Six
years ago, President Bill Clinton signed legislation overhauling
part of the nation's welfare system. The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193)
replaced the failed social program known as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) with a new program called Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). The reform legislation had
three goals: (1) to reduce welfare dependence and increase
employment; (2) to reduce child poverty; and (3) to reduce
illegitimacy and strengthen marriage.
At
the time of its enactment, liberal groups passionately denounced
the welfare reform legislation, predicting that it would result in
substantial increases in poverty, Hunger, and other social ills.
Contrary to these alarming forecasts, welfare reform has been
effective in meeting each of its goals.
- Overall poverty,
child poverty, and black child poverty have all dropped
substantially
Although liberals predicted that welfare reform would
push an additional 2.6 million persons into poverty, the U.S.
Bureau of the Census reports there are 3.5 million fewer people
living in poverty today than there were in 1995 (the last year
before the reform).
- Some 2.9 million
fewer children live in poverty today than in 1995
- Decreases in
poverty have been greatest among black children
In fact, the poverty rate for black children is now at
the lowest point in U.S. history. There are 1.2 million fewer black
children in poverty today than there were in the mid-1990s.
- Hunger among
children has been cut roughly in half
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
there are 420,000 fewer hungry children today than at the time
welfare reform was enacted.
- welfare
caseloads have been cut nearly in half
and employment of the most disadvantaged single mothers
has increased from 50 percent to 100 percent.
- The explosive
growth of out-of-wedlock childbearing has come to a virtual
halt
The share of children living in single-mother families
has fallen, and the share living in married-couple families has
increased, especially among black families.
Some
attribute these positive trends to the strong economy in the late
1990s. Although a strong economy contributed to some of these
trends, most of the positive changes greatly exceed similar trends
that occurred in prior economic expansions. The difference this
time is welfare reform.
welfare reform has substantially reduced
welfare's rewards for non-work, but much more remains to be done.
When TANF is reauthorized next year, federal work requirements
should be strengthened to ensure that states require all
able-bodied parents to engage in a supervised job search, community
service work, or skills training as a condition of receiving aid.
Even more important, Congress must recognize that the most
effective way to reduce child poverty and increase child well-being
is to increase the number of stable, productive marriages. In the
future, Congress must take active steps to reduce welfare
dependence by rebuilding and strengthening marriage.
PREDICTIONS OF SOCIAL DISASTER DUE TO
WELFARE REFORM
Six
years ago, when the welfare reform legislation was signed into law,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) proclaimed the new law to be
"the most brutal act of social policy since reconstruction."1 He
predicted, "Those involved will take this disgrace to their
graves."2
Marian Wright Edelman, president of the
Children's Defense Fund, declared the new reform law an
"outrage...that will hurt and impoverish millions of American
children." The reform, she said, "will leave a moral blot on
[Clinton's] presidency and on our nation that will never be
forgotten."3
The
Children's Defense Fund predicted that the reform law would
increase
child poverty nationwide by 12 percent...make
children hungrier...[and] reduce the incomes of one-fifth of all
families with children in the nation.4
The
Urban Institute issued a widely cited report predicting that the
new law would push 2.6 million people, including 1.1 million
children, into poverty. In addition, the study announced the new
law would cause one-tenth of all American families, including 8
million families with children, to lose income.5
The
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities asserted the new law would
increase the number of children who are poor and "make many
children who are already poor poorer still.... No piece of
legislation in U.S. history has increased the severity of poverty
so sharply [as the welfare reform will]."6
Patricia Ireland, president of the
National Organization for Women, stated that the new welfare law
"places 12.8 million people on welfare at risk of sinking further
into poverty and homelessness."7
Peter Edelman, husband of Marian Wright
Edelman and then Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at
the Department of Health and Human Services, resigned from the
Clinton Administration in protest over the signing of the new
welfare law. In an article entitled "The Worst Thing Bill Clinton
Has Done," Edelman dubbed the new law "awful" policy that would do
"serious injury to American children."8
Peter Edelman believed the reform law
would not merely throw millions into poverty, but also would
actively worsen virtually every existing social problem. "There
will be more malnutrition and more crime, increased infant
mortality, and increased drug and alcohol abuse," claimed Edelman.
