How the U.N. Aids Marxist Guerrilla Groups
(Archived document, may contain errors)
177 April 8, 1982 HOW THE U.N. AIDS MARXIST GUERRILLA GROUPS
INTRODUCTION The PLO, an international terrorist organization, is
awarded "permanent observer1I status at the U.N. and given a U.N
budget for interfiational publicity to sene as an expert on
airplane hijacking permanent observer1' at the U.N., preparing
students to be guer ri l la soldiers at U.N.-supported schools in
Angola ANC and PAC, communist-dominated guerrilla and terrorist
groups operating across the South African border, enjoy at least 9
million biennial U.N. aid plus U.N. political approval e The PLO is
invited to a U. N . conference on civil aviation SWAPO, a Southwest
African terrorist group, becomes a The U.N. officially endorses
violent "armed strugglet1 by the PLO, SWAPO, ANC and PAC against
U.N. member states includ ing tacit approval of terrorist attacks
on civilia ns mhese are just a few highlights of U.N. aid and
support of Marxist-oriented, Soviet-backed guerrilla movements. The
links are no secret and appear in United'xations official
Yet U.N. funding and political support for armed guerrilla warfare
whether conducted by Marxists or others, is not authorized by the
U.N. Charter. The Charter, in fact, mandates that !#All members
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful mean s in
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are
not endangered Chapter 1, Article 2, para. 3.) 2 Despite this, the
U.N.'s own records show that since 1975 at least $116 million has
been spent or.budgeted to .support what the U.N. c alls "national
liberation movements1 NLMs). About 25 percent of this has been and
is being contributed by the American taxpayer.
Some of these NLMs, such as the MPLA of Angola or FRELIMO of
Mozambique, have already seized power and are the governments of t
heir countries. ZAPU and ZANU, now the chief political parties of
Zimbabwe, were.also heavily backed by the U.N. as guerrilla groups.
These former NLMs all are Marxist and either are or were aligned
with the Soviet Union and its allies U.N. support of NLM s has been
curiously selective. No backing, for instance, has been given to
pro-Western national liberation movements, such as UNITA (now
fighting a successful guerrilla war against the Marxist government
of Angola). Nor has the U.N. been willing to recogn i ze
non-Marxist representatives of the Palestinians or the democratic
political parties of Namibia in southern Africa. Instead, the
General Assembly recognizes the PLO and SWAPO as the,llsoleil
representatives of the Palestinian and Namibian peop'les respe
ctively. Yet there are many other representatives of both peoples
who get neither recognition nor assistance from the U.N.
U.N. support of guerriila liberation movements ranges from gifts of
food, housing and health services to radio channels for broadcast
ing propaganda. Both SWAPO and ANC of South Africa, for instance,
make wide use of U.N.-sponsored radio propaganda broad casts U.N.
officials interviewed for this study scrupulously avoided
even'hinting that the U.N. is aiding the military training of NLM s
. It is obvious, however, that guerrilla armies need food, medicine
and civilian training for their cadres, as well as arms. These
necessities they have been able to obtain in abundance from the U.N
Military arms, equipment, training and advisors for thes e NLMs are
provided by the USSR, Cuba and Eastern bloc nations.
But much of their ''humanitarian aid" comes from the United
And most of the money abcut 65 percent for this humanitarian aid
comes from the U.S. and other Western industrial democracies.
Probably more important than the actual aid and development
projects is the international political legitimacy which U.N
recognition confers on the NLMs. Offical U.N. recognition, for
instance, is enjoyed by four communist-oriented guerrilla groups t
he Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO the Southwest African
People's Organization (SWAFO), the African National Congress ANC
and the Pan-African Congress (PAC). This U.N. seal of approval
gives them an unfair advantage over their political rivals at h o
me. It gives them money, aid projects, publicity and international
lobbying power not available to their competitors. 3 It also
distorts their image on the international scene making them appear
to be the true representatives of their respective peoples t hough,
in reality, all four are actually fighting for political survival
How did the U.N. stray so far from its charter? Several historians
trace the organization's support of guerrillas to the 1967
Arab-Israeli war. Following the Arab defeat in t hat conflict the
Soviet Union formed a political alliance in the U.N. General
Assembly with the Arab states. The res'ulting Soviet-Arab-Third
World bloc led to a series of General Assembly resolutions
beginning in 1969, affirming what is called the "inali e nable
rights of the Palestinian people.11 A number of experts on the U.N.
maintain that the Soviet Union, its satellites and client states,
along with Arab oil nations and the Marxist liberation movements of
southern Africa, created the U.N. voting bloc t hat opened the door
to PLO chief Yassir Arafatls appearance at the U.N. in 1974.' He
addressed the General Assembly and the Security Council as if he
headed a legitimate and sovereign state.
