Of
the many ways that are available to tackle the question of what we
all need to learn from Canada's 30-year love affair with the
government monopoly, single-payer health care system that we in
Canada call " Medicare," I think the model of that great health
care analyst and public policy guru, David Letterman, serves our
purposes best. I am therefore going to entitle my talk today, "The
Top Ten Things People Believe About Canadian Health Care, But
Shouldn't."
Number One: Canada Has the Best Health
Care System in the World
Not
even close. According to the World Health Organization, Canada
ranks 30th in the world, with the U.S. ranking 38th.1 The ranking
criteria were: bang for the buck, preventive measures, and access
for vulnerable populations
Thus, while Canada and the U.S. are both
only middling performers, we both have a great deal to learn from
other places that manage to combine costs that are no higher than
Canada's (and frequently are lower) and population health outcomes
(e.g. longevity, infant mortality, etc.), that are as good or
better.
Let
me offer a comparison that will shake some of the complacent
assumptions that many Americans seem to have about the equity and
effectiveness of the Canadian health care system. Let's talk about
infant mortality for African-American babies vs. Canadian babies.
Infant mortality risk is a function of birth weight, with the risk
of death rising as birth weight falls. Now, over the full range of
low birth weights (i.e., any birth weight below 2500 grams),
African-American babies fare better than Canadian babies, except at
the very top end of the range, where they are essentially equal. In
short, among low birth- weight babies, you are better to be born to
an African-American family than you are to be born to the average
Canadian family.
Number Two: The Canadian Public Loves
Medicare
We
have to be careful here. The public loves some features of the
system. In particular, there is huge support for the principle that
no one should be denied access to needed medical care on the basis
of ability to pay. Ideologues in the health care system have tried
to stretch the public's support for that basic principle in all
kinds of distorted directions.
For
example, there is a view afoot in health policy circles that
because Canadians support this basic principle, they support a
health care monopoly on the current model; that Canadians
disapprove of private, for-profit business in the health care
sector; that only the state should deliver health care services,
etc. In fact, the recent report of the Royal Commission on the
Future of Health Care took as its starting point a picture it
painted of Canadians' values, arguing that those values supported
the status quo--only more so (i.e., an expansion of the system into
home care and pharmacare and a major injection of taxpayer
dollars).
But
Canadians have actually shown themselves to be a deeply practical
and non-ideological people. Commissioner Roy J. Romanow has made
the case that the debate over the future of Medicare is all about
Canadians' values. But the way that Canadians express those values,
unfiltered by the work of the Commission, is much different from
what Mr. Romanow implies Canadians want.
According to a recent poll entitled The
National Pulse on Health Strategy, 80 percent of Canadians want
major reforms to the health care system:
Two-thirds of Canadians (66 per cent) tend
to be supportive, more or less, of a host of new models of
financing in order to reduce stress on the system - for example,
where everyone (except those with low incomes) pays a small amount
for health care services out of their own pocket. They also tend to
support strategies such as using nurses or other health
practitioners rather than physicians to provide certain services.
Just under half (45 per cent) tend to be supportive of
market-oriented reforms--greater efficiency, accountability and
customer service, including private sector companies delivering
health care services.
The
National Post reported that the same poll found that fewer than
half of respondents would support increasing taxes to pay for
health reforms. But notably, only 10 percent of Canadians would
accept a health care system that excluded those who could not
afford to pay for services
These results need not be seen as a
contradiction. As Jane Armstrong, Senior Vice President of
Environics Research Group, says, "Canadians, ever-constant
champions of fair play and equity, are devoted to maintaining a
system that ensures access to quality health care for all. . .
.They're willing to make changes, even if this includes new and
varied ways of financing the system as well as a greater dependence
on market forces such as private companies delivering certain
health services."
Another recent poll, by Decima Research, found that more than
half (55 percent) of Canadians were opposed to paying higher
personal income taxes--even if these funds were designated to pay
for health care. An even larger majority of respondents (67
percent) also believed that they would have to rely on their own
personal savings to pay for their use of health services in the
future.
These public opinion polls appear to
indicate that Canadians want a system of health care that provides
high-quality medical services and is financially sustainable over
the long term at an acceptable economic price, without excluding
poorer people from access to medically necessary services. And in a
typically pragmatic way, Canadians are not worried whether it is
the private sector or the public sector that achieves this--they
just want results. In fact, when Canadians do express a preference
for either private or public approaches to health reform, the
majority are willing to fund their future medical needs themselves
rather than pay higher taxes to expand the Medicare model of health
care.
That
is why, in the context of the Romanow Report, I like to say that
not since the days of Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy has
ventriloquism enjoyed such vogue. But at least Edgar and Charlie
were good at it, and it was purely for entertainment.