"There will be increased family violence and abuse against children
and women." Moreover, the bill would fail even in the simple task
of "effectively" promoting work because "there simply are not
enough jobs now."9
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED
In
the six years since the welfare reform law was enacted, social
conditions have changed in exactly the opposite direction from that
predicted by liberal policy organizations. As noted above, overall
poverty, child poverty, black child poverty, poverty of single
mothers, and child Hunger have declined substantially. Employment
of single mothers increased dramatically, and welfare rolls
plummeted. The share of children living in single-mother families
fell, and -- more important -- the share of children living in
married-couple families grew, especially among black families.10
Opponents of reform would like to credit
many of these positive changes to a "good economy." However,
according to their predictions in 1996 and 1997, liberals expected
the welfare reform law to have disastrous results during good
economic times. They expected reform to increase poverty
substantially even during periods of economic growth; if a
recession did occur, they expected that far greater increases in
poverty than those mentioned above would follow. Thus, it is
disingenuous for opponents to argue in retrospect that the good
economy was responsible for the frustration of pessimistic
forecasts since the predicted dire outcomes were expected to occur
even in a strong economy.
Less
Poverty
Since the enactment of welfare reform in 1996, the
poverty rate has fallen from 13.8 percent in 1995 to 11.7 percent
in 2001. Liberals predicted that welfare reform would push an
additional 2.6 million people into poverty, but there are actually
3.5 million fewer people living in poverty today than there were
when the welfare reform law was enacted.11
Less Child
poverty
The child poverty rate has fallen from 20.8 percent in
1995 to 16.3 percent in 2001. In 1995, there were 14.6 million
children in poverty compared with 11.7 million in 2001. Though
liberals predicted that welfare reform would throw more than 1
million additional children into poverty, there are some 2.9
million fewer children living in poverty today than there were when
welfare reform was enacted.12
Less Black Child
poverty
The decline in poverty since welfare reform has been
particularly dramatic among black children. As Chart 1 shows, for a
quarter-century prior to welfare reform, there was little change in
black child poverty. Black child poverty was actually higher in
1995 (41.5 percent) than in 1971 (40.4 percent).

With
the enactment of welfare reform in 1996, black child poverty
plummeted at an unprecedented rate, falling by more than a quarter
to 30.0 percent in 2001. Over a six-year period after welfare
reform, 1.2 million black children were lifted out of poverty. In
2001, despite the recession, the poverty rate for black children
was at the lowest point in national history.13
Less Poverty
Among Children of Single Mothers
Since the enactment of welfare reform, the drop in child
poverty among children in single-mother families has been equally
dramatic. For a quarter-century before welfare reform, there was
little net decline in poverty in this group. poverty was only
slightly lower in 1995 (50.3 percent) than it had been in 1971
(53.1 percent). After the enactment of welfare reform, the poverty
rate for children of single mothers fell at a dramatic rate, from
50.3 percent in 1995 to 39.8 percent in 2001. In 2001, despite the
recession, the poverty rate for children in single-mother families
was at the lowest point in U.S. history.14
Dramatic
Reduction in Child Hunger
The number of children who are "hungry" has been cut
roughly in half since the enactment of welfare reform, according to
the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The USDA reports that in 1995,
the year before welfare reform was enacted, 887,000 children were
hungry; by 2001, the number had fallen to 467,000.15 In
percentage terms, the numbers fell from 1.3 percent of children in
1995 to 0.6 percent in 2001. Overall, there are more than 400,000
fewer hungry children today than at the time welfare reform was
enacted. (See Chart 2.)

Decrease in
"Severe poverty"
Liberals predicted that welfare reform would increase
"the severity of poverty." However, the number of children living
in "deep poverty" has declined appreciably. (Families in "deep
poverty" have incomes that are less than half the poverty income
level.) In 1995, there were 5.9 million children living in deep
poverty; by 2001, the number had fallen to 5.1 million.16
Plummeting
Welfare Dependence
The designers of welfare reform were concerned that
prolonged welfare dependence had negative effects on the
development of children. Their goal was to disrupt
inter-generational dependence by moving families with children off
the welfare rolls through increased work and marriage. Since the
enactment of welfare reform, welfare dependence has been cut by
more than half. The caseload in the former AFDC (now TANF) program
has fallen from 4.3 million families in August 1996 to 2.02 million
in September 2002. (See Chart 3.)

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the
decline in welfare dependence has been greatest among the most
disadvantaged and least employable single mothers -- the group with
the greatest tendency toward long-term dependence. Specifically,
dependence has fallen most sharply among young never-married
mothers who have low levels of education and young children.17This is
dramatic confirmation that welfare reform is affecting the whole
welfare caseload, not merely the most employable mothers.