With the General Assembly vote to.welcome Arafat as !!the represe
ntative -of the Palestinian people,I1 the PLO, the world's most
notorious international terrorist organization, was clothed in a
new respectability and accepted in international diplomacy at the
U.N. This occurred just two years after the PLO murders of t h e
Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich. PLO terror did not stop after
Arafat's U.N. appearance, but this did not prevent the PLO from
gaining official observer status at the U.N Other guerrilla and
terrorist groups soon got the message that they could be le
gitimized and obtain international political credentials at the
In 1976, another leading guerrilla organization scored a critical
victory when the General Assembly voted to support SWAPO l'i?s the
sole and authentic representative of the Na mibian people 3.N.
Resolution 31/146, para. 2.) As in the case of the PLO the U.N.
recognized SWAPO as the sole party of the Namibians despite many
other political parties in Southwest Africa. In the same
resolution, the General Assembly supported SWAPO I f in their
struggle, by ali means, including armed struggle, to achieve
self-determination, freedom and national independence The General
Assembly similarly recognized the two- Marxist guerrilla groups the
ANC and the PAC as the sole legitimate represen tat i ves of South
Africa, wnile stripping the government of South Africa of its
General Assembly voting rights Seymour Maxwell Finger The PLO at
the United Nations American Academic Association for Peace in the
Middle East, January 1979; and Paul Johnson Barba r ous Parliament
The New Republic, December 20, 1975. 4 Dramatically reflected in
these actions is the U.N.'s increas ingly ubiquitous double
standard. How can a self-proclaimed peace-keeping organization like
the United Nations sponsor guerril las and terr orists? And why are
the only recipients of such U.N backing Marxists and anti-Western
groups? It is hyprocrisy and double standards of this kind which
discredit the United Nations make it an object of derision, and
undermine its support in the U.S.
WHAT THE PLO GETS FROM THE U.N.
Before U.N. recognition, the PLO was viewed as an unpredict able
and dangerous international terrorist organization. The world's law
enforcement agencies have not changed their minds about that. But
since Yassir Arafat's speech at the U.N. and the creation of two
PLO-dominated U.N. commmittees the Inalienable Rights Committee and
the IISpecial Unit on Palestinian Rights the PLO is now able to
wave its U.N. identification badge and call itself a legitimate
national liberation movem ent. PLO spokesman Abdul Abdu Massur, for
example, broadcast a startling statement on Radio Damascus as
justification for the murders of two innocent Israelis by a PLO
terrorist assault group on June 15, 19
75. He declared We sponsored! the operation becau se it is our
right to fight for our rights, and the whole world sponsored it and
our operations along with us, because the United Nations General
Assembly has approved the right of the Palestinians to pursue
their. struggle with all means to regain usurpe d rights. It The
Damascus broadcast, intended for an Arab audience demonstrates how
the PLO uses its U.N. credentials to boost its image among other
Arabs. This kind of public relations campaign is essential to the
PLO's political existence, especially sin ce 70 percent of the
Palestinians in the Middle East live in either Jordan or the West
Bank, where the PLO is banned. It was an Arab leader, King Hussein,
who banned the PLO in Jordan.
In 1975, following a PLO initiative, the General Assembly created
Ifthe Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People.Il Though not a member of the Committee the PLO
was allowed to participate in the closed sessions of the
Committee's drafting group. Consequently, the Committee's recom
mendati o ns essentially echo the PLO Covenant rejecting concili
ation or negotiation with Israel. Thus, the U.N. tacitly endorses
terrorism by its recognition of the PLO, an avowedly terrorist
group, as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians
Letter from the National District Attorney's Association, Chicago,
Illinois to Gerhard Mueller, Executive' Secretary, 5th U.N.