The
stakes riding on today's high profile ventriloquism act are far
higher--the future of Canada's $100-billion public health care
system. What does ventriloquism have to do with Roy Romanow's Royal
Commission report on Medicare? Everything.
From
the very first Mr. Romanow made it clear that the foundation on
which all of his work would be built would be the values of
Canadians. That is powerful: Not many politicians want to be seen
as ignoring Canadians' deeply held views on a topic as important as
health care. Thus, the title of Mr. Romanow's report, "Building on
Values."
He
invoked the values of Canadians up front in an attempt to make his
recommendations invulnerable to criticism and caviling by
politicians and interest groups. But for this gambit to succeed,
the methods the commissioner used for arriving at a picture of
Canadians' values on health care must be beyond reproach. Yet his
methods were flawed and unprofessional. The report is a thinly
disguised attempt to make Mr. Romanow's own values--and those of
his narrow little coterie of experts and bureaucrats--pass for the
values of Canadians generally. Canadians are the dummy, and Mr.
Romanow is the ventriloquist.
If
this analogy seems extreme, consider what Mr. Romanow and his
colleagues did. They organized focus groups across the country to
find out what people were thinking about where they would like to
see health care go in Canada.
What
they heard from these focus groups was pretty much what Canadians
have been telling pollsters for the last several years and that I
have sketched out for you here. Canadians are a down-to-earth,
non-ideological, practical people. They are interested in what
works and they are interested in real solutions to the growing
evidence of the accelerating decline of the health care system.
So,
in response to questions from the commission's people, they
indicated that they were open to a wide range of options that
needed to be tried if they might improve things. They were open
minded about things like user fees, allowing more private sector
involvement in health care provision, and allowing people to buy
health care in circumstances in which they are not permitted to do
so today.
But
that did not square with the views of Mr. Romanow and his merry
band. So they marched their focus groups into a room, and presented
them with "expert opinion" to show these poor benighted citizens
why the things they were willing to try were bad ideas that
wouldn't work, that would harm people's health, and be hard on the
poor. They presented these views as established facts, rather than
the highly contested arguments of an elite group of health policy
makers, an elite whose ideas have been responsible for bringing our
health system into its current state of disrepair.
Unsurprisingly, on being presented with
what seemed to be an objective and authoritative debunking of ideas
that had seemed practical and worthy of trying, the members of Mr.
Romanow's focus groups timidly gave in to the views of the
"experts." But the irony is that there is a lot of evidence in the
academic and policy literature that the practical, common sense
things that Canadians were prepared to look at actually do make a
difference for the better. The only real flaw with these ideas is
that they did not fit the inflexible and narrow ideology of Mr.
Romanow's colleagues.
Now
anyone in the university polling world can tell you how to avoid
such charges of bias in determining what people think about
emotional topics like health care. For instance, a reputable
arm's-length polling expert would never have allowed people from
Mr. Romanow's own commission to be closely involved in the testing
of public opinion. The risk of influencing people to say what the
client wants to hear are too great. But the commissioner's own
people did work directly with the focus group organizers. And those
organizers were themselves not members of an objective polling
group, but representatives of a public policy group closely tied to
the people guiding the work of the commission and identified with
their views. This "research" would never have passed muster in a
rigorous review by the best university experts.
So
by using a flawed process riddled with conflicts of interest and
unprofessional methods, Roy Romanow was able to make it look like
Canadians were ruling out of court any experimentation with the
health care status quo he and his advisors favor. But for someone
who made such grand claims about basing his recommendations on hard
evidence, the core of the commissioner's report is nothing more
than his own prejudices transformed by the ventriloquist's art into
Canadians' most cherished values. Good thing we are not the dummies
he thinks we are.
Number Three: Canadian Medicare Is
Sustainable
On
the contrary, Medicare is not sustainable on its present course. A
modest slowdown in the rate-spending increases has been bought
chiefly through reductions in services, closure of facilities,
fewer health professionals, dissatisfaction among those who remain,
increased waiting times, and forgoing innovative (but expensive)
new technologies.
Medicare as we know it can only be
"sustainable" if Canadians are willing to accept less service or
more taxes. Polls, as I have already mentioned, indicate that
neither is acceptable. And given increasing consumer expectations
for expensive health technologies, drugs and procedures, and the
expected health demands from an aging population, Medicare's
problems are only going to grow. In fact, a paper by Bill Robson, the
Vice President at the C.D. Howe Institute, a very prestigious think
tank in Toronto, has argued that the unfunded liability of Medicare
(i.e., promises to pay for services for which normal increases in
the take from the existing tax load will not cover) is in the
$500-billion to $1.2-trillion range. Canada's entire national debt,
by comparison, is currently about $530 billion.
