Protect the Homeland

Stop Malign CCP Activities in Higher Education.

Issue: PRC interference and operations in U.S. higher education institutions pose a long-term economic and national security threat. Confucius Institutes, ostensibly used to promote Chinese language education and cultural exchange, give CCP agents a foothold on U.S. campuses and have been used to compromise faculty research, steal intellectual property, surveil overseas Chinese students, and spread pro-CCP propaganda.

Many top research universities have financial ties to organizations linked to the CCP through donations, joint programs, and investments by university endowments. The Department of Education has warned that foreign donors often influence teaching and research.⁴⁴ Some U.S. institutions have exchange programs with Chinese universities known to serve as feeder schools for China’s intelligence services.⁴⁵

A small but dangerous minority of Chinese citizens who study in the U.S. have relationships with Chinese intelligence or military organizations and are involved in sensitive research and technologies that could pose national security threats. They provide the CCP access to and influence on university campuses as well as opportunities to reward, educate, control, discipline, and utilize Chinese citizens to the party’s benefit.⁴⁶

Action: The U.S. government and academia must ensure that U.S. universities and their students are not subject to influence and exploitation operations by foreign adversaries. The Administration must expose and counter CCP efforts to subvert and exploit American higher education. The U.S. government must seek to identify and roll back education partnerships linked to the CCP and entities responsive to Chinese-government direction. The U.S. government and academia must apply far greater scrutiny to Chinese applicants to programs with military, dual-use, or high-technology applications, beginning with the presumption of denial for programs deemed most sensitive to national security.

The State Department must review visa applications from adversarial countries to ensure that the background and research plan of every applicant for a student visa are thoroughly vetted on national security grounds. Individuals deemed to pose a national security threat due to their personal or professional ties to the CCP, background, or research focus on sensitive technologies should be denied visas.

Implementation: The Department of Education should immediately enforce existing laws by requiring institutions of higher learning to report foreign gifts and grants. The Administration should also ban, at a federal level, all Confucius Institutes and all collaborations between U.S. institutions and Chinese entities affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security or other security and intelligence agencies. Congress and state legislatures should pass laws to defend U.S. academic institutions from CCP influence. These should include threats to withhold state and federal funds—including loan and grant support, research funding, Department of Education funding, and ROTC program funding—from colleges and universities that resist efforts to eliminate CCP influence operations. Background investigations into student visa applicants should deny citizens of the PRC, and those of other U.S. adversarial countries, access to Department of Defense–funded research programs.

Impact: Rolling back CCP influence on U.S. campuses will restore American higher education primarily to the service of the American people. The loss of research funding and cooperation with Chinese organizations, as well as a likely decrease in enrollment by Chinese students in sensitive research programs, will cause financial repercussions that may make many colleges and universities uncooperative. The greatest hardship will likely be felt by elite STEM graduate programs, which have historically had a large number of students from China researching cutting-edge technologies and have been leading recipients of Chinese cooperation and funding.⁴⁷ These changes are nevertheless necessary for the protection of U.S. institutions and intellectual property from the CCP.

Allies: The U.S. should encourage allied and partner nations facing similar threats to take action. There is already momentum building for such actions abroad, including in the U.K.⁴⁸

Sharing information with allies and partners on the extent of Chinese influence operations within colleges and universities and coordinating best responses should be a priority. The U.S. will also have to work with international partners to prevent China from using other nations as conduits for Chinese agents aiming to infiltrate U.S. colleges and universities.

Crack Down on Illegal Chinese Police Operations in the U.S.

Issue: Chinese security personnel routinely conduct illegal operations in the U.S., making a mockery of U.S. sovereignty and violating the rights of their victims.⁴⁹ These include actions under Operation Sky Net, a CCP campaign aimed at repatriating Chinese “fugitives” abroad, as well as broader surveillance and intimidation of Chinese students, activists, ethnic minorities, and others inside U.S. borders. Chinese agents often direct operations remotely from China, harassing their victims via social media, threatening their victims’ relatives in China, and hiring local thugs to stalk and intimidate their victims. Sometimes, Chinese agents visit the U.S. on tourist visas and conduct operations in person.

Chinese police departments have also begun opening overseas outposts in other countries, including the U.S.⁵⁰ They are ostensibly designed to provide Chinese citizens with standard “clerical services,” but reports by human rights organizations have implicated these facilities in illegal law enforcement operations.⁵¹ The U.S. government is aware of these illegal activities, and as early as 2015 warned China to stop sending police officers on covert missions to the U.S.⁵² Nevertheless, U.S. law enforcement rarely prosecutes such activities. When it does, U.S. officials usually do not press charges until after the Chinese agents have returned to China, where they can continue to operate remotely and with impunity.⁵³ Some of these operations are conducted from Chinese embassies and consulates in the U.S.

Action: The U.S. government must take China’s blatant disregard of American sovereignty seriously and take persistent, concrete action to convince Beijing that the costs of continuing these operations on American soil are prohibitively high. The Trump Administration’s forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas, in 2020 offered an important example. While it gave no specific reason, the State Department noted that China had “engaged for years in massive illegal spying and influence operations” and that the State Department made the move “in order to protect American intellectual property and Americans’ private information.”⁵⁴

A whole-of-government response is needed, to include diplomatic pressure, legislation, and bold, consistent action by federal law enforcement to bring Chinese agents involved in these activities into custody.

Implementation: These efforts must be led by the executive branch, and officials up to the U.S. President must be willing to raise this issue frequently with their Chinese counterparts. U.S. law enforcement should recognize that Chinese agents do as much damage remotely in China as they do in America, and should take every opportunity to bring them into custody, even if it means luring agents implicated in such cases to the U.S. or countries with extradition agreements with the U.S. The Department of Justice should reinstate the China Initiative and ensure that the CCP’s repressive efforts in the U.S., which predominantly victimize Chinese Americans and Chinese nationals living in America, is a focus of that initiative. As most cases are never reported, the U.S. government must promote policies to help to educate Chinese immigrant communities in understanding their constitutional rights and opportunities to report malicious CCP activities without fear.

Impact: High-profile arrests of senior Chinese agents in the U.S. will impose costs on Beijing for continuing to conduct illegal law enforcement and intelligence activities on U.S. soil, as well as penalties for American collaborators with Chinese agents, although some may be unaware that they are collaborating with Chinese security services. The U.S. government must prepare for Beijing to retaliate through further hostage diplomacy and avoid the practice of trading CCP criminals for hostages.

Allies: China’s illegal police operations are a global phenomenon. U.S. allies and partners also struggle with these actions, and some—including Australia⁵⁵—have had residents of Chinese origin kidnapped on their own soil and smuggled to China by Chinese agents. U.S. leadership is crucial for showing the path forward in confronting this threat and spurring other countries to action.

Ban Dangerous Chinese Apps.

Issue: Chinese apps are widely used on digital devices in America. TikTok, for example, claims to enjoy150 million active users in the U.S. Capitalizing on the paralysis of U.S. regulators, Chinese app makers, such as ByteDance and Tencent, have abused an ever-expanding suite of applications used in the U.S. to obtain critical information on American citizens. On the surface, the activities of these Chinese firms differ little from those of American app makers, which also collect vast amounts of data. The risks posed by Chinese apps are much greater, however, due to China being an adversarial state and Chinese laws that require companies to provide data to, and cooperate in the intelligence work of, the Chinese government upon request.⁵⁶

China has already weaponized mobile applications as a tool for data harvesting and surveillance. Through exploiting weak security protocols on mobile app stores and the absence of real oversight, the CCP has infiltrated the mobile devices of over one hundred million Americans, gaining unfettered access to troves of personal data, including the geolocation patterns of Americans, keystroke logs, and sensitive login information.⁵⁷ Analysts have identified these kinds of activities to collect and exploit data as integral to the Chinese methods of information warfare.⁵⁸ Beyond data security and privacy concerns, the widespread adoption of CCP-controlled social media platforms in the United States represents a major national security threat. Today, TikTok is the most popular social media platform self-reported by U.S. teens and plays an increasingly prominent role in U.S. electoral messaging.⁵⁹ Given the CCP’s leverage over ByteDance due to the aforementioned laws and a “golden share” of the company owned by a Chinese government entity, TikTok is an unacceptable vector for election interference, disinformation campaigns, and other malign intelligence-collection activities.

Action: The U.S. government should ban TikTok. In addition, the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce should institute a risk-based framework for assessing potential bans from the U.S. market on foreign-owned digital platforms that meet specific criterion for a national security justification. This action is vital to address malicious exploitation of Americans’ data and personal information as well as to mitigate impacts of potential foreign influence operations conducted by and on these platforms. Congress should also consider the merits of updating the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.⁶⁰

Implementation: Congress should consider delisting applications that meet stated criteria via an agreed upon risk-based framework from app stores operating in the U.S. Under the authority of the powers given to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018, Congress should direct CFIUS to continuously review the activities of all Chinese mobile app companies and recommend specific apps to be banned on national security grounds.⁶¹

Some state governments have already acted. More than 20 states have banned or acted against TikTok in one form or another.⁶² Others should consider similar actions. At the very least, all levels of the U.S. government should immediately ban Chinese apps from devices used by government employees.

Impact: Banning Chinese apps that pose security risks will inhibit a key element of China’s information-warfare strategy against the U.S. The removal of these applications will also result in a more secure environment for consumers with better protections for their privacy and personal data. For too long, applications, such as ByteDance’s TikTok and Tencent’s WeChat, have successfully evaded regulatory action while collecting invaluable and incalculable volumes of sensitive American data.

Allies: In prohibiting Chinese apps with national security risks from operating in the U.S. the U.S. can share best practices with partners and allies. There is growing momentum for these actions. Other nations, such as India, have identified similar threats and risks, banning hundreds of Chinese apps in recent years.⁶³

The U.S. should lead the charge among free nations promoting a comprehensive and cooperative effort to reform the mobile application markets and add stronger security protocols to digital marketplaces.

Engage State and Local Governments.

Issue: The PRC has engaged in systematic and aggressive influence operations at the state and local level that threaten U.S. interests. The CCP’s strategy for exploiting subnational governance to advance its objectives is led by its official foreign influence agency, the United Front Work Department (UFWD). The UFWD, through its various front organizations, including the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, has established an extensive network of associations, sister cities, cultural groups, friendship societies, and business forums in all 50 states.

In July 2022, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center issued a bulletin warning that “Leaders at the U.S. state, local, tribal, and territorial levels risk being manipulated to support hidden PRC agendas. PRC influence operations can be deceptive and coercive, with seemingly benign business opportunities or people-to-people exchanges sometimes masking PRC political agendas.”⁶⁴ Furthermore, the U.S. intelligence community noted that “financial incentives may be used to hook U.S. state and local leaders.”⁶⁵

The advisory concluded that “geopolitical reality has placed state and local officials in the United States on the front lines of national security.”⁶⁶

Action: The scope of CCP influence and activities at the state and local level are vast and complex, requiring a whole-of-nation effort to mitigate. “We must take this opportunity to expeditiously advise, inform and detail the threat to every fabric of our society and why it matters,” insists former director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, William Evanina.⁶⁷ State legislatures bear significant responsibility for meeting this threat by formulating legislation to confront China’s influence in areas under their jurisdiction. Governors can also take executive action, including through the issuance of executive orders to address threats posed by the CCP at the state level. Mayors and local government officials need to remain vigilant and educated about nefarious CCP actions at the local level.

Implementation: State and local governments must address vulnerabilities that the CCP is exploiting.⁶⁸ They must prevent Chinese companies from obtaining contracts to build critical infrastructure, resist purchasing Chinese products and technology that can pose espionage or national security risks, limit and roll back nefarious PRC activities on U.S. university campuses, encourage public funds—particularly pension funds—to divest from problematic Chinese entities, prevent the purchase of sensitive land or property near critical infrastructure or strategic farmland by PRC agents, and identify and halt lobbying of state and local governments by Chinese agents.

Impact: More robust state and local action will mitigate PRC efforts to exploit unprepared state and local government officials and regulations as the weak links through which to advance its broader aims in the U.S. and to exploit economic and national security vulnerabilities.

Allies: The U.S. government must share best practices in terms of state actions and lessons learned with friendly allied nations grappling with their own challenges related to PRC influence and activities at sub-national governance levels.

Prevent Malicious Land Use.

Issue: Undisclosed and unregulated investments in U.S. agricultural assets and acquisition of land by Chinese individuals, state-owned enterprises, or affiliated entities can present a national security risk. The greatest concerns relate to the purchase of land in sensitive areas, particularly near U.S. military installations and critical infrastructure. Since 2017, U.S. officials have “investigated Chinese land purchases near critical infrastructure…and stonewalled what they saw as clear efforts to plant listening devices near sensitive military and government facilities.”⁶⁹

Yet, not all current and previous land purchases have been subject to adequate review. While purchases of land by Chinese actors remain limited, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) found that Chinese land investments in the United States grew from roughly 14,000 acres in 2010 to 194,000 acres in 2020—more than a tenfold increase. If joint ventures are included, the total exceeds 350,000 acres.⁷⁰

Action: Protecting U.S. military and critical infrastructure installations is of paramount importance. The PRC has a long and proven track record of taking advantage of American openness to conduct espionage activities and could leverage ownership of U.S. land in a variety of ways that are detrimental to U.S. national security interests. The U.S. must take additional measures to prohibit, limit, or scrutinize Chinese land acquisitions, particularly when they are located near sensitive U.S. facilities.

Several states already have various prohibitions, conditions, and disclosure requirements on foreign agricultural land ownership, but more must be done at both the state and federal level to harmonize and enforce the patchwork of legislation.⁷¹ That will require not only greater scrutiny of future investments, but assessments of past purchases as well. Effective action will also require a greater understanding of Chinese tactics to obscure financing and ownership structures that could pose national security risks or contribute to intellectual property theft and transfer.

Implementation: New federal and state reforms must require greater transparency of foreign agricultural and land purchases from countries of particular concern. This action must include additional information on downstream ownership mechanisms, and greater enforcement of penalties for non-disclosures. While CFIUS can seek input and data from the USDA, the USDA currently sits outside the formal review process. To counter downstream and convoluted ownership structures designed to obfuscate and circumvent restrictions, Congress should require that the USDA be included in the CFIUS process. The Department of Homeland Security should define and locate critical infrastructure that could be affected by proximity-based purchases of land near installations and military facilities of concern, coordinating with the Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, and other departments or agencies as appropriate.

Impact: Mitigating threats from acquisitions of agricultural, industrial, and commercial property and other infrastructure in the U.S. by CCP-linked entities, including ventures with U.S. co-ownership, will reduce China’s ability to compromise U.S. security near sensitive infrastructure and military assets.

Allies: The U.S. should engage with allies and partner nations on this issue, raising awareness about the threats posed by Chinese land acquisitions, and encouraging them to conduct their own internal threat assessments and create their own review mechanisms. Information sharing among allies and strategic partners will aid in identifying problematic Chinese acquisitions and setting standards to identify Chinese exploitation tactics.

Ban CCP Lobbyists.

Issue: The CCP conducts widespread lobbying campaigns targeting U.S. officials and influencers at the federal, state, and local levels. While influence operations by foreign governments require disclosure under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), most of China’s lobbying activities are conducted indirectly, including through businesses, allowing lobbyists to skirt disclosure requirements under FARA. Chinese businesses tied to the CCP spend considerable sums on lobbying efforts and, in some cases, are represented by prominent former U.S. officials, few of whom are ever required to register as a foreign agent.⁷²

These officials are often able to register under the more lenient, and less stigmatizing, Lobbying Disclosure Act, which is administered by House and Senate clerks rather than the Justice Department, which administers FARA. There is often confusion over who must register and under which regime, which has led to the underenforcement of existing laws.

Action: The U.S. government must seek to increase the transparency and accountability of the Chinese government’s lobbying activities in the U.S. and, where necessary, ban them outright. There is no constitutional prohibition against such action: Restrictions on some forms of lobbying activities by Americans are already in place.⁷³ Furthermore, foreign governments, foreign political parties, and foreign corporations lack the same legal standing in the U.S. as their American counterparts, as indicated by the restrictions on their contributions to U.S. political campaigns. The U.S. government should also increase the penalties on U.S. citizens and non-citizens for failing to disclose foreign lobbying activities.

Implementation: Congress should ban lobbying by agents of the Chinese government. It should pass legislation that requires lobbyists representing Chinese government-controlled companies to register as foreign agents, as well as a law that prohibits foreign agents from lobbying representatives or agents of U.S. national or sub-national government entities on behalf of these companies or the Chinese government. Taken together, these actions would make it illegal for individuals—American or Chinese—to lobby the U.S. government on behalf of either the Chinese state or Chinese companies.

Impact: Prohibiting lobbying by Chinese agents—including agents of Chinese government-controlled companies—will reduce the amount of influence an adversarial regime can exert on local, state, and federal governments. It will not completely eradicate the problem, though. These measures will not prevent U.S. companies from lobbying the U.S. government on behalf of their China-related business interests. U.S. businesses frequently oppose U.S. actions that will damage their interests either directly or indirectly by inviting retaliatory action by Beijing, as is their right under the U.S. Constitution. Those rights would be unaffected by these recommendations.

Allies: Banning lobbying by agents of China will not significantly harm U.S. allies. Other countries would be unaffected and allowed to continue regular lobbying activities. These actions would set a precedent that some allied and partner countries might want to replicate.

Ensure Border Security and Immigration Enforcement.

Issue: The Biden Administration has an open-border policy that has facilitated illegal entry and presence in the United States. At the current pace of illegal immigration, the illegal population in the country will more than double by the end of Joe Biden’s term. These policies will negatively affect the U.S. economy in a variety of ways, from increased transnational criminal activity to drug overdose deaths, human trafficking, and massive additional burdens on U.S. taxpayers. In addition, open borders pose national security threats specifically related to China. These include China’s role in global drug trafficking, exploiting instability in the U.S. and Latin America caused by illegal migration, and using opportunities to undermine American security through its uncontrolled borders. The U.S. government should close loopholes in immigration law and policy that China is exploiting.