Congress on the Preven tion of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, August 27, 1975, p. 4 5 Through the creation of the
Inalienable Ri g hts Committee the U.N. also makes itself a
propaganda voice of the PLO, giving PLO terrorist attacks
respectability. The Committee on Inalienable Rights, with the PLO
as its chief consultant, was able to persuade the General Assembly
in 1977 to create ano t her U.N. organ, the Special Unit on
Palestinian Rights.3 Secretariat, this unit has been useful to the
PLO in several ways. Its mandate instructs it to turn out
publications.and direct a public relations campaign for the
Palestinian cause including an ann ual IIInternatioIial Solidarity
Day with the Pales tinian People.It All these activities are under
the direction of the Inalienable Rights Committee, which, in turn,
is heavily influenced by the PL0.4 Established within the U.N.
The pamphlets of the Special Unit implicitly support the PLO as the
only real representative of the Palestinians. One such booklet,
sold in the U.N. bookstore and distributed to U.N centers
worldwide, is entitled The International Status of the Palestinia n
People. It lauds Yassir Arafat as a freedom fighter.
It justifies Arafat's and the PLO's use of terrorism by noting how
successful the "Palestinian commandos1' have been through terrorism
in bringing the Palestinian question to the world's attention.
Last year's annual U.N. Palestinian Solidarity Day saw the PLO set
up an unapproved exhibition in a U.N. corridor featuring a PLO flag
and a. map of ''Palestineii that did not include Israel.
Despite protests from Israel, the PLO propaganda display was allo
wed to stand after the PLO representative, Zehdi Labib Terzi told
U.N. security guards he would !'use force if necessaryi1 to keep
the flag and the map in place.5 Full observer status for the PLO
has been voted by several U.N. agencies, including: UNESCO, the
International Labor Organi zation (ILO the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Interna tional Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). When ICAO awarded this privilege to the PLO in
October 1977, it allowed the PLO to send observers to all.meetings
whe r e the U.N. discusses air security. The rationale for this:
the PLO has had considerable experience with air piracy
(as.skyjackers, of course) and the PLO's advice could prove
valuable to these meetings.6 A few years earlier, the PL0,was
invited to attend the Fifth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, It held in
Geneva, Swi",serland, September Harris
0. Schoenberg Terror Legitimized Midstream, March 1979, pp 7-8.
Washington Post, December 1, 1981, p. All.
Robert W. Lee, The United Nations Conspiracy Boston, Los Angeles
Western Islands, 1981 p. 211 6 1, 19
75. This drew a vigorous protest from the U.S. National District
Attorneys Association, which called for the withdrawal of the
invitation to the terr orist group. In its letter, the NDAA quoted
from the IIPLO Spokesman,l' the official newspaper which boasted
only months after the Munich massacre, in its September 1972 issue
We have to kill the most famous. Since statesmen are difficult to
kill as they are well protected, we have to kill artists and
0. W. Mueller, an American who is Executive Secretary of the U.N.
crime prevention congress, refused to withdraw the invitation,
citing the PLO's official observer status. Mueller further no ted
that: "those acts of violence which are caused by political and
ideological frustration cannot be expected to cease until the world
community succeeds in dealing with the underlying causes.118 In the
case of PLO terrorism, the underlying cause accordi ng to the PLO's
own Covenant, is the existence of Israel.
On July 27, 1977, the PLO was admitted to the U.N. Economic and
Social Council's (ECOSOC) Commission for Western Asia. This was the
first time that full membership status was ever given to a non-cou
ntry. The PLO since has been allowed to chair the Commission THE
PLO AND TJ3E U.N. BUDGET In the 1982-83 U.N. biennial budget, the
Committee for.the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People is scheduled to receive $71,8
00. The Special Unit has budgeted 6,156,500 for the two-year
period. This includes money for conferences related to Palestinian
rights lavishly funded United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA programs' for Palestinian refugees in the Miadle East. John
Miles, direct o r of the UNRWA's New York liaison office, say's
that all of UNRWF,'s 17,000 worldwide employees, except for about
120 international staff are Palestinians. There is strong evidence
that this nearly entirely Palestinian-run organization is dominated
by the PLO. There is further evidence that the PLO controls the
U.N.!s Palestinian refugee camps. The Associated Press reported on
June 18, 1979 hat PLO terrorists controlled three Palestinian
refugee camps around Tyre, and Lebanon's southern and eastern
outskir ts. These are UNRWA camps But there is also evidence the
PLO may have infiltrated the NDA4 Letter, op. cit.