Yet
Roy Romanow has already publicly rejected these arguments and has
recommended not only retaining, but even expanding, the centrally
planned, government monopoly model of health care in Canada. Those
recommendations are now being acted upon by Ottawa and the
provinces.
Virtually every other major inquiry into
health care, including the Kirby Report (by a committee of the
Senate of Canada), the Mazankowski Report (by the Alberta Premier's
Advisory Council on Health, of which I was a member) and the Fyke
Report for the Government of Saskatchewan (where Mr. Romanow was
premier), identifies sustainability of the health care system as
the challenge we face. Mr. Romanow's own former Minister of Finance
in Saskatchewan underlined this when she appeared to testify before
his commission.
But
Mr. Romanow denies there is a problem. We are spending the same
share of gross domestic product (GDP) today on public health care
as 30 years ago. If a little more than 7 percent of GDP was
sustainable in 1972, why is that same percentage unsustainable
today?
It
is the wrong question. It is not how much we are spending, but how
we are paying for it and what we are getting in return. For years
we borrowed and spent on health care (and other services), so we
got more than we were willing to pay for. Today, as the only G7
country consistently in budgetary surplus, we pay the full cost of
today's services, plus the interest on money we borrowed for health
care and other things in the past. So while the spending has
remained constant as a share of GDP, the tax burden has grown and
quality has declined.
The
irresistible force of demand for "free" services is running
headlong into the immovable object of unavoidably limited health
budgets. To date, the pressure has been relieved by crumbling
health infrastructure, loss of access to the latest medical
innovations, declining numbers of medical professionals, and
lengthening queues. By and large, people have access to ordinary,
relatively low-cost services like general practitioner office
visits, but find it increasingly difficult to get vital services
such as sophisticated diagnostics, or many types of surgery and
cancer care, where the waits can be measured in months, if not
years.
This
is the exact reverse of what the rational person would want. We
should use the public sector to pool everyone's risk of expensive
interventions, ensuring that they are available when needed, but
leaving ordinary interventions (whose cost can easily be borne by
the average person) to individuals, supplemented by private
insurance and subsidies for those on low incomes. Hardly anyone can
afford cancer care, bypass surgery, gene therapy, or a serious
chronic illness on their own. These are the things that, without
insurance, destroy people's finances.
But
as much as 30 percent of the services consumed under Medicare are
unnecessary, not medically beneficial or even harmful. No one would
be financially ruined by having to pay for an ordinary doctor's
office visit if we ensured that people on low incomes were
subsidized and there was a reasonable maximum anyone would be
called on to pay. No one would be harmed by an incentive not to go
to the emergency room when a visit to the family clinic would do
just as well. The biggest health care study in the world, the RAND
experiment, found that people who had to pay something towards the
cost of their care consumed less of it, but that their health was,
with very slight qualifications, every bit as good as those who got
totally free care.
The
extra infusion of taxes Mr. Romanow recommends will merely put off
the day when we realize that we must concentrate scarce public
health care dollars where they will do the most good, and give
users of the system incentives to be prudent about how they spend
them. We spend vast sums on procedures of little or no value, while
we place patients whose conditions endanger their lives in
lengthening queues.
Number Four: Single-payer, Canadian-style
Keeps Costs Under Control
A
mythology has grown up about the superiority of our system to
control costs. Indeed, Mr. Romanow in his report repeats the
argument that, until the introduction of Canadian Medicare, our
health care costs tracked those of the U.S. After the introduction
of Medicare, however, our growth in costs, and especially physician
costs, dropped significantly after the predictable short-term rise.
In a paper on the health care numbers for my Institute by health
care economist Brian Ferguson, we examined these numbers more
carefully, and a wholly different picture emerged for us.
We
see the spike in expenditure associated with the introduction of
Medicare, and the drop off in expenditure growth as the adjustment
to universal coverage works itself through. But by the late 1970s,
the two countries' expenditure growth series are back in sync. In
fact, they are more closely aligned in that period than they are in
any previous period. They diverge again only in the mid- to
late-1980s, when, arguably, Canadian governments became really
serious about controlling spending.
While we can identify transitional effects
surrounding the introduction of Medicare, it is not possible to
identify a lasting effect of the introduction of Medicare on
expenditure on physician services. Basically, the introduction of
Medicare had no effect on the rate of growth of expenditure, and
the reason the Canadian GDP share figure fell below the U.S. figure
was not because of differences in the rate of growth of expenditure
but rather because Canada happened to have the good fortune to
bring Medicare in during a period in which the Canadian economy
outdid the U.S. economy in terms of real growth.