Action: The Administration must reverse its current open-border policies. The U.S. should move quickly to regain operational control of the border, blocking illegal border crossings, interdicting transnational criminal activity, and denying illegitimate asylum and refugee claims. Further, the U.S. must more aggressively enforce U.S. immigration laws and detain and deport illegal aliens as quickly as possible, in as large numbers as possible, to show consequences for illegal behavior in order to deter the flow of current and future illegal immigration.

Implementation: States and local governments should move aggressively to complement federal border and immigration enforcement.⁷⁴ Congress must reassert its authority and undo much of the Biden Administration’s destructive immigration policies. In particular, Congress should insist on fully funding thorough border and immigration enforcement and explicitly reject amnesty for violators of immigration law. Furthermore, Congress should exercise more expansive oversight of federal activities as well as close loopholes in the system that have long been exploited by the cartels and human traffickers.⁷⁵ Finally, the Administration should implement a full spectrum of reforms to ensure a secure border and regular legal immigration system.⁷⁶

Impact: Effective border and immigration enforcement will benefit the U.S. economically by significantly reducing unnecessary burdens on American taxpayers and the associated costs of criminal, drug, and human trafficking activity. U.S. national security objectives require a secure border.

Allies: The U.S. must insist on cooperation from other nations in combating human trafficking, illegal migration, and refugee and asylum abuse. In particular, U.S. policies must foster cooperation with Latin America that discourages illegal migration and combats transnational criminal activity. Further, the U.S. government should return to a requirement and enforcement of the “safe third country” concept. This means that a migrant fleeing his home country to protect his life must request that protection in the first safe country he enters, not traverse multiple countries to claim asylum in the U.S. Because the “safe third country” directly affects Mexico and Central American countries, the U.S. must also pursue new Asylum Cooperative Agreements with those governments.

Address China’s Role in the U.S.Drug Crisis.

Issue: China is contributing to a deadly drug crisis in the U.S. that is devastating American communities, harming the U.S. economy, and exacerbating national security concerns by facilitating transnational criminal activity and making the open U.S. border even more dangerous. In recent years, the U.S. homeland has been flooded with fentanyl, a synthetic opioid drug of Chinese origin that has 50 times the potency of heroin and 100 times the potency of morphine.⁷⁷

Chinese fentanyl reaches American shores in two primary ways: as nearly pure fentanyl shipped directly from China and in much larger proportions as shipments of “cut” or diluted fentanyl manufactured by Mexican cartels using chemical precursors from China.

In 2019, authorities from the U.S. and Mexico seized enough fentanyl to kill the entire population of the U.S. more than three times over.⁷⁸ Since then, things have only gotten worse, producing a crisis that has in a single year resulted in the death of more than 70,000 Americans.⁷⁹ Although Beijing is very effective at controlling drugs within its borders, it lacks the same dedication when it comes to controlling the export of controlled substances to other countries. In 2019, China made a commitment to President Trump to schedule all fentanyl derivatives as controlled substances.⁸⁰ This was important, as fentanyl, a synthetic substance, could be altered in minor ways to distinguish its chemical structure from pure fentanyl while retaining—or even enhancing—the same level of lethality and addictiveness. Yet, enforcement in China has been lackluster, as Chinese precursors remain the number one source of Mexican-developed fentanyl.⁸¹

Action: The U.S. must adopt a family of policies and actions aimed at forcing China to end the export of dangerous precursor chemicals to Mexico. The U.S. should not allow the CCP to establish linkages between gaining China’s cooperation in drug trafficking—a responsibility Beijing already has—in exchange for U.S. cooperation on other issues.

Implementation: U.S. sanctions on China for non-compliance should be direct, punitive, and severe. The U.S. should sanction individuals and entities within China, Mexico, and the U.S. that are involved in enabling this drug trade and rigorously enforce the sanctions regime.

Impact: Preventing Chinese fentanyl precursor chemicals from reaching Mexico could substantially disrupt the production of fentanyl, significantly increasing the cost and decreasing supply. Reductions in drug-trafficking volume will help to address the U.S. drug crisis. In addition, by highlighting how the CCP is a “silent partner” in this deadly drug trade, the U.S. will diminish the legitimacy of China’s claim that it is a responsible global actor.

Allies: The U.S. must encourage its allies to schedule fentanyl, fentanyl derivatives, such as Alfentanil, Sufentanil, Remifentanil, and Carfentanil, and fentanyl precursor chemicals as controlled substances. While fentanyl serves an important function in hospital settings, the ease of abuse requires significant oversight in all nations. It will also be important to engage with other major drug-making countries, such as India, which have also begun exporting more precursor chemicals to Mexico to compete with Chinese companies.

Ban the Import and Sale of Chinese Manufactured Drones.

Issue: Aerial drones and other unmanned vehicles represent key present and future technologies with both significant military and economic implications.⁸² Most recreational and commercial drones used in the U.S. are manufactured in China and the associated operating systems are both impressive and troubling.⁸³ A growing number of drones employed by federal, state, and local agencies are also Chinese origin. The collection capabilities of these systems have improved dramatically, as miniaturization brings capabilities once associated with large drones to those used for recreation. The data collected by those systems is stored on servers owned by Chinese corporations that are legally obligated to share that data with the CCP upon request, effectively giving the Party access to government, corporate, and private data on request.⁸⁴

The Chinese corporation Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI) accelerated the introduction of these systems in April 2020 by providing drone-collection systems free of charge to 45 law enforcement and first responder organizations across 22 U.S. states during the COVID-19 crisis. Those “gifts,” along with hundreds of other purchased systems are now being used in major metropolitan areas to monitor every aspect of life in these cities. The data and images collected hold the precise location of critical infrastructure and other sensitive information, including the location of influential figures, their movements, and interactions.⁸⁵

Action: The U.S. government must prohibit any federal agency from purchasing, operating, or deploying Chinese drones, and it must encourage states and local jurisdictions to take the same preventive measures. Several bipartisan attempts have been made to prohibit the use of federal funds to purchase or operate unmanned aircraft systems made by foreign entities through language in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). These amendments, however, were stripped out in the conference committee process. Language preventing federal government acquisition of these systems should be reinserted the next time the NDAA is re-authorized and signed into law. Once implemented, Congress should task federal agencies with educating officials at the state and local level about the goal of both preventing the purchase of future systems and removing existing platforms.

Implementation: In anticipation of a legislative solution, the White House should implement a ban on the federal purchase and use of Chinese drones through executive order. The ban could include exceptions for agencies capable of significantly altering the operating code of these systems to ensure that they can no longer transmit data to entities accountable to the CCP. Once the ban is in place at the federal level, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security should present briefings to state and local entities and compel them to take similar actions.

Impact: Although Chinese attempts to infiltrate data portfolios and information systems within the U.S. will continue, eliminating drones will significantly reduce their collection capabilities and the associated threat to the US. Further, the banning of drones will highlight the broader risks of doing business with technology companies linked to the CCP.

Allies: The precedent set by a U.S. drone ban could influence allies and strategic partners to take similar measures to protect their own vital security interests. This could also stimulate more global competition, innovation, and development in drone technology and a more robust and resilient industrial base.

Protect the U.S. from Life Science and Biotechnology Threats.

Issue:China has one of the world’s most advanced life sciences research and development (R&D) enterprises and is striving to become the world’s biotechnology leader. Chinese civilian and military institutions are engaged in national security–related work in life sciences and biotechnology programs that could threaten U.S. and global security. The Pentagon has already registered concerns about Chinese biotechnology developments, especially in several life sciences subfields, including precision medicine, biological warfare, enhanced soldier performance with gene-editing technologies, and human–machine teaming.⁸⁶ China, according to the U.S. Defense Department, also continues to develop “biotechnology infrastructure and pursue scientific cooperation with countries of concern.”⁸⁷ Previous security issues and leaks of pathogens at medical research labs⁸⁸ and continuing questions about the origins of COVID-19 highlight additional risks associated with this work. Finally, China possessed a biological weapons (BWs) program from the 1950s to the late 1980s that Beijing still refuses to acknowledge,⁸⁹ and questions remain about China’s compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Action: The U.S. must significantly limit dual-capable life sciences technology transfers to China, especially biotechnology, for national security reasons. These prohibitions should include stricter “guardrails” on technology transfers, greater transparency of approved transfers, and greater oversight of academic and commercial joint R&D in life sciences and biotechnology with Chinese entities. Finally, the intelligence community must increase attention and resources dedicated to Chinese military and security-related R&D in the life sciences.

Implementation: Congress should appoint a blue-ribbon commission of security-cleared, non-governmental experts to assess the military-related life sciences and biotechnology threats emanating from China and the U.S. This assessment should serve as the basis for an updated framework of controls and counter actions. A final report should include public policy recommendations to mitigate conceivable threats and an unclassified report for public consumption. Congress should provide oversight, including additional resources and authorities needed for the intelligence community to properly evaluate these threats. For example, the CIA’s recent creation of the China Mission Center and Transnational and Technology Mission Center⁹⁰ should address these biotechnology threats as part of a broader focus on addressing dual-use life science threats. Finally, the executive branch should consider additional appropriate International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions specifically aimed at China.

Impact: Decisive action could help to prevent more severe future biological and technological threats. The CCP has identified life sciences and biotechnology as critical for future strategic dominance. U.S. leadership in the science of biotechnologies and protection of intellectual property and research will undercut Beijing’s plan to both dominate the global biotechnology and life science industries and to weaponize these capabilities as national security threats.

Allies: In concert with like-minded international partners, the United States should pressure China to comply fully with the BWC and challenge Chinese leadership positions under the BWC while these questions linger. Finally, the U.S. should halt or restrict Department of Defense and National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding for overseas research partners involved in programs that could contribute to a Chinese BW program. The United States should establish further ties with international partners on life sciences R&D while sharing, where applicable, intelligence on Chinese efforts to obtain military and national security–related life sciences technology from leading institutions globally.

Safeguard and Advance U.S. Prosperity

Strengthen the U.S. Economy.

Issue: America enjoys a stronger and more vibrant free-market economy than China yet has consistently squandered its economic advantages. The U.S. enjoys an enormous domestic consumer market; advanced technology research, development, and expertise; and deep, low-cost capital markets. China takes advantage of these American strengths, sending its citizens to be trained in America’s world-class research institutions, legally and illicitly obtaining advanced U.S. technology, and raising capital in America’s financial markets. The stock of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. stood at $1.5 trillion in 2021,⁹¹ dwarfing domestic Chinese IPO issuance of just $58 billion that year (with an additional $13 billion in Hong Kong).⁹²

However, some of America’s economic advantages are rapidly fading. Since 2000, the U.S. real GDP growth per capita has slowed by nearly half compared to the previous 50 years to just 1.1 percent per year.⁹³ Washington’s failure to implement pro-growth policies has squandered opportunities to take advantage of President Xi’s economic mismanagement, which has dramatically cut China’s own growth rates.⁹⁴

Action: To outcompete China, the U.S. must pursue pro-growth economic policies that can simultaneously meet unprecedented federal debt obligations while fully funding U.S. defense requirements and sustaining the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency. Tax reforms, long-term entitlement reforms, restrained discretionary non-defense spending, and relief from growing regulatory burdens are essential reforms to ensure that the U.S. economy can outcompete China’s for the foreseeable future.

Implementation: America cannot prevail without reforming an unsustainable social welfare state and dismantling a spending model that is on course to cripple America’s economic foundations. While taxes on business and investment were eased during the Trump Administration, policymakers must oppose efforts by the Biden Administration to raise them again.⁹⁵ Meanwhile, the current explosion in business regulations, particularly mandates in environment and energy, as well as labor, ESG, and equity, must be reversed.⁹⁶ Further, the U.S. Congress must return to producing annual budgets aimed at systemic reductions in debt and deficit spending.⁹⁷

Impact: Beyond strengthening U.S. leverage against China, pro-growth policies strengthen America’s negotiating position with other countries, including in market-access negotiations across Europe and Asia. Furthermore, pro-growth policies buttress America’s international influence and coalition-building efforts by combating perceptions of the U.S. as a declining power incapable of sustaining a long-term competition with China while making America a more attractive partner for friendly capitals and trading partners.

Allies: The U.S. is the top export market for a wide variety of U.S. allies and partners, and robust U.S. growth benefits their economies as well. As the size and gravity of the U.S. economy expands, it draws trade and investment away from adversarial regimes. Stronger growth also allows the U.S. to offer more credible alternatives to emerging markets and developing economies, building responsible economic partners for U.S. workers and producers. Strong trade ties between free-market nations can complement national security objectives. Expanding economic freedom helps to create a community of nations with shared interests, including protecting their right to exchange goods, services, and ideas freely.

Ensure Reliable Semiconductor Supply Chains.

Issue: Semiconductors, also known as microchips, are omnipresent, critical to the function of every electronic device from smartphones to fighter jets. As a result, semiconductors are vital to U.S. national security and economic prosperity. Secure supply chains of critical goods are especially vital during war time and war mobilization, including in any potential conflict scenario in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, semiconductor supplies are vulnerable to disruption. The geographic distribution of critical semiconductor supply chains is heavily weighted toward East Asia. Taiwan alone accounts for a disproportionate share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity: Taiwanese company TSMC fabricates 92 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductor chips, with South Korean company Samsung accounting for the remaining 8 percent.⁹⁸

The PRC, meanwhile, is investing considerable resources in expanding its own semiconductor production capabilities. Beijing’s Made in China 2025 plan sets goals for China to achieve 70 percent self-sufficiency in semiconductors by 2025, although to date Chinese companies have faced considerable challenges in realizing these ambitions. COVID-19-related disruptions demonstrated that fragile supply chains can threaten the resilience of many economic sectors. Although calls for more diversified and secure supply chains are increasingly bipartisan, effective solutions have been lacking. The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act passed in 2022, for example, fails to address this issue comprehensively.⁹⁹

Action: The U.S. must ensure that developments in U.S. industrial policy address the national security and competitiveness shortcomings of the CHIPS and Science Act. The U.S. should increase American competitiveness by cutting red tape, removing regulatory burdens, reducing federal spending, reforming the tax code, and addressing delays at the federal, state, and local levels. In particular, the U.S. should remove punitive taxes on investments that expand the economy. Returning to allowing full and immediate expensing of R&D and capital expenditures would foster expanding opportunities to advance manufacturing and research and development in the U.S. In 2022, TSMC announced a new $40 billion investment to build a second semiconductor-chip plant in Arizona.¹⁰⁰

Productive efforts such as this will be greatly facilitated by pursuing pro-growth tax reforms. An absence of reforms to remove burdensome and punitive taxation on investments and business operations will hinder any effort to stop offshoring of U.S. industrial capacity to China.

Implementation: Congress must eliminate security loopholes and add additional oversight mechanisms in the funding and execution of the CHIPS and Science Act.¹⁰¹ Additional investments in counterintelligence education and capabilities will reduce insider threats and legal and illegal technology transfers that boost the PRC’s semiconductor industry. Congress should further improve the tax environment for capital investments for semiconductors where current recovery periods heavily disadvantage the construction of commercial infrastructure, such as chip fabricators. Pro-growth tax and regulatory reforms would incentivize semiconductor reshoring, encouraging companies to move manufacturing to the United States. Furthermore, Congress should instruct the Development Finance Corporation—an institution created ostensibly to promote strategic investments to counter the PRC—to prioritize foreign investment support in sensitive high-technology sectors where China is gaining ground, such as semiconductor supply chains.

Impact: Securing reliable semiconductor supply chains will mitigate a critical U.S. national security vulnerability and improve self-reliance and sustainability for strategic industries. It will prevent China from weaponizing semiconductor supply chains (as it did when it restricted rare-earth exports to Japan amid geopolitical tensions in 2010) and build resilience and flexibility in America’s industrial base while creating high-quality manufacturing jobs and facilities in the U.S.

Allies: The U.S. should pursue further bilateral and multilateral trade initiatives to enhance semiconductor supply-chain resilience. Encouraging allies and like-minded partners to harmonize export-control measures to deny the CCP advanced semiconductor technology with those of the United States should be a diplomatic priority. The U.S. government should further diversify the technology industrial base by pursuing arrangements with strategic partners, such as Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Finally, Taiwanese firms should be encouraged to continue building more resilient industrial capacity and infrastructure, including through making new investments in semiconductor production capacity inside the United States.

Secure Critical Mineral Supplies.

Issue: China’s domination of the critical minerals and rare earth elements (REEs) supply chains is a core vulnerability that threatens U.S. national and economic security. REEs can be found in everything from mobile phones to nuclear-powered submarines and fighter aircraft. In 2021, the Department of the Interior identified 35 minerals as critical to sustaining America’s national defense, economic growth, and manufacturing base.¹⁰² The U.S. is 100 percent dependent on imports for at least 20 of them.¹⁰³ According to the International Energy Agency, although China only has around 36 percent of the world’s REE reserves,¹⁰⁴ it controls more than 70 percent of the world’s extraction capability and nearly 90 percent of processing capacity.¹⁰⁵

Action: The U.S. must reform the permitting process and update federal and state regulatory policies to allow additional mining production without compromising air and water quality standards. At present, it can take up to a decade for a new REE mine to receive government approval.¹⁰⁶ Excessive red tape, including one dozen major environmental statutes and competing federal, state, and local rules, inhibit U.S. competitiveness.¹⁰⁷ The U.S. already has the means to more cleanly process and handle waste from REE mining and processing than China. Thus, U.S. recalcitrance is a greater environmental threat than expanding mining operations in America.

