Senator John Kerry
(D-MA), the Democratic presidential candidate, is offering an
expansive plan to increase insurance coverage and control health
care costs. Based on the preponderance of recent empirical
analyses, Senator Kerry's plan would cost well in excess of $1
trillion during its first 10 years of operation.[1]
Complex and
far-reaching health care plans are invariably difficult to explain
to the general public and even more difficult for Congress to enact
and for the executive branch to implement. This is especially true
of Senator Kerry's health plan, because it is not a single,
coherent plan, but rather a wide array of complex policy
changes affecting public and private health care
coverage.
Array of
Initiatives
Senator Kerry's
proposal includes:
Changes in the
employment-based health insurance system, tax credits and
subsidies, and federal assumption of the bulk of high-end
catastrophic health costs;
Adoption of new rules
and policies for the provision of prescription
drugs;
Changes in the laws
governing medical malpractice and patients' rights;
Provision of federal
incentives to improve health care quality;
Adoption of
information technology to curb administrative health care
costs;
Strengthened safety
net organizations;
Promotion of disease
management and health promotion initiatives;
Expanded public
coverage for children and adults through Medicaid and the State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), as well as changed
federal and state responsibilities;
Creation of health
care tax credits and subsidies to make coverage more
affordable; and
Opening the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) to uninsured
Americans and employers through a separate pool.[2]
Taken together, these
initiatives are expected to expand health coverage for
approximately 27 currently uninsured million persons.[3]
Tackling Tax
Policy. A fundamental weakness
of the health care system is the outdated and inequitable tax
treatment of health insurance, which ties access to health
insurance to the workplace. Refundable tax credits, which have
gained broad support among both liberals and conservatives, are an
efficient way to target assistance to those in need. If
implemented properly, health care tax credits could also lay the
foundation for transforming the health care system and creating new
dynamics in which consumers control key health care decisions,
particularly the choice of health plans and
benefits.
Commendably, Senator
Kerry includes tax credits in his plan as a way to make health
care coverage more affordable. However, many of the crucial
details of these credits and other key provisions of his proposal
(and how they would be implemented) remain unclear.[4]
Value of the
FEHBP. The Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program is the popular and successful health
insurance program that provides coverage to Members of Congress,
federal workers, and retirees. Senator Kerry has made direct access
to the FEHBP by individuals and small businesses a key part of his
effort to expand coverage.
While the FEHBP can be
a useful model for reform based on consumer choice and
competition, however, there are some serious practical
problems with relying on the FEHBP itself, even with separate
pooling arrangements. A number of these problems arise from
the major differences between the federal workforce and the
uninsured population.
Costly
Complications. While the Senator's
plan would clearly broaden coverage, a closer review reveals that
it would incrementally expand federal control over the financing
and delivery of health care and that it is fraught with unintended
consequences for taxpayers, employers, and employees. Specifically,
the Kerry plan would:
Shift the high cost of
private health insurance to taxpayers and increase these
obligations over time. The Kerry health plan
envisions the taxpayers picking up the high-end costs of patients
and employers in private insurance. However, the economic and
political dynamics of this proposal would surely undermine
existing incentives to contain costs and likely result in even
higher taxpayer obligations and health care spending over
time.
Expand Medicaid and
other public programs and crowd out private coverage
options. By expanding
eligibility for these programs, the Kerry plan would make
millions of Americans dependent on the government for the financing
and delivery of health care services. It would also displace
existing private coverage to some degree and discourage future
private coverage options for Americans who might otherwise be able
to secure the coverage of their choice through an alternative
health care tax credit program.
Accelerate the growth
of government control over the health care system.
To
implement, manage, and enforce the wide array of health
initiatives put forth in the Kerry plan, the role of the federal
government would expand. It not only would assume a more direct
financial responsibility for coverage, but also would impose even
heavier regulation on the already overregulated health care sector.
This would increase costs.
Impose an enormous new
tax burden on Americans. Professor Kenneth
Thorpe of Emory University has estimated that the Kerry plan would
cost $653 billion over 10 years.[5] These health policy
initiatives would be financed by repeal of various tax cuts enacted
during the first term of the Bush Administration. However, the
latest independent cost estimates of the Kerry health plan are more
staggering, ranging from $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion for the first
decade of operation.[6] Given these new cost estimates, it is
highly unlikely that the Senator's proposed tax increases
would cover the cost of his health plan, and taxpayers would likely
face additional significant tax increases.
The health care sector
of the American economy needs a major systemic transformation that
would result in a new patient-centered, consumer-driven system.
Although an impressive effort to address several pressing problems,
the Kerry plan falls short of transforming the health insurance
markets or making patients the key decision makers in the health
care system.[7]
As Joseph R. Antos,
senior health policy analyst at the American Enterprise Institute,
has observed, "Taking a lesson from previous reform efforts that
failed to gain popular support, the Kerry agenda stays carefully
within the framework of public and private health insurance as we
know it today."[8] John Goodman, president of the National
Center for Policy Analysis, notes that, in expanding existing
third-party payment arrangements, 90 percent of Senator Kerry's
proposed spending would go to employers, insurance companies, and
state government-not individuals.[9]
How Senator Kerry
Would Change Employment-Based Health Insurance
Senator Kerry has
outlined key initiatives designed to control health care costs and
expand coverage,[10] but his most far-reaching proposals
center on his initiatives to change the risks of employment-based
health care coverage.
Premium Rebate
Pool. Senator Kerry would
have the federal government assume 75 percent of the costs for
employer-based health claims that exceeded certain thresholds,
starting at $30,000 in 2006 and reaching $50,000 in 2013.[11]
To qualify for this
"premium rebate," employers would be legally required to (1)
provide health care coverage to all their employees; (2) adopt
disease management programs in their health plans; and (3) pass
along savings from the rebate to employees. Premium savings are
estimated at 10 percent, or $1,000 for a standard family health
plan.[12]
According to the Lewin
Group, the employer (and non-group) premium rebates would amount to
$725.7 billion in federal spending over the first 10 years of the
program.[13]
Analysis.
The employer
premium rebate proposal would no doubt appeal to some major
employers and health insurance executives. They would have an
opportunity to off-load the high costs of high-risk enrollees onto
the taxpayers.
In other words, the
proposal would be an engine of major cost shifting. Jeffrey
Petertil, an independent consulting actuary, says that the
proposal would make insurance premiums more
"predictable," but it would be costly and would "supplant" the
reinsurance market, "so it is a bigger step toward national
health insurance than may be evident from a quick read of the
idea."[14] In any case, billions of dollars of
additional cost shifting in the health care sector would not
add one cent of value to patient care.[15]
The Kerry proposal
would also introduce new dynamics into employer-based health
insurance that would directly expand federal control over benefit
offerings. The substance of this approach, as Joseph Antos has
observed, is a "voluntary mandate," meaning that employers
must comply with the new rules in order to qualify for the generous
taxpayer subsidies.[16] Specifically, this approach
would:
Push employers toward
a standardized government benefit package. By establishing a
government reimbursement for high-cost claims, the Kerry plan would
likely lead the government to establish a list of "qualified
expenses" used to track claims. Employers, for the sake of ease,
would likely adjust their benefit packages to conform with the
government's list of qualified expenses, thus creating a default
standardized benefit package for employer-based coverage and
subjecting the plans and employers to unending government
regulatory requirements.
Pass costs on to
American taxpayers. The Kerry plan would
shift the costs of caring for the highest-cost privately insured
patients directly onto the taxpayer. With the government
assuming the financial risk of these patients, the Kerry
initiative negates the very purpose of private insurance, which is
designed to protect against catastrophic costs. It also negates the
function of private group health insurance, which is designed to
spread risk across a large number of people. As Antos further
observes, "It does not add significantly to the financial
protection against risk already available to employers in the
insurance market."[17]
Discourage
cost-conscious behavior of actors in the health care
system. By shifting the high
costs to the taxpayers, the Kerry plan would reduce the incentive
for individuals, employers, insurers, and providers to be
prudent users or managers of health care services. If the
taxpayer will pick up the bulk of high-end costs, those in the
private sector have less reason-or incentive-to worry about cost
growth. Helen Darling, president of the National Business Coalition
on Health, notes that, once a patient reaches the threshold at
which the taxpayer funding kicks in, "there's no reason for anyone
to pay attention to costs."[18] Therefore, instead of
controlling health care costs, this proposal is likely to have the
exact opposite effect.