Had
our economic growth been as weak as U.S. growth was through the
1970s and 1980s, and had our health spending nonetheless remained
unchanged, for two decades our share of GDP devoted to health care
would have been higher than the actual U.S. GDP share. Canada, in
other words, would have had the most expensive health care system
in the world, a situation that would have changed only in the
1990s.
Why,
given Canada's apparent success at controlling health care costs
through the 1970s and 1980s--at least as judged by the GDP share
evidence--were recent efforts at cost control not handled with less
disruption?
The
answer now seems to be not that we were poor performers this time
around, but rather that our earlier "success" at cost control was
illusory. Simply put, the introduction of Medicare did not
introduce a period of, or efficient mechanism for, health care cost
control. When it came to the question of how much of our national
income we were spending on health, we were not particularly good;
we were just lucky.
Number Five: More Cash Is the Solution to
Medicare's Problems
I
might point out that Canada in 2002 spent about $75 billion on
publicly funded health care (and another $30 billion or so on
private health care). Mr. Romanow's solution to our problems is a
cash infusion of up to $6.5 billion per year, a recommendation that
now has largely been accepted by Ottawa and the provinces in a
recent First Ministers Conference. But the federal-provincial
deputy ministers of health, in their last report, made a convincing
case that health care costs are rising within the system at 5
percent to 6 percent a year, just under the current cost pressures,
and that there are a number of new pressures that are likely to
accelerate that trend. So you do the math. Add an annual
tax-financed contribution of $6.5 billion to a health care budget
of $75 billion rising at 5 percent per year, and within two years
the ordinary and totally foreseeable costs of the existing system
will have eaten up every penny of that new funding.
Indeed, the health care system in Canada
staggers from crisis to crisis in which new funding is promised by
the federal government. But the federal government put something
like $20 billion into Medicare just before the 1997 federal
election, and, as Mr. Romanow himself remarked in his press
conference on the release of his report, everybody wants to know
what we got for that money. The queues have lengthened, not
shortened, the shortage of diagnostic equipment has got worse, and
people are less able to find a family physician than they were five
years ago. In fact, we have had a lot of experience in Canada with
new injections of cash into the system, supposedly to "buy change."
Normally, what happens is that the powerful organized interests
within the system (doctors, nurses, support staff, etc.) organize
to capture a share of that money. Costs rise, but productivity does
not and services are no better or more timely. The Canadian
Medicare system is a black hole into which we can pour seemingly
infinite amounts of money.
Ironically, in two days of talks with the
provincial premiers in September 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin
squandered a decade's effort to put Canada's public finances in
order in an effort to buy peace with the provinces on the health
care financing front. You would think that he would at least exact
a big price for this sacrifice. After all, he more than any other
single individual can properly claim the credit for having defeated
the deficit and put Ottawa on the path of surplus budgets and
fiscal redemption. The strategy was risky, but Martin courageously
won over public opinion and became the best finance minister in a
generation.
Now,
under heavy fire from the premiers, who had designs on Ottawa's
hard-won surpluses to finance their out-of-control health spending,
Paul Martin did exactly what his predecessors did to land Canada in
its earlier fiscal mess. He is trying to spend his way to
popularity. Tens of billions of dollars are to go to the provinces
over the next few years, allegedly for health care, but with no
real control over where the money goes.
The
sad irony in all this is that when he moved to shore up Ottawa's
finances, Paul Martin took aim squarely at transfers to the
provinces for health care. In this he was continuing a struggle the
feds had been engaged in with the provinces for several decades
over health spending.
In
the early days of Medicare, Ottawa gave the provinces the famous
"50 cent dollars." For every dollar the provinces spent on health,
Ottawa kicked in fifty cents. It was an open-ended federal
commitment, so the provinces had every incentive to spend on health
and less on many other things. After all, if you spent on health,
Ottawa picked up half the tab, which was an almost irresistible
lure, and caused many a province to sacrifice what it considered
higher priorities on the altar of federal cash.
In
the late 1970s Ottawa tried to introduce a little more discipline.
Out went the 50 cent dollars. In came Established Program
Financing. The provinces got block-funding with relatively few
strings attached, plus some extra taxing room.
This
put a cap on Ottawa's cash commitment and made the premiers angry
because they had the responsibility of actually delivering health
care programs, and none of them wanted to take the political heat
for cutting the expansion of health care spending. Thus began the
long march upward of the share of provincial spending going on
health care. Thirty years ago, most provinces were spending about
30 percent of their program spending on health. By some time in the
next decade, every province is expected to be spending over half of
its program spending on hospitals, docs, and drugs.
But
the redefinition of Ottawa's role in health care financing was not
over. As the deficit problem really bit, Ottawa realized that
transfers to the provinces had to be cut back again. This time, it
was Paul Martin who wielded the knife. The new federal plan, called
the Canada Health and Social Transfer, removed the last minor
strings on federal transfers to the provinces for social programs
(chiefly health, but also welfare and education) but cut the total
amount transferred.
