November 17, 2003 | WebMemo on Health Care
The Medicare conference agreement fails the two critical requirements of a responsible drug benefit program for the nation's seniors. The original idea underlying this legislation was never just about adding drug coverage to Medicare. It was about doing so in a way that would not lead to huge additional liabilities to future generations, and in a way that would reform the program so that it could respond to the changing needs of the elderly and disabled. But the agreement will not lead to that. Instead it guts critical reforms, relegating them to a "demonstration project" that is doomed to failure. And it opens the floodgates to new entitlement spending that will mean huge taxes on future workers.
It is time for Congress and the President to go back to the drawing board and do two things:
What's Wrong With the Conference Agreement
Early text from Medicare conferees indicate critical decisions have been made that should cause great concern to reformers and to taxpayers. Among them:
It is time for Washington to recognize that the current process of developing a drug benefit with Medicare reform was ill-fated from the start. Once it was clear to Capitol Hill that the President was not going to build on his initial set of principles by taking the high-profile lead to build public and congressional support in addressing the tough issues, it became increasingly difficult for serious reformers in Congress to achieve a responsible outcome. Those fundamental issues, such as how to deal with the staggering liabilities of Medicare that threaten the program's ability to deliver existing benefits, remain unresolved as Congress seems poised to add to the burden on future generations.
Faced with the prospect of political and policy failure, Congress and the President should change course and focus on two objectives in the remaining weeks of this session. First, Congress should put off creating a major new drug benefit and instead enact a modest program focused on those genuinely in need. Second, the President should reassemble a "coalition of the willing" of those members of congress from both parties who are prepared to change the Medicare program for the next generation of retirees, the baby boom generation. . Working closely with this coalition - consisting of congressional leaders who are committed to responsible reform-, the President should embark on a national campaign to discuss the key reform issues in Medicare and to build public support for major reform legislation.
Specifically, with the active support of the President, Congress should:
The conferees have already adopted a prescription drug card, and they are in agreement on the need to subsidize the coverage of low-income seniors. The provision would enable all seniors to have a choice between at least two different drug cards that would secure drug discounts between 15 percent and 25 percent. Low-income seniors would also be able to get a $600 annual subsidy to cover the cost of their prescriptions.
Congress also may wish to add a provision for government-subsidized private catastrophic coverage to protect poor seniors against high drug costs. This could be done immediately, and the access problem facing poor seniors without prescription drug coverage could be resolved quickly and efficiently.
In 1997, with the strong support of President Bill Clinton, Congress created the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare. This, among other major Medicare provisions, was a significant advance in public policy under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Chaired by Senator John Breaux (D-LA) and Representative Bill Thomas (R-CA), the commission completed 18 months of hearings, briefings, studies, and analyses on the Medicare program and its future. A majority of the commission reached a consensus and voted in 1999 to recommend changes in the program that would transform it into a superior system like the popular and successful Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. President Clinton failed to build upon the work of the Commission, and an historic opportunity to make change was lost.
President Bush does not have to repeat this disastrous mistake. But to avoid it, he must be directly engaged. To fashion a coherent policy and build strong public support to advance the reform agenda on Capitol Hill, the President must work closely with congressional reformers who are sincerely committed to the necessary structural reform. Together, they could develop and present a detailed, market-based reform program to Congress for enactment as soon as possible. With congressional and executive branch cooperation on a shared goal of real Medicare reform, lawmakers should be able to move very quickly, building upon the solid policy work and first-rate analyses produced in 1999 by the Bipartisan Commission and its staff. Meanwhile, President Bush should commit to building public support for the reform measure.
A critical element to achieve success is that the President must commit himself to building public support for real Medicare reform , so that his recommendations will command wide support when presented to Congress.
Consequences of Failure
The President must make a strong and sustained case for change. The Congress has an historic opportunity to prepare the Medicare program for the baby boomers-the next generation of senior citizens. They will be retiring in just eight years. The consequences of failure are unacceptable, both for future retirees and for the future generations of taxpayers who will be supporting them. It is wrong for Congress to deny an entire generation the right to choose their own health care plans, especially when medical and information technology are rapidly evolving and opening up unprecedented opportunities to serve the personal needs of millions of Americans.