The proposal would
also set in motion undesirable political dynamics. Clearly, it
would create political incentives to lower the dollar threshold at
which the taxpayer funding kicks in. Alternatively, it could
also induce political pressures to reduce or eliminate the
remaining private-sector cost sharing. Why should employers,
employees, and health insurers be satisfied with paying 25
percent when they could lobby to pay only 20 percent, 10 percent,
or zero percent? The political dynamics of lower cost sharing-
accompanied by standard "something for little or nothing" political
appeals-are normally unstoppable, regardless of which party
controls Congress. Costs would explode.[19]
Introduce complex
implementation problems. The administrative
burden placed on both the employers and the government to track and
qualify expenses would be daunting. Moreover, guaranteeing that
cost and premium savings are passed down directly to individual
employees, presumably through government audits, would be complex,
difficult, and intrusive. Federal agencies and departments,
such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, struggle
mightily in handling such detailed and tedious jobs within the
framework of well-established government health programs.[20]
Tracking Medicare beneficiary spending in the 2006 implementation
of the Medicare drug benefit will give Americans the flavor of the
task ahead. It is certain that these new and complex administrative
tasks, applied to private-sector insurance, would prove to be an
enormous managerial challenge to federal officials and a new burden
on employers.
A Better
Approach. Rather than having the
government assume catastrophic health care costs, the federal and
state governments should assist private insurers in setting up
catastrophic claims reinsurance pools. Under such a model, all
insurers in a state or region would cede their
catastrophic claims to the pool, and the cost of the pool
would then be funded out of a per-covered-life assessment on all
insurers. In that way, the burden of high-cost cases would be
spread evenly among all carriers and insurers, who would have
strong economic incentives to manage these cases, and not simply
dumped on the taxpayer.
How Senator Kerry
Would Make Prescription Drugs More Affordable
The cost of
prescription drugs is a topic that resonates with Americans,
especially those who do not have prescription drug coverage. Beyond
easing importation of drugs from Canada, Senator Kerry proposes
three major policy initiatives aimed at making prescription drugs
more affordable.
First,
the Senator
would change the rules governing Prescription Benefit Managers
(PBMs). He would require PBMs that do business with the
federal government to disclose any "savings" received from
manufacturers and from bulk purchasing.[21]
Second,
the Senator
would change the patent laws governing pharmaceuticals by
eliminating so-called loopholes in patent law in order to allow
less expensive generic drugs to enter the market faster.[22]
Third,
the Senator
would encourage states to negotiate discounted rates for
prescription drugs, similar to Medicaid discounted rates, for their
citizens and would devise incentives for states to implement
efficient contracting for better rates.[23]
Analysis.
The Kerry
prescription drug proposals would have several undesirable
consequences. Specifically, they would:
Restrict the ability
of PBMs to continue to negotiate discounts for
consumers. Price disclosure
at the wholesale level would result in producers offering less
generous discounts to retailers. If a producer does not know the
discounts that its competitors are offering the retailer, it
has an incentive to offer the largest discount that it can afford
without harming its own profitability. However, if the producer
knows the wholesale prices offered by its competitors to a
particular retailer, the producer has an incentive to "shadow
price" (i.e., offer only a slightly more generous discount than its
nearest competitor) rather than offer the largest possible discount
while maintaining profitability. Thus, if the government requires
disclosure of wholesale prices, the discount levels offered by the
manufacturers to the PBMs would erode, with the eventual
result that consumers would pay higher prices for prescription
drugs.
This approach could
also restrict the ability of PBMs and pharmaceutical companies to
have a private contractual relationship related to pricing and
incentives. This information would alter the nature and/or
structure of those agreements. If required to make their
private concessions available to the government and the
public, pharmacy networks and drug manufacturers might be less
willing to offer terms as generous as those they currently offer.
Policymakers should resist efforts to restrict the
ability of PBMs to engage in private contracts and should
instead allow competition to continue bringing discounted prices to
consumers.
Possibly disrupt
carefully constructed patent law. While the patent laws
may not be perfect, Congress labored to create the proper balance
between patented drugs and generic drugs. This balance ensures that
innovative drug manufacturers are rewarded for their efforts and
that generic drug manufacturers can enter the market in a timely
and fair fashion. It is imperative that policymakers proceed
cautiously when changing existing patent law so that they do
not destroy this balance in favor of either patented or generic
drugs.
Encourage state
governments to set prices for prescription drugs. Allowing states to
extend the Medicaid rebate program to larger populations, as
implied by the Kerry plan, would induce manufacturers to reduce or
eliminate discounting for both Medicaid and other purchasers-or
even to raise prices further. The net effect would be that
Medicaid would end up paying more for drugs.
If states were also
allowed to apply the Medicaid formulary to those purchases, they
would effectively have the ability to demand specific prices
from drug makers as a condition of sale in their states. This, in
effect, would result in direct government price controls for
prescription drugs, enforced by denying patients access to drugs if
manufacturers do not agree to a state's terms.[24]
A Better
Approach. New government rules,
including regulations, on prescription drugs may prove politically
popular in the near term, but such measures ultimately lead to
government officials deciding which drugs are made available.[25]
Policymakers should focus on ensuring that individuals have
access to health insurance policies that integrate
prescription drug coverage into the overall health care package and
that allow the private sector to negotiate prices and discounts, as
PBMs currently do. Furthermore, individual consumers should have
access to a variety of coverage options from which they can select
the health plans that best suit their individual health care
needs.[26]
How Senator Kerry
Would Change Medical Malpractice Law
Senator Kerry proposes
a series of changes in medical tort law, and other changes in the
legal system,[27] that he believes would improve the
conditions for both doctors and patients.
The Kerry medical
liability proposal would require a specialist to determine whether
a "reasonable claim exists" before allowing an individual to
bring a case and would impose mandatory sanctions for
improper, unwarranted cases.[28] Under the Kerry plan,
states would be required to establish non-binding mediation
before permitting a case to go to trial.[29] Senator Kerry would also
oppose awards of punitive damages unless there was "proof of
intentional misconduct, gross negligence, or reckless
indifference to life."[30]
According to the Lewin
Group, Senator Kerry's medical liability proposals would reduce
private health insurance premiums by about $7 billion over a
10-year period.[31]
Analysis.
The Kerry plan
includes a number of positive proposals for changing medical
malpractice law, particularly the restrictions on punitive
damages, the establishment of mediation, and measures to discourage
frivolous or weak cases from going to trial.
The Kerry approach,
however, lacks the core features of the most aggressive and
successful medical malpractice reforms that have been adopted in
the states, most importantly the capping of non-economic
damages. Professional medical societies strongly agree such major
changes in medical malpractice laws are essential to
maintaining patient access to quality medical care.[32]
A Better
Approach. Given the gravity of
the problem, many states already have enacted serious medical
malpractice reforms. The Senator's proposals are a valuable
contribution to the policy debate, but certain basic features-such
as capping non-economic damages-are keys to successful
reform, as illustrated in California. States should be encouraged
to continue these efforts.
How Senator Kerry
Would Improve Health Care Quality
Senator Kerry proposes
a series of initiatives to deal with problems of quality in health
care delivery. For instance, the Senator would provide a
"quality bonus" for doctors, medical specialists, and health
plans.[33] The quality bonus proposal would (1)
provide financial incentives to encourage providers and
purchasers to make changes and meet benchmarks to improve quality,
(2) establish a reward system for health care organizations and
physicians that implement modern information systems, (3) provide
financial incentives to computerize prescribing systems, and
(4) encourage immediate reporting of patient injuries and errors.[34]
Analysis.
