damaging
internal U.N. Oil-for-Food audits until January of this year only
added to the impression of a major cover-up by the U.N.
In the
eyes of Congress, the Volcker Committee was also badly damaged by
the controversy over Anna Di Lellio, its director of communications
and a former U.N. employee. She resigned[10] on
September 23, 2004, over statements to The Guardian in
2002, in which she implicitly compared President Bush to Osama
bin Laden:
I see
the major threats coming from ourselves, rather than the east. I
find deeply unsettling both the ascendance of George Bush and his
puppeteers to the U.S. government, and the mix of self-serving
hypocrisy and incompetence prevailing in European governments. I
don't like it that the two nations whose citizenship I hold, Italy
and the U.S., have leased their institutions to a couple of
families. With defenders like W and Berlusconi, largely unchecked
by a sycophantic media, who needs Bin Laden to destroy culture,
personal freedom, respect for other human beings, integrity, and
the rule of law-all the things that make our lives worthwhile?[11]
The Di
Lellio resignation helped to fuel growing doubt on Capitol
Hill regarding the supposed independence of the Volcker
inquiry and raised major questions regarding the committee's modus
operandi, its staff, its judgment, and its overall
effectiveness.
Paul
Volcker and an Apparent Conflict of Interest
In
addition to the problems outlined above, the fact that Mr.
Volcker's own outlook may be influenced by past associations
should be an issue of serious concern. It is vitally important that
any independent inquiry into the extremely serious allegations
against the United Nations over its management of the Oil-for-Food
program be totally independent of the U.N. It is just as
important that the person heading the inquiry be
completely unbiased and objective in his approach to the
organization he is investigating. For example, in the corporate
world, it would be inconceivable for an independent inquiry into
fraud and corruption to be headed by someone with strong ties
and loyalties to the corporation being investigated.
However,
in the case of Volcker and the IIC, there is an apparent conflict
of interest that brings into question whether or not the committee
can be relied upon to investigate the United Nations objectively.
When Volcker was appointed to head the Oil-for-Food investigation
in April 2004, it was not widely known by the public, the world's
media, and the U.S. Congress that he was a director of the
United Nations Association of the United States of America
(UNA-USA) and the Business Council for the United Nations (BCUN).
Volcker is listed as a director in the 2003-2004 UNA-USA annual
report,[12] as well as in the annual
reports for 2001-2002 and 2000-2001.[13]
His
biography on the Independent Inquiry Committee's Web site does not
mention his involvement with the UNA-USA,[14] a rather
striking omission considering that he is charged with
conducting a highly sensitive investigation into the U.N. Volcker
does disclose his other institutional affiliations-including the
Trilateral Commission, the Institute of International Economics,
the American Assembly, and the American Council on Germany-but is
seemingly shy about his work with the United Nations
Association.
The
United Nations Association of the United States of America is a
pro-U.N. advocacy group that "supports the work of the United
Nations." In the words of a grateful Kofi Annan:
There
are United Nations Associations in many other countries, but this
one is unique-both in the challenges it faces and in the energy and
resources it devotes to tackling them. From our perspective, it is
hard to think of any work more valuable than what you do to improve
the understanding of United Nations issues in our host country.[15]
A key
goal of the United Nations Association is to "greatly expand and
contribute to Americans' understanding of the U.N. and its
importance to the U.S. by increasing the channels through which we
inform Americans, particularly opinion-makers, elites, UNA-USA
members and students."[16] It is also a forceful advocate
of U.S. membership of the International Criminal Court.
The
UNA-USA has played a significant role in defending the U.N.'s
response to the Oil-for-Food scandal and the leadership of
Secretary-General Annan. It has also prominently defended the
reputation of the Oil-for-Food Independent Inquiry Committee.