Letter from Gerhard
0. W. Mueller, Chief of U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Section to NDAA, Chicago, Illinois, September 25, 1975 7 In the AP
dispatch, the PLO liaison officer for Tyre, Major Saed, said:
"Running the camps and handling their defenses is a PLO res p
onsibility [together] with the Lebanese government. I'1 Another
Pales.tinian refugee camp, Tell a1 Zaater, in Beirut Lebanon, came
to the public's attention during the Lebanese civil war. On August
10 1976, both Radio Beirut and Radio Palestine reported t h at the
camp was a major PLO military base with rein forced concrete
bunkers. The radio reports also confirmed the presence of armed
terrorists and artillery emplacements in'the camp. Other
intelligence sources reported that the camp's bunkers were "canouf
l aged by civilian hovels inhabited by the refugees of the PLO.lt
Even more conclusive evidence of PLO use of U.N. refugee camps is
the statement of the Lebanese Ambassador, Edward Ghorra in a letter
to former U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim The Palest i nians
increased the influx of arms into Lebanon they transformed most of
the refugee camps if not all into military bastions the camps, in
fact, became centers for the training of mercenaries sent and
financed by other Arab states.I'll Attached to this le t ter by
Ghorra to Kurt Waldheim was another letter from the deputy prime
minister of Lebanon to the 5th conference of Heads of Non-Aligned
States in Colombo, Sri Lanka The Palestinians] have breached their
accords with Lebanese authorities in 1969 by insta l ling heavy
weapons in the camps They have even occupied the UNRWA cffices in
the camps UNRWA's annual budget is about $200 million. Most of that
pays for over 600 Palestinian elementary schools, according to
Miles. Roughly $20 million a year goes to the c amps in Lebanon.
Whether the PLO directly gets any of this money is not the point;
what is critical is PLO access to the refugee camps which serve as
valuable recruiting centers, bases for military training and
indoctrination and, as reported by these Leba nese officials as
actual military installations PLO leader Yassir Arafat has made it
clear recently at PLO plans for national liberation include regions
Arafat told the General Federation of Palestinian Writers and
Journalists this January that PLO guerrillas serve in Nicaragua 1o
Associzted Press, June 18, 1979.
Letter from Lebanese Ambassador to U.N., Edward Ghorra, to
Secretary General of the U.N Kurt Waldheim, August 17, 1976, U.N.
Document A/31/179. a El Salvador and Angola. Arafat emphasized the
links between the PLO and other Ifnational liberation" groups
around the world. He added that PLO pilots were flying planes in
Nicaragua.l The U.S. State Department confirmed Arafat's boast in
early March, acknowledging that Soviet-trained PLO pilots
apparently were flying ammunition drops from Nicaragua to
guerzillas in nearby El Salvador. The'Palestinians,
Newsweek-reported can fly large helicopters and transport aircraft
that the Nicaraguans have not mastered I l Since it is highly likel
ythe PLO plays a large role inside UNRWA, should the U.S which
contributed $62 million-to UNRWA in 1981, continue to participate
in the Palestinian refugee program?
And why should the U.S. taxpayer underwrite this PLO-dominated
organization when the 01.1-rich Arab states contribute very little
to UNRWA? Saudi Arabia and eleven other Arab states in 1981
contributed' only about $18.5 million.