Positive
financial incentives such as "quality bonuses" are invariably
superior to negative incentives, such as financial penalties,
price restrictions, or market exclusions. The computerizing of
prescriptions promises to reduce the number of medication
errors, and the "immediate reporting" of errors would certainly
benefit patients, improve communications among doctors and nurses,
and contribute to an overall improvement in patient care.
Needless to say, enhanced communication among providers, doctors,
specialists, and nurses would improve even more in an
atmosphere in which the constant threat of malpractice
litigation is significantly reduced.
The crucial policy
issue is whether improvements in quality will come within the
framework of an open system governed by consumer information
and consumer choice-in which patient advocacy is robust and
financial incentives naturally follow quality improvements-or
through a new regulatory regime of imposed government
standards.
On this point, Senator
Kerry's approach raises several concerns. The Senator's proposal
could:
Put the federal
government in charge (eventually) of defining and enforcing
quality. While making
up-to-date information on medical services available is
clearly desirable, the danger lies in the power that the government
could exercise in its implementation and its impact on the delivery
of care. This revolves around potential reimbursement rules for
medical services. Details matter.
For the government to
pay plans and providers for "quality improvements," it would first
need to determine which quality improvements qualify for the
bonuses. Quality in health care can be broadly defined as securing
the right diagnosis for the right treatment at the right time.
Beyond this broad generalization, it is not always easy, even for
medical authorities, to determine what constitutes quality of care
in any given case. Peer-reviewed medical journals and a rich body
of professional literature focus precisely on these
issues.
Government introduces
a new dynamic. When government plays a role, the quality issues are
no longer confined simply to medical judgment, even when government
officials are working closely with medical experts. Once government
officials become involved in the process, there is a natural
evolution toward uniformity in the application of standards.
Standardized "quality" measures will likely emerge from government
officials through a government decision-making process. The
inevitable result would be a set of government-sanctioned quality
standards. It is impossible to separate the policy process from
political considerations.
Link future quality
improvement innovations to the federally regulated incentive
payment structure. Establishing an
incentive-and-reward payment system for quality might actually
retard future innovation. Medical science and the resulting
insights into health care "best practices" are evolving at a much
faster rate than any government bureaucracy burdened by
rulemaking and due process requirements could ever hope to
match. Therefore, as the government lags in its ability to keep up
with the latest quality innovations, so will its payments. This lag
in payments will reduce the incentive for providers and purchasers
to deviate from the government status quo.
The likely results
would be that providers and purchasers would be more dependent on
the incentive and reward payments and would have less flexibility
in their practice of medicine and that the patient would be
cared for through a bureaucratic model instead of the far more
desirable doctor-patient model. At the same time, such a system
would entrench standards that are based on obsolete
understandings of the effectiveness of various medical
treatments. Patients could end up receiving care based on
perennially outdated models of medicine.
A Better
Approach. While some incentive
structures may be logical, policymakers should be wary of replacing
free-market competition with government subsidies that remove the
natural market incentives to improve care and adapt to patient
demand. The better approach is to foster the creation of
multiple, private standard-setting organizations. These can
gather and disseminate solid information quickly and
efficiently, updating best practices, in a fashion that is far
more responsive than the standard and painfully sluggish government
regulatory regime, such as the regulations administered by Medicare
and Medicaid.
The key ingredient is
the ability of patients to act directly on that information by
controlling the flow of dollars in the system. Empowering patients
with more control over their health care financing will bring to
the fore the natural incentives that all patients have to receive
the best quality care, which in turn will spur providers and
insurers to develop, implement, and publicize best practices on
their own and in real time.
In the end, better
reporting of adverse medical events requires medical malpractice
reform. No system designed to identify and correct medical errors
will work unless those who report the information (providers)
are first shielded from having it later used against them in a
court case. Without such reforms, it will simply be impossible to
change the system from one that focuses on punishing past
mistakes to one that focuses on preventing the reoccurrence of
those mistakes.
How Senator Kerry
Would Curb Unnecessary Health Care Costs
A key problem in
health care today is that too many dollars flowing into the system
are wasted, lost to inefficiency, or lost to a variety of
time-consuming activities unrelated to patient care,
including the amount of time and money that is lost to
third-party administration.
However, a variety of
activities, beyond the administrative costs of marketing private
health insurance or the management of care by health insurance
officials, affect cost. They include the proliferation of
litigation, the administration of claims for routine medical
services in third-party payment arrangements, and compliance with
an ever-growing body of government rules and regulations in
which costs often outweigh benefits. In recent testimony to the
Joint Economic Committee, Christopher Conover, professor of
economics at Duke University, estimated that excessive
government regulation, on the basis of a cost-benefit
analysis, costs the health care system $128 billion annually.[35]
Senator Kerry
recognizes the systemic inefficiency of existing arrangements
and outlines several policy initiatives to reduce these
costs.
First,
the Senator
would establish a "technology bonus,"[36] but the proposal lacks
sufficient detail to determine precisely how it would work. While
the proposal does not specifically describe how the bonus system
would operate, it would focus policymakers' attention on
implementing various technologies. The technology bonus would
(1) create private electronic records for all Americans, (2)
computerize government health care transactions, and (3) require
insurers doing business with the federal government (i.e.,
Medicare, Medicaid, and the FEHBP) to adopt the computerized
transaction system.[37]
Second,
the Senator
includes initiatives to "help strengthen safety net" institutions
by investing in capital improvements and "service expansions." The
Senator believes that these investments, plus his other access
proposals, would cover 95 percent of all Americans.[38]
They would also generate savings by reducing uncompensated
care.[39]
Third,
again without
much detail, Senator Kerry envisions a government role to
"disseminate best practices for disease management and health
promotion, encourage exercise, and invest in preventive
care."[40]
Analysis.
Few details
characterize Senator Kerry's safety-net "investments," and regular
exercise, preventive care, good health, and disease management
are desirable things to promote. Theoretically, improved use
of technology-as well as the promotion of more efficient health
care delivery-would reduce administrative costs and reduce
errors.
But Senator Kerry's
commendable efforts to focus on reducing costs by adopting
technology improvements and promoting efficiencies in care delivery
are also short on details. Much would depend on how these
initiatives are implemented. At the same time, the very breadth of
these recommendations opens up a wide range of possibilities
as to how these goals would be accomplished, including the
potential imposition of burdensome additional regulation or new
government spending. Health care costs, including compliance
and transactional costs, could increase-precisely the opposite of
what the Senator's proposal is intended to accomplish.
A Better
Approach. Beyond existing
efforts to integrate better information technology and
delivery systems, policymakers should be mindful of the
powerful role of consumers in creating demand for modernization in
technology and care delivery. With a market-driven health care
system, consumer demand for quality information and efficiencies
would force providers to adopt the necessary information technology
improvements to remain competitive, thereby making these
improvements broadly available to consumers.
Much of the same holds
true for disease management and preventive care measures.
Efforts to incorporate these components into health care
delivery are continuing, but they will intensify once patients are
financially rewarded for collaborating directly with providers to
stay healthy when possible and better manage their own care when
necessary.[41]
Senator Kerry's "New
Compact" to Cover Adults and All Children
Senator Kerry proposes
several changes in the scope of eligibility for public health
programs, particularly Medicaid. He also advocates a number of
administrative changes in the Medicaid program, which is
administered by the states and supervised by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services in the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. Under this specific initiative,
Senator Kerry expects to enroll 18 million currently uninsured
children and adults in public health coverage.[42]
The New
Compact. Under the New Compact,
the federal government would assume the full cost of the estimated
20 million children enrolled in Medicaid, and states must agree to
(1) expand eligibility and enroll all eligible children up to 300
percent of the federal poverty level (FPL, $56,550 for a family of
four); (2) expand coverage to working parents of children
eligible for public coverage up to 200 percent of the FPL ($37,700
for a family of four), who would receive an enhanced federal
matching contribution; and (3) agree to cover childless adults up
to the FPL ($9,310 for an individual).[43]
Senator Kerry would
also make several administrative changes in public program
enrollment. He proposes instituting automatic public coverage
enrollment for children in schools, requiring states to adopt a
12-month continuous coverage policy that would allow individuals to
remain on public coverage for an entire year regardless of a change
in their eligibility status, and placing "eligibility workers" in
community health centers to qualify and enroll families in public
coverage.[44] Senator Kerry also proposes removing the
five-year waiting period for legal-immigrant pregnant women and
children to qualify for public coverage and allowing disabled
children to remain on public coverage after their parents return to
work.[45]
According to the Lewin
Group, Senator Kerry's Medicaid initiative would cost $553.1
billion over 10 years.[46]
Analysis.