Implementation: The U.S. must reform outdated federal and state environmental statutes, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Clean Air Act, eliminating redundant state regulatory barriers while maintaining commonsense environmental standards. This should include prohibiting pre-emptive and retroactive vetoes under Section 404 of the CWA, empowering states to manage their water resources, preventing abuse of Section 401 of CWA for non-water matters, and significant reforms to the Endangered Species Act (ESA).¹⁰⁸ The federal government must also identify and account for all land subject to administrative withdrawal for critical mineral mining purposes and streamline fruitful underwater REE mining potential. Further, as a report by the Congressional Research Service concludes, it is unclear if production and process independence “could be achieved relying on markets alone.”¹⁰⁹ The U.S. should be prepared to use tariffs for national security reasons to ensure that materiel vital to the U.S. military can be sourced domestically and from strategic allies.

Impact: Proactive policies can help to counter China’s use of REE as leverage over the U.S. and other countries with significant economic and national security implications. Alongside its international partners, the U.S. will be positioned to build a more resilient, environmentally friendly, and secure supply chain of critical minerals. Not only would China’s leverage over U.S. supply chains be reduced, but these efforts would support a resurgent manufacturing and industrial base. Domestic mining and processing of REEs protects U.S. industries, the Armed Forces, and consumers from potential supply shocks from adversaries, ensuring a more stable and resilient economy and robust military capabilities.

Allies: Critical minerals are a crucial issue for U.S. partners and allies. China will continue to seek to drive a wedge between America and its allies by leveraging its dominance in critical mining and processing markets. Partners and allies should embrace actions that, with U.S. leadership, break Chinese bottlenecks. Major consuming economies are seeking more resilient suppliers. Producing countries are also concerned about their environmental conditions and economic opportunities. They should see U.S. willingness to mine and produce as a signal to upgrade their own competitive efforts. In turn, the U.S. will need to work closely with allies, including Quad partners, Canada, Mexico, and those in South America, Africa, and Europe, to collectively diversify REE processing. The executive branch should use Development Finance Corporation authorities more proactively and direct financing support toward critical mineral development and processing capabilities in allied and partner nations.¹¹⁰

Risk-Manage Inbound Investment.

Issue: According to a report requested by the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chinese foreign direct investment in American companies peaked at more than $15 billion in 2015.¹¹¹ Yet, an independent accounting that tracked Chinese money funneled through third countries showed the true figure to be closer to $53 billion.¹¹² Wary of capital outflows, the Chinese government began cracking down on “irrational” outbound investment in 2017.

In 2018, the U.S. Congress implemented significant reforms to the regulator for inbound investments under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to strengthen and modernize CFIUS.¹¹³ Among other things, the reforms added protection of personal data as a criterion for CFIUS to review transactions.¹¹⁴ By 2021, the annual volume of inbound investment from the PRC was estimated to have fallen to below $2 billion.¹¹⁵ Some asserted that a tighter review of Chinese investments would harm the American economy. There has, however, been no noticeable impact so far. Moreover, allies did not rush to court investments blocked by the U.S.; rather, they upgraded their own review mechanisms.¹¹⁶ In that regard, CFIUS reform was a success. However, the U.S. government’s foreign investment review process can be strengthened further to address CCP threats. While large-scale Chinese spending in the U.S. has substantially declined, Chinese investments in the U.S. with national security implications remain an ongoing concern.

Action: The U.S. must improve review of and strengthen control over inbound investments from China. Among other things, CFIUS must address the lack of information about China’s participation in private-equity deals, where an American entity is the lead but a substantial Chinese stake in the investment could result in access to sensitive technology or data. Addressing this challenge requires a combination of better monitoring capabilities and harsher penalties. PRC greenfield investments¹¹⁷ in the United States that present national security concerns must also be subject to CFIUS review. While FIRRMA requires mandatory CFIUS review over transactions involving emerging and foundational technologies,¹¹⁸ the Commerce Department is solely empowered to implement this provision of the law and has refused to do so. Other CFIUS members, such as the Department of Defense, should be granted authority by Congress to assert that a technology meets the FIRRMA criteria.

Implementation: Congress must add regulation of private equity and venture capital financing for designated “countries of concern” and sensitive transactions as already defined in the 2018 CFIUS reform. U.S. companies deliberately concealing Chinese participation in this subset of activities should face severe penalties. The U.S. must enhance situational awareness of potential threats by re-establishing and refocusing the Department of Justice’s China Initiative.¹¹⁹ The executive branch should direct the Department of Commerce’s more than 100 offices across the U.S. to educate state and local government investment offices about the threats and risks of Chinese investments. Finally, new legislation should define critical sectors, and CFIUS should review acquisitions by countries of concern to ensure that they do not compromise supply-chain integrity in these sectors. This legislation should expand CFIUS review to cover PRC greenfield investments and ensure that Congress’s intent to require CFIUS review for emerging and foundational technologies is implemented.

Impact: Fixing loopholes in the CFIUS process and ensuring proper implementation of the legislative intent of FIRRMA will protect the country from national security threats emanating from CCP investments that continue to exist following the 2018 passage of FIRRMA.

Allies: The U.S should consult with allies on the oversight of critical sectors and protecting supply chains from malicious Chinese investments. The U.S. should continue to encourage other nations to establish CFIUS-type mechanisms of their own, while pressing them not to allow these tools to be manipulated to create non-tariff barriers to legitimate and competitive trade and investment or hinder joint national security and defense ventures with partners and allies. The U.S. government must also work to ensure that problematic private-equity transactions denied by the U.S. government do not simply shift to allied jurisdictions.

Protect Intellectual Property.

Issue: China engages in wide a range of malicious cyber activities ranging from espionage and information warfare to potential threats to national infrastructure.¹²⁰ Of perhaps greatest concern, China’s ongoing intellectual property (IP) theft stifles innovation and creates opportunities for the CCP to exploit U.S. government and private-sector data for significant economic gain and threaten U.S. national security. In 2022 alone, Chinese-sponsored hacking groups compromised hundreds of gigabytes of sensitive information in the U.S.¹²¹ China’s expansive IP theft operations are estimated to cost the American economy upwards of $600 billion annually. In addition, Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE use their technology infrastructure to illegally capture the corporate data of U.S. companies and the personal data of Americans.¹²² China also utilizes bulk data collection to steal American IP.¹²³

Finally, China seeks to dominate the U.S. in the future information-warfare competition by seeking an overwhelming advantage in the application of emerging technologies in AI and quantum computing.

Action: The U.S must substantially limit the employment of Chinese technology in the U.S. that could pose national security threats and expand prohibitions on outbound investments in Chinese military-related and surveillance-related companies by prohibiting joint ventures and R&D partnerships with Chinese state-owned entities in these fields.¹²⁴ The U.S. must expedite the development of countermeasures to thwart emerging Chinese AI- and quantum-related security threats. The U.S. should also expand cooperative action with allies to ban the import of Chinese technologies that pose espionage and national security threats.

Implementation: Congress should direct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to review and reject approvals for the export of advanced technology equipment to Chinese state-linked entities more aggressively. Regulators must better define the term “sensitive data” to include “personally identifiable information” and “geolocation data,” limiting the commercial transfer of such data to Chinese entities. These actions would also prevent further proliferation of Chinese tech products that facilitate corporate espionage.¹²⁵

To address future threats, the U.S. government should expedite post-quantum cryptography plans, beginning with rapidly identifying public-key cryptography and how it is used within government agencies. While experts lack consensus on when the cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) will become capable of breaking public-key cryptography, there are legitimate concerns that China or another state-based adversary may acquire these capabilities before the U.S., exposing it to massive risks. This is a significant concern and should be a priority for action.

Impact: The U.S. government has a responsibility to help to ensure that foreign adversaries do not rob American citizens and American firms of the fruits of their labor. The actions outlined here will help to ensure that the creative spark of the American people is not dimmed by the PRC. These policy proposals are measured and targeted to prevent the CCP from stealing valuable American IP without inhibiting the engines of the U.S. economy or harming America’s trading partners. Greater IP protections will complement other policies in this Special Report to drive economic growth and retain America’s leadership position in the global economy.

Allies: The U.S. should coordinate measures with allies and partners to prevent the adoption and proliferation of Chinese technologies that jeopardize the sensitive data of both the private and public sector. The U.S. should expand its Clean Network initiative and promote world-class digital trust standards.¹²⁶ In the ever-evolving digital environment, cooperation with allies will be a critical aspect of preventing Chinese dominance of future technology sectors.¹²⁷

Promote “Reshoring,” “Nearshoring,” and “Friendshoring.”

Issue: The U.S. is overly dependent on China for imports of a wide variety of vital goods. China supplies 90 percent of the raw materials used in antibiotics, 80 percent of rare earth minerals, and 72 percent of America’s smart phones.¹²⁸ Excessive interference in business operations by Chinese regulators has made disruptions of critical supply chains more common in recent years, as seen in the shortages of pharmaceuticals and other goods caused by COVID-19 lockdowns in China. Furthermore, China has repeatedly shown that it is willing to weaponize economic interests to punish or coerce uncooperative countries.¹²⁹ Should Chinese authorities temporarily disrupt activity in key manufacturing plants, critical U.S. supply chains could be disrupted. Additionally, prices for imported goods could skyrocket and Americans could be denied access to everyday essentials. These risks would grow exponentially in the event of armed conflict with China.

Action: To enhance U.S. national security, the U.S. government should proactively encourage businesses operating in strategically relevant fields to move operations out of China and work toward “reshoring” supply chains back to the U.S., “nearshoring” to countries in the Western Hemisphere, or “friendshoring” to allies, partners, and non-adversarial countries. To be clear: This targeted decoupling is just one tool at America’s disposal, and not an economic strategy. Decoupling is a defensive measure, not an offensive weapon. In the most sensitive sectors, these efforts must be undertaken irrespective of the short-term, medium-term, or even long-term financial costs. Decoupling actions are critical to reducing dependence on unreliable supply chains; eliminating opportunities for strategic blackmail or disruptions to the U.S. economy; disengaging with entities conducting predatory practices, human rights abuses, and other malicious actions; and ensuring reliable alternatives for strategic materials, technology, goods, and services.

Implementation: The U.S. government should provide comprehensive assessments to U.S. firms highlighting the strategic risks of doing business in and with China, both in articulating concerns and helping to develop responsible alternatives. U.S. actions must be deliberate, systematic, sustained, and sequenced. For critical industries vital to U.S. national security and economic well-being, the U.S. government must be prepared to employ punitive policy measures to enforce compliance, including sanctions and entity-list restrictions. Congress should establish authority for “specific U.S. entities or U.S. entities operating in specific sectors to divest in a timely manner.”¹³⁰

Where large, complex supply chains cannot be speedily redirected without irreparable harm, firms should receive time to complete their supply-chain restructuring. The process should mitigate costs and disruptions to U.S. firms, if possible. Fully switching the U.S. tax system to a territorial system would remove penalties present in the current U.S. tax system that can leave assets stranded in countries such as China.¹³¹ In some cases, companies may not need to cease operations in China altogether. There is no single model for executing decoupling. The U.S. must take a risk-management approach.

Impact: The U.S. must strengthen the resilience of the American economy by mitigating China’s ability to harm U.S. security and business interests through coercive measures. China will have less economic leverage to wield against the U.S. in response to bilateral tensions, while U.S. businesses will reduce vulnerability to coercive Chinese measures. Foreign countries that benefit from friendshoring and nearshoring operations will have new opportunities and incentives to do business with the U.S. and, presumably, less incentive to turn to China for economic opportunities. Strategic decoupling from China also maximizes the benefits of free, fair, and open-market practices for U.S. businesses in proven, stable, and friendly markets. China will not allow businesses to decouple easily—trade restrictions and punitive responses should be expected.

Allies: Partners are essential for any successful decoupling and friendshoring measures. Public and private U.S. entities need to proactively coordinate with foreign countries that can serve as new destinations for American financial and physical investments. A number of developing countries are uniquely positioned to secure increased investments from the U.S. in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. Friendshoring will benefit partner nations by bolstering trade and investment ties, as well as their domestic economic capacity.¹³²

Reject Damaging Environmental, Social, and Governance Policies.

Issue: U.S. financial institutions have strong financial incentives to pursue ESG policies that strengthen China and weaken the U.S. They are incentivized to do so by progressive interest groups and “blue states” who use their status as market participants to pressure financial institutions to push ESG goals, such as “net-zero” carbon emissions.¹³³ Net zero requires companies to phase out fossil fuels, which increases dependence on a Chinese government that controls the supply chains for key components of renewable energy.¹³⁴ Thus, ESG is not simply an instrument promoting social justice, it is a political agenda with implications beyond domestic politics or the environment. ESG policies represent a framework of potentially destructive policies that undermine U.S. foreign and national security policies and America’s capacity to safeguard vital interests. Increasing dependence on China, and a Chinese climate industry rife with forced labor, is at odds with responsible corporate governance.

Action: Legislators and regulatory agencies should adopt policies that discourage ESG compliance in ways that benefit the CCP. Private-sector companies should scrutinize corporate governance and business practices and their implementation of ESG. Congress should establish legal mandates that prevent state and federal agencies from imposing regulatory requirements that make critical infrastructure or a company’s supply chain more dependent on China.

Implementation: Actions to stop the weakening of the United States through the adoption of ESG policies include enforcing existing legal duties to prevent financial services from being used to promote net zero and other ESG goals, establishing new state and federal legal obligations that discourage ESG compliance that aids China, enhancing scrutiny of ESG ratings and preventing regulators from taking actions that promote ESG scores, and encouraging states to prevent the imposition of net-zero policies.

These actions are critical because the market concentration of large financial institutions means that they can shape corporate behavior and function as quasi-regulators. Such proactive measures can be undertaken through educational briefings and partnerships with state Attorneys General, Treasurers, Governors, and state and federal legislators.

Impact: Proactive counter-ESG policies will boost U.S. economic growth and promote energy independence, both of which are vital to success in outcompeting China. Further, diminishing the influence of ESG policies will reduce dependence on China, diminish CCP manipulation of the topic, and reverse poor public policy.

Allies: ESG policies are increasingly prevalent in friendly and allied nations and can represent risks to their economic well-being, corporate governance, and energy security. The White House should direct U.S. federal agencies to educate foreign governments, the private sector, and civil society about CCP manipulation of ESG issues. Further, the U.S. government should adopt a proactive strategy to resist and combat harmful ESG activities promoted by international and multinational institutions.

Address Energy and Climate Challenges.

Issue: China has an aggressive energy consumption agenda and an abhorrent environmental record. Its energy and climate policies are designed to fuel rapid domestic economic growth, exploit the West’s obsession with the transformation to green energy, and expand China’s power and influence. China is a major investor, consumer, and producer of energy and environmental technologies at a scale that influences global markets.¹³⁵ Despite being the world’s largest polluter, China also enjoys the favorable terms and flexibility afforded to developing nations under international climate and finance bodies.¹³⁶ Prior U.S. governments have approached climate negotiations with China naively, allowing Beijing to block any effective verification or enforcement provisions while expanding greenhouse gas emissions and claiming credit as a responsible champion of the environment. Beijing has also sought to force the U.S. to make geopolitical concessions on trade, human rights, and transparency in order to “earn” China’s cooperation on climate change.¹³⁷ Finally, Beijing has aggressively pursued traditional energy investments abroad while supporting U.S. and European mandates, regulatory standards, and subsidies that force a transition to renewable energy and electric-vehicle technologies dominated by Chinese firms.¹³⁸

Action: The U.S. government must discount the climate agenda as the organizing principle governing foreign and domestic energy policy. America must reorient its energy policy away from pursuing a “net-zero” economy and toward ensuring reliable, affordable, and abundant energy (ideally with ample domestic supplies) for the American people. Critical actions include eliminating arbitrary, self-imposed restrictions that impose competitive disadvantages for no environmental benefit; reducing domestic dependencies on China for energy and transportation technologies; eliminating the more than $250 billion of newly enacted green energy–related tax credits from the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA); enacting tax reform that would lift burdens from investments that would strengthen the ability of American companies to meet global energy needs; and increasing global energy supplies to mitigate adversarial countries’ leveraging of energy markets for political ends.

Implementation: The U.S. must eliminate the special treatment of China, as well as domestic energy policies that reduce American competitiveness, while strengthening partnerships with allies and trading partners. Because many renewable energy technologies and components come from China, the executive branch and Congress must ensure compliance with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) of 2021 and strengthen its implementation. The UFLPA prevents American entities from purchasing Chinese goods produced in Xinjiang prison camps. Congress must repeal and replace policies seeking to force a costly and ineffective transition away from conventional energy to renewable energy as enshrined in the Paris Agreement. This includes the Biden Administration’s regulatory agenda restricting numerous aspects of energy exploration and production, from financing and private-sector investment to pipeline construction and operation, and consumer use.¹³⁹

Congress should also address outdated statutes and regulations that subsidize certain energy technologies, inhibit efficient distribution of energy, and block access to domestic resources.¹⁴⁰ Finally, the U.S. should continuously highlight China’s abhorrent use of forced labor in the energy-technology sector as well as find innovative ways to highlight China’s poor environmental stewardship, as former U.S. Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman did when he directed the U.S. embassy in Beijing to publish daily data on air-quality readings in the Chinese capital.¹⁴¹

Impact: Implementing dramatic changes to energy policy will support American energy security and dramatically increase U.S. capacity to influence global energy markets, as well as deliver more resources and means to address climate and other environmental concerns. At the same time, these actions will undermine Chinese efforts to exploit Western economies and end its abuse of claiming “developing nation” status to skirt its responsibilities.