The
change was a painful one, but one that helped to restore Ottawa to
fiscal health. The provinces claim, of course, that this was done
at their expense, but this claim is highly exaggerated. At the same
time the provinces were pleading poverty, they were also cutting
taxes and failing to discipline health spending. In any case, no
matter what Roy Romanow says, the health care system's problem is
not a lack of cash (we've never spent more on health than we do
today). On the contrary, it is poor management and a lack of
accountability.
Moreover, powerful producer groups rule
the health care system. If you doubt this, just watch the wave of
health care worker strikes that the latest infusion of cash is
guaranteed to unleash as docs, nurses, administrators, and others
jockey to capture their share of the new funding. It has happened
over and over again: In the absence of real reform, and
particularly of demanding standards of accountability and real hard
performance measures, new cash simply disappears into the system
without a trace. And at the rate health spending rises, the
premiers will soon be back rallying round their standard battle
cry: "It's not enough."
In
order to shore up his weak political position in a minority
parliament, Paul Martin has largely sacrificed the fiscal
maneuvering room he himself won for Ottawa in the early nineties.
Yet he got no commitments for reform from the premiers, and only
token nods in the direction of greater accountability for results.
The Prime Minister has largely destroyed his chief legacy as
finance minister and got nothing to show for it other than a year
or two of peace on the health front.
A
final note on this matter of whether more money will save Medicare:
The Canadian Medicare system was created in the 1960s as a new
layer on an existing, relatively well-funded health care system.
Since then we have paid most of the day-to-day operating costs, but
we have been coasting on the capital within the system and not
renewing it.
The
average hospital in Ontario, our wealthiest province, is 50 years
old. David MacKinnon (the former head of the Ontario Hospitals
Association) and I calculate that the total working capital deficit
of Canada's hospitals today is roughly $4 billion. On top of that,
the cost of simply the ordinary capital expenditures for the
Canadian hospital system is about $2 billion per year for the next
five years.
So,
simply eliminating the working capital deficit in our hospitals
(because working capital represents capacity for change) and paying
for the ordinary capital costs in the hospital sector alone over
the next five years would wipe out all the extra funding Mr.
Romanow was proposing for the system as a whole. And don't forget
that he not merely proposed throwing cash at the existing system.
He also talked about larding it with new responsibilities whose
costs are virtually guaranteed to be higher than what has been
forecast -- and Ottawa is preparing to act on some of those
recommendations, such as its proposed universal catastrophic drug
coverage and home care. Even if you think that money is the
solution, what Mr. Romanow is proposing, and that Ottawa and the
provinces now seem largely to have accepted, is barely enough to
take the incipient crisis in Canadian health care off the boiling
point for two to three years at best.
Number Six: Under Medicare, People Get the
Health Care Services That They Need
A
whole host of things needs to be said here, and I do not have time
for them all. Let me start by saying that while the language of
Medicare is that Canadians get "medically necessary services" paid
for by the state, this is not at all so. Among the services that
are not covered are pharmaceuticals (increasingly important, as
many forms of surgery, etc. are now being supplanted by drugs
regulating the body's functions), dentistry, home care,
chiropractic (in most provinces), and a number of other services.
And there is a wide range of new diagnostic and other services that
it is not yet clear that Medicare will cover, such as gene therapy.
In fact, one of the "brilliant" research papers for the Romanow
Commission argued that, in fact, technology need not be a cost
driver for the health care system because it was only a cost driver
if we actually used these technologies.
Let's talk about a few other aspects of
whether we get the care that we need in Canada.
Queuing
Queuing is a controversial measurement,
not least because there may be many explanations for the queuing,
many of them medically justifiable, so that aggregate queuing
figures may conflate those whose waiting poses no health or other
risk with those whose health may be impaired or may suffer pain
while waiting.
That
being said, in a system in which health services are free at the
point of consumption, queuing is the most common form of rationing
scarce medical resources. And since patient satisfaction plays no
part in determining incomes or other economic rewards for health
care providers and administrators in the public system, patients'
time is treated as if it has no value. There are no penalties in
the system for making people wait.
It
is thus not surprising that the measures of queuing now available,
including the Fraser Institute's annual report card, "Waiting Your
Turn," indicate a
lengthening of queues for a great many medical services, including
access to some specialists, diagnostic testing, and surgery. What
is surprising is that those administering the system must rely on
external studies, not having implemented modern information systems
to monitor waiting periods and identify those who have had an
excessive wait.