The Kerry plan
directly increases government responsibility for health care
coverage for more Americans, expanding public coverage up the
income scale and well into the middle class. The policy, in effect,
is a retreat from the more desirable goal of enabling all
Americans, including lower-income working families, to gain access
to superior private health care coverage, which most uninsured
Americans want for themselves. Specifically, the Kerry plan
would:
Create greater
dependency on a troubled government-run health care
system. This includes Medicaid,
SCHIP, or both. States are already struggling to maintain and
manage their public health programs, especially Medicaid. Most
states have adopted a variety of cost-containment strategies in
order to rein in program costs. Especially in Medicaid, states
have turned to cutting already low provider payments and
limiting access to prescription drugs,[47] both of which will
undoubtedly affect quality and access to care. In SCHIP, many
states have stopped outreach efforts, and some states have cut
eligibility or restricted benefits in response to budget issues.[48]
Medicaid in particular
is in serious trouble. Physician reimbursement is low, and a
lot of doctors are not taking new Medicaid patients. While the
federal government would assume responsibility for covering
children in middle-class families, under the Kerry plan, the
states would still struggle to serve a growing number of elderly
and disabled. The Kaiser Family Foundation reports that while the
elderly and disabled are only 25 percent of enrollees, they account
for 70 percent of Medicaid spending.[49] The Kerry proposal does
little to reform Medicaid; it only increases its huge
cost.
Crowd out existing
private coverage options. Research shows that
such public program expansions, such as Medicaid expansions,
have crowded out private insurance coverage, inducing employers to
drop those eligible for public coverage.[50] For example, David Cutler
of Harvard University and Jonathan Gruber of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology found that Medicaid expansions led to a 15
percent decline in private insurance among the affected populations
between 1987 and 1992.[51] Likewise, Urban Institute
researchers Lisa Dubay and Genevieve Kenny found that among
pregnant women with incomes between 100 percent and 185
percent of poverty, Medicaid coverage was associated with a 52
percent decline in employer-sponsored coverage.[52]
A Better
Approach. The best health care
policy for low-income individuals and families is not to create
greater dependency on the government, but to help mainstream them
into private health insurance, which the majority of Americans
enjoy today. In this respect, Medicaid policy should track welfare
policy with the objective of moving people off government-run
public health programs and helping them to obtain superior private
health care coverage for themselves.
Policymakers should
also have greater flexibility to restructure and improve service
for those who are currently enrolled. For example, they should
aggressively pursue direct subsidies, such as vouchers, to help
lower-income individuals and families obtain private health
coverage. Policymakers should also consider integrating and
expanding consumer-directed models into these health programs.
Recently, the potential of this approach has been powerfully
demonstrated by the success of Medicaid's experimental Cash and
Counseling programs.[53]
How Senator Kerry Would
Expand Coverage Through Tax Credits and Subsidies
Senator Kerry has also
proposed a series of initiatives to expand coverage for
individuals and families, including tax credits and/or
subsidies to individuals and small businesses and giving
individuals and businesses access to the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program.
Using Tax Credits and
Subsidies. Senator Kerry proposes
to provide a complex array of tax credits and subsidies to make
health care coverage more affordable for Americans. For small
businesses and their employees, the Kerry plan would provide a
refundable tax credit worth up to 50 percent of the cost of
coverage.[54] For individuals without coverage,
the Kerry plan would provide assistance for those costs above 6
percent of an individual's income.[55] To assist those who have
lost their jobs, unemployed individuals would receive a 75 percent
tax credit "to assure [that] workers can keep their health
insurance when they are between jobs."[56] Individuals close to
retirement (those between ages 55 and 64) would also receive a 25
percent tax credit for the cost of their health care.[57]
Together, according to
the Lewin Group, these credits would total $384.9 billion over 10
years.[58]
As a major vehicle for
the tax credit policy, Senator Kerry also proposes opening the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program-the plan that serves
Members of Congress, federal employees, and retired federal
workers-to small and large businesses and to individuals through a
special pooling arrangement.
Analysis.
Health care tax
credits, which have gained broad bipartisan support over the years,
can make health care coverage more affordable. In that respect, the
Senator's proposal is commendable. Nonetheless, a few
observations are in order:
Tax credits targeted at
employer-sponsored coverage are misguided and discourage the
evolution of a consumer-oriented health care system.
Senator Kerry's
proposal to give tax credits to small businesses "and their
employees" misses the point of tax credit policy. The point is to
expand personal choice, not the options of employers.
Today's tax code
discriminates against those who purchase their coverage outside the
workplace because individuals who obtain coverage through
their workplace already receive a tax benefit insofar as the value
of the health plan is not included as part of the employee's
taxable income. In 2004, federal tax breaks alone are expected to
be $188 billion.[59] However, an individual that purchases
coverage outside the workplace must use after-tax dollars to do so.
Tax credits are a tool to help level the playing field for those
individuals who do not have employer-sponsored coverage, not a way
to make employer-sponsored coverage more generous. Tax credits
should be used as an efficient way to assist individuals who
purchase coverage outside the workplace.
Second, while
refundable tax credits are an efficient way to distribute
assistance to individuals in need, targeting them to small
businesses is not. Businesses, both large and small, already get
unlimited tax breaks for offering health insurance coverage. Thus,
the Kerry plan is simply another way to entice small employers
to provide health care coverage. There are a variety of reasons why
small businesses in particular are not an efficient vehicle for the
delivery of health coverage to workers, including higher worker
turnover rates and a greater share of marginal workers (part-time
and seasonal) than is found among larger employers.[60]
The Kerry policy
strongly reinforces the existing third-party (employer and
insurer) system that tightly controls the plans and benefits
available to workers and their families. It also does little either
to help create portability (so workers do not have to depend on
their workplace or work status for health insurance) or to
promote continuity of care. The funding for additional tax breaks
for employers should be used to make individual health care tax
credits more generous.
The various tax credits
and subsidies for individuals are missing critical
details. While the Kerry
proposal does target tax credits and subsidies to those who do
not have employer-sponsored coverage, the details of their
application are missing. For example, the Kerry plan would provide
laid-off workers with a 75 percent tax credit "to assure [that]
workers can keep their health insurance when they are between
jobs."[61] Does this imply that workers receiving
the tax credit would be able to use the credit only to maintain
their existing (but costly) employer-sponsored coverage (i.e.,
COBRA coverage) or enrollment in the proposed Congressional
Health Plan (CHP), or could they use the credit to obtain other
coverage that would best reflect their own wants and needs?
Would there be restrictions on the types of policies to which an
individual could apply the credit, such as prohibiting the use of
the credit for health savings accounts? The text of the Senator's
description of the range of eligible consumer options is
unclear.[62]
Answers to these and
other questions are vital in assessing the proposal and its likely
impact on personal freedom. How they are answered would reveal
whether or not these health care tax credits and subsidies would
help to transform the health care system to a consumer-based
system or to one that remains employer-based but heavily regulated
by the federal government.
A Better
Approach. Senator Kerry's
reliance on health care tax credits to expand coverage reflects an
increasingly bipartisan approach to the problem of the uninsured.
Health care tax credits are the key to expanding affordable
coverage for millions of individuals and families. They are also
the key to transforming the health insurance market from one that
is dominated by employers, insurers, and government-run health care
to a new system that is based on consumer choice and
competition.