SWAPO AT THE. U.N In 1976, the U.N. General Assembly recognized the
Southwest African People's Organization as the "s ole and
authentic" repre sentative of Southwest Africa, the South African
trusteeship often known as Namibia. SWAPO, however, is only one of
forty-five political parties representing Namibia's one million
people, but is tightly tied through military aid a n d training to
the Soviet Union. It also has a well-documented record of terrorist
attacks against civilians dating from the late 1960s Following a
pattern it was to repeat in the case of Arafat and the PLO, the
U.N. General Assembly invited SWAPO's leader Sam Nujoma, to speak
at the U.N. in May 19
73. On that occasion Nujoma said I pledge here and now that we will
continue to talk to South Africa in the only.language they
understand and that is intensification of armed liberation struggle
SWAPO will contin ue to mobilize the masses and intensify and
expand military operations until all the objectives of the struggle
United Nations recognition and support of SWAPO is very similar to
U.N. treatment of the PLO. Like the PLO, SWAPO relies heavily on
the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc nations for military
equipment, supplies and military training. For humani tarian aid,
SWAPO turns to the U.N. Namibian refugees, scattered l2 "Arafat
Says PLO Aids Foreign Guerrilla Units Wall Street Journal Janua r y
14, 1982 l3 "The PLO on the Wing in Nicaragua Newsweek, March 15,
1982, p. 19. 9 over four or five southern African countries, are
cared for by a dozen U..N. agencies. SWAPO plays a major, and often
a controlling role in the administration of these U.N. relief
programs. Through these programs, as the only representative of the
Namibians recognized by the U.N., SWAPO in 1981 had access to about
$28 million worth of food, education, medical and vocational
training projects. And the United Nations Industria l Development
Organiza tion (UNIDO) recently requested an additional $17.6
million for an industrial management training program for Namibia.
Document A/36/154/add. 1.) This would almost certainly be domina
ted by SWAPO.
Another source of U.N. backi ng for SWAPO is the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR From 1979 to 1981, it allocated
about $10 million for the Namibian refugee camps principally in
Angola, SWAP0''s main staging location for terrorist operations
The World Food Program, meanwhile, has given SWAPO $5.4 million
worth of food since 19
74. The current WFP food gift budget for SWAPO is $2.8 million.
With WFP food, SWAPO can feed Namibian refugees in Angola, thus
using U.N resources to. ingrati ate itself with the refuge e
population. This surely helps SWAPO attract young recruits from
within the camps. A Reagan Admini stration aide reports that SWAPO
is even kidnapping young recruits from Namibia, luring them with
promises of medical school fellow ships SWAPO secured abo ut $5
million in food aid from WFP for Namibians 'in Angola from early
March 1978 through October 1979.
When the South African Army raided SWPSO bases in Angola in the
summer of 1979, food cartons from WFP were found in the guerrilla
camps. SWAPO obviously used U.N. food to feed its terrorist troops
as well as the Namibian refugees.14 SWAPO AND THE U.N. BUDGET The
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) budget for 1977-81
earmarked $7,750,000 for SWAPO; another $7,750,000 has been
recommended by UNDP off icials for the 1982-86 budget UNDP will
receive another $4,477,870 for Namibia via the recognized by the
U.N. for Namibia, .SWAP0 will play a leading role in the
distribution of this sum also Namibia Trust Fund. As the sole
"national liberation movement"
The World Eealth Organization SWAPO from 1974-81, while the Food
also gave about $256,000 to and Agriculture Organization l4 Robert
W. Lee, op. cit p. 209; Lee Affairs Research Institute report on is
quoting from a 1979 London Foreign SWAPO 10 gave $90,00 0 to SWAPO
80. UNESCO has a separate fund of about $4 million called "Aid to
Refugees and Natkonal Liberation Movements,lt divided among the
PLO, SWAPO and the two South.African terrorist guerrilla groups,
the ANC and the PAC.
Namibia in New York, w hich, in turn, funnels funding for aid
projects to SWAPO through the U.N. Fund for Namibia'and the
U.N.-sponsored Institute for Namibia. The United Nations Commis
sioner for Namibia, with offices in New York, Luanda (the capital
of Angola) and Botswana al s o receives U.N. funds for aid.to SWAPO
U.N. aid is also channeled to SWAPO by the U.N. Council for The
U.N. and its specialized agencies have allocated a grand total of
at least $40 million in aid either directly or indirectly to SWAPO
for programs begun between 1977 and 1981 and for programs beginning
and continuing during 1982-
86. The United States contributes about 30 percent of this.
Another $17.6 million is on the drawing boards via UNIDO.