I
would also like to point out that while we talk a lot about queuing
in the Canadian health care system, and we talk as if we know how
many people are waiting and how long they wait, in fact we do not
know this at all. Ironically for the largest single program
expenditure of governments in Canada, we know astonishingly little
about what we get for our money. As my colleague David Zitner,
Director of Medical Informatics at Dalhousie University in Halifax
and Health Policy Fellow at my Institute, likes to say, no health
care institution in Canada can tell you how many people got better,
how many people got worse, and how many people's condition was left
unchanged by their contact with their institution. None of them can
give you an answer. No one knows how many people died while waiting
for needed surgery. No one knows how many people are queuing for
any particular procedure or how many people cannot find a family
doctor. Mostly we have guesswork, anecdote, and subjective
measures, not objective ones (such as the Fraser Institute reports
mentioned earlier). We do not even know how long someone has to
wait before he or she has waited "too long," because the health
care system does not establish official standards for timely
care--although presumably even Mr. Romanow would agree that someone
who died while waiting for care may have waited a tad too long.
All
of this is due, as I argued in a major paper I co-authored in
2002, to the
conflict of interest at the heart of Medicare, in which the people
who are the ultimate providers of health care services in Canada
are also the people charged with regulating the system and quality
assurance. Since no one is a competent judge of his or her own
performance, and no one likes to be held accountable for his or her
work, the result is that the health care system simply does not set
tough standards or collect the information that would allow us to
hold the system's administrators accountable for their stewardship
of our health care and the billions of dollars that they spend. The
people who would collect the information are also the people whose
performance would be assessed if useful information were made
available. There appears to be no legal obligation on governments
actually to supply the services they have promised to the
population as their monopoly supplier of health insurance. This is
an appalling double standard, as no responsible regulator would
permit a private supplier of insurance to behave in this way, as a
recent background paper for my Institute makes clear.
Access to Doctors and Medical
technology
Aggregate numbers of doctors per 1000
population do not give a good picture of access to physicians in,
say, cities versus rural areas within countries, nor of proportions
between scarce specialists and plentiful general practitioners, nor
of the quality of medical training. On the other hand, it is a
crude measure of the overall state of access to qualified
practitioners.
On
this measure, Canada performs badly. In 1996, this country had 2.1
practicing physicians per 1000 population, while of the comparison
group only two (Japan and the UK) had a lower ratio: Australia
(2.5), France (3.0), Germany (3.4), Japan (1.8), Sweden (3.1),
Switzerland (3.2), UK (1.7) and U.S. (2.6). Thus, even in countries
with lower per capita spending than Canada, there is greater access
to physician services.
With
respect to medical technology, Canada's performance is also
unimpressive. In a study comparing Canadians' access to four
specific medical technologies (computed tomography [CT] scanners,
radiation equipment, lithotriptors, and magnetic resonance imagers
[MRI]), with access by citizens of other Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, Canadians' access
was significantly poorer in three of the four. Despite spending a
full 1.6 percent of GDP more on health care than the OECD average,
Canadians were well down the league tables in access to CT scanners
(21st of 28), lithotriptors (19th out of 22), and MRIs (19th out of
27). Moreover, access to several of these technologies worsened
relative to access in other countries over the last decade.
Number Seven: "Free" Health Care Empowers
the Poor
Everything I want to say about this is
summed up in a story that happened to my partner Shelley. Shelley
and I are partners in a restaurant, and she actually runs it. She
was given an appointment at the hospital for a procedure, and she
duly showed up at the appointed time. Two hours later she was still
sitting there waiting to be called. Now she was only able to get a
two-hour parking meter, and so she approached the desk and asked if
she could go and put money in the meter. She was curtly told that
she was free to go and put the money in, but that if her name were
called while she was away, that her name would fall back to the
bottom of the queue. So she just decided that she would take the
parking ticket as part of the price of getting the medical service
she needed. Another two hours passed, and still she was not called,
so she again approached the counter, and very patiently and
politely explained (as only Shelley can, because she is the soul of
graciousness) that she actually had a small business to run; that
she was there at the appointed time for her appointment; that she
had waited four hours, which is far longer than she had been led to
expect the whole thing would take; that she had other commitments
because of the business; and could they possibly at least give her
some idea of how much longer she might have to wait?
Well, the woman behind the counter got on
her dignity, drew herself up to her full height, glared at Shelley
and said, "You're talking as if you're some kind of customer!"
There you have it, ladies and gentlemen,
the essence of the problem: When the government supplies you with
"free" health care, you are not a powerful customer who must be
satisfied. They are doing you a favor and you owe the state
gratitude and servility in return for this awesome generosity. They
can give you the worst service in the world, but because it is
free, you are totally disempowered. One of the most important
lessons I have learned from my contact with the Canadian Medicare
system is that payment makes you powerful. And its absence makes
you risible if not invisible.