Much depends, however,
on how these credits are structured and administered. Policymakers
should build on the framework of individual tax credits. Targeting
a refundable and advanceable tax credit to individuals and families
in need would be a more effective use of federal dollars than using
them to perpetuate distorted features of the status quo.
A new tax credit
program could begin to move the health care system into a more
consumer-oriented model in which individuals could own their
own policies and maintain coverage regardless of their place of
work or work status. Employers could continue to assist with their
employees' health costs, but with greater flexibility. Instead of
controlling the coverage, employers could simply provide a direct
contribution to the plan of their employee's choice.
How Senator Kerry Would
Use the FEHBP to Expand Coverage
Perhaps the most
dramatic provision of Senator Kerry's health plan is his proposal
to use the FEHBP as a vehicle to cover the uninsured. For
administrative purposes, there would be a pool, the Congressional
Health Plan, that is separate from the existing pool of federal
employees and retirees.[63] This approach is intended to provide
individuals with more affordable coverage, more choices, and lower
premiums, as well as to give small businesses greater market clout
and help reduce administrative costs.[64]
For large employers to
participate in the CHP, the proposal requires that they maintain
the current level of contribution and "not selectively segment
their workforce into the CHP."[65] In other words, they must
agree to send all, not just some, of their employees to the CHP.
This is designed to curtail adverse selection in the program, the
congregation of high risks in a few plans, and setting off high
costs and instability in the market. Moreover, as with high-cost
patients in private insurance, the Senator's premium rebate
provision would apply to the high-cost enrollees in the
FEHBP.
Analysis.
The Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program is the world's largest group
health insurance program, covering more than 8 million federal
workers, retirees, and their families. It has a clear record of
success in controlling health care costs, providing a variety of
choices in health plans and benefits, and achieving high levels of
consumer satisfaction.[66]
This is why many health
policy analysts, including those at The Heritage Foundation,
have long promoted the FEHBP as a model for Medicare reform,
particularly for the baby-boom generation.[67] It is also why
many health policy analysts seeking a more efficient and effective
state-based and consumer-driven market have suggested, with careful
qualifications, the comparatively light regulatory regime that
governs the FEHBP as a far superior alternative to the imposition
of benefit mandates in state-based health insurance
markets.
The FEHBP's success is
based on personal choice and market competition. It is not based on
the generosity of the employer's contribution to coverage or
the richness of its benefit package.[68] In any case, there is no
one FEHBP benefits package. The program includes a variety of
benefits packages that reflect different offerings by different
plans (including health savings accounts) with different
levels of premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and coinsurance.
This is a crucial point overlooked by congressional spokesmen
who routinely tell the public that they favor giving ordinary
Americans the "same" benefits that Members of Congress
enjoy.
There is a world of
difference, however, between proposing the FEHBP as a model
for health care reform and using the program itself as the primary
vehicle for enrolling the uninsured. Indeed, certain prescriptions
for the Congressional Health Plan outlined by Senator Kerry are the
polar opposite of current practices in the FEHBP, meaning that the
dynamics of CHP would be very different from today's FEHBP. These
crucial differences would result in profoundly different program
dynamics, negatively affecting the FEHBP itself.
First, the FEHBP is, broadly
speaking, a "defined contribution" program in which the government
as employer contributes up to 75 percent of the cost of a premium
for a plan in the program. (Federal employees cannot take the
government's contribution and buy a plan outside the program.)
The government contribution is annually calculated on the
basis of the weighted average of premiums that prevail in the
FEHBP market and capped each year at a specific dollar amount. If
any given plan is more expensive than the capped amount, the
federal worker pays the full difference between the government
contribution and the premium. With frugal plan purchase,
therefore, there is also a definite limit to the taxpayers'
exposure.
By contrast, in the
proposed Congressional Health Plan, at whatever level employers or
individuals contribute, the various tax breaks and
subsidies to offset the premium costs are simply raw
percentages of the cost of plan premiums, with no fixed dollar cap.
For individuals, under the Kerry plan, health insurance premiums
could not exceed 6 percent of personal income. Presumably, even if
a person were to choose the most expensive plan available through
the FEHBP, there would be no limit on the credit or subsidy but the
raw percentage of the premium. This would significantly
increase the taxpayers' exposure, while the program's cost
would increase.
Second,
in the FEHBP
today, competing health plans, not the taxpayers, assume the risk.
The federal government is not self-insured. Because the health
plans assume the risks, those that do not manage risk well,
including the serious risks of high cost enrollees, end up losing
market share or leaving the program.
In the proposed
Congressional Health Plan, as in the FEHBP itself, Senator Kerry's
proposed "premium rebate" for high-cost enrollees would apply,
meaning that taxpayers, as noted, would assume the full cost of
high risks, starting at the $30,000 threshold in 2006. This is a
radical break from current FEHBP practice. According to the
official description of the Kerry plan, it
will provide uninsured
individuals protection from unaffordable premiums by providing
assistance with costs above six percent of their income. In
addition, a 'premium rebate pool' for certain high cost health
cases will help reduce health care costs for all Americans. It will
help assure that premiums in the Congressional Health Plan are
affordable.[69]
This expansion of
taxpayers' exposure, so radically unlike today's FEHBP, will
guarantee soaring costs in the program.
The Kerry plan would
also change the governance of the program because the rules
governing the Congressional Health Plan presumably are to be the
same as those in the traditional FEHBP. The rising costs and
differences in financing and cost sharing would surely invite a
much heavier level of regulation by officials at the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM). That heavier regulation would further
transform the FEHBP into a program very different from the one
that exists today.
Limitations of the
FEHBP. The FEHBP is a unique
employment-based health insurance plan. It is designed as
employment-based coverage for federal employees and retirees, a
significantly older population that is different in many respects
from the general population, let alone the uninsured
population. The rates and benefits that prevail in the FEHBP
reflect that simple fact.
Federal workers and
retirees comprise a unique health insurance pool. It is an older
cohort of the American population. The average age of the federal
workforce is roughly 47 years,[70] and FEHBP enrollment
is also open to federal retirees, who comprise roughly 40 percent
of total enrollment. Thus, the average age of the FEHBP enrollee is
61.[71]
As a workforce, the
federal employees are largely middle-class with an overall average
annual salary of $55,715, while federal workers in the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area have an average salary of $71,139.[72]
Not surprisingly, the economic and demographic profile of this
community is reflected in the FEHBP's rates and benefits, and 85
percent of federal employees choose to enroll.[73] For calendar year
2005, based on OPM's 2004 negotiations with private health plans,
the average single premium is $4,733; the average family premium is
$10, 756.[74]
The Congressional
Health Plan will thus likely experience certain difficult problems.
For example:
FEHBP benefits are
likely to be very expensive for younger uninsured
workers. According to the
official description of the Kerry plan, "John Kerry believes that
all Americans should have access to the same affordable
coverage policies that Members of Congress get today." [75] A
key detail is whether the benefit packages in the CHP must be
exactly the same as the benefit packages in the FEHBP.
But if the benefit
levels in the Congressional Health Plan are to be the same as those
in the FEHBP, benefits packages are going to be expensive for a
much younger, lower-income, working, uninsured population that is
disproportionately concentrated in small businesses. In fact,
more than one-third of all uninsured people have incomes below the
federal poverty level.[76] If potential enrollees could purchase
cheaper health insurance elsewhere, getting better value for the
money, there would be no obvious reason for them to enroll in the
CHP.
Unlike the traditional
FEHBP, the new CHP would likely suffer from serious adverse
selection. Even though the FEHBP
is a pluralistic system of competing health plans with a wide
variety of choice, it does not suffer from significant adverse
selection. Instead, it is a remarkably stable health insurance
market. A key reason for this is the generosity of the
government's defined contribution-up to 75 percent of the
cost of the health plan-which encourages younger federal employees
to select more generous coverage and thus encourages a more even
age distribution in the program.[77]
The CHP is unlikely to
replicate the FEHBP performance in mitigating adverse selection.