The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also has
submitted a large proposal for national liberation,funding which
would direct yet more funds to SWAPO, ANC and PAC l'to provide an
opportunity for the leadership of the NLMs to be more fully
acquainted with the activities of UNCTAD in the area of inte r na
tional economic relationsit and to build up' Ilmanagement capacity
of NLM cadres U.N. Document TD/B/WP/16, p. 20 In the $17.6 million
UNIDO proposal for the training of industrial managers is found the
U.N. rationale for these types of wide-ranging and comprehensive
U.N. development programs intended for SWAPO.
The proposal is broken down into three parts: pre-indepen dence,
transitional and post-independence aid. This program like all. the
U.N. programs for Namibia/SWAPO, takes place outside Namibia an d
is dominated by SWAPO recipients. The intent is. to train the
professional cadres of the future independent Namibia.
Why then is SWAPO the main beneficiary of these programs? Why has
the U.N. decided that in some future Namibia, these profession als
wil l come from the ranks of SWAPO? The U.N in effect, is feeding,
clothing, educating and giving civilian training to the SWAPO
guerrilla army. But the U.N. is also training SWAPO candi dates as
government functionaries for the day when SWAPO seizes the rein s
of power in Namibia. What about the non-SWAP0 groups in Namibia?
Why do they not qualify for help from the U.N.? Why are they
victims of the U.N. double standard?
SWAPO'S PROPAGANDA W MEDIA BONANZA AT THE U.N.
Through U.N. Resolution 34/92F (1979 SWAPO is guaranteed a free
international public relations service provided by the U.N.
Department of Public Information of the Secretariat. This resolu11
tion notes the need Itto intensify the wide-spread and continuous a
dissemination of information on the str uggle for liberation being
waged by the people of Namibia, guided by their liberation movement
sic] the SWAPO.II Because of this resolution, SWAPO distributes
propaganda through U.N. press releases on Namibia and through U.N.
publications and periodicals. SWAPO.also has access to the U.N.
Department of Public Information (DPI) Radio Service, which
broadcasts worldwide. SWAPO airs special programs on Namibia Day.
It also provides its own radio material to broadcasting
organizations, including a special seri es of six quarter-hour
programs in English, French, Spanish and German for international
The U.N. Visual Service, meanwhile, screens such SWAPO films as
!'Namibia, a Trust Betrayed lfColonialism: A Case Study Namibia and
"End of an Era DPI al so provides photographic and exhibition
services for special SWAPO events displays later used as
semi-permanent exhibits at the United Nations Headquarters and
offices in Geneva and Vienna. Copies go to all the worldwide
Information Centers of the United N ations. None of the other
Namibian movements enjoys such generous and valuable treatment by
the U.N. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, for example, has no
privileges or standing at the U.N SWAPO'S PRIVILEGED U.N. STATUS
SWAPO became an l'observerlt to th e U.N.'s Council for Namibia in
67. As such, the Marxist group accompanies the Council on its
missions away from New York. From its reports, it seems that the
Council not only makes no moves without consulting SWAPO, but
responds to SWAPO initiatives. S WAPO also is invited to the
international conferences of several U.N. specialized agencies such
as the ILO, FAO, WE-0, UNCTAD and UPU (Universal Postal Union are
part of the Council of Namibia budget, as are travel and
subsistence expenses of SWAPOIs memb e rs travelling with the
Council's missior,s 67,000 in 1979 of c::mxultation,ll diplomatic
trips to win support for its aims to twenty-three countries in 1980
including the U.S France Great Britain and West Germany and used
the opportunities to convey the S W APO philosophy of "armed
struggle awarded "permanent observer1' status in .the General
Assembly in 1976 and since 1971 has been invited by the Security
Council to participate in Security Council meetings on Namibia. No
other Namibian 'group is so privileg e d SWAPO's office expenses in
New York 182,300 in 1979 A SWAPO representative was present on the
Council's llmissions In a dramatic application of the double