Strikingly, the TANF caseload has
continued to decline even during the current recession. The
caseload has fallen from 2.109 million families in April 2001 at
the beginning of the recession to 2.017 million in September 2002
(the most recently measured month). This represents a net decline
in caseload of 4.4 percent since the beginning of the recession.
The continuing decline in welfare dependence during the recession
stands in sharp contrast to the 30 percent growth in the AFDC
caseload during the economic slowdown of the early 1990s.
Increased
Employment
Since the mid-1990s, the employment rate of single
mothers has increased dramatically. Again, contrary to conventional
wisdom, employment has increased most rapidly among the most
disadvantaged, least employable groups:
- Employment of never-married mothers has
increased nearly 50 percent.
- Employment of single mothers who are high
school dropouts has risen by two-thirds.
- Employment of young single mothers (ages
18 to 24) has nearly doubled.18
Thus, against conventional wisdom, the
effects of welfare reform have been the greatest among the most
disadvantaged single parents -- those with the greatest barriers to
self-sufficiency. Both decreases in dependence and increases in
employment have been most dramatic among those who have the
greatest tendency to long-term dependence; that is, among the
younger never-married mothers with little education.
A Halt in the
Rise of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing
After the beginning of the War on poverty, the
illegitimacy rate (the percentage of births outside of marriage)
increased enormously. For nearly three decades, out-of-wedlock
births as a share of all births rose steadily at a rate of almost
one percentage point per year. Overall, out-of-wedlock births rose
from 7.7 percent of all births in 1965 to an astonishing 32.6
percent in 1994. However, in the mid-1990s, the relentless 30-year
rise in illegitimacy came to an abrupt halt. For the past five
years, the out-of-wedlock birth rate has remained essentially flat.
(See Chart 4.)

Among blacks, the out-of-wedlock birth
rate actually fell from 70.4 percent in 1994 to 68.8 percent in
1999. Among whites, the rate rose slightly, from 25.5 percent to
26.7 percent, but the rate of increase was far slower than it had
been in the period prior to welfare reform.
A Shift Toward
Marriage
Throughout the War on poverty period, marriage eroded.
However, since the welfare reform was enacted, this negative trend
has begun to reverse. The share of children living with single
mothers has declined, while the share living with married couples
has increased.
This
change is most pronounced among blacks. Between 1994 and 1999, the
share of black children living with single mothers fell from 47.1
percent to 43.1 percent, while the share living with married
couples rose from 34.8 percent to 38.9 percent. Similar though
smaller shifts occurred among Hispanics.19
While these changes are small, they do
represent a distinct reversal of the prevailing negative trends of
the past four decades. If these shifts toward marriage are
harbingers of future social trends, they are the most positive and
significant news in all of welfare reform.
WHO GETS THE CREDIT? THE GOOD ECONOMY
VERSUS WELFARE REFORM
Some
would argue that the positive effects noted above are the product
of the robust economy during the 1990s rather than the results of
welfare reform. However, the evidence supporting an economic
interpretation of these changes is not strong.
Chart 3 shows the AFDC caseload from 1950
to 2000. On the chart, periods of economic recession are shaded,
and periods of economic growth are shown in white. Historically,
periods of economic growth have not resulted in lower welfare
caseloads. The chart shows eight periods of economic expansion
prior to the 1990s, yet none of these periods of growth led to a
significant drop in AFDC caseload. Indeed, during two previous
economic expansions (the late 1960s and the early 1970s), the
welfare caseload grew substantially. Only during the expansion of
the 1990s does the caseload drop appreciably.
How
was the economic expansion of the 1990s different from the eight
prior expansions? The answer is welfare reform.
Chart 3 does show that the national TANF
decline has slowed appreciably during the current recession, which
began in April 2001. Critics of reform might argue that this shows
the state of the economy has been the dominant factor in the
reduction of dependence. While it is true that the slowdown in the
economy is affecting the decline in caseload, however, it is
important to note the vast difference in trends before and after
welfare reform. Prior to the mid-1990s, the AFDC caseload remained
flat or rose during economic expansions and generally rose to a
substantial degree during recessions. Since welfare reform, the
welfare caseload has plummeted downward during good economic times
and declined more slowly during the recession.