Much depends on whether the Senator's proposed business tax
credits or subsidies could be used more effectively to purchase
health insurance packages that are more affordable than those that
prevail in the FEHBP. A 50 percent small business tax credit,
combined with the specified 50 percent premium payment, may still
not be attractive to firms willing to accept government conditions
for enrolling all of their employees in the CHP. Many younger and
healthier uninsured workers are in small firms, and FEHBP-level
plans may be either unaffordable or unattractive for them.[78]
Other details also
matter. The FEHBP's underwriting rules presumably would be the
same in the CHP. The FEHBP has a crude form of "community rating"
in which older and sicker persons pay the same rates as younger and
healthier persons. For the young and healthy, these underwriting
rules may make the benefits packages less attractive or
affordable, and the tax credits and subsidies may still not be
enough to induce enrollment in the CHP.[79] Once again, there would be
no reason for them to enroll in the CHP if they could purchase less
expensive health care coverage elsewhere.
However, for persons
with health care costs that are high compared to their income-
regardless of their age or job status-enrollment in the CHP,
with enormous back-end taxpayer subsidies for their premiums
and high-end costs, could prove irresistible. Moreover, they would
have a powerful incentive to enroll in one of the richer and more
expensive plans that participate in the program.
Assuming, once again,
that the rules for the new CHP would be the same as those for the
FEHBP, there could be no pre-existing condition exclusions,
and there would be no risk-adjustment mechanism. By attracting
older and sicker enrollees over time, the premiums in the
Congressional Health Plan would likely discourage younger and
healthier enrollees, who make up the bulk of the uninsured
population.
It is also unclear
whether all of the health plans that provide coverage nationally to
federal workers and retirees would also be required to provide
coverage to the uninsured nationally under the Congressional Health
Plan. Presumably, they would, and the rules would be the same.
Because these are very different populations, with very
different experiences, this could be a crucial question for these
national plans, determining their participation and thus the
success of the CHP.
The Congressional
Health Plan would likely become an engine of federal control rather
than a force to promote free-market competition.
The FEHBP's
success is not based on efficient administration by the career
civil servants at the Office of Personnel Management. It is
based on its free-market principles of consumer choice and
competition, and a historic hesitation on the part of government
officials to micromanage the program.
Given the key elements
of the Kerry proposal-particularly insistence on the
taxpayers' assumption of risks and high-end costs and the
potential for adverse selection-a Congressional Health Plan created
within the FEHBP would likely devolve into an overregulated,
government-controlled system of limited competition, with consumer
choice restricted to a government-standardized benefits package
offered by a few, select plans commissioned by the federal
government. Since the two pools could not coexist in the same
program with radically different rules-one set for federal workers
and another for non-federal enrollees-it is likely that the
traditional FEHBP would be altered beyond recognition.
A Better
Approach. The FEHBP is a
successful program because of its wide range of choice and
competition, but it is not perfect.
Rather than trying to
use the FEHBP as a primary vehicle to cover the uninsured, which
involves a variety of difficult administrative problems,
policymakers should use it as a model. They should
build on the best features of the FEHBP-including broad consumer
choice, market competition, and a light regulatory regime-and
encourage the states to create statewide pooling arrangements
based on these principles. In so doing, the states could also
experiment with new insurance rules to expand coverage and new
risk-adjustment mechanisms or reinsurance
arrangements.
Unlike the FEHBP,
states should also allow premium variations based on age and
health risk, as well as establish a private-sector-administered
reinsurance pool to mitigate potential adverse selection problems.
Moreover, a refundable tax credit approach would be more productive
with insurance products that are already available within the
existing individual market.[80]
Such an approach could
replicate the best features of the FEHBP while allowing
variations in health care financing and delivery peculiar to the
conditions that prevail in the states.
Financing the Kerry
Health Proposals
There are a variety of
cost estimates on the Kerry health plan. In any case, as Jeff
Lemieux, executive director of Centrists.Org and former
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyst, has observed, "Taken as
a whole, the Kerry plan is very expensive."[81]
Professor Ken Thorpe of
Emory University, a nationally prominent health policy analyst who
served in the Clinton Administration, says the Kerry plan would
cost an estimated $653 billion over 10 years.[82] For this proposed
expenditure, he estimates that the Kerry plan would secure a net
increase of insurance coverage for about 27 million
Americans.[83]
However, more recent
estimates conducted by other independent health analysts conclude
that the Kerry plan would impose a much higher cost. According to a
report prepared by Joseph Antos and his colleagues for the American
Enterprise Institute, the Kerry plan would cost $1.5 trillion over
10 years.[84] The Lewin Group, a leading econometric
firm specializing in health care policy, concluded that the Kerry
plan would cost $1.25 trillion over 10 years.[85] These two
analyses roughly substantiate an earlier projection by
analysts at the National Center for Policy Analysis, who
estimated that the Kerry plan would cost in excess of $1 trillion
over 10 years.[86]
Senator Kerry proposes
to pay for his health care initiatives through new tax initiatives,
particularly by rolling back President Bush's tax cuts for
upper-income families with an annual income of more than $200,000.
This would include raising the two top tax rates from 33 percent to
35 percent and from 36 percent to 39.6 percent, respectively. The
Kerry plan would also reverse the Bush tax cuts on capital gains
and dividends for upper-income families and preserve, rather
than end, the estate tax. The Senator would also repeal additional
Medicare payments to private health plans in Medicare.[87]
The Heritage
Foundation's Center for Data Analysis estimates that the
proposed Kerry personal tax rate changes for these upper-income
Americans alone would generate total revenues of only $174.3
billion over the period 2005-2014.[88] Moreover, the Senator's
total tax and spending package would increase, not decrease, the
budget deficit.[89] Based on the preponderance of empirical
analyses, the proposed tax increases are unlikely to cover the
costs of the Kerry plan.
Analysis.
Assumptions are
key in making cost projections. Different assumptions yield very
different estimates.
For example, Professor
Thorpe included assumptions concerning Senator Kerry's
promotion of disease management techniques and the broader
dissemination of information technology. He assumed that disease
management would save almost $116 billion over 10 years-a
substantial reduction in health care costs.[90] The Lewin Group
estimated that the Kerry plan's disease management initiatives
would save $22.3 billion over 10 years.[91]
There is a long and
undistinguished record of analysts making assumptions about the
future costs of health care programs, particularly those with a
large government component. If anything, there is a tendency to
underestimate the true costs of health programs, particularly
government health programs. This caution applies with special force
to the Kerry health proposals because the incentives are geared
toward increasing rather than containing health care
spending.
Conclusion
Senator Kerry has
proposed a major set of health policy proposals that, if enacted,
would increase health care federal spending well in excess of $1
trillion during the first 10 years of their
implementation.
The Senator's plan
amounts to a major expansion of government programs-including
Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program, and
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program-as vehicles to
secure insurance coverage for the uninsured. Meanwhile, the
Senator has also proposed that the federal government assume the
bulk of the most expensive claims incurred in private health
insurance, thus shifting the heaviest health care costs to the
federal taxpayer. This arrangement would be accompanied by a
much higher level of federal regulation over employment-based
health care than exists today.
In fact, the Kerry plan
is a wide array of distinct proposals that touch everything from
disease management and information technology to medical
malpractice and prescription drug coverage. Perhaps the most
dramatic provision of the Senator's plan is his proposal to open
the FEHBP to the uninsured, putting employers and employees in a
special pool called the Congressional Health Plan. Because of the
Senator's proposed changes, however, the FEHBP would not work
as it does today.
Based on independent
estimates, it appears that the Senator's proposals would
significantly increase federal health care spending while
substantially reducing the number of Americans who are without
insurance coverage. At the same time, he would refrain from
undertaking any substantial reform of either private health
insurance markets or government health care programs, including
Medicaid. While existing third-party payment arrangements would be
retained and expanded, individuals and families would still be
unable to own and control their health insurance policies. In that
respect, the Senator's proposals fall far short of comprehensive
reform.
Robert E. Moffit,
Ph.D., is Director of, Nina Owcharenko
is Senior Policy Analyst for Health Care in, and Edmund F.