To a great degree, the UNA-USA has acted as lead cheerleader for
the U.N. and the Volcker Committee with regard to the
Oil-for-Food controversy. Its talking points on "The Oil-for-Food
Programme," for example, argue that the Volcker report "will be
objective, thorough and fair" and that "the U.N. Security
Council-not the Secretary-General or his staff-had ultimate
oversight authority for the Oil-for-Food Programme." The
UNA-USA has criticized the "politically motivated attacks" on
the U.N. over Oil for Food and the calls for Annan's resignation,
which it says "constitute an effort to undermine the U.N., which is
a real objective for many of those who are distorting the
facts on this complex issue."[17]
The
UNA-USA's partner organization, the Business Council for the
United Nations, works to "advance the common interests of the U.N.
and business in a more prosperous and peaceful world." One of its
chief underwriters was BNP Paribas,[18] the French bank
that held the escrow account for Oil-for-Food funds. BNP donated
more than $100,000 to UNA-USA and the BCUN in 2002 to 2003.[19] BNP's role in the Oil-for-Food
scandal is currently being investigated by the House International
Relations Committee,[20] as well as by the Volcker
Committee.
Key
Recommendations
The
U.N.'s credibility has been badly damaged by its disastrous
mismanagement of the Oil-for-Food program. The United Nations as an
organization will need to work hard to mend its battered image
and restore the faith of both the Iraqi and American peoples, as
well as of the wider international community. In order to
guarantee an effective and credible investigation of the
Oil-for-Food scandal, the IIC and the U.N. should take the
following actions:
-
A
mechanism for external oversight of the operations of the
Independent Inquiry Committee should be put in place. Its
operations are shrouded in secrecy, with little
transparency.
-
In the
interests of openness and accountability, the IIC should fully
disclose the identities and previous affiliations of all 60 staff
members.
-
Transcripts
of interviews conducted between the IIC and U.N. officials,
including Secretary-General Kofi Annan, should be publicly
disclosed along with the final findings of the
IIC.
-
Members
of the U.N. Security Council should be furnished with regular
monthly updates on the IIC investigation, including a full list of
interviewees.
-
A firm
date should be set for final publication of the IIC report. The
timing of the report's release must not be open to political
manipulation by the U.N.
-
The
United Nations should make available for interview to congressional
investigators all U.N. personnel involved in managing and staffing
the Oil-for-Food program.
-
All U.N.
documents relating to the Office of the Iraq Program, headed by
Benon Sevan, should also be made available to Congress. The U.N.
should not have a monopoly of vital evidence.
Conclusion
Supporters
have hailed the Independent Inquiry Committee into the Oil-for-Food
program as a huge step forward for the United Nations in terms of
increasing accountability and transparency. They have held it up
both as an example of a new spirit of openness supposedly sweeping
through the world body and as a powerful symbol of Kofi Annan's
stated objective to restore the reputation of the U.N.
In
reality, the Volcker Committee suffers from a huge credibility
problem of its own. It is hard to see how a team of investigators
handpicked by the U.N. Secretary-General, whose son is himself a
subject of investigation, can be considered truly independent.
There is also a major question mark over its chairman's neutrality.
Considering Mr. Volcker's several years as a director of the
United Nations Association and the Business Council for the United
Nations, it is difficult to see how he could cast a critical,
objective eye on the U.N.'s leadership. It is inconceivable that
Kofi Annan was unaware of Volcker's close ties to the UNA-USA when
he appointed him to head the Oil-for-Food investigation. Indeed, it
could well have been an important factor influencing his
decision.
There
are also major concerns over the IIC's lack of transparency. The
U.N.-appointed investigation has operated in astonishing secrecy,
with virtually no outside scrutiny. For an inquiry designed to
unearth hidden corruption and malpractice on a huge scale, it is
strikingly opaque. Such is its level of secrecy that its Web site
does not even contain a mailing address.
In
addition to its clear lack of independence and questionable covert
operating style, there are serious doubts with regard to the
IIC's ability to do its job. The Volcker Committee bears all the
hallmarks of a toothless paper tiger: It carries no
enforcement authority (such as the power to punish contempt)
to compel compliance with its requests for information and has no
authority to punish any wrongdoing that it discovers.
As the
U.N. faces a major crisis of public confidence, it is
imperative that any investigation of U.N. corruption and
mismanagement be seen as independent, open, transparent, and
effective. It is regrettable that the Volcker Committee is failing
on all counts. Indeed, the U.N.-appointed Independent Inquiry
Committee should not be seen as the definitive investigation of the
Oil-for-Food program. It should be viewed as one of several
major investigations and, on current evidence, far less credible
than its congressional counterparts.
Nile
Gardiner, Ph.D., is Fellow in Anglo-American
Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation. William Schirano, Foreign Policy Research Assistant,
and Nicole Collins, Foreign Policy intern, assisted with the
research for this paper.