Thus, while the state of the economy does
have an effect on AFDC/TANF caseloads, irrespective of economic
conditions, the difference in caseload trends before and after
reform is enormous. This difference is clearly due to the impact of
welfare reform policies.
Another way to disentangle the effects of
welfare policies and economic factors on declining caseloads is to
examine the differences in state performance. The rate of caseload
decline varies enormously among the 50 states. If improving
economic conditions were the main factor driving down caseloads,
the variation in state reduction rates should be linked to
variation in state economic conditions. On the other hand, if
welfare polices are the key factor behind falling dependence, the
differences in reduction rates should be linked to specific state
welfare policies.
In a
1999 Heritage Foundation study, "The Determinants of welfare
Caseload Decline," one of the present authors examined the impact
of economic factors and welfare policies on falling caseloads in
the states.20 This analysis showed that
differences in state welfare reform policies were highly successful
in explaining the rapid rates of caseload decline. By contrast, the
relative vigor of state economies, as measured by unemployment
rates, changes in unemployment, or state job growth, had no
statistically significant effect on caseload decline.
A
recent paper by Dr. June O'Neill, former Director of the
Congressional Budget Office, reaches similar conclusions. Dr.
O'Neill examined changes in welfare caseload and employment from
1983 to 1999. Her analysis shows that in the period after the
enactment of welfare reform, policy changes accounted for roughly
three-quarters of the increase in employment and decrease in
dependence. By contrast, economic conditions explained only about
one-quarter of the changes in employment and dependence.21
Substantial employment increases, in turn, have led to large drops
in child poverty.
Overall, the health of the economy in the
mid and late 1990s did serve as a positive background factor
contributing to positive changes in welfare dependence, employment,
and poverty. It is very unlikely, for example, that dramatic drops
in dependence and increases in employment would have occurred
during a prolonged recession. However, it is also certain that good
economic conditions alone would not have produced the striking
changes that occurred in the late 1990s. It is only when welfare
reform was coupled with a growing economy that these dramatic
positive changes occurred.
WELFARE REFORM AND CHILD POVERTY
A
recent paper by Dr. Rebecca M. Blank, former member of the Council
of Economic Advisers in the Clinton White House, examines the link
between welfare reform and child poverty.22 Professor Blank analyzes
the income of families with children from 1992 to 2000 and finds
that incomes rose for all but the bottom 2 percent of families with
children. Moreover, poor families showed greater income gains than
higher-income families, "suggesting that most poor families
experienced larger income gains than did most middle and
upper-middle income families."23
Dr.
Blank's analysis shows a direct link between state welfare reform
policies and rising incomes among poor families. States with
welfare reform programs that offered "strong work incentives"
showed greater increases in the income of single parents with
children than did states with weak work incentives. Moreover,
at the bottom of the distribution, states
with strong work incentives have the smallest share of children in
families with negative changes in income, while states with the
weakest work incentives show the highest share of children with
[decreases in income].24
In
other words, states with strong welfare work incentives had fewer
families that lost income than did states with weak welfare work
incentives. Blank finds that these income differences are the
result of state welfare policies rather than differences in state
economies.
In
addition, Dr. Blank examines the effects of tough welfare reform
"penalties" on the incomes of poor single-parent families.
Examining the impact of stricter time limits and strong sanction
policies that "provide a strong enforcement mechanism for women to
participate in welfare-to-work programs," she finds that tough
welfare policies had a positive effect in raising the incomes of
poor families. Overall, states with stricter time limits and
stronger sanction policies were more successful in raising the
incomes of poor children than were states with lenient policies.
Dr. Blank concludes that
states with strict or moderate penalties
for not working consistently show higher income gains among poor
children throughout the income distribution than do states with
lenient penalties.... [I]t is the more lenient states with softer
penalties where children's income seems to have grown least.25
Out-of-Wedlock
Childbearing and the Economy
Out-of-wedlock childbearing and marriage rates have never
been correlated to periods of economic growth. Efforts to link the
positive changes in these areas to growth in the economy are
without any basis in fact. The onset of welfare reform is the only
plausible explanation for the shifts in these social trends.
welfare reform affected out-of-wedlock childbearing and marriage in
two ways.
First, even before passage of the law, the
public debate about welfare reform sent a strong symbolic message
that, in the future, welfare would be time-limited and that single
mothers would be expected to work and be self-reliant. This message
communicated to potential single mothers that the welfare system
would be less supportive of out-of-wedlock childbearing and that
raising a child outside of marriage would be more challenging in
the future. The reduction in out-of-wedlock births was, at least in
part, a response to this message.