Haislmaier is Visiting Research Fellow in the Center for Health
Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
[1]For example, see
John Sheils and Randall Haught, "Bush and Kerry Health Care
Proposals: Cost and Coverage Compared," Lewin Group, September 21,
2004, at
www.lewin.com/NR/rdonlyres/
e3atrfxcgu4ge5exrxwbqcespnrtjpckiofchqjmc47
ucccnysofc25cdom67s42ng2b446i7dnfyj/
LewinAnalysisCandidatesProposals.pdf
(September 30, 2004); Joseph Antos, Roland (Guy) King, Donald
Muse, Tom Wildsmith, and Judy Xathopoulos, "Analyzing the Kerry and
Bush Health Proposals: Estimates of Cost and Impact," American
Enterprise Institute, September 13, 2004, at
www.aei.org/docLib/20040913_KerryBushHealthPlans.pdf
(September 30, 2004); John C. Goodman and Devron M. Herrick, "The
Case Against John Kerry's Health Plan," National Center for Policy
Analysis NCPA Study No. 269, September 10, 2004, at
www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st269 (September 30, 2004). Professor
Kenneth Thorpe of Emory University offers a more modest ten year
cost estimate of $653 billion. See Kenneth Thorpe, "Federal Costs
and Savings Associated with Senator Kerry's Health Care Plan,"
Emory University, August 2, 2004, at
www.sph.emory.edu/hpm/thorpe/kerry-8-23-04.pdf (September
30, 2004).
[2]Kerry-Edwards 2004,
"John Kerry's Plan to Make Health Care Affordable to Every
American," at www.johnkerry.com/issues/
health_care/health_care.html (September 16, 2004).
[3]Ibid., p. 10. The Lewin Group estimates the
reduction in the number of uninsured under Kerry's plan at 25.2
million, or 51 percent. See Sheils and Haught, "Bush and Kerry
Health Care Proposals," p. vi.
[4]As Jeff Lemieux, executive director of
Centrists.Org, notes, "Campaign proposals are designed to make
political points and illustrate conceptual policies. But the
cliché that 'the devil is in the details' is true." Jeff
Lemieux, "Senator Kerry's Health Proposal: Prospects for
Bipartisanship?" Centrists.Org., August 25, 2004.
[5]Thorpe, "Federal Costs and Savings
Associated with Senator Kerry's Health Care Plan," p. 1.
[6]Antos et al., "Analyzing the Kerry and Bush Health
Proposals," p. 1; Sheils and Haught, "Bush and Kerry Health Care
Proposals," p. 5; Goodman and Herrick, "The Case Against John
Kerry's Health Plan."
[7]For a bipartisan discussion of how the
current health care system should be changed, see Robert E. Moffit,
Ph.D., Daniel "Stormy" Johnson, M.D., Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D., Stan
Dorn, J.D., John Goodman, Ph.D., and Kenneth Thorpe, Ph.D., "A
Vision for Health System Change," Heritage Foundation
Lecture No. 848,
August 12, 2004, at www.heritage.org/research/
healthcare/hl848.cfm.
8]Joseph Antos, "Kerry, Bush, and the
Uninsured," American Enterprise Institute Health Policy
Outlook,
September-October 2004, p. 3.
[9]John C. Goodman, "Kerrycare," The
Wall Street Journal,
August 26, 2004, p. A12.
[10]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Coverage Affordable to Every American," pp.
1-6.
[11]Ibid., p. 2.
[12]Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[13]Sheils and Haught, "Bush and Kerry
Health Care Proposals," p. 8.
[14]"Presidential
Prescriptions for Our Ailing Health Care System,"
Contingencies,
September/October 2004, p. 28.
[15]On the flaws of the current health
insurance markets and the problem of cost shifting, see Michael E.
Porter and Elizabeth Olmstead Teisberg, "Redefining Competition in
Health Care," Harvard Business Review, June 2004, pp. 65-76.
[16]Antos,
"Kerry, Bush, and the Uninsured," p. 3.
[18]Sarah Lueck, "Businesses Are Wary of
Kerry Health Plan," The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2004, p. A4.
[19]Soaring costs would doubtless encourage
federal officials to resort to price controls or access controls,
or tougher standards for "medical necessity" and "appropriateness,"
thereby hurting precisely the persons the plan is designed to
help.
[20]For an indication of the managerial
problems that continue to plague Medicare, see Robert E. Moffit,
"Congress Should Think Twice About Allowing the Medicare
Bureaucracy to Manage a Drug Benefit," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No.
1583, September 9, 2002, at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg1583.cfm.
[21]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," p. 3.
[22]Ibid.
[23]Ibid.
[24]For further discussion, see Nina
Owcharenko, "Why Maine Rx Is the Wrong Model for Improving Access
to Prescription Drugs," Heritage Foundation WebMemo
No. 282, May 28, 2003, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm282.cfm, and Derek
Hunter, "Government Controls on Access to Drugs: What Seniors Can
Learn from Medicaid Drug Policies," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 1655, May 27, 2003, at www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/bg1655.cfm.
[25]As Jeff Lemieux
notes, "Government price setting in health care-however
indirect-can have long term negative side effects that consumers in
search of instant gratification may not perceive or comprehend."
Lemieux, "Senator Kerry's Health Proposal."
[26]On this point, see Edmund F. Haislmaier,
"Compromising Quality: The High Cost of Government Drug
Purchasing," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder
No. 1764, May 25, 2004, at www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/bg1764.cfm.
[27]For example, the Senator would
reintroduce "patients bill of rights" legislation, providing for
new avenues of litigation against HMOs. According to the Lewin
Group, this proposal would increase private health insurance
premium costs by an estimated $108.9 billion over 10 years. Sheils
and Haught, "Bush and Kerry Health Care Proposals," p.
13.
[28]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," pp.
3-4.
[29]Ibid., p. 4.
[30]Ibid.
[31]Sheils and Haught, "Bush and Kerry
Health Care Proposals," p. 12.
[32]See John C. Nelson, M.D., M.P.H., "Dying
for Help: Are Patients Needlessly Suffering Due to the High Cost of
Medical Liability Insurance," testimony before the
Subcommittee on Human Rights and Wellness, Committee on Government
Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 1, 2003, at
www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/mlr_dying_for_help.pdf.
[33]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," p. 4.
[34]Ibid., pp. 4-5.
[35]Christopher Conover, Ph.D., "Health Care
Costs and the Uninsured," testimony before the Joint Economic
Committee, U.S. Congress, May 13, 2004, p. 11, at
jec.senate.gov/_files/ConoverTestimony051304.pdf (September
30, 2004).
[36]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," p. 5.
[37]Ibid.
[38]Ibid., p. 6.
[39]Ibid., p. 5.
[40]Ibid., p. 6.
[41]For a discussion of the experience of
consumer-directed health plans, see Grace-Marie Turner, "New
Studies Show Consumer-Directed Care Reduces Costs and Improves
Access," Galen Institute Health Issues, July 21, 2004, at www.galen.org/
fileuploads/New_Studies.pdf (September 30, 2004).
[42]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," p. 6.
[43]Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[44]Ibid., p. 6.
[45]Ibid., p. 7.
[46]Sheils and Haught, "Bush and Kerry
Health Care Proposals," p. 8.
[47]Vernon Smith, Rekha Ramesh, Kathleen
Gifford, Eileen Ellis, Victoria Wachino, and Molly O'Malley,
"States Respond to Fiscal Pressure: A 50-State Update of State
Medicaid Spending Growth and Cost Containment Actions," Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Kaiser Family
Foundation, January 2004, at
www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/
commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=30453
(September 30, 2004).
[48]Vernon K. Smith, Ph.D., David M.
Rousseau, M.P.H., and Molly O'Malley, M.P.P., "SCHIP Program
Enrollment: December 2003 Update," Kaiser Commission on Medicaid
and the Uninsured, Kaiser Family Foundation, July 2004, at
www.kff.org/ medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=44443
(September 30, 2004).