Allies: The U.S. can build international consensus for actions by emphasizing how America will contribute to energy security for partners and allies, increase prosperity, and address China’s human rights abuses and its poor track record on reducing emissions, all while delivering better environmental outcomes. Strengthening partnerships with allies requires modifying protectionist policies, including eliminating tariffs and trade barriers that target allies. This includes domestic content requirements on steel, timber, minerals, semiconductors, shipping, vehicles, and biofuels.¹⁴² The U.S. should also improve energy trade across North America, permitting efficient energy-infrastructure projects (such as pipelines, export facilities, and transmission lines). Finally, the U.S. should encourage energy diversity and production of global energy resources, including nuclear energy, and extend technical, regulatory, and legal support for European nations to use hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling technologies.¹⁴³

Promote Good Corporate Governance.

Issue: U.S. businesses have for decades actively contributed to China’s rise, at times putting their own long-term economic welfare and U.S. national security at risk.¹⁴⁴ U.S. corporations operating or investing in China face risks of espionage, IP theft, and state administrative sanctions. In many cases compensation and reporting structures incentivize companies to transfer technology to China and increase dependence on Chinese supply chains. U.S. corporations also must navigate a growing web of U.S. government sanctions on China.¹⁴⁵

Finally, there remains significant risks that U.S.–China geopolitical tensions could escalate, which could devastate businesses exposed to the Chinese market. While U.S. business decisions should be sensitive to market forces and responsibilities to shareholders, properly balancing national security and profitability is also necessary and will ensure long-term stability for U.S. companies operating in the international market.

Action: U.S. corporations should meet their fiduciary responsibilities by adopting specific measures to create greater awareness of the threats of doing business in and with the PRC and mitigate the risks of enriching CCP-linked entities in critical strategic sectors. Shareholders should be aware that the longer U.S. corporations engage with and support such CCP-linked businesses, the more likely they are to suffer adverse consequences and risk endangering national security and American economic interests.

Implementation: U.S. companies with significant China exposure should be encouraged to select leadership and board members who understand the geopolitical context of the China challenge and recognize that incorporating national security considerations in their corporate governance practices is in the long-term interests of shareholders. Corporate boards should consider the following steps: diversifying critical supply chains by beginning to move production out of China, diversifying export markets to reduce CCP leverage over their decision-making, refusing deals that involve exposing or transferring advanced U.S. technology or trade secrets to any CCP-linked entity, rejecting ESG and DEI compliance measures that undermine U.S. competitiveness¹⁴⁶ and advantage Chinese competitors, and applying due diligence to prospective employees and counterparties that may have connections to the CCP. Finally, given the stakes involved, corporate leaders operating or investing in sensitive industries should not wait until the government forces them to divest or take associated protective measures.

Impact: Reducing economic ties with China in critical sectors will enhance the long-term profitability, mitigate risks of espionage and IP theft, and reduce sanctions-related economic disruptions. Additionally, the U.S. will reduce strategic vulnerabilities caused by dependencies on Chinese markets and supply chains. As corporations adopt policies that safeguard their entities from CCP influence, both the entities themselves and U.S. national security will benefit from more secure investments.

Allies: U.S. corporations are uniquely positioned to lead globally, combating the CCP’s economic exploitation tactics. The substantial influence and economic power of U.S. business may encourage allies and partners that may be hesitant to implement their own economic safeguarding measures to follow America’s lead. Furthermore, as U.S. corporations look for new markets, allies and partners can benefit from U.S. nearshoring and friendshoring operations.

Reorient America’s Defense Posture

Recalibrate America’s Defense Posture to Meet the China Threat.

Issue: China is building the capacity to diminish and overcome U.S. means of strategic and conventional deterrence.¹⁴⁷ If successful, China hopes to “win without fighting,” deterring the use of U.S. military force in the Indo–Pacific or, if necessary, prevailing in a conventional conflict, including in the Taiwan Strait.¹⁴⁸ A regional conflict between China and the U.S. would be disastrous with significant human and economic costs, disrupting supply chains, the energy trade, and other critical economic activity. Deterring a regional conflict will require robust capability to operate in the maritime and air domains (subsurface, surface, and air) as well as conducting supporting operations in space and cyberspace and on land.

As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) rapidly modernizes, the U.S. Navy remains unprepared for protracted great-power conflict, with an aging fleet of fewer than 300 ships.¹⁴⁹ The PLAN’s expanding fleet, by contrast, will soon exceed 300, even as the CCP enjoys an advantage over the U.S. in enlisting civilian or commercial vessels and its “maritime militia” for quasi military activities. As a result, the credibility of U.S. conventional deterrence in the Western Pacific is fading. This is not a problem that can be solved only by “pivoting to Asia.”¹⁵⁰ The preponderance of U.S. Navy assets, more than 70 percent by some estimates, are already positioned in the Indo–Pacific. However, U.S. Air Force assets, particularly fighter, bomber, and air-refueling squadrons remain in short supply in the region.

Action: China has an advantage in purchasing power parity and a robust defense industrial base.¹⁵¹ The U.S. must adopt a cost-imposing strategy that pairs significantly expanding asymmetric U.S. and allied naval and air capabilities with greater efforts to outcompete China economically. Preparing for regional contingencies and deterring China from taking provocative military actions will require additional warships, aircraft, and munitions, paired with an effective deterrence strategy. The U.S. will also require a more capable industrial base to enhance the U.S. naval fleet’s performance at sea, as well as increasing production of the F-35 and B-21 aircraft.

Implementation: The U.S. government must make it a priority to reduce the longest lead time for delivery, enhancing naval warfighting capacity through expanded shipbuilding. To leverage the savings inherent to making large block purchases and economies of scale, Congress should craft a Naval Act of 2023. This one-time legislation would authorize and appropriate the funds necessary for a large block purchase of naval assets for a total of $152.3 billion before anticipated savings.₁₅₂ Ships covered by this purchase would only be those with approved, stable designs and that are in production today at numbers already stipulated in the current approved Future Years Defense Program that runs through 2027.

Impact: Establishing a modern Naval Act would provide industry with the predictability to make needed infrastructure investments and increase the workforce, creating a virtuous cycle of follow-on effects in improving maintenance and repair capacity. As a discrete legislative act, it would draw attention to a vital national security priority while not competing directly with other military service budget needs. A modern Naval Act, echoing the nation’s historic success in preparing for war in the Pacific during World War II, would galvanize meaningful action.

Allies: Effective deterrence with an undersized U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force necessitates allied support and combined action as the U.S. rebuilds its naval and air forces. This will include greater access to each other’s shipyards for repairs and sustainment of deployed operations. At a minimum, other key allies in Pacific warfighting scenarios include Japan, and potentially the Philippines, as well as Pacific Island nations to secure critical transpacific sea and air lines of communication.

Restore Conventional Deterrence in the Indo–Pacific.

Issue: The unquestioned military advantage that the U.S. enjoyed in the Indo–Pacific for decades following World War II has atrophied significantly. Today, it is uncertain whether the U.S. military can present a credible conventional deterrent against the PLA in the near future. Indeed, there are growing concerns among U.S. defense planners and experts that the U.S. military may prove unprepared to win a regional conflict with the PRC, including a conflict over the Taiwan Strait. The next several years—before the U.S. delivers critical military platforms to Taiwan—present an elevated risk for the U.S. and Taiwan. Preparedness acts as the strongest deterrent against Chinese aggression, yet the PLA’s modernization has left U.S. forward-deployed and rotational forces potentially overmatched in the first island chain.

Action: The United States should immediately adopt and resource a strategy of deterrence by denial against the PLA.¹⁵³ This will require disciplined prioritization, advantaging improvements to U.S. military capabilities in the Indo–Pacific over competing objectives in other theaters. This strategy must also account for the possibility that attempts to deter an invasion could fail, providing adequate resources and capabilities to sustain and win a longer-term conflict if necessary.

Implementation: The Administration and Congress should prioritize providing the U.S. Indo–Pacific Command with the funding and capabilities identified as requirements in the Commander’s annual independent assessment under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Additionally, the Pentagon should prioritize the Indo–Pacific for rotational deployments necessary to backfill any capabilities removed from the region, a need highlighted recently by congressional concern over the removal of F-15 squadrons from Okinawa.¹⁵⁴ The Pentagon and State Department should make the realization of a more distributed and resilient force posture a primary goal of U.S. foreign policy.

The Pentagon should accelerate efforts to expand basing in the Freely Associated States of the Pacific Islands, and the State Department should undertake a major effort to solidify America’s alliance with the Philippines, with the goal of regaining the ability to operate from the Philippines in a regional contingency, which will prove invaluable in any China conflict scenarios. To counter the PLA’s massive advantage in ground-based missiles,¹⁵⁵ the U.S. government must make determined efforts to develop and regionally deploy ballistic and cruise missiles formerly prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Impact: Apart from reducing near-term risks of conflict, the decades of stability and peace in the Indo–Pacific underwritten by U.S. military strength not only served American and allied interests, but also helped China enrich to itself. Restoring conventional deterrence in the Indo–Pacific is the surest way to extend this peace dividend and avoid a PLA fait accompli over Taiwan, or any armed conflict with China, for that matter.

Allies: A more credible U.S. conventional deterrent would reassure U.S. partners and allies in the region. While allied forces cannot replace the need for the United States to implement a strategy of deterrence by denial, the U.S. should lean on allied capitals to complement and enhance this strategy, particularly through expanded access to local military and logistics facilities and through the hosting and deployment of ground-based missiles.

Enhance Nuclear Deterrence.

Issue: China is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces as part of what U.S. senior military leaders have defined as a “strategic breakout.”¹⁵⁶ China is building hundreds of new missile silos capable of carrying its most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles and is projected to have at least 1,000 nuclear weapons by the end of the decade, and 1,500 by 2035, which roughly equals the number deployed by the United States.¹⁵⁷ China is also upgrading its arsenal qualitatively, with around 900 nuclear-capable missiles in the Indo–Pacific capable of striking Guam with precision. By contrast, the United States does not base nuclear forces in the Indo–Pacific.¹⁵⁸ China is also developing novel technologies, including a fractional orbital bombardment system armed with a hypersonic vehicle, a technology not found in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. As a result, China has rapidly become a peer nuclear competitor to both the United States and Russia.¹⁵⁹

Action: The United States must strengthen its nuclear forces to maintain a suitable level of nuclear deterrence amid rapid gains in China’s nuclear arsenal. Currently, U.S. nuclear forces are sized only to deter Russia—not both Russia and China at the same time. When decisions were made regarding the future of U.S. nuclear forces under the Obama Administration, policymakers were not expecting a Chinese nuclear expansion of this magnitude.¹⁶⁰ As a result, current U.S. nuclear modernization plans will not suffice to deter two nuclear peers at once, and the United States will need to bolster its nuclear forces in response.

Implementation: First, the United States should increase the size of its nuclear arsenal by preparing to more quickly utilize its capacity to transfer additional warheads to deployed forces in crisis scenarios and by planning to procure more modernized nuclear systems than initially planned. Second, the U.S. needs to develop additional capabilities tailored specifically to deter China. Investing in the development of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) would mark an important first step. Third, the United States should seek to accelerate timelines for developing new warheads and increase production of plutonium pits for storing nuclear warheads.¹⁶¹

Impact: Enhancing U.S. nuclear forces will strengthen deterrence by enabling the United States to demonstrate to the PRC that during a crisis or conflict, escalating to the nuclear level would be disastrous for Beijing. It will also help to prevent Chinese nuclear coercion. With a stronger nuclear force and posture tailored to the unique Chinese threat, the United States can disabuse China of the notion that it can continue to engage in nuclear blackmail or coercion toward the U.S.

Allies: China’s nuclear expansion threatens the credibility of U.S. commitments to extended deterrence for its regional allies. The U.S. government must continue working with allies through extended deterrence dialogues to ensure that they do not feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons of their own, an outcome that would run contrary to long-standing U.S. nonproliferation efforts.

Urgently Increase Munition Production and Arm Taiwan.

Issue: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that America’s defense industrial base is not currently capable of producing munitions at a sufficient rate or quantity. This failure is most concerning for Taiwan’s defense, as it has rendered the foreign military sales (FMS) process—the only mode of U.S. military support to Taiwan beyond training––unreliable. While successive Administrations have continued to announce high-profile sales to Taiwan, few of the capabilities that Taiwan has purchased in recent years have actually been delivered.¹⁶² Many of the most critical capabilities to defend against PLA aggression, such as Harpoon missiles, are still years away from delivery. Taiwan’s Harpoon purchase likely will not be fully delivered until at least 2029.

Action: The Administration must deliver critical munitions to Taiwan as soon as possible, as current delivery timelines stretch beyond when the PLA will reach a 2027 deadline reportedly set by General Secretary Xi to be prepared to wage a successful invasion of Taiwan. In the medium term and the long term, a whole-of-government effort will be necessary to revitalize the defense industrial base and ensure that the United States is able to produce munitions at the levels required for great-power competition.

Implementation: When the Administration sends capabilities that are backlogged for Taiwan to other places, it should be required to justify the decision to Congress with full transparency about the trade-offs to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Suggestions that future military aid to Ukraine will not impact Taiwan¹⁶³ ignore the additional stresses on the defense industrial base and obscures the higher opportunity costs of arming Taiwan with depleted U.S. stocks. The executive branch should use the drawdown authority in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to arm Taiwan with critical munitions to fill the gap left until delayed FMS platforms are delivered.

Impact: Failure to deliver munitions that Taiwan has purchased undermines U.S. credibility as a defense partner and can heighten the threat of PLA aggression across the Taiwan Strait. Addressing the shortcomings of U.S. munitions productions with short-term and long-term solutions would help to repair the damage and enhance deterrence of the PLA.

Allies: U.S. allies and partners manufacture defense systems relevant to Taiwan’s defense that may not be available from U.S. sources. They should be encouraged to sell or otherwise transfer such capabilities to Taiwan without regard to PRC opposition. In some cases, it may be appropriate for the U.S. to purchase the defense material from third parties and sell or transfer it to Taiwan.

Foster Innovation in the U.S. Maritime and Shipping Sectors.

Issue: An uncompetitive and outdated shipbuilding and shipping sector diminishes U.S. competitiveness, undermines the resilience of the economy, constrains the nation’s ability to mobilize and sustain a wartime economy, and meet the U.S. Navy’s global responsibilities. Furthermore, it inhibits U.S. prosperity, hindering transportation-intensive strategic industries including energy and heavy manufacturing. Passed more than 100 years ago, the current legislative framework governing the commercial maritime space, the Jones Act, has severely restricted the U.S. maritime industry’s ability to modernize.¹⁶⁴ Since 2000, the paucity of U.S. shipyard capacity and expeditionary battle-damage repair capacity has resulted in prolonged delays in warship production and sustainment.¹⁶⁵ Several key U.S. ports have seen historic shipping backlogs¹⁶⁶ and are hobbled with protracted labor negotiations.¹⁶⁷

Action: The U.S. government should create domestic commercial–military naval infrastructure that can foster a sustainable competitive advantage in American shipbuilding, shipping, and logistics. Such an initiative would have the additional benefit of jump-starting the U.S. economy. Revolutionizing American shipping and shipbuilding industries will enhance America’s ability to compete with China globally and meet urgent military logistic needs, in addition to making the U.S. an even larger global logistics hub.

Implementation: Congress should repeal and replace the antiquated Jones Act with a naval act that makes American shipping globally competitive. Doing so would ensure adequate sealift for the U.S. Navy while creating a new paradigm for domestic shipbuilders and supply-chain innovation. Greater free-market competition will offer superior results even as it accommodates national security protections. Technological developments will bring a revolution in shipping on the scale of the container shipping revolution of the 1950s.¹⁶⁸

The U.S. must be on the cutting edge, including developing the capability to secure bulk, containerized, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) cargo on a competitive commercial basis. Any revolution in shipping must consider redesigning twenty-foot-equivalent unit (TEU) containers, opening new more competitive means of managing, packaging, and shipping goods.

Additive manufacturing, such as computer-aided-design hardware and software, will be a crucial enabler, supporting both defense and commercial efforts in reducing costs and delivery delays and lowering transportation capital investments.¹⁶⁹ Novel means of distributed production must be included in future naval logistics ship designs, leveraging best practices from the commercial sector and providing incentives for American private-sector innovation. In addition, the U.S. should develop new capabilities for aerial vertical cargo lift to reduce dependence on ports and rail. Finally, new shipbuilding must be paired with expanding U.S. maritime constabulary capability, ensuring that the ability to expand the U.S. maritime economy is matched by the means to safeguard assets and interests.¹⁷⁰

Impact: Fostering an American revolution in shipping can energize a lethargic industrial sector and serve as a deterrent against Chinese economic coercion and military adventures abroad.

Revitalizing the U.S. maritime industry would both boost the economy and expand the defense industrial base. Positioning the U.S. at the cutting edge of shipbuilding innovations will advance U.S. security and prosperity.

Allies: Allies and partners increasingly anxious about China’s expanding naval capabilities will be reassured by a renewed U.S. shipbuilding industry capable of increasing the quality and quantity of American naval platforms and enhancing its ability to export warships and auxiliary naval vessels to allies and partners. Other nations will also be eager to leverage new technologies, platforms, and processes wrought by a revolution in American shipping and shipbuilding.

Align National Security Spending with National Security Priorities.

Issue: Successive U.S. Administrations have repeatedly identified the PRC as the United States’ top national security challenge, and the Indo–Pacific as the most important theater for countering that threat. The 2022 National Defense Strategy explicitly states: “The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo–Pacific region…. The PRC presents the most consequential and systemic challenge.” Meanwhile, the Defense Department will be “prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo–Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe.”¹⁷¹

Nevertheless, the U.S. government has struggled to shift diplomatic and defense spending priorities to align with these threat assessments. Across the last three presidential Administrations, the U.S. diplomatic budget, which funds all tools of American statecraft short of military force, has allocated less than 10 percent of foreign assistance to the Indo–Pacific region each year. In fiscal year (FY) 2021, both Africa and the Middle East each received roughly five times the Indo–Pacific’s share of U.S. foreign assistance spending.¹⁷²

The U.S. defense budgeting process has done a better job of providing the resources necessary to assert U.S. power in the Indo–Pacific, but significant shortcomings remain.