Second, reform indirectly reduced
welfare's disincentives to marriage. Traditional welfare stood as
an economic alternative to marriage, and mothers on welfare faced
very stiff financial penalties if they did marry. As women leave
AFDC/TANF as a result of welfare reform, fewer are affected by
welfare's financial penalties against marriage. In addition, some
women may rely on husbands to provide income that is no longer
available from welfare. Thus, as the number of women on welfare
shrinks, marriage and cohabitation rates among low-income
individuals can be expected to rise.
Welfare Reform
and the Current Recession
When welfare reform was enacted, liberal opponents
predicted that it would yield sharp increases in poverty even in
good economic times; the effects of reform during a recession were
expected to be disastrous. As noted, liberal predictions about the
negative effects of reform during good economic times have been
proven completely erroneous. Moreover, the disastrous effects
expected of welfare reform during an economic downturn have, at
least so far, failed to materialize during the current
recession.
Historically, during a recession, overall
child poverty rises by two to three percentage points. For example,
during the economic downturn in the early 1990s, the overall child
poverty rate rose from 14.8 percent to 17.8 percent. Historically,
black child poverty rises even more sharply during a recession.
During the back-to-back recessions in the early 1980s, for example,
black child poverty rose by more than six percentage points, from
41.2 percent in 1979 to 47.6 percent in 1982.
However, during the current recession
(which began in April 2001), these traditional negative patterns
have not appeared. While the poverty rate for adults rose during
2001 in a manner consistent with prior recessions, the poverty
rates for children in general -- and for black children in
particular -- differed sharply from prior historical patterns.
Despite the recession, from 2000 to 2001, the overall child poverty
rate remained flat.26 The poverty rate for black
children actually fell by a full percentage point from 31.2 percent
in 2000 to 30.2 percent in 2001. Such a decline in black child
poverty during a recession is without historical precedent.
While the child poverty figures for 2001
(the first year of the current recession) are unusually positive, a
note of caution is warranted. The effects of a recession on poverty
often continue and deepen for two or three years after the
recession's onset. Thus, when the Census Bureau releases poverty
figures for 2002 and 2003, it is quite possible that reported child
poverty will increase.27 However, if the unusual
poverty figures for 2001 are any indication, the overall increase
in child poverty (if any) generated by the current recession is
likely to be far milder than in prior economic downturns.
The
welfare dependence figures during the current recession also differ
sharply from prior recessions. As Chart 3 shows, the AFDC caseload
almost always rose during recessions.28 In some cases, the increase
in caseload was dramatic. For example, during the early 1990s, the
AFDC caseload rose by around 30 percent. However, during the
current recession, the TANF caseload has actually declined. Between
the beginning of the recession in April 2001 and September 2002
(the date of the most recent available data), the caseload actually
fell by 4.4 percent.
The
fact that welfare caseloads have, up to now, declined during the
current recession is good news. However, a note of caution is,
again, warranted. The effects of a recession in increasing welfare
dependence may continue for several years after the onset of the
recession. Thus, it is possible that TANF caseloads will rise
during 2003. However, the recent trends in caseload strongly
suggest that, if TANF caseloads do rise in 2003, the increase will
be quite small when compared to increases spurred by prior
recessions.
The
fact that child poverty has not, as yet, risen during the present
recession is linked to the continuing decline of TANF caseloads.
During previous recessions, large numbers of single mothers left
employment and entered the AFDC program. Families on AFDC are
almost always poor. Thus, increases in welfare caseloads during
prior recessions invariably led to concurrent increases in child
poverty. However, the work requirements and time limits established
by welfare reform have created strong pressures discouraging single
mothers from leaving employment and entering welfare. The fact that
TANF caseloads have not risen during the current recession has, in
turn, helped to limit any rise in child poverty.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
The
trends of the past six years have led some of the strongest critics
of welfare reform to reconsider their opposition, at least in part.
In 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Services Policy
Wendell Primus also resigned from the Clinton Administration to
protest the President's signing of the welfare reform legislation,
predicting that the new law would throw millions of children into
poverty.