[49] Kaiser Commission
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Kaiser Family Foundation, "Medicaid:
Fiscal Challenges to Coverage," Policy Brief, August 2003,
at
www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?
url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=31732
(September 30, 2004).
[50]Antos, "Kerry,
Bush, and the Uninsured," p. 5.
[51]David Cutler and
Jonathan Gruber, "Medicaid and Private Insurance: Evidence and
Implications," Health Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1
(January/February 1997), pp. 196-198, at
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/16/1/194 (September
30, 2004).
[52]Cited in Rick
Curtis and Anne Page, "Improving Health Care Coverage for Low
Income Children and Pregnant Women: Public and Employer Financed
Coverage Relations," Institute for Health Policy
Solutions, December 17,
1996, p. 10.
[53]For a discussion of the Cash and
Counseling program, see Stacy Dale, Randall Brown, Barbara
Phillips, Jennifer Schore, and Barbara Lepidus Carlson, "The
Effects of Cash and Counseling on Personal Care Services and
Medicaid Costs in Arkansas," Health Affairs Web exclusive, November 13, 2003, at
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.566v1
(September 30, 2004), and Leslie Foster, Randall Brown,
Barbara Phillips, Jennifer Schore, and Barbara Lepidus Carlson,
"Improving the Quality of Medicaid Personal Assistance Through
Consumer Direction," Health Affairs Web exclusive, March 23,
2003, at
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.162v1
(September 30, 2004).
[54]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," p. 9.
[55]Ibid.
[56]Ibid., p. 10.
[57]Ibid.
[58]Sheils and Haught, "Bush and Kerry
Health Care Proposals," p. 8. Urban Institute researchers have a
more modest estimate of $177 billion over 10 years. See Leonard
Burman and Jeffrey Rohaly, "Senator Kerry's Tax Proposals," Urban
Institute and Tax Policy Center, July 23, 2004, p. 1.
[59]John Sheils and Randall Haught, "The
Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004," Health
Affairs Web exclusive,
February 25, 2004, p. 1, at
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.106v1
(September 30, 2004).
[60]For further discussion, see Stuart M.
Butler, Ph.D., "Reducing Uninsurance by Reforming Health Insurance
in the Small-Business Sector," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No.
1769, June 17, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/
bg1769.cfm.
[61]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," p.
10.
[62]For example, in the
description of the Kerry health care tax credit for Americans
between ages 55 and 64, the text reads: "John Kerry's plan will
give this population access to a variety of plan choices
under an affordable group plan [emphasis added]." Kerry-Edwards
2004, "John Kerry's Plan to Make Health Care Affordable to Every
American," p. 10. While this may or may not include association
health plans or other emerging forms of group insurance, it appears
to preclude a right to purchase individual health insurance. With
the 50 percent business tax credit, the Kerry language discusses it
in the context of the Congressional Health Plan but does not
state that the CHP is the only permissible option for small
businesses. However, in Professor Thorpe's analysis, the Kerry
business tax credit is seemingly tied to enrollment in the new
Congressional Health Plan, and the 75 percent tax credit for
workers between jobs seems to be restricted either to COBRA
coverage or to enrollment in the CHP. See Thorpe, "Federal Costs
and Savings Associated with Senator Kerry's Health Care Plan," p.
2.
[63]Kerry-Edwards 2004,
"John Kerry's Plan to Make Health Care Affordable to Every
American," pp. 8-9.
[64]Ibid., p. 9. It is worth noting that, since
the Office of Personnel Management has plenary authority to
negotiate rates and benefits within the FEHBP, any participating
businesses, large or small, would be the passive beneficiaries of
OPM's exercise of "market clout."
[65]Ibid., p. 10.
[66]On these points, consult Walton J.
Francis, "The FEHBP As a Model for Medicare Reform: Separating Fact
from Fiction," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1674, August 7, 2003, at www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/bg1674.cfm.
[67]See Walton J. Francis, "Using the
Federal Employees' Model: Nine Tests for Rational Medicare Reform,"
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1675, August 7, 2003, at
www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/bg1675.cfm. See also
Robert E. Moffit, "What the GAO Says About the Best Model for
Medicare Reform," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1625,
February 21, 2003, at www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/bg1625.cfm.
[68]Historically, private corporate benefit
packages have been more generous than those traditionally available
in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.
[69]Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John Kerry's Plan
to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," p. 9.
[70]Kay Coles James, Director, U.S. Office
of Personnel Management, remarks before the American Association of
Health Plans National Policy Forum, February 25, 2004, p.
4.
[71]Kay Coles James, Director, U.S. Office
of Personnel Management, address to the Blue Cross, Blue Shield
Employees program, June 2, 2003, p. 6.
[72]U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics: Pay Structure of the
Federal Civil Service as of March 2002, December 2003, p. 2, at
www.opm.gov/feddata/02paystru.pdf (September 30,
2004).
[73]U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program Fact Sheet, September 14,
2004.
[74]Personal
communication with Walton Francis, editor, Checkbook's
Guide to Health Plans for Federal Employees, October 6,
2004.
[75]Kerry-Edwards 2004,
"John Kerry's Plan to Make Health Care Affordable to Every
American," p. 8.
[76]Stan Dorn, 'Towards Incremental
Progress: Key Facts About the Uninsured," Economic and Social
Research Institute ESRI Fact Sheet, September 2004.
[77]See Curtis S.
Florence and Kenneth E. Thorpe, "How Does the Employer Contribution
for the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program Influence
Plan Selection?" Health Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (March/April
2003), pp. 211-218, at content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/22/2/211 (September 30, 2004,
subscription required).
[78] The Kerry plan
references the Congressional Health Plan in connection with the 50
percent business tax credit, but the text does not indicate that
the CHP is the exclusive option. See Kerry-Edwards 2004, "John
Kerry's Plan to Make Health Care Affordable to Every American," p.
9.
[79]Even in the FEHBP, where federal
employees get a generous government contribution of up to 75
percent of their premium costs, about 8 percent of federal workers
do not enroll because they cannot afford the 25 percent of the
premium costs and the cost sharing. Personal communication with
Walton Francis, October 6, 2004.
[80]See estimates based
on analysis of 62,000 plans conducted by eHealthInsurance, one of
the nation's largest Internet brokers of health insurance. Derek
Hunter, "New Data on Health Insurance, the Working Poor, and the
Benefits of Health Care Tax Changes," Heritage Foundation
WebMemo No. 492, April 28, 2004, at www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/wm492.cfm.
[81]Lemieux, "Senator
Kerry's Health Proposal," p. 2.
[82]Thorpe, "Federal Costs and Savings
Associated with Senator Kerry's Health Care Plan," p. 1.
[83]Ibid., p. 5.
[84]Antos et al., "Analyzing the Kerry and Bush Health
Proposals," p. 1.
[85]Sheils and Haught, "Bush and Kerry
Health Care Proposals," p. 5.
[86]Goodman and Herrick, "The Case Against
John Kerry's Health Plan."
[87]This refers to the Medicare
"stabilization fund" created under the Medicare Modernization Act
of 2003 to encourage health plan participation. Repeal would yield
an estimated $14.4 billion over 10 years. See Thorpe, "Federal
Costs and Savings Associated with Senator Kerry's Health Care
Plan," p. 8.
[88]Estimates are based on a "static"
analysis. William W. Beach, Ralph A. Rector, Rea S. Hederman,
Alfredo Goyburu, and Tim Kane, "The Candidates' Tax Plans:
Comparing the Economic and Fiscal Effects of President George W.
Bush's and Senator John F. Kerry's Tax Proposals," Heritage
Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report No. CDA04-09, September 20, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/cda04-09.cfm.
[89]Brian M. Riedl, "Would Senator Kerry's
Budget Really Reduce the Deficit?" Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No.
1797, September 21, 2004, at www.heritage.org/reseachbudget/bg1797.cfm.
[90]Thorpe, "Federal Costs and Savings
Associated with Senator Kerry's Health Care Plan," p. 4, Table
1.
[91]Lewin Group, "Bush and Kerry Health Care
Proposals," p. 6.