Action: Congress should require the Administration to produce budgets that reflect the current national security threat environment, rather than repeating the inertia of past budgets. The U.S. should organize foreign assistance in a way that advances U.S. national interests in its priority theaters, counters America’s highest-priority threats, and achieves tangible and measurable outcomes.

Implementation: Congress should require the Administration to produce a plan to double the share of foreign assistance spending in the Indo–Pacific within two years, bringing the Indo–Pacific to approximately 15 percent of annual foreign assistance spending. If the Administration fails to do so, Congress should reorient foreign assistance through the appropriations process, rather than continuing to appropriate strategically deficient budget requests from the White House with only incremental changes.

As a part of this process, Congress should consider establishing an Indo–Pacific companion to the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account, which provides a dedicated line item in appropriations legislation. Furthermore, Congress must fund the Taiwan security assistance programs authorized in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which the FY 2023 omnibus bill failed to do, while renewing Compacts of Free Association with the Pacific Islands nations of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

Impact: Taxpayer funds entrusted to the government are not infinite and should be managed in a way that reflects the nation’s top priorities. The CCP seeks hegemony in the Indo–Pacific, and it is a national security imperative to sustain partnerships and alliances in the region and to promote diplomatic and economic alternatives to countries seeking alternatives to Chinese regional hegemony.

Allies: Reorienting U.S. spending for the Indo–Pacific will strengthen the American allies and partners on the front line of the CCP’s territorial aggression and hegemonic ambitions. The United States can offer the region capabilities that no other country can provide, such as the ability to significantly boost the maritime law enforcement capacity of South China Sea claimant states under duress from China’s “maritime militia.” At the same time, the United States still lacks critical capabilities that are necessary for great-power competition in the 21st century, including the ability to offer alternatives to PRC-provided infrastructure with strategic implications. Appropriately prioritizing limited resources for the Indo–Pacific will strengthen U.S. allies and partners by leveraging comparative advantages and addressing America’s diplomatic, military, and economic shortcomings in the region.

Diminish the CCP’s Influence and Hold It Accountable

Expand Export Controls.

Issue: America should not be exporting technology to China that makes the PLA more capable; threatens the security of the U.S. or its allies and interests abroad; or contributes to the CCP’s human rights abuses. From surveillance data to hypersonic missile components, the U.S. has for too long assisted the CCP in achieving its technology-related objectives.¹⁷³ Beijing’s aggressive quest to acquire U.S. technology through illicit means is a serious problem compounded by the wholly inadequate measures taken by the U.S. government to stop it.

In 2018, the U.S. Congress voted to restrict “foundational” technology exports to China¹⁷⁴ but the executive branch still has not carried out its mandate.¹⁷⁵ Implementing authority for export controls lies with the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which has a history of prioritizing export revenue over national security. In 2022, the BIS acknowledged that it had failed to designate a single foundational technology as controlled, despite legislation instructing BIS to do so.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, in 2022, Congress announced new export controls on high-end chip technology, with promises of more to follow.¹⁷⁷ It remains to be seen whether the BIS will implement these controls as the BIS has in the past ignored congressional oversight requests in contravention of the 2018 export-control reform law. Compounding the problem, the scarce data available shows that the BIS approves almost all transactions with malign PRC entities even when controls are in place.¹⁷⁸

Action: The U.S. must develop a more systemic and disciplined approach to export controls that eases barriers to sharing technology with critical allies and denies important dual-use technologies to China. Congress must apply greater scrutiny and oversight to the BIS and require the agency to be transparent about licensing decisions for PRC entities that present national security threats. Congress should require the Department of Commerce to explain, not simply assert, the legal justification for setting aside the 2018 congressional mandate on foundational technology export controls. Congress should apply the findings of this enhanced oversight to fundamentally revamp the export control system in light of the national security threat of the CCP’s military-civil fusion efforts and effective control of all economic entities in the PRC.

Implementation: Federal agencies do not have authority to overrule or ignore legislative guidance to protect the national interest from a threat like the CCP.¹⁷⁹ The BIS should provide written justifications and public testimony to relevant congressional committees on previous and future rulings on granted licenses subject to the 2018 mandate. After a review, Congress should decide if transferring export-control authority elsewhere is warranted. Among other options, one legislative proposal introduced in Congress in 2022 would transfer export-control authority from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Defense.¹⁸⁰ In the interim, Congress should mandate the regular release of licensing data for malign PRC entities on the Commerce Department Entity List. Congress should also authorize at least one national security agency in the export-control license decision-making process to veto license approvals to malign PRC entities.

Impact: More aggressive implementation of strategically targeted export controls against China will invariably create short-term and medium-term economic disruptions. Some firms will see deals scuttled, operations impeded, and drops in revenue or stock prices. It is worth the cost. The CCP has already turned against China’s own tech innovators¹⁸¹ and the party distrusts large private firms.¹⁸² Without ready access to American technology, China could face the same dilemma that confronted the Soviet Union, unable to keep pace technologically with the United States. Expanding export controls, combined with new U.S. investments in defense capabilities, promoting domestic economic growth, and cooperating more with allies could dramatically reverse the relative gains that China has made in the past decade and further tip the balance of military and economic power in America’s favor.

Allies: For U.S. export controls to be successful, American partners and allies must also limit Chinese access to advanced technology with dual-use applications. Export controls can be limited in scope: Only a few countries have products at the top of the value chain and restrictions can be narrow. But they must resist growing pressure from a Chinese state determined to gain access to their technology. In the immediate term, it should be a top foreign policy priority of the U.S. government to ensure that the controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment in other high-end producers, such as the Netherlands and Japan, align with U.S. actions.

Moving forward, the U.S. must set an example, and American firms must be willing to accept lost corporate profits, in service to the national interest. If necessary, the U.S. must also be willing to apply secondary sanctions to companies from friendly countries if they are involved in high-tech transfers to China. Such secondary sanctions will involve applying foreign direct product rules protecting U.S.-origin technology and barring transactions with firms that offer sanctioned technology to China and other countries of concern.¹⁸³

Finally, the U.S. must ensure that export controls do not do active harm, such as not slowing down military joint-development projects with allies, including in the AUKUS initiative, to co-develop submarines and collaborate on other defense industrial initiatives.¹⁸⁴

Restrict Outbound Investment into China.

Issue: For decades, U.S. investments in China have empowered the CCP, undermined American security and prosperity by eroding its industrial base, and created profit-seeking constituencies in the U.S. that are financially incentivized to contribute to the CCP’s economic goals and are opposed to more forcefully confronting Beijing. Of greatest concern are material investments in China by U.S. actors that endanger U.S. national security. The U.S. government currently lacks adequate tools and transparency for assessing national security risks engendered by outbound American investments in China or the appropriate mechanisms to manage them.

The U.S. Treasury Department currently lacks comprehensive data on the amount of U.S. money invested in China and how those funds are being used. Thus, the U.S. government is unable to determine how much investment is supporting capabilities and companies that are detrimental to U.S. national security, let alone take decisive action to address this problem. What is known, however, is that the scale of U.S. investments is massive. In 2020, the stock of American portfolio investment in China (excluding Hong Kong) stood at $1.15 trillion.¹⁸⁵ Not all this capital outflow is helping to strengthen Chinese military capabilities or aiding in the repression of the Chinese people—but even 10 percent of that total exceeds $100 billion. Furthermore, there are Chinese companies facing U.S. sanctions that can still freely receive American funding.¹⁸⁶

Action: As a moral and practical matter, the federal government should encourage state governments and private entities to divest away from China. Investments with direct implications for U.S. national security should receive first priority, but any investment that benefits a regime with an abhorrent human rights record should be heavily scrutinized. The U.S. government should insist on greater disclosure by American funders of significant investments to countries of concern, beginning with China. Existing tools, such as the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List are neither designed for, nor capable of, answering the scale of this challenge. Congress must establish a review process that focuses first on advanced technology with implications for U.S. national security.

Implementation: For large-scale investments in critical economic sectors, in accordance with guidelines established by Congress, the U.S. government should require American entities investing in China to submit information on their counterparties and anticipated use of funds for approval prior to investing, under a presumption of denial. This process must cover joint ventures with PRC entities. Penalties for circumvention, such as routing through offshore financial centers, should be severe.

Impact: These actions will impose costs on China, denying it access to critical resources and capabilities that can threaten the U.S. and harm American interests. They will dampen China’s global reputation and attractiveness as a target of foreign investment.

Allies: The U.S. should encourage partner and allied nations to implement their own outbound investment controls; however, the U.S. should take the lead. As American (and Australian) leadership against CCP-controlled 5G networks showed, it is possible to convince aligned capitals that they, too, should refrain from financing Chinese investments in sensitive technologies, such as genetics, high-end semiconductors, and other capabilities that have significant national security and economic implications.

Counter Xi’s Big Data Ambitions.

Issue: The threat of CCP-controlled apps operating in the U.S. is one part of a larger national security challenge stemming from the CCP’s ambition to dominate big data. In 2013, Xi told the Chinese Academy of Sciences: “The vast ocean of data, just like oil resources during industrialization, contains immense productive power and opportunities. Whoever controls big data technologies will control the resources for development and have the upper hand.”¹⁸⁷ This philosophy informed the CCP’s industrial policy laid out in the Made in China 2025 initiative which prioritizes the storage, management, and accumulation of vast quantities of bulk data.

Xi and the CCP understand that in the 21st century, big data is irreplaceable fuel for critical technologies, economic competitiveness, and national security applications. Accordingly, China seeks an upper hand over this resource not only through its illicit activities, but by exploiting commercial data while walling off China’s data from reciprocal access.¹⁸⁸

Action: The U.S. should significantly reduce data flows from the United States and allies and partners to entities that are based in China or answer to the CCP and seek to diminish CCP efforts to block China’s data from the rest of the world. These measures should be guided by commercial reciprocity, as the PRC restricts some transactions of data that is stored in the U.S. China’s legal framework and the CCP’s leverage over economic actors in the PRC means that any sensitive data can be accessed or co-opted by the party in malign ways.

Implementation: In the immediate term, the Department of Commerce must begin robust implementation of executive orders relating to the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) supply chain, including by publishing and enforcing final ICTS supply-chain regulations. Proper implementation of the initial executive order on the ICTS supply chain, dated May 15, 2019,¹⁸⁹ should entail the blocking and unwinding of transactions that cause large amounts of U.S. data to flow to the PRC.

CFIUS and other investment review mechanisms should prohibit the transfer of large amounts of data to PRC entities, and the U.S. government should seek to prohibit any U.S. entity from aiding the CCP’s data localization efforts. Congress should enact a personal data privacy law to protect Americans’ privacy, reform sanctions laws to ensure that relevant data flows can be blocked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and legislate to extend export controls over commercial transfers of data which threaten national security.

Impact: Curtailing the flow of U.S. data to PRC entities would blunt the CCP’s espionage activities, protect Americans’ privacy, counter the CCP’s predation on the United States for commercial advantage, and mitigate national security threats. Halting contributions to the CCP’s big data ambitions is consistent with American values, as AI-enabled technologies reliant on vast data sets are crucial to the CCP’s efforts to implement a draconian police state, including its genocidal programs in Xinjiang.

Allies: The U.S. should encourage its allies and partners to take similar actions to stop the nonreciprocal flow of data to CCP-controlled entities. As evidenced when several allies adopted investment review mechanisms in the years following CFIUS reform in the United States, American leadership can help to spur allies to action.

Address China’s Abuse of the World Trade Organization.

Issue: China’s violations of its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments have led to calls from U.S. Members of Congress for the United States to review the U.S.–China Relations Act of 2000 that granted China permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status.¹⁹⁰ Since its ascension to the WTO in 2001, China has routinely violated its WTO commitments, costing U.S. businesses, U.S. workers, and the U.S. economy dearly. By one estimate, the U.S. manufacturing industry has lost 2.8 million jobs to China since its WTO ascension—nearly 75 percent of the 3.7 million total jobs lost since then.¹⁹¹

Despite U.S. victories against China in WTO litigation, the CCP has demonstrated a history of making cosmetic changes to ensure narrow compliance rather than reforming the underlying economic policies that violate the spirit of the WTO.¹⁹²

The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC)¹⁹³ and Congressional–Executive Commission on China have produced more than 100 examples of lamentable Chinese economic and human rights practices.¹⁹⁴ China’s PNTR status, however, limits the U.S. government’s ability to hold China accountable.

Action: The U.S. government should make the case that China has violated the 1999 Agreement on Market Access between the PRC and the U.S., as well as its WTO accession commitments, including its commitment not to condition approval of foreign investments on “the transfer of technology.”¹⁹⁵ The U.S. government should consider the merits of suspending PNTR status for China.

Implementation: The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) should conduct a comprehensive review of China’s compliance with its WTO commitments, as recommended by the USCC.¹⁹⁶ Supporting evidence, such as previous USTR assessments¹⁹⁷ and WTO rulings, should be included.¹⁹⁸ If the USTR assesses China to be noncompliant, Congress should consider legislation to revoke PNTR status. Should legislation be signed into law, Congress could develop conditions for reconsidering China’s PNTR status. H.R. 7193, the China Trade Relations Act of 2022,¹⁹⁹ and S. 785, the China Trade Relations Act of 2021,²⁰⁰ offer potential templates for action and implementation.

Impact: Action on China’s PNTR status would underscore the United States’ shift away from an engagement-first model while forcing China to re-evaluate its exploitive economic practices. China could well respond with tariff escalation and other retaliatory action on U.S. trade and investments. Before revoking PNTR status, Congress should produce a report that assesses the potential economic impact and explore ways to mitigate effects on American businesses and consumers.

Allies: Although the U.S. can unilaterally revoke PNTR, it would be advisable to consult with allies. American leadership on combating China’s economic violations should inspire other states to consider revoking their own “most favored nation” designations for China. Due to China’s global economic reach, allies may be reluctant to join the U.S. On the other hand, if revocation were executed in concert with the other economic initiatives in this plan, the cumulative effect would create more momentum for others to follow the U.S. lead and create more economic opportunities for friendly and allied nations.

Make Limited Use of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers.

Issue: In the 21st-century global economy, American consumers have benefited from low tariffs. American firms, through exporting goods to other countries and importing low-cost, high-quality industrial inputs to bolster U.S. manufacturing, have benefitted when other nations have reduced their tariffs. While that generally remains the case today, China poses a unique set of challenges. China’s 2001 entry into the WTO opened its market to foreign trade and investment, resulting in lasting disruptions to the U.S. labor market and the entanglement of supply chains.²⁰¹

At the same time, the CCP failed to implement robust reforms to its state-led economic system while taking advantage of the global free-trading system. China’s economic policies and currency-manipulation tactics have distorted markets beyond its borders. To date, tariff and non-tariff actions have failed to address the underlying problems and in some cases U.S. tariffs have needlessly increased costs for Americans and harmed relationships with friends, allies, and key trading partners. For instance, the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 championed by President Biden included several measures criticized by partners and allies.²⁰²

Action: Tariffs have long been a tool for U.S. foreign, national security, and economic policy and have acceptable applications vis-a-vis China when employed in specific, targeted ways to respond to direct national security threats or in response to egregious Chinese trading practices and non-tariff barriers. The use of punitive tariffs to combat unfair trade practices and protect U.S. national security is consistent with U.S. obligations as a member of the WTO and the principles of the international trading system routinely violated by Beijing.²⁰³

Implementation: The U.S. government should be less risk-averse in implementing and enforcing tariffs to punish Chinese predatory behaviors and facilitate the reshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring detailed earlier. Tariffs, however, are no panacea and can be a double-edged sword. To ensure continued growth and prosperity, the U.S. must equally focus on unleashing the power of America’s greatest comparative advantage against China: the ingenuity and work ethic of its people. To support American workers, the U.S. government must eliminate and lower regulatory barriers, cut taxes, carefully consider intermediate goods tariffs, and rein in government spending. These measures can restore vitality to the American economy and will mitigate the economic burdens of imposing tariffs and Chinese retaliatory countermeasures.

Impact: Tariffs can reduce China’s access to American markets and the U.S. should anticipate a symmetrical response from Beijing. The CCP is likely to respond with its own tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as measures to punish U.S. companies engaged in business with or in China. Negative impacts on the U.S. economy can be mitigated or offset with reforms in domestic economic policies, such as pro-growth tax and regulatory reforms.²⁰⁴

Allies: China’s coercive economic practices are common concerns for the United States and its allies. As opposition to unfair Chinese trading practices grows, the United States must work with allies to develop pragmatic ways to impose costs on Beijing and restructure global value chains. An inability to provide substitutes will make it challenging for allies to fully support U.S. actions against China’s market distortions. The U.S. must make clear to international partners that it is narrowly focused on advancing free and fair international trade and punishing illiberal economic policies practiced by the CCP.

Hold China Accountable for Its Role in the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Issue: The coronavirus that caused global economic recession and tremendous human suffering and loss of life originated in China. While the evidence pointing to a “lab leak” from one of the Chinese facilities in Wuhan that was experimenting with novel coronaviruses has strengthened with time, there may never be definitive proof of the virus’ origins, in part due to the Chinese government’s destruction of evidence and obstruction of any impartial investigation.²⁰⁵ It is nevertheless clear that the Chinese government’s initial cover-up, delayed response, opacity, and stonewalling of independent investigations into the virus’s origins contributed to the spread of the disease and caused countless casualties.²⁰⁶ The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) response to the COVID-19 pandemic was also inexcusably poor, exposing itself as vulnerable to politicization and coercion from the CCP.