As
Director of Income Security at the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, Primus has spent the past six years analyzing the
effects of welfare reform. The evidence has tempered his earlier
pessimism. "In many ways," he recently stated, "welfare reform is
working better than I thought it would. The sky isn't falling
anymore. Whatever we have been doing over the last five years, we
ought to keep going."29
Wendell Primus is correct. When Congress
reauthorizes the TANF program this year, it should push forward
boldly to promote further the three explicit goals of the 1996
reform:
- To reduce dependence and increase
employment;
- To reduce child poverty; and
- To reduce illegitimacy and strengthen
marriage.
These three goals are linked
synergistically. Work requirements in welfare will reduce
dependence and increase employment, which in turn will reduce
poverty. As fewer women depend on welfare in the future, marriage
rates may well rise. Increasing marriage, in turn, is the most
effective means of reducing poverty.
Next Steps in
Reform
When Congress reauthorizes Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families in 2003, it should take the following specific steps.
- Strengthen
federal work requirements
Currently, about half of the 2 million mothers on TANF are
idle on the rolls and are not engaged in constructive activities
leading to self-sufficiency. This is unacceptable. Existing federal
work requirements must be greatly strengthened so that all
able-bodied parents are engaged continuously in supervised job
search, community service work, or training.
In addition, some states still provide
federal welfare as an unconditional entitlement; recipients who
refuse to perform required activities continue to receive most
benefits. In reauthorizing the TANF program, Congress should ensure
that the law prohibits federal funds from being misused in this
manner in the future.
Some might object to toughening work
requirements during a recession, but it is important to remember
that the TANF reauthorization law will set the rules for the
program not for one year, but for the next five years. Provisions
to toughen federal work requirements can be phased in so that they
do not take effect until 2005 or later, long after the current
recession has passed.
- Strengthen
marriage
As Chart 5 shows, the poverty rate among single-parent
families is about five times higher than the poverty rate among
married-couple families. The most effective way to reduce child
poverty and increase child well-being is to increase the number of
stable, healthy marriages. This can be accomplished in three
ways.

First, the substantial penalties against
marriage in the overall welfare system should be reduced. As it is
currently structured, welfare rewards illegitimacy and wages war
against marriage. That war must cease.30
Second, the government should educate
young men and women on the benefits of healthy marriage in
life.
Third, programs should provide couples
with the skills needed to reduce conflict and physical abuse and to
increase satisfaction and longevity in a marital relationship.
The
1996 TANF law established the formal goals of reducing
out-of-wedlock childbearing and increasing marriage, but despite
nearly $100 billion in TANF spending over the past five years, the
states have spent virtually nothing on specific pro-marriage
programs. The slowdown in the growth of illegitimacy and the
increases in marriage have occurred as the incidental byproduct of
work-related reforms and not as the result of positive pro-marriage
initiatives by the states. The current neglect of marriage is
scandalous and deeply injurious to the well-being of children. In
future years, at least $300 million in TANF funds should be
earmarked for pro-marriage initiatives.
CONCLUSION
More
than 20 years ago, President Jimmy Carter stated, "the welfare
system is anti-work, anti-family, inequitable in its treatment of
the poor and wasteful of the taxpayers' dollars."31 President
Carter was correct in his assessment.
The
1996 welfare reform began necessary changes in the disastrous old
welfare system. The rewards for non-work in the TANF program have
been substantially reduced. But much more remains to be done. When
Congress reauthorizes TANF this year, it should ensure that, in the
future, all able-bodied welfare recipients are required to work or
undertake other constructive activities as a condition of receiving
aid.
But
increasing work is not enough. Each year, one-third of all children
are born outside of wedlock; this means that one child is born to
an unmarried mother every 25 seconds. This collapse of marriage is
the principal cause of child poverty and welfare dependence. In
addition, children in these families are more likely to become
involved in crime, to have emotional and behavioral problems, to be
physically abused, to fail in school, to abuse drugs, and to end up
on welfare as adults.
Despite these harsh facts, the
anti-marriage effects of welfare, which President Carter noted over
two decades ago, are largely intact. The current indifference and
hostility to marriage in the welfare system is a national disgrace.
In reauthorizing TANF, Congress must make the rebuilding of
marriage its top priority. The restoration of marriage in American
society is truly the next frontier of welfare reform.
Robert
Rector is Senior Research Fellow in Domestic Policy
Studies, and Patrick F. Fagan
is William H. G. FitzGerald Research Fellow in Family and Cultural
Issues, at The Heritage Foundation. This paper is an updated
version of Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1468, published on
September 5, 2001.