[1]For
background on the Oil-for-Food issue, see Nile Gardiner, James
Phillips, and James Dean, "The Oil-for-Food Scandal: Next Steps for
Congress," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1772, June
30, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/bg1772.cfm.
[2]"Expressing
the sense of the House of Representatives that due to the
allegations of fraud, mismanagement, and abuse within the United
Nations oil-for-food program, Kofi Annan should resign from the
position of Secretary-General of the United Nations to help restore
confidence that the investigations into those allegations are being
fully and independently accomplished," H. Res. 869, 108th Cong.,
2nd Sess., December 6, 2004, at thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d108:HE00869:@@@P (January 24, 2005). Representative Roger F.
Wicker (R-MS) sponsored the resolution.
[3]The
author is grateful to James Dean, Deputy Director, Government
Relations, Foreign and Defense Policy, at The Heritage Foundation,
for these details.
[4]See Sean
Hannity, interview with Colin Powell, "Sec'y of State Powell Talks
with Sean," partial transcript, Fox News, January 12,
2005, at www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,144218,00.html
(January 24, 2005).
[5]Warren
Hoge, "No 'Smoking Gun' in the Inquiry into Iraq's Prewar Oil
Sales," The New York Times, January 7, 2005, p.
A3.
[6]The
IIC's main terms of reference are to "collect and examine
information relating to the administration and management of the
Oil-for-Food Programme, including allegations of fraud and
corruption on the part of United Nations officials, personnel
and agents, as well as contractors, including entities that have
entered into contracts with the United Nations or with Iraq under
the Programme." Independent Inquiry Committee into the United
Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, "Terms of Reference," at
www.iic-offp.org/reference.htm (January 24,
2005).
[7]The
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on International
Relations, House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations, and House Committee on Energy
and Commerce are all conducting investigations. Three other U.S.
federal investigations-by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Treasury-are also
underway.
[8]John
Danforth, quoted in Fox News, "Danforth: Volcker Doesn't Have Right
Tools," January 8, 2005, at www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,143714,00.html (January 24, 2005).
[9]Paul A.
Volcker, "A Road Map for Our Inquiry," The Wall Street
Journal, July 7, 2004.
[10]See
press release, "Statement for the Press," Independent Inquiry
Committee, September 24, 2004, at www.iic-offp.org/
story24sept04.htm (January 24, 2005). See also Nile Gardiner
and James Phillips, "The Volcker Oil-for-Food Commission: Is
It Credible?" Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 569, September
20, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm569.cfm.
[11]Mark
Tran, interview with Anna Di Lellio, The Guardian, September
11, 2002, at
www.guardian.co.uk/september11/oneyearon/interview/0,12385,787426,00.html
(January 24, 2005).
[12]United
Nations Association of the United States of America, 60 Years of
Educating Americans About the United Nations: UNA- USA Annual
Report 2003-2004, at
www.unausa.org/pdf/publications/2003_annual_report.pdf
(January 24, 2005).
[13]United
Nations Association of the United States of America, Annual
Report 2001-2002, at www.unausa.org/../pdf/ar02.pdf
(January 24, 2005), and Annual Report 2000-2001, at
www.unausa.org/../pdf/ar01.pdf (January 24,
2005).
[14]Independent
Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme,
"Members," at www.iic-offp.org/members.htm (January 24,
2005).
[15]Kofi
Annan, quoted in United Nations Association of the United States of
America, Annual Report 2001-2002, p. 9.
[16]United
Nations Association of the United States of America, 60 Years of
Educating Americans About the United Nations, p. 3.
[17]United
Nations Association of the United States of America, "The
Oil-for-Food Programme," talking points, December 2004, at
www.unausa.org/policy/newsactionalerts/advocacy/tpoff.asp
(January 24, 2005).
[18]United
Nations Association of the United States of America, Annual
Report 2000-2001, p. 22.
[19]United
Nations Association of the United States of America, 60 Years of
Educating Americans About the United Nations, p. 28.
[20]See Bill
Gertz, "Bank Lapses Cited in Iraq Oil Program," The Washington
Times, November 18, 2004, at www.washtimes.com/
national/20041118-120331-8156r.htm (January 24,
2005).