Now
the articulate and the middle class do not let little things like
that get them down. Even though they do not pay, they still get in
the faces of the people providing service and make their wishes
known. But often the vulnerable, the poor, the ill-educated, and
the inarticulate are the ones who suffer the most because no one's
well-being within the health care system depends on
patients/consumers being well looked after. And by depriving them
of the power of payment within the health care system, Medicare
disempowers them. And the poor see this, because while they may be
poor, they are not stupid.
In a
Compass poll for The National Post, fully 41 percent of Canadians
were of the view that individuals should be able to choose private
health insurance for Medicare if they so chose--allowing them to
obtain better, or at least faster care than at present.
Interestingly, for a society preoccupied with the inequities
implied in "two-tier health care," more of those earning less than
$25,000 per year (47 percent) were interested in this option than
those earning over $75,000 per year (39 percent). Those most
satisfied with their health care were not the least educated, but
the best educated--those with postgraduate degrees.
These findings are consistent with my view
that Canada's system does, in fact, create multi-tiered health care
where health care services are distributed on the basis of
middle-class networks and ability to communicate one's needs
aggressively to professional caregivers. It is the poor, the
vulnerable (including, most obviously, the sick) and the
inarticulate who receive the worst care, because they cannot
circumvent the system the way the middle class and its advocates
can.
Number Eight: Canadian Medicare Is Fairer
Because No One Gets Better Care Than Anyone Else
Roy
Romanow has made it clear that he wants to ensure that "two-tier"
health care continues to be forbidden in Canada and this was a
major theme of the 2004 federal election. Too late. If you are on
worker's compensation; are in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or
the military; if your company has its own salaried physicians; if
you use a private hospital like Shouldice (which specializes in
hernia surgery) in Toronto or one of the country's private abortion
clinics; if you are a member of the medical professions or know
someone who is; or are just articulate and determined or famous and
connected; if you travel to the U.S. or any one of a number of
other places, you can get better, faster, or more satisfactory care
than someone who just lets the wheels of Medicare grind on.
Moreover, technology is allowing the
remote delivery of ever more health services, so the ability of
governments to frustrate patients' desire to get better and faster
treatment is declining, and that decline will accelerate. The
debate, therefore, is really about how many tiers and under what
conditions they will exist. And many of these tiers are beyond
government control.
Virtually any kind of pharmaceutical
product can now be purchased over the Internet from foreign
providers who can evade our government's controls. You can even get
involved in online auctions for the drugs you want. Your x-rays or
MRI scans can be read just as easily by a radiologist in Boston or
Bombay as in Toronto or Truro.
More
powerfully, the brain repair team at Dalhousie University recently
operated on a patient in Saint John, New Brunswick. The surgeons
never left Halifax. Using video cameras and computer controls, they
operated robotic arms that actually did the surgery hundreds of
kilometers away. When you can go to a surgical booth in Canada and
be operated on by the best surgeon in the world, who may be at his
office in London or Houston or Minneapolis, the notion of a closed
national health system in which people must take what public
authorities decide they should have simply cannot survive.
"Multiple tiers" is a slippery concept.
For some, if some people can get a service by paying for it, while
others who cannot pay do not get access, that constitutes multiple
tiers. On the other hand, there are people who oppose tiers because
of an ideology of egalitarianism. Thus, two people with similar
conditions may both get treated, one more quickly through private
payment, the other more slowly (but within appropriate norms for
their condition) by Medicare.
We
are not talking about people being denied care based on ability to
pay, because anyone willing to wait will eventually get care
(although we possess no figures on how many die while queuing for
public health care). The complaint is rather that someone got care
more quickly. That is a very different objection: No one should be
able to get faster treatment than in the public system, even where
such faster access does not affect the quality or timeliness of the
care obtained by people who continue to use the public system.
This
peculiar brand of egalitarianism suggests that people should not be
denied service because of their own inability to pay, but should be
denied access because of their neighbor's inability or
unwillingness to pay (through taxes) for the care an individual
decides he or she needs.
Canada is almost alone in the Western
world in outlawing people paying privately for services that are
also publicly insured. One consequence of this is that there are
many services, such as drugs or home care, that we cannot afford to
cover publicly, whereas they are often publicly insured
elsewhere.
Thus, by forbidding people who wish to do
so the ability to pay, we satisfy our ideological craving for
egalitarianism, but at the cost of an inability to make room in the
public budget for a wider range of services that low-income people
might truly need.
Now
this might be a defensible trade off if our system were superior to
others--and indeed we frequently hear it said that we have the best
health care system in the world. But neither the World Health
Organization (in its ranking of world health systems) nor the
citizens of Canada, nor the poor and the elderly in Canada (based
on polling data), agree.