The broader structural reform of Medicare should continue. It should not be reduced to another failed demonstration program, or otherwise watered down and rendered ineffectual. But it should be done carefully and with the full support of the President in his capacity as the nation's leader. It is unlikely that solid Medicare reform will be accomplished without a clean and coherent set of reform proposals forged by a willing coalition of Members committed to real reform, a reliance on the solid work done by the previous Bipartisan Commission, or the President making a strong public case for change and weighing in on the specifics of Medicare reform policy.
Meanwhile, Congress can and should, quickly and efficiently, resolve the problem for seniors without drug coverage. They can do that immediately, and they should.
Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D., is Vice President for Domestic and Economic Policy Studies atThe Heritage Foundation, and Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., is Director of the Center for Health Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
 On this point, see Robert E. Moffit, " Courting Disaster: Adding A Prescription Drug Benefit Without Serious Medicare Reform," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, No. 816, May 17, 2002.
Congressional Budget Office, "H.R. 1: Medicare Prescription Drug Modernization Act of 2003 and S. 1: Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003," Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, July 22, 2003.
See remarks of Thomas R. Saving, Medicare Trustee, in Robert E. Moffit et al., "What Will Medicare's Future Hold for Seniors and Taxpayers?" Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 797, September 23, 2003, p. 4.
Daniel J. Mitchell, "Why Medicare Expansion Threatens the Bush Tax Cuts and Undermines Fundamental Tax Reform," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1672, July 28, 2003.
William Beach and Brian Riedl, "The New Medicare Drug Entitlement's Huge New Tax on Working Americans," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1673, July 30, 2003.
 For a discussion of this cost containment issue, see Stuart M. Butler, et al., " Cost Control in the medicare Drug Bill Needs Premium Support, Not a 'Trigger'", Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1704, November 10, 2003.
 For a brief account of similar health care and Medicare demonstration efforts, see Robert E. Moffit, " A Demonstration Project= No Medicare Reform," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 366, November 13, 2003.
 Joanne Kenen, " Medicare Outline May be In Reach by Friday," Reuters, October 23,2003, 7:35 PM.
See Kenneth Thorpe, "Potential Implications of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit on Retiree Health Care Benefits," Emory University, September 13, 2003; see also Derek Hunter, "Recent Research Confirms That Seniors Will Lose Coverage Under New Medicare Legislation," Heritage Foundation Web Memo No. 345, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm345.cfm.
On the dynamics of retiree coverage loss, see Edmund F. Haislmaier, "How Congress's Medicare Drug Provisions Would reduce Seniors' Existing Coverage," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1668, July 17, 2003; see also Lanhee J. Chen, "What Seniors Will Lose With a Universal Medicare Drug Entitlement," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1680, August 26, 2003, and Derek Hunter, "The Medicare Drug Entitlement's High Cost to Seniors With Employer-Based Coverage," Heritage Foundation Web Memo No. 344, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm344.cfm.
According to a recent Kaiser Family Foundation survey, only 34 percent of seniors have a "favorable impression" of the congressional Medicare proposals. See Derek Hunter, "What New Research Reveals About the Medicare Drug Debate," Heritage Foundation Web Memo No. 342, September 25, 2003, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm342.cfm.
On this point, see Robert Laszewski, "Will the Conferees' Medicare Insurance Provisions Really Work?" Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 801, October 15, 2003.
 Mary Agnes Carey, "Medicare Conferees Agree on Fallback Drug Plan," CQ Today, October 21, 2003. p. 1.
Robert Pear, "Compromise Calls for U.S. to Guarantee Medicare Drug benefit," The New York Times, October 21, 2003. Under the proposed compromise, according to Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), the taxpayers would assume the financial risk of providing drug benefits in any geographically defined market with fewer than two private drug plans.
 Robert Pear, 'Deal 'In Principle' for Medicare Plan to Cover Drug Costs,", The New York Times, November 16, 2003.
On this point, see Derek Hunter, "More Taxpayer Subsidies Will Not Correct Congress's Medicare Drug Miscalculation," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 357, October 27, 2003.
As health insurance expert Robert Laszewski notes, "Most health plans operate in only one state, or two or three states, and rarely in every town and village in those areas." Laszewski, "Will the Conferees' Medicare Insurance Provisions Really Work?" p. 2.
 Pointing to the difficulty of getting cooperation on Medicare legislation, Rep. Bill Thomas (R-CA) used the phrase in his October 19, 2003 appearance on ABC.
Sarah Leuck, "Drug Cards Could Be Fallback If Prescription Bill Bogs Down," The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2003.