standard, SWAPO was 12 Oespite the U.N.'s intimate association with
SWAPO, the U.N. seem ignorant o f SWAPO's startling record of
terrorist attacks on civilians and government officials tactic is
the planting of land mines at random on public roads in Namibia
mines parties terrorist attacks against black civilians. Former
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim ignored completely evidence of 969
terrorist attacks mounted by SWAPO, including 227 deaths, 385
abductions and 227 serious injuries A favorite SWAPO terrorist
Local residents have been the main vi'ctims of these SWAPO has also
assassinated officials of r i val political The U.N however, has
never criticized SWAPO for its SWAPO'S USE OF U.N. REFUGEE CAMPS
Mirroring the PLO SWAPO is using U.N. refugee camps to recruit and
train guerrillas. New York Times reporter Bernard Nossiter visited
a UNHCR refugee camp f or Namibian exiles in Angola. In his March
28, 1981, dispatch he reported that the camp, designed for 10,000
Namibian school children on a coffee plantation 200 miles south of
Luanda, is training its students to "return as guerrillast1 to
Namibia. The stu d ents, he wrote ranged from 5 to 18 years. old,
"most of them well under 16 Center million, of which the UNDP
contributes $612,857. (U.N. Document DP/153 the camp's programs and
maintenance The UNHCR camp is called the Namibia Health and
Education Nossiter estimated the yearly cost cf the camp at $2
Other U.N. agencies also may be contributing a share of Nossiter
reported that daily use of the camp's resources are in the hands of
SWAPO. Nossiter added that it would be easy for SWAPO to deceive
UNHCR about c a ching arms or conducting military tra1ning.h the
camp. The UNHCR inspector makes the rugged trip to the camp only
once a month As Nossiter was leaving the Center, a choral group
from the nearby women's camp (population: 25,000) sang a refrain
for the depa rting visitors We are determined that Namibia must-be
free. Marxism Leninism is our ideology, founded on
The United States funds about 25 percent of all U.N. programs
Namibia, including this camp.
ANC AND THE PAC OF SOUTH AFRICA In addition to SWAPO, two other
guerrilla-terrorist movements in South Africa are recognized and
supported by the U.N African National Congress (ANC) and its
offshoot, the Pan-African Congrzss (PAC). Both have vowed the des t
ruction of the present South African government The 13 The 1980-81
U.N. budget for ANC and PAC development and support programs was
about $9,700,000, not including assistance to ANC and PAC from most
of the U.N. specialized agencies. Nor did it include as sistance
from the Trust Fund for South Africa and the U.N. Educational and
Training Program for South Africa.
The 1981-83 UNESCO budget, for instance, clearly earmarks about
830,000 for ANC and PAC. Another $3,294,000 is budgeted to be split
among the PLO, SWAPO, ANC and PAC. UNCTADfs proposal for trade and
developmentll assistance for SWAPO also includes money for ANC and
At least seven U.N. bodies fund educational projects, health care,
food, scholastic and training fellowships and refugee aid for the
ANC ana the PAC. This includes about $6.7 million from UNHCR and
almost $3 million from UNDP.
Then there is the U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa. Its $4 million
is used to pay for attorneys for ANC and PAC members jailed by
South Africa and for the support of their families.
Many of these prisoners are accused of terrorism and sabotage.
Once again, the United States pays about 25 percent of the U.N.
programs benefitting ANC and PAC.
The General Assembly, meanwhile, has asked all organs of the U.N.
to invite the ANC and the PAC to attend all meetings concern ing
southern Africa There are other U.N. fringe benefits for ANC and
PAC. Like SWAPO, the two groups have been anointed by the General
Assembly as "the national liberation movements of South Afric a"
and, as such the authentic representatives of the South African
people in their just struggle for liberation1 the most recent
statement of this is U.N. Resolution 35/206 A 1980).
Since 1974, the General Assembly has denied South Africa its right
to answer charges against it. The Assembly has rejected the
credentials of South Africa, a sovereign and independent nation and
a U.N. member state.