Action: The U.S. should use its influence and leverage to improve focus, effectiveness, and accountability at the WHO and support alternative frameworks to accomplish the essential mission of international cooperation for pandemic detection and response. Although conclusive evidence on the origins of COVID-19 is unlikely to appear anytime soon, recent congressional studies illustrate that there is more to be learned.²⁰⁷ The U.S. should continue to investigate the origins of COVID-19 through its own initiatives and advocate a truly independent, international investigation both to advance the principle of accountability and to better prepare for the future.²⁰⁸ A new draft pandemic treaty under consideration called “WHO CA+” fails to adequately address China’s intransigence, and the Biden Administration should reject it.²⁰⁹

Until a transparent and thorough investigation is conducted with full Chinese cooperation, the U.S. should suspend funding and cooperation with Chinese laboratories on biomedical research. In addition, funding for the WHO should be conditional on continued and objective investigations into the origins of the disease. International efforts to bolster pandemic detection and response, whether by updating the International Health Regulations (IHRs) or through a new pandemic treaty, should require full transparency and cooperation with regular international assessments of facilities and, should an outbreak occur, an unbiased international inspection by experts.

Implementation: U.S. leadership is vital to ensuring that the international pandemic response framework prevents the type of non-cooperation that China practiced during COVID-19, at great cost to the world. To address global pandemics, an impartial and science-oriented international health framework is vital to protect the American people and U.S. interests. The U.S. should propose an international framework that champions new standards for pandemic detection and response while respecting U.S. sovereignty.²¹⁰

Accountability is also important: China faced no consequences for its lack of transparency and cooperation on COVID-19. This creates perverse incentives for the future. The CCP’s mishandling of COVID-19 has been historically disastrous and consequential, but accountability is vital for more than just addressing past misconduct. Understanding COVID-19’s origins is necessary to mitigate future dangers. The U.S. government must pursue accountability as the basis for enhancing the IHRs that currently govern pandemic detection and response.

Impact: These steps are essential to protecting the U.S. economy and the American people from future shocks emanating from these threats. The U.S. government should also force China to incur greater reputational costs for its malpractice early in the pandemic. Unless the U.S. applies strong diplomatic and financial pressure, pushes for greater accountability, and works closely with allies to effect change, the current system will remain inadequate and unchanged when the world confronts its next global pandemic.

Allies: Every nation should have a strong interest in ensuring robust international cooperation in the ability to detect, respond to, and suppress communicable diseases. Since most decisions in international organizations are adopted by a majority or super majority, the U.S. should focus on rallying support from other governments to address these vulnerabilities. U.S. policies should emphasize proactive mitigation measures rather than intrusive measures that would undermine national sovereignty, personal liberties, or create intrusive and burdensome requirements on international travel.

Expose CCP Influence over U.S. Cultural Institutions.

Issue: Enterprises that shape and influence American culture—such as Hollywood studios and sports leagues like the NBA—are popular in China, earn considerable revenue for the CCP, and have courted significant investments from Chinese entities. At times, these linkages have made U.S. cultural enterprises unwitting, and sometimes witting, partners in Chinese censorship and oppression. In some cases, owners and investors have additional business interests tied to China and the CCP that influence their behavior.

Beijing manipulates these entities by coercing or enticing the leadership into censoring speech and content in ways that benefit the CCP. For example, the NBA in recent years silenced athletes and franchise owners who spoke out against Chinese human rights abuses in Xinjiang or in support of the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement.²¹¹

For Hollywood, the size of China’s movie market and the difficulty getting a film approved for screening in a country with hypersensitive censors and a strict quota on foreign films results in self-censorship by studios, as well as expensive measures to infuse movies with narratives that will appeal to the CCP.²¹²

Action: The United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party should organize public hearings to shine a transparent light on the ways in which the CCP coerces U.S. firms operating in China to avoid falling afoul of the CCP’s policies and priorities. The committee should exercise its subpoena powers to force senior executives of U.S. firms and cultural enterprises to explain to the American public the ways in which they have been coerced to meet censorship demands and questioned on cases in which they engaged in blatant self-censorship. Congress should also consider legislation that would authorize corporations and businesses that are in, or that affect, interstate commerce to establish best practices so that they can publicize CCP attempts to influence their business decisions. Finally, U.S. civil society should mobilize to bring greater transparency to CCP influences over U.S. cultural institutions.²¹³ One example of civil society mobilization is The Heritage Foundation’s China Transparency Project, a network of open-source information documenting the nefarious domestic and foreign activities of the CCP.²¹⁴

Implementation: The federal government should take the steps noted above to shed light on the problem of Chinese influence operations. Philanthropic institutions should support transparency efforts. Institutions that address, educate, and advise on corporate governance should develop and promote proposals to address Chinese malicious influence and manipulation tactics. These proposals should make clear that they are addressing activities and influence by a threatening adversarial power and are not intended to discriminate against ethnicity or any specific group of persons.

Impact: Such measures might reduce cases of censorship by Chinese authorities and cultural entities consulting with Chinese authorities on content. At a minimum, they will educate the American audience about how the CCP seeks to manipulate U.S. businesses to serve its geopolitical agenda. In addition, greater transparency of Chinese influence over U.S. cultural entities and the national security implications will help to make censorship on Beijing’s behalf reputationally harmful for businesses in these sectors.

Allies: Beijing conducts similar activities in countless countries, seeking to manipulate cultural businesses into self-censorship on matters related to the PRC. From South Korean movie studios and record companies to European soccer leagues, cultural enterprises from around the world have had their financial interests in China held hostage by the CCP for political reasons.²¹⁵ The U.S. should share its best practices with others, as well as situational awareness on CCP activities and practices.

Combat Malicious CCP Activity in International Organizations.

Issue: The U.S. and other global capitals hoped that China’s integration into the international system would “liberalize” China. Instead, China has sought to reorder the international system to its benefit and manipulate the United Nations and other international organizations from within to advance CCP interests.²¹⁶ Over the past two decades, China has substantially expanded its influence in international organizations in ways that have undermined U.S. interests, the global rule of law, and international norms, such as on human rights.²¹⁷ These efforts are at odds with the stated principles of the U.N. and the interests and values of America and like-minded countries. Should China succeed, the United States will face an even steeper uphill battle to ensure that international institutions adhere to their founding principles and promote the norms and policies that have led to transformative developments throughout the world to advance freedom, human rights, and economic prosperity.

Action: The U.S. should launch a focused campaign, in concert with partners and allies, to counter Chinese-led policies and initiatives that infringe on U.S. interests or violate the founding principles of the U.N. and other international organizations. In general, the U.S. should oppose Beijing’s preferred candidates to lead certain international organizations. Similarly, the United States should more vigorously highlight China’s hypocrisy and regular violations of international norms by pressing for investigations into its human rights practices and seeking to expel it from bodies like the Human Rights Council.

The U.S. government should conduct a detailed assessment of China’s expanding reach in international organizations and the tactics it deploys to exert influence and advance its preferred candidates to leadership positions, sharing its findings and coordinating with partner capitals to counter those efforts. The U.S. should contest the PRC’s distortion of Resolution 2758 as a core element of its engagement with the U.N. and also advocate Taiwan’s participation in an array of appropriate international organizations.²¹⁸

Implementation: The U.S. should target international organizations whose responsibilities affect key U.S. interests and challenge Chinese nominations that will threaten U.S. interests in the respective organizations.²¹⁹ The U.S. must be purposeful and judicious in applying pressure on international bodies, including withholding financial contributions, if necessary. Previous successes include opposing China’s attempt to elect Wang Binying of China as director-general of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2020²²⁰ and pressuring the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to release its report on human rights violations in Xinjiang.²²¹ The U.S. government should also work to fracture traditional pro-Chinese voting blocs. Not all international organizations are equally important, though. The U.S. should not squander time, effort, and resources on organizations where China’s capacity for mischief is limited, such as the World Tourism Organization.

Impact: These measures will counteract China’s shrewd diplomatic and economic tactics to advance its interests, maximize its benefits, and minimize its costs in international organizations. Stronger resistance against Chinese actions will limit China’s ability to wield influence in international organizations in ways that are inimical to U.S. interests.

Allies: Since most decisions in international organizations are adopted by a majority or super majority, the U.S. needs support from other governments to achieve its goals. It should work with like-minded partners and use its influence as the top funder of many international organizations to organize opposition to Beijing’s preferred candidates to lead international organizations by coordinating support for alternative candidates. Votes in international organizations are often the product of bartering, trading, and coalition building, and the United States is one of the only countries that can muster the resources and coordination to counter malign Chinese practices and preferences in international organizations.

Highlight the CCP’s Abhorrent Human Rights Record.

Issue: The CCP has a long and established record of egregious human rights violations. Fundamental freedoms like speech, assembly, press, and religion, are undermined by CCP policies designed primarily to protect the pre-eminence of the party. The CCP has systemically targeted ethnic and religious minorities for persecution, including Uyghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Hong Kong citizens, Chinese Christians, and others.²²² Perhaps no group has faced greater depravations at the hands of the CCP more than the Uyghurs. In recent years, at least one million Uyghurs have been held in political re-education camps²²³ and the U.S. government determined that the CPP is committing ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs.²²⁴ In Xinjiang, the CCP is arguably committing some of the worst human rights atrocities of the 21st century. U.S. foreign policy toward China is incomplete without a plan to highlight and address the CCP’s gross human rights violations.

Action: Condemning China’s human rights record should be a core element of a broader U.S. effort to hold China accountable.²²⁵ Holding CCP officials and entities accountable for undermining human rights should be a consistent priority for U.S. foreign policy, emphasizing it in every diplomatic engagement and international forum. The U.S. should also provide support to those persecuted in China by providing access to information and resources to help them advocate for their basic human rights and individual liberties.

Implementation: The U.S. should increase the quality and quantity of unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Chinese individuals and entities responsible for undermining freedom and basic human rights. The U.S. should also prioritize the release of political prisoners like Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, Christian pastor Wang Yi, and the Panchen Lama.²²⁶ In addition to sanctions, the U.S. should extend safe haven by issuing “Priority 2” refugee status to some persecuted Uyghurs and Hong Kongers.²²⁷ The U.S. should also enforce the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and identify additional means at its disposal to shift the CCP’s risk calculus and alter its willingness to continue committing human rights violations.²²⁸

Impact: Highlighting the CCP’s gross human rights violations will further undermine the legitimacy of China’s claim that the nation is a responsible global actor. Further, there are few more tangible ways to assist the Chinese people than to advocate freeing political prisoners and assisting legitimate political refugees and asylum seekers. Enforcing the ban on goods produced with forced labor in China makes it less likely that ordinary U.S. citizens will inadvertently aid and abet the CCP in its human rights abuses.

Allies: There is already substantial momentum building in the international community to place greater emphasis on China’s human rights violations. The U.S. should adopt proactive policies to support and lead this effort by encouraging countries to partake in joint education programs like those organized by the Victims of Communism Foundation, and collaborative parliamentarian forums, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, to draw global attention to the CCP’s draconian domestic policies.

Address the Persecution of Christians.

Issue: Estimates on the number of Christians living in China vary widely, from 30 million to more than 130 million and growing,²²⁹ divided between the state-run churches with clergy chosen by the CCP and underground churches. The CCP’s goal to diminish religion in Chinese culture and everyday life has accelerated since Xi became general secretary. Nevertheless, the Vatican has entered into an agreement in which the papacy and the CCP share authority to appoint Chinese Catholic bishops.²³⁰ The arrangement undermines religious freedom. Over the past four years, conditions for Christians have deteriorated dramatically, with churches demolished, bishops jailed, and Bibles burned. According to some media reports, the CCP is also in the process of writing its own version of the Bible.²³¹ “Along with the Uyghur genocide, the persecution of Christians is one of the most critical religious liberty violations that the U.S. must address.

Action: The U.S. should challenge the CCP assault on religious liberty, underscoring China’s animus toward freedom and human rights. A key component of this challenge must focus on the papacy. The Vatican is a state. Therefore, the U.S. government, together with partners and allies, should vigorously engage with the papacy, encouraging the pontiff to revoke the agreement with Beijing, highlight the regime’s persecution of Christians, and adopt policies and measures to support the underground church. Furthermore, the U.S. government should educate the American public on China’s draconian suppression of religion and mobilize governments and nongovernmental partners in a global information campaign. The U.S. government should also look for ways to support organizations and initiatives that advocate for Christians and religious liberty in China, such as ChinaAid.²³²

Implementation: The U.S. should demonstrate to the Vatican how seriously it takes this issue, including through legislative action. Legislation has already been proposed in the U.S. Congress to “hold accountable senior officials of the Government of the People’s Republic of China who are responsible for or have directly carried out, at any time, persecution of Christians or other religious minorities in China, and for other purposes.”²³³ Further, the U.S. should apply Global Magnitsky sanctions and other applicable sanctions to Chinese officials involved in the torture, sexual abuse, or death of prisoners who are in state custody because of their religion.

Impact: A human rights campaign targeting those responsible for abuses against Christians in China should impose reputational costs on the CCP. For help, the U.S. should look to partners in the transatlantic community, where the majority of the world’s Christians reside, including in Latin America, Europe, and North America. Ideally, in addition to imposing reputational costs on China, the pressure campaign would result in a relaxing of draconian restrictions on China’s Christian population.

Allies: Some of America’s partners and allies have already highlighted violations of religious liberty by the CCP. The European Parliament, for instance, passed a resolution criticizing the detention of Hong Kong’s Cardinal Joseph Zen, a vocal critic of the Vatican–China deal, who was convicted and fined in 2022 for his involvement with a fund to support pro-democracy protestors, and who may face additional charges under Hong Kong’s National Security Law. The EU’s resolution called for dropping all charges against him, as well as demanding that the Vatican “strengthen its diplomatic efforts and its leverage on Chinese authorities to demand Cardinal Zen’s unconditional release and the end of persecution and human rights violations in China.”²³⁴ A core group of concerned parties already exists that should make this campaign a multilateral initiative rather than a unilateral U.S. effort.

Revitalize the Blue Dot Network.

Issue: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains a crown jewel of Chinese foreign policy, a multibillion-dollar project to fund new infrastructure and connectivity investments across the globe. Yet, the BRI has faced substantial criticism in the U.S. and abroad for promoting low labor and environmental standards and low-quality infrastructure, lacking transparency, ensnaring countries in “debt trap diplomacy,” and advancing China’s strategic interests atop ostensibly economic projects.²³⁵

To outcompete China and offer countries quality infrastructure options with higher standards, the Trump Administration established the Blue Dot Network (BDN), a collaborative program among Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to certify infrastructure projects that meet robust international quality standards. In 2021, the Biden Administration encouraged the Group of Seven (G7) to adopt the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative.²³⁶

The Blue Dot Network was subsequently co-opted into B3W. This change was more political than substantive, shoehorning the BDN into an overly broad and politicized initiative that will complicate efforts to counter China in the global infrastructure space.

Action: The U.S. should re-focus on the BDN as a strategic priority for establishing and enforcing constructive rules for international development. The BDN can provide a high-standards certification to give potential investors confidence and begin treating infrastructure investments as an asset class that can be rated. It will also highlight the projects and investments that do not meet international standards.

Implementation: The U.S. should disaggregate the BDN from the B3W and focus on promoting better standards, greater transparency, and a new vision for regional connectivity. The U.S. must shine a light on the risks and consequences of the BRI where necessary, aid friendly countries subject to Chinese economic coercion, and assist like-minded partners and institutions in providing investment alternatives. The U.S. should also align aid and economic engagement agencies in execution of the BDN and support Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development proposals for Blue Dot certification.²³⁷

Impact: Standardized contracts, quality certification, and quality audits could help to remove uncertainty and minimize risk for outside investors while facilitating confidence and private capital flows. Certified projects will embody transparency and openness, mitigate financing risks, and offer regional capitals better alternatives to China’s BRI. A successful BDN will create economic opportunities for U.S. and other high-standards investors, and in the long term will strengthen the resilience and prosperity of recipient nations.

Allies: The BDN already has momentum. Australia and Japan embraced the BDN program to introduce “high-quality trusted standards for global infrastructure development.”²³⁸

The three partners began working together during the Trump Administration through the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation.²³⁹ The U.S. should seek participation from other friendly capitals, including New Delhi, Seoul, and Taipei, to enlarge its scope and capabilities. The U.S. should also encourage BDN certification for reconstruction projects in Ukraine, the Three Seas Initiative, and infrastructure projects along the Middle Corridor. The U.S. should also seek buy-in for the BDN from partners in the Middle East, especially to include those countries that signed the Abraham Accords.²⁴⁰

Address Illegal Fishing and Maritime Militia Activities.