In
sum, many of Mr. Romanow's concerns, and those of the Canadian
health care establishment whose views he now repeats, are
ideological and have little to do with the quality of care
delivered within the public system. He clings to a system that
outlaws private spending on publicly insured services in the
mistaken belief that parallel systems rob the public system of
resources, while both objective and subjective international
rankings show that multiple tiers of access are fully compatible
with high quality public systems, high levels of care overall, high
levels of patient satisfaction, and public health outcomes as good
(or better than) Canada's.
Number Nine: Medicare-type Spending Is the
Best Way to Improve Health
Again, a lot of people seem to believe
this, but it just is not so. In fact, there are many forms of
spending that are far more likely to improve health outcomes than
health care spending. Consider, for example, that there is a very
close link between health and wealth. The wealthier you are, the
more likely your health is to be good. This implies that spending
that is likely to improve the wealth-creating capacity of society
is also an investment in health. That means things like education,
economic infrastructure, and a reasonable tax burden are all key
determinants of health. So too are public health measures like
sanitation, water quality, environmental protection, and preventive
measures such as pap smears, etc.
The
irony is that as the health care budget expands in Canada, it is
crowding out many of these other forms of public spending. For
example, the provinces, who have responsibility in Canada for the
delivery of most services (such as health care; primary, secondary
and post-secondary education; roads; environmental protection;
water provision, etc.) have seen health rise from around 30 percent
of provincial program spending to nearly 50 percent. In all
provinces it is expected to exceed 50 percent within a decade. And
Canada's tax burden is about 8 to 10 percentage points of GDP
higher than in the U.S., so that our tax burden is uncompetitive
with you, our major market and major competitor, while the health
care budget is cannibalizing scarce public dollars that could be
going toward things much more likely to produce superior population
health outcomes. But the politics of health spending are powerful
and have proven nearly irresistible to date.
Number Ten: Medicare Is an Economic
Competitive Advantage for Business
In
the United States, in the ordinary course of things, as the price
of health care increases, so, too, do insurance premiums since,
ultimately, all insurance payments come from the pool of premiums
collected from the insured. Since people usually obtain this type
of insurance through their place of employment, it is often thought
that the rising cost of insurance constitutes an increased cost to
employers. This view is especially widespread with regard to health
insurance in the United States, where it is often said that health
insurance premiums make up a larger part of the cost of building a
car than steel does. Canadian politicians are prone to argue that
since, under Medicare, Canadian companies do not have to bear this
extra cost, they have a competitive advantage in world markets. As
with so many statements concerning Medicare, this, too, is wrong.
Economic theory predicts, and empirical
evidence confirms, that the full cost of the insurance premiums is
passed back to workers in the form of lower take-home pay. Canadian
workers pay the costs of Medicare through income taxes; U.S.
workers pay the cost of their health coverage through the pass-back
of premiums. Even the part nominally paid by the employer actually
comes out of the pool of funds available for paying labor, and
therefore comes out of the workers' pockets, in that case before it
even reaches them.
Conclusion
So, in conclusion, let me just summarize
again the top ten things many people believe about Canadian
Medicare, but shouldn't:
- Number One: Canada has the best health
care system in the world.
- Number Two: The Canadian public love
Medicare.
- Number Three: Canadian Medicare is
sustainable.
- Number Four: Single-payer, Canadian-style
coverage, keeps costs under control.
- Number Five: More cash is the solution to
Medicare's problems.
- Number Six: Under Medicare, people get the
health care services that they need.
- Number Seven: "Free" health care empowers
the poor.
- Number Eight: Canadian Medicare is fairer
because no one gets better care than anyone else
- Number Nine: Medicare-type spending is the
best way to improve health.
- Number Ten: Medicare is an economic
competitive advantage for business.
Now,
like most Canadians, I believe that our system is superior in many
respects to the U.S. system, but it is a system that staggers under
the burden of serious design flaws. Far from sharing Mr. Romanow's
complacency, I am deeply worried about the long-term sustainability
of our health care system, and I think that we have much to learn
from countries that ranked much higher than either Canada or the
U.S. in the World Health Organization rankings.
These countries demonstrate that many of
the fears that Canadians have about significant reform to Medicare
(to introduce payment for health care, to allow people to pay
directly for health care outside the government monopoly, and even
breaking up the provision monopoly to allow competition and a
greater role for the private sector) are all reforms that can be
carried out within a public policy framework that continues to be
preoccupied by equity considerations. That gives Canadians better
value for the tens of billions of dollars they so patiently and
lovingly devote to public health care spending in a repeated
triumph of hope over experience.
Brian Lee Crowley is the
President of the Atlantic Institute of Market Studies located in
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. Mr. Crowley kindly updated his
remarks for this publication.