CONCLUSION United Nations funding of terrorist-oriented Ifnational
liberation movements,Il L1 of them with ties t o the Soviets, the
Eastern bloc nations or to mainland China, is a threat to the
security of the U.S. and its allies. The goal of the PLO is the
destruction of Israel. Yet the U.S. tacitly supports the PLO
through numerous U.N. programs, including the- UN RWA refugee
South Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, both strategically critical
to the U.S., are threatened by terrorist sabotage and subversion
through ANC and PAC. Still the U.S. pays 25 percent 14 of the
nearly $40 million in U.N. support now go ing to these two groups
and to the SWAPO guerrillas attacking Namibia. Should the Marxist
governments in South Africa and Namibia?
U.S. pay for the upkeep of terrorist forces who would bring in The
answer clearly should be ltno.ft Washington should cut off
contributions to U.N. "national liberation movementIf programs.
UNDP, for instance, has recommended that SWAPO, ANC and PAC be
assisted with $22 million in aid projects during 1982-
86. The U.S. contribution in voluntary funding to UNDP in 1980 was
at 17.5 percent. At that rate, the U.S. would pay almost $4 million
to SWAPO, ANC and PAC during the next four years.
The U.S. contributed about $97 million to the World Food Program in
19 80, or about 27.5 percent of the budg,et. Over the past seven
years, WFP has exceeded all other U.N.'bodies in contributions to
natonal liberation movements (NLMs Between 1974 and 1981, the World
Food Program paid almost $44.5 million in cash, commodities and
services to NLMs, most of them Marxist.
The Soviet Union, by comparison, which gives arms and military
training to the same NLMs, gives nothing to WFP and never has.
Exactly how much guerrilla and terrorist groups get from the U.N.
directly and from the U.S. via the U.N. is unknown. The totals
could be much higher than the documented figures of this study.
What is needed .to uncover the full amount is a thorough
investigation of the funding of all U.N. agencies by the General
Accounting Office and th e U.S. Congress which has powers to
subpoena documents and take testimony under oath. The focus of the
investigation should be'on the amount of funding and assistance of
all kinds funneled through these organizations to NLMs. All
international organization s related to the U.N., such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, should also be probed to
determine how much U.S. and Western European money is funding loans
to current and former guerrilla groups.
Washington also should try to convince America's allies to stop
funding guerrilla-terrorist groups through the U.N.
If the Soviets, Africans and Third Worlders insist on using their
voting majority in the U.N. General Assembly to fund terror ist,
anti-U.S. national liberation movements, then U. S. funding of
agencies like UNESCO, the FAO, WFP, WHO, UNHCR and UNDP (all of
which have NLM programs)'should be cut back or eliminated.
The U.S. Mission to the U.N moreover, should monitor and report to
Congress on whether U.N. forums, such as the U.N.
Commission en Human Rights and the Special Committee Against
Apartheid, are being exploited by terrorist groups'like the Tupa
maros of Uruguay. If terrorists cannot be banned from these forums
and international meetings of U.N. agencies, then the U.S shou l d
demand that those who oppose the terrorists also be given the
chance to speak. 15 New schemes to extend U.N. support of
guerrillas to groups in South and Central America (including Puerto
Rico and elsewhere should be carefully.monitored and reported to
the U.S. Congress.
Both Congress and the GAO should investigate thoroughly the
suspected use of UNHCR and UNRWA refugee camps by guerrillas and
terrorists for storing arms; for military training or indoctri
nation centers; for political indoctrination; and for recruitment.
At present, the U.S. is doing almost none of this. Congress has
passed into law three provisions cutting off U.S. Contributions to
the U.N. destined for the PLO and SWAPO. But the total funds
withheld in 1980 and 1981 only amounted to $900,3
25. The actual amount of U.S. money which went to national
liberation movements through the U.N. that year was nearly $2
million from four organi zations alone UNDP, UNHCR, WHO and FAO.
Congress can avoid the annual wrangle over cutting U.S contribu
tions to the U.N.-sponsored guerrillas by writing a permanent
cut-off of funds to the PLO and other terrorist guerrilla groups
into the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 or into the State
Department Service Act It is time to act. At stake not only are
those U .S. national interests threatened by the PLO, SWAPO and
other guerrilla groups but the credibility and integrity of the
United Nations the United States maintain its own integrity'while
associated with a U.N. that supports terror Nor can Thomas G.
Gulick United Nations Assessment Project