Issue: Illegal fishing practices condoned or permitted by the CCP are widespread and damaging, and the U.S. should highlight them as Beijing seeks to bolster its reputation as a responsible international actor. China deploys a massive flotilla of fishing vessels and the CCP uses these vessels partly to buttress its unlawful claims in international waters, such as its claims over all the water and territory within the “Nine Dash Line” encompassing virtually the entire South China Sea. Chinese fishing vessels also engage in uncontrolled and illegal practices that violate maritime law.²⁴¹

Apart from the serious damage that illegal Chinese over-fishing has done to fishing stocks,²⁴² Chinese fishing vessels regularly harass and clash with maritime vessels registered to other nations while fishing far beyond China’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Chinese fishing vessels are increasingly operating further abroad, including in the Western Hemisphere. In August 2022, for instance, Chinese fishing vessels clashed with a U.S. Coast Guard vessel while the latter was on a legal patrol of the high seas near Ecuador’s Galapagos Islands.²⁴³

Action: The U.S. should take both unilateral and multilateral diplomatic action to pressure Chinese fleets to operate in compliance with relevant maritime law. The U.S. should also increase its capacity to conduct maritime constabulary activities and collaborate with other nations to increase their capacity, including through expanding the size, capabilities, and mandate of the U.S. Coast Guard.²⁴⁴

Implementation: The U.S. must draft a clear declaratory policy against China’s illegal fishing practices. This policy should directly attribute the fleet’s actions to the CCP—Chinese fishermen would not operate with such blatant disregard for international laws and maritime norms without at least implicit support from Beijing. The U.S. should increase its global maritime presence, enhancing naval and Coast Guard patrols in strategically sensitive international waters and in the EEZs of U.S. partners and allies where welcomed. In particular, the U.S. should increase the Coast Guard’s capacity to operate in Arctic waters.²⁴⁵ The U.S. should also consider the merits of banning the import of Chinese fishing products until those products are verifiably harvested in a legal way. The U.S. should refuse to recognize so-called Chinese fishing bans in the South China Sea, which use the cover of concern for the environment to enforce Chinese claims to control the region.

Impact: Restraining China’s illegal fishing will have a modest impact on China’s economy but shining a light on its unlawful activities will diminish Beijing’s claim to be acting as a responsible global power. In addition, U.S. actions will have environmental and economic benefits, preserving fishing stocks for use by other nations, including the U.S. Finally, it will deprive the CCP of a weapon that Beijing uses to buttress its unlawful claims of sovereignty over international waters and the EEZs of other countries.

Allies: U.S. action cannot be effective on its own. Nations from Vietnam to the Philippines to Ecuador resent the aggressive approach by the Chinese fishing fleet and the theft of natural resources. The U.S. should coordinate diplomatic action as well as Coast Guard patrols with friendly nations and, where practical, impose joint restrictions on Chinese fishing products obtained through unlawful means.

Exercise Global Leadership

Diminish China’s Threat to Taiwan.

Issue: Nowhere else in the world do the interests of China and the United States collide as directly or dangerously as they do in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the CCP has increased coercive military activities around the self-governing island, including live-fire military exercises, provocative missile testing, and encroachments into Taiwan’s EEZ. Since 2022, the PRC’s belligerence has reached new heights, conducting ballistic missile launches over Taiwan and conducting a mock blockade. If China’s stated goal of “reunification” with the island was to be realized, it would cement the PLA’s control of the Western Pacific, threaten critical interests of the U.S. and key allies, disrupt the global supply of semiconductors, and give the CCP unprecedented leverage over vital sea lines of communication and, therefore, the global economy. U.S. credibility among its regional allies and partners would be dealt a mortal blow, as would broader U.S. efforts to thwart China’s global ambitions.²⁴⁶

An armed conflict over Taiwan, whether the United States is directly involved or not, would be distinct from any conflict that generations of younger Americans have experienced, as it would inflict economic harm on every American household. Deterring the CCP’s aggression toward Taiwan must be an apex priority for U.S. foreign policy.

Action: The U.S. must deter China from any attempt to take Taiwan by force by expanding U.S. military capabilities in the Indo–Pacific and by providing robust political, diplomatic, and military aid to Taipei. The U.S. must demonstrate the resolve—and above all the capability—to support Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, up to and including direct U.S. military intervention. Further, the U.S. must work in partnership with the Taiwanese government to increase its own capacity to deter Chinese military adventurism and defend its territory. Finally, it must seek to persuade and incentivize Taipei to pursue the optimal strategies and military platforms necessary to defend the island.

Implementation: The U.S. government should push back on China’s efforts to distort the United States’ one-China principle and undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. While avoiding any change in U.S. policy on the diplomatic status of Taiwan, the U.S. government should have a declaratory policy that unambiguously states its commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes across the Taiwan Strait while demonstrating the capacity to support the defense of Taiwan. In addition to providing robust military support as required by the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. should deepen economic ties with the island, including by negotiating a free trade agreement to help Taiwan gradually to become less dependent on its trade with China and open more business opportunities for U.S. companies.²⁴⁷ Following the authorization of up to $10 billion of military aid to Taiwan over five years in the 2023 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. government must ensure that those funds are actually appropriated and are used to bolster Taiwan’s defense by focusing on those capabilities that are most likely to be effective.

Impact: The most effective way to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is to convince Beijing of U.S. military superiority and its strong commitment to defending Taiwan without changing Taiwan’s official status. This will secure a vital U.S. interest by denying China control of the first island chain and some of the world’s most vital sea and air lines of communication that sustain global trade and supply chains.

Allies: The more that Taiwan enjoys the diplomatic space and engagement commensurate with its economic and geopolitical clout, the more the CCP will fear the international consequences of any reckless military intervention. The United States, along with other democratic states, should therefore ensure that Taiwan’s diplomats can participate in discussions of relevant transnational issues. Taiwan should have meaningful participation at various international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the WHO, Interpol, and other entities that help to create and monitor international standards. The U.S. should also encourage other free nations to enhance their bilateral diplomatic and economic engagements with Taiwan, including establishing representative offices and free trade agreements where applicable. The Administration should set an example by accepting Taiwan’s long-standing request to update the name of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Relations Office to the Taiwan Representative Office.

Enhance Regional Stability in Northeast Asia.

Issue: Countering China requires strong, confident, and secure regional allies in Northeast Asia, where both South Korea and Japan are critical economic partners and treaty allies hosting substantial U.S. military forces and personnel. North Korea, an ally of China, is a destabilizing threat to both these American allies. Beijing exploits its status as predominant economic trading partner to gain leverage over South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

Any future policy toward North Korea must respect two important U.S. interests: First, peace and stability in Northeast Asia is a vital U.S. strategic objective. North Korea must be deterred from military aggression against Japan, South Korea, or U.S. forces in the region. Second, the U.S. cannot accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear power with the capacity to threaten the U.S. or its allies. This interest is critical to the defense of the American homeland and the future of the global nonproliferation regime. North Korea cannot be permitted to benefit from its blatant violations of U.N. resolutions and international law and threats of nuclear blackmail.

Action: The U.S. must eschew any effort to offer China concessions in exchange for cooperation on North Korea, explicitly rejecting linkages to other bilateral issues. Abandoning denuclearization as a policy objective would have significant repercussions. If the U.S. foreswears denuclearization, it will undermine the 11 U.N. resolutions requiring North Korea to abandon its weapons programs in a complete, verifiable, irreversible manner.²⁴⁸ The U.S. should continually affirm its extended deterrence guarantee to Japan and South Korea while maintaining current levels of American forces in the region until the North Korean threats have been reduced. Washington should encourage Seoul to continue to improve its own deterrence vis-a-vis North Korea with an extensive conventional force build-up, including enhanced precision-strike capabilities and new missile defense systems. The U.S. should also work to strengthen South Korean, Japanese, and American trilateral cooperation on regional economic and security matters.²⁴⁹

Implementation: The U.S. government must craft an unambiguous policy to uphold U.N. resolutions and U.S. law requiring North Korean denuclearization backed by strategic and conventional deterrence. Arms control proponents mischaracterize denuclearization as requiring North Korea to abandon all its programs before receiving any benefits. In fact, denuclearization proposals call for incremental implementation over a period of years based on reciprocal actions.

Further, calls for an alternative “new” arms control approach are not all that new.²⁵⁰ North Korea has violated all its prior agreements.²⁵¹ The prospects for externally or internally fomented regime change are unrealistic. The U.S. must instead focus on continuing to seek a comprehensive agreement that retains denuclearization as a stated goal, implemented in verifiable incremental steps over time. This should be paired with the U.S. and allied efforts to protect their national security by augmenting and improving their deterrence and defense capabilities.

Impact: These efforts will help to deter North Korea from attacking American allies and interests in Northeast Asia and diminish Pyongyang’s ability for coercive diplomacy. Further, a stable Northeast Asia will make South Korea and Japan stronger allies in promoting a free and open Indo–Pacific and confronting threats from the CCP.

Allies: The U.S. must underscore the efficacy, viability, and practicality of a comprehensive approach to North Korea denuclearization with regional partners and allies. It must stress the importance of burden-sharing and joint economic and security cooperation to create a strong foundation for multilateral cooperation on North Korean policy.

Diminish the Value of Russia as China’s Ally.

Issue: As one of Beijing’s closest allies, Russia is a part of the China challenge. Russia has turned more decisively toward China since its 2014 invasion of Crimea, becoming one of Beijing’s most important strategic partners in the process, providing energy, raw materials, market access, arms deals, geopolitical leverage, and support in international organizations. A strengthening entente between China and Russia presents the U.S. with a powerful adversarial coalition that seeks to challenge American interests in Europe, the greater Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, as well as to diminish U.S. influence in international institutions. As permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Russia and China regularly work together to obstruct U.S. initiatives. Finally, Russian threats and actions destabilizing and weakening Europe create additional strategic challenges for the U.S. and NATO, distracting American attention and resources from focusing on diminishing the China threat.

Action: The U.S. must prioritize countering China in the Indo–Pacific while deterring further Russian aggression in Europe and diminishing Russia’s capacity for military adventurism. To do so, the U.S. government must continue to stress the importance of burden-sharing among European partners and allies. As the U.S. focuses greater resources and attention on China and the Indo–Pacific theater, European states, particularly NATO members, will need to significantly increase their defense spending and capabilities. Furthermore, Europe must enhance its energy security by diversifying imports away from Russia, further limiting Moscow’s influence over the continent.

Robust U.S. efforts to develop energy resources and increase U.S. energy export capacity will aid Europe’s transition and further isolate Russia politically and economically. Ultimately, U.S. policy should strive to diminish the value of Russia to China. A progressively weakened Russia will add strain to the China–Russia relationship, forcing Beijing to carry a greater burden to sustain the partnership, although the PRC will simultaneously seek to benefit from Russian weakness, wielding increased leverage in negotiations over energy import prices and arms contracts, among other things.

Implementation: U.S. policy should promote the robust forward defense of NATO, a strong and independent Ukraine, a more resilient Georgia and Moldova, and greater Eastern European cooperation through the Three Seas Initiative.²⁵² The U.S. must continue to provide responsible military assistance to Ukraine with substantial transparency and accountability, push European capitals to provide more civilian and military aid, and press all parties involved to develop a responsible plan for reconstruction.²⁵³ Further, the U.S. must adopt robust energy policies that enhance European energy security.²⁵⁴

Impact: Bolstering European resilience against Russian aggression, further isolating Moscow and draining Russian finances, will serve U.S. interests, diminishing Moscow’s capacity for aggression in Europe and allowing America to focus its energy and attention on China and the Indo–Pacific. Weakening and isolating Russia will make Moscow a less desirable partner for China, limit the two countries’ efforts to co-opt and influence international organizations, and weaken their ability to work jointly to diminish U.S. influence and reputation. Seizing opportunities to showcase Russian atrocities and war crimes in Ukraine can increase the reputational costs to China for continuing to support a pariah regime in Moscow.

Allies: The U.S. must remain strong and capable in both the European and Indo–Pacific theaters, but it cannot provide adequate conventional deterrence in both without allied support. The U.S. must press all NATO members to expeditiously enforce their commitments to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense.²⁵⁵ Further, the U.S. must work with European partners to rebuild a robust and capable defense industrial base adequate to support NATO’s long-term needs. Finally, the U.S. must press European partners not just to divest from Russian energy sources, but to adopt responsible energy policies that ensure reliable, affordable, and abundant energy in the future.

Expand Economic and Security Cooperation with India.

Issue: South Asia and the Indian Ocean are crucial theaters for countering China’s expanding influence in the Indo–Pacific. India has become a vital U.S. partner in the region, a key strategic counterweight to China, and a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to advance a free and open Indo–Pacific. A foundational member of the Quad, India is a net-security provider in a region overseeing key lines of communication linking East and West across the Indian Ocean, “with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two-thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes.”²⁵⁶

India is also an important emerging economic partner for the United States, with bilateral trade reaching roughly $150 billion annually. India is also a vital partner in confronting other regional challenges: The threat of transnational terrorism in the region remains acute, particularly after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. The long-standing nuclear-tinged India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions over the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability.

Action: Strengthening the India–U.S. strategic partnership is critical both to U.S. interests in the region and to India’s ability to deter China at the disputed border. The U.S. should aid India in developing the capabilities necessary to prevent continued Chinese incursions across the Line of Actual Control and the naval capacity to remain a responsible steward of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the U.S. must remain engaged with other regional powers—including Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh—which remain strategically important and have experienced buyer’s remorse after assuming billions of dollars in loans from China. Finally, U.S. policy must be attentive to the risks of terrorism in the region and clear eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s ongoing and highly problematic relationships with a wide range of terrorist and Islamist extremist groups.

Implementation: The U.S. should develop a new regional strategy for South Asia that resets American priorities in the region and enhances economic engagement.²⁵⁷ While U.S. economic engagement with the region, and India in particular, has grown exponentially since the turn of the millennium, the countries of South Asia still account for less than 3 percent of total U.S. external trade.²⁵⁸ While prioritizing the strategic partnership with India, the U.S. should continue to expand trade and investment opportunities with the rest of the region, improving defense cooperation, and promoting political and economic freedom. However, the U.S. must remain cognizant of the fact that regional capitals are wary of being seen as pawns in a larger geopolitical struggle between the U.S. and China.

Finally, in order to realize stronger cooperation with India on China, Washington should engage with New Delhi in setting an agenda for the Western Indian Ocean and Middle East. Looking west, India sees threats from piracy, a hostile Pakistani navy, and a new Chinese military base in Djibouti on the east coast of Africa. It also has a large diaspora population in the Middle East and is a major importer of energy from the region. The U.S. should be attentive to these concerns and collaborative opportunities, including through the India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, U.S. (I2U2) multilateral grouping.

Impact: A strong Indian–U.S. partnership, and sustained U.S. engagement with the rest of South Asia, will deter Chinese efforts to dominate the “Indo” half of the Indo–Pacific. Enhanced U.S. economic engagement with the region will provide regional capitals alternatives to dependence on Beijing, especially in the area of much-needed infrastructure development, where unfavorable terms and sovereignty-violating provisions of several agreements have exposed China to accusations of debt-trap diplomacy.

Allies: Strengthening the Indian–U.S. partnership, developing India’s role as a cornerstone of the Quad grouping, and enhancing India’s capacity to defend itself from Chinese military encroachments must remain top priorities for U.S. policy in the region. The State Department should also develop new “Quad-Plus” engagements in the region, inviting other South Asian powers to participate in select Quad activities, potentially as observers, on issues of mutual interest.²⁵⁹

Prioritize the Pacific Islands.

Issue: The Pacific Islands include Melanesia (the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji), Micronesia (Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Nauru, and Kiribati), and Polynesia (Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, and a dozen other islands, including Hawaii). The Pacific Islands are strategically significant, forming a bridge between the U.S. state of Hawaii and East Asia. Any loss of U.S. presence and influence on the islands puts at risk critical economic and security air and maritime routes linking the U.S. to the Indo–Pacific. In recent years, China has made greater political, economic, and even military inroads into several Pacific Island nations, most notably signing a new security agreement with the Solomon Islands in March 2022.²⁶⁰ Beijing has also signaled its interest in the Pacific Islands by dispatching senior Chinese leaders on major tours throughout the region, offering discounted deals for infrastructure projects, and pushing for new security arrangements with regional governments.²⁶¹

Action: The U.S. should prioritize renewing the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) agreements with the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau through which the U.S. provides financial assistance in exchange for military access and responsibility for the defense of those islands. Citizens of those three islands serve in the U.S. Armed Forces. These COFA agreements are due for renewal in 2023 and 2024.²⁶²

The U.S. should also explore options to sign new COFAs with Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu.²⁶³ Maintaining exclusive defense access to these territories is critical to America’s defense posture in the Indo–Pacific.²⁶⁴ The U.S. must also deepen diplomatic and economic engagement with all Pacific Islands partners, and demonstrate sensitivity to their own interests and needs, which include economic development, fisheries management, and climate-change mitigation.

Implementation: The U.S. should take actions that will add momentum to the COFA negotiations: It should make the U.S.–Pacific Island Country Summit an annual event,²⁶⁵ and the President should tour the Pacific Island states. A U.S. President has never visited a Pacific Island state; meanwhile, Xi visited Fiji in 2014²⁶⁶ and Papua New Guinea in 2018.²⁶⁷ At a minimum, minister-level meetings must increase in frequency; Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s 2022 visit to Fiji was the first such visit by a Secretary of State since 1985,²⁶⁸ and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo became the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit Federated States of Micronesia in 2019—despite a COFA agreement since 1986.²⁶⁹

In accordance with the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. should identify resources to provide Pacific Island partners with high-quality infrastructure projects.²⁷⁰ It should also encourage more Coast Guard engagement and agreements with Pacific Island nations to help to combat illegal fishing and establish a new Coast Guard station on American Samoa. Finally, the Administration should encourage the National Guard to form new state partnerships with Pacific Island nations and increase embassy and defense attaché representation throughout the region.

Impact: Improved political and economic engagement with the Pacific Islands will ensure continued U.S. military access to vital military bases and logistics hubs and prevent these strategically significant nations from dependence on the PRC, which can threaten vital U.S. interest in the region.

Allies: Several Pacific Island nations are having second thoughts about engagement with the PRC: Some states have terminated, rejected, or frozen high-profile Chinese investments while Chinese state aid to the Pacific Islands has decreased in recent years amid slowing Chinese growth.²⁷¹ The U.S. must seize the moment and take advantage of regional capitals’ desire for alternatives to the PRC. In addition, several U.S. partners and allies in the region have a shared interest in ensuring that the Pacific Islands remain sovereign, democratic, prosperous states free from dependence on China. The U.S. should emphasize joint action, specifically working with regional partners Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Australia has been a particularly important partner, dispatching senior officials on regional tours and providing Pacific Island capitals with more than $10 billion in official development assistance since 2009.²⁷²

Stay Engaged in Southeast Asia.

Issue: Southeast Asia is a dynamic and important region for the U.S. and the global economy. U.S. trade with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2020 exceeded $360 billion.²⁷³ ASEAN is a diverse grouping including democratic U.S. treaty allies like Thailand and the Philippines, important economic and political partners in Indonesia and Malaysia, emerging strategic partners like Vietnam, international pariah military regimes like Burma, and close autocratic allies of the PRC like Cambodia and Laos. Singapore remains a vital U.S. partner in the region, granting the U.S. military access to its naval and air force bases. China also maintains robust economic ties to ASEAN but has conflicting territorial claims with several of its members, including the Philippines.

In recent years the PRC has raised tensions in the South China Sea, whose sea lanes carry one-third of the global shipping trade, with unlawful and expansive territorial claims, military and grey-zone coercion tactics, and the construction of several militarized artificial islands.²⁷⁴ The PRC has also engaged in reckless behavior toward U.S. surveillance aircraft and clashed with the U.S. over U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), wherein U.S. military vessels fly and sail through international waters and airspace to signal non-recognition of China’s unlawful claims.²⁷⁵ Privately, Southeast Asian leaders reaffirm their support for U.S. FONOPs and America’s ongoing military commitments in the region, even as they prefer to avoid publicly criticizing the PRC and incurring Beijing’s wrath.

Action: The U.S. must remain diplomatically, economically, and militarily engaged with ASEAN and cognizant of its members’ interests and concerns. ASEAN members are fairly consistent in their requests of the United States: Reaffirm ASEAN’s “centrality” as the central convener of the region’s various diplomatic forums, engage in these forums with senior political and military representation from the U.S., enhance trade and investment ties and join in the region’s multilateral trade and investment initiatives, do not force ASEAN countries to choose sides between China and the U.S., and maintain a robust but non-provocative defense posture in the region as a hedge against Chinese militarism.

Most of these requests are reasonable and require modest commitments from the U.S. government, with the exception of U.S. ascension to regional trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement, which are currently politically untenable in Washington. Nevertheless, the U.S. retains a strong economic position in the region: While ASEAN trade ties with China have flourished, the stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in ASEAN countries was around $330 billion in 2020, roughly five times China’s stock of FDI in the region.²⁷⁶

Implementation: The U.S. should take measures to deepen engagement with ASEAN, including encouraging U.S. companies decoupling from China to consider Southeast Asian alternatives. The U.S. should also use tools at its disposal to help Southeast Asian capitals to find alternatives to China’s BRI with high-quality, transparent, responsible infrastructure alternatives. The White House should make it a priority to attend or host ASEAN summits on an annual basis and ensure that other regional diplomatic forums are appropriately staffed.

The U.S. Navy should keep a robust pace of FONOPS in the South China Sea, ideally two per quarter, to both reassure regional partners of America’s enduring commitment and signal to China that the U.S. will not be intimidated into abandoning its rights to fly, sail, and operate where international law allows. The U.S. should support efforts by Southeast Asian states to bolster their military and deterrence capabilities in light of the coercive military pressure that the PRC is applying to their maritime borders. The U.S. should support efforts to de-legitimize China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that invalidated China’s “Nine Dash Line” claims in 2016.

Impact: The U.S. is unlikely to draw Southeast Asian capitals into any robust balancing coalitions, such as the Quad or AUKUS initiatives, but it can prevent regional capitals from being pulled too far into China’s orbit by remaining economically, diplomatically, and militarily engaged in the region. ASEAN is an important center of economic and diplomatic activity for the entire Indo–Pacific, geographically linking South Asia and the Indian Ocean to East Asia and the Western Pacific. It is in America’s interest to maintain military access in the region through basing and rotational arrangements in Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, while retaining robust economic ties with ASEAN.

Allies: The U.S. should look for opportunities to complement and engage with ASEAN on its ASEAN Outlook on the Indo–Pacific²⁷⁷ strategy adopted in 2019. The U.S. should ensure that it has senior representation at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Finally, the U.S. should work with the Philippines to enhance and accelerate implementation of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (ECDA), including through expanding U.S. access to new military bases in the Philippines and enhancing the U.S. presence at existing ones.

Establish and Resource an Atlantic Strategy.

Issues: Malicious activities by the CCP threaten America’s ability to defend its national interests, democracy, and free enterprise in the Atlantic area—a geopolitical and economic zone encompassing the Atlantic Ocean and the 80 littoral nations and territories from Greenland in the north to Antarctica in the south.²⁷⁸ China is an increasingly active player in the Atlantic space. In 2019, China, Russia, and South Africa held their first trilateral maritime exercise off Cape Town.²⁷⁹ In 2022, the PLAN joined other American antagonists, including Russia and Iran, in war games hosted by Venezuela.²⁸⁰ Chinese state-owned enterprises operate along the Panama Canal,²⁸¹ a chokepoint for U.S. trade. The PRC may soon establish its first Atlantic Ocean naval base in Africa’s Equatorial Guinea.²⁸² China also declared itself an “Arctic power,”²⁸³ prompting the United States to increase its diplomatic presence in Greenland.²⁸⁴ China leverages its status as the top trading partner and, in many cases, the top financial partner for many African and Latin American countries along the Atlantic Ocean rim.²⁸⁵ Without a coherent, integrated national response, the U.S. could face greater threats from Chinese malicious activity in the Western Hemisphere in the years ahead.

Action: The U.S. should develop a comprehensive and coordinated Atlantic Strategy that mitigates potential Chinese threats and rolls back pernicious aspects of China’s influence. The Atlantic Strategy should harness America’s military, economic, diplomatic, and global leadership capabilities to ensure a stable, prosperous, and secure Atlantic region based on common economic, political, and security interests and shared values.²⁸⁶

Implementation: The U.S. should include an Atlantic Strategy as a priority in the next President’s National Security Strategy to ensure that policymakers across the U.S. government coordinate their respective responses to strategic challenges from the CCP. On the military front, the United States must enhance air, sea, undersea, space, intelligence, and cybersecurity cooperation with Atlantic partners to mitigate future threats from the CCP. Furthermore, the U.S. government must shift its foreign aid–based development model to one that promotes private sector–led wealth creation through robust commercial diplomacy, bilateral free trade agreements, and leveraging taxpayer-financed U.S. and international lenders to favor private companies over Chinese state-owned enterprises.²⁸⁷

The U.S. can host an Atlantic Summit of like-minded allies and designate the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs to execute the strategy.

Impact: An effectively directed and resourced Atlantic Strategy should establish a comprehensive regional framework for addressing threats from the PRC in the Atlantic region. The strategy must promote greater synergy and efficiency in employing U.S. capabilities in the theater while imposing additional costs on China for working against U.S. interests in the Atlantic and Western Hemisphere. An Atlantic Strategy would signal to U.S. partners and allies America’s firm commitment to defend its interests and values in its own backyard.

Allies: The U.S. needs a core of like-minded leaders in Atlantic capitals to implement a proper Atlantic Strategy.²⁸⁸ Gibraltar (the U.K.), Greenland (Denmark), Honduras, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, and other NATO allies offer a strong Atlantic network of bases for military cooperation. Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Caribbean states remain strong hemispheric partners and targets for enhanced cooperation.

Expand Economic Partnerships in Eurasia.

Issue: China is expanding strategic and economic engagement with countries throughout Eurasia, as it increasingly challenges American global leadership. Major Chinese projects, such as the BRI, have undermined regional stability and the economic health of several participating nations. As a result, a growing number of regional capitals have soured on the BRI.²⁸⁹ While there is widespread recognition of the value that a modern Silk Road could bring to the region, many capitals are uncomfortable with the terms of the arrangement and Chinese control over the initiative. This discomfort creates an opportunity for the nations of North, Central, and Southern Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia to pursue alternatives to secure their futures. The U.S. is well suited to collaborate with regional capitals, even as it advances its own economic and strategic interests.

Action: The U.S. should support Eurasian development through four interrelated projects: (1) the European Three Seas Initiative (3SI); (2) the reconstruction of Ukraine; (3) an international campaign for a “free and open” Black Sea; and (4) the “Middle Corridor,” an expanse of energy production and distribution, value-added supply chains, and transport infrastructure stretching from Central Asia to the Mediterranean. Together, the four projects will serve as a new backbone of prosperity linking East and West.²⁹⁰

Implementation: The U.S. should proactively support, and encourage private-sector firms to participate in, the 3SI, which invests in Eastern European physical, energy, and digital infrastructure through commercial enterprises rather than state-directed infrastructure programs. This support will offer participants a more dynamic, imaginative, responsive, and sustainable development model. The 3SI is a vehicle for attracting global private capital, investing in a responsible manner that respects the rule of law and transparency, and offering a clear alternative to the development options offered by Beijing. The U.S. should also materially contribute to a “free and open” Black Sea.²⁹¹ An evolving yet critically relevant dimension to the 3SI is a trade route called the “Middle Corridor,” which encompasses linkages from Europe to the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and from there, via the Black Sea, to Türkiye. The U.S. should encourage and support corridor development.²⁹²

Impact: The 3SI can offer the United States and Europe a concrete, alternative engagement model to the BRI in Central Europe and China’s faltering “16+1” development framework. The 3SI could also strengthen dual-use infrastructure for the forward collective defense of NATO. With support, the Middle Corridor could emerge as an alternative transcontinental trade route. A high-functioning Middle Corridor would give the whole of Europe resilient and diversified supply chains, new sources for energy diversification and energy security, and new opportunities for value-added manufacturing and resource development.

Allies: Proactive U.S. economic engagement would be welcomed by regional partners as a counterbalance to China’s expanding power and influence. Regional capitals desperately want new investments, but they also want options. The postwar reconstruction of Ukraine, coordinated in part through the 3SI, will speed European integration and political stability. That effort, paired with working for a “free and open” Black Sea and a high-functioning Middle Corridor, would give the whole of Europe resilient supply chains that are diversified from China and Russia. This is a game plan for regional prosperity and stability—and an opportunity that the U.S. government should seize on.

Establish a Quad Select Initiative.

Issue: The U.S. must foster an enduring, resilient regional coalition that challenges the expansion of Chinese power and influence in the Indo–Pacific while offering alternative leadership to the region. This group of like-minded nations must protect freedom of the commons, champion human rights, and foster alternative development paths based on economic freedom and resilient physical and digital infrastructure. The Quad is a critical diplomatic initiative joining Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. All four countries are committed to promoting a free and open Indo–Pacific, encouraging responsible environmental stewardship, protecting human rights, and fostering responsible infrastructure development. These elements form a capstone diplomatic framework for U.S. engagement in Asia, a coordinating structure that sits atop a network of trilateral and bilateral consultations.²⁹³

Action: To enhance the Quad even further, the Quad should consider expanding the network to include pursuing “Quad Plus” activities with like-minded nations.²⁹⁴ Where appropriate, other nations can be selectively invited to join Quad meetings, initiatives, and even military exercises, improving coordination and joint planning activities among a network of strategically aligned democracies in the Indo–Pacific.²⁹⁵ Separately, a new “Quad Select” initiative could add a more proactive economic dimension to the Quad. As the U.S. and other countries move toward greater decoupling from China, Washington should encourage the flow of investment, trade, and joint production toward Quad countries and select partners. At the same time, the four Quad capitals should collaboratively work to complement and enhance the Blue Dot Network and the Clean Network initiatives to promote responsible infrastructure and digital networks throughout the Indo–Pacific.²⁹⁶

Implementation: Rather than being limited to the bureaucracy and mandates of complicated regional free trade agreements, a Quad Select initiative would enjoy an open architecture facilitating deal-making and development within a community of like-minded nations. This community would value the principles of economic freedom, rule of law, and human rights and would reject the CCP’s predatory economic practices. Under the direction of the White House, cabinet officials would be charged with coordinating joint action and coordination of infrastructure investments that would have strategic impact and deliver a responsible financial return on investment. These projects could serve as pilot programs and blueprints for additional private-sector initiatives and cooperation. Educating and consulting with the private sector, and building support within Congress, will be critical to success.

Impact: A Quad Select initiative would enhance the scope, agenda, and profile of the existing Quad, and accelerate U.S. efforts to provide credible, responsive, and impactful alternatives to China’s BRI and its exploitation activities. It would strengthen trust and confidence among U.S. partners while contributing to economic growth and dynamism among a community of like-minded nations in the Indo–Pacific.

Allies: A new Quad Select initiative, working alongside the BDN and Clean Network initiatives would help to encourage and channel investments toward the four Quad core member countries and select partners across the Indo–Pacific, including the Pacific Islands.

Improve U.S.–Canadian Bilateral Cooperation.

Issue: The U.S. and Canada share borders, infrastructure, supply chains, natural resources, and responsibility for the protection of North American air and maritime space. Threats from China that affect one materially affect the other. This reality necessitates greater U.S.–Canadian cooperation and shared threat assessments of China. Progress is being made. In addition to a new Indo–Pacific Strategy that frames China as a “increasingly disruptive global power,”²⁹⁷ Canada is also raising concerns over Chinese-linked radio deals and ordering China to divest from Canadian mining companies.²⁹⁸ Canadians were also alarmed by the unlawful detention of two Canadian citizens by the Chinese regime in 2018 for 1,000 days.²⁹⁹ But while awareness of China’s malign intentions is growing among U.S. partners and allies in the Indo–Pacific and Europe, Canada lags behind major strategic partners in appreciating the scope of the China challenge.

Action: A more proactive U.S. response to threats from the CCP will help to spark Canada’s own awakening. The U.S government, private sector, and civil society must engage more proactively with Canada at the national level, as well as with provincial and local governments, to highlight growing threats posed by the CCP and press for joint action. In particular, the U.S. must seek to build consensus and operationalize efforts to counter China’s growing role in the Arctic, screen sensitive Chinese investments in North America, and resist repressive and subversive Chinese activities, particularly in universities and other civic institutions.³⁰⁰

Implementation: The U.S. should support implementation of Canada’s Indo–Pacific Strategy provisions that combat Chinese influence and nefarious practices in North America. While Canada has had policy disputes with China in recent years, the Canadian government has also attempted to improve its ties with Beijing and sought to expand trade with the CCP.³⁰¹

Impact: The U.S. should not expect immediate or dramatic shifts in Canadian policy. As in the United States, a change in Canada’s approach to China will not happen overnight. It will take patience and tenacity to build consensus and create the basis for implementing new policies. Successful efforts will further position Canada as a strong U.S. ally in securing their shared border and the Western Hemisphere from nefarious CCP influence.

Allies: Including Canada in international dialogues and multilateral decisions related to China will increase Canada’s resilience. As Canada is one of the United States’ strongest allies, U.S.–Canadian measures to combat China should be integrated and coordinated as closely as possible.

Facilitate Strategic Economic Partnerships with Deal Teams.

Issue: China engages in mercantilism, using the power of the state to achieve economic benefits for both state-owned and privately owned Chinese companies. The CCP works actively to aid and subsidize Chinese firms to win business deals, both abroad and when competing with foreign firms in China’s domestic market. China’s development deals and “packages” can take several forms, including below-cost pricing and market-rate financing, government grants in unrelated areas, military assistance, and illicit or corrupt cash transfers. Many of these deals not only put the United States at a disadvantage, but also undermine governance, prosperity, stability, and rule of law in the affected countries. The U.S. government, by contrast, does not own, control, or aid businesses in the same ways, often putting U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage. Further, traditional instruments of U.S. government economic engagement and assistance are inadequate to sustain and win a strategic competition with China.³⁰²

Action: The U.S. should create effective government interagency coordination mechanisms, including re-energizing the Deal Team Initiative (DTI), which supports U.S. firms competing with foreign firms backed by foreign governments.³⁰³

The U.S. government has considerable resources with which to aid American businesses while upholding free-market principles. Sometimes this assistance is required to level the playing field with foreign competitors that receive assistance from their governments. Other times, the U.S. has strategic or national security interests at stake that draw government interest in business transactions. Failure to support U.S. business in sensitive transactions can allow Chinese companies to acquire unfair advantages, forcing U.S. firms to cede opportunities and market share while U.S. consumers become more reliant on Chinese products.

Implementation: Deal Teams should consider the strategic competition with China, and transactions relevant to that competition and U.S. national security, as their overwhelming priority. The Department of State’s Economic Undersecretariat and the Department of Commerce’s International Undersecretariat manage the DTI. Coordination includes representatives from 13 government agencies.³⁰⁴

The Administration should coordinate Deal Team activities with the National Security and Domestic Economic Councils, integrating actions with the Administration’s broader China strategy. It should ensure that Deal Teams in Washington, regionally, and at foreign embassies focus on nearshoring and friendshoring, with particular emphasis on Northern, Central, and Southern Europe, and partner countries in the Americas, the Caucuses, and South Asia.³⁰⁵

Impact: Revitalizing the DTI can help to level the playing field for U.S. firms, enhance the dynamism of the U.S. economy, and strengthen America’s hand in its competition with China. It will provide a means to operationalize other nearshoring and friendshoring initiatives and counteract CCP advantages in deal-making. U.S. businesses will benefit by receiving government support in ensuring that foreign countries adhere to free-market principles and allow U.S. entities to fairly compete in the global marketplace.

Allies: Many countries across Europe and the Indo–Pacific have been targets of Chinese economic abuses and coercion.³⁰⁶

The U.S. should emphasize that DTI helps to promote a fairer global marketplace, leveling the playing field for non-Chinese firms. The U.S. should encourage partners—including members of the Quad and nations participating in the Abraham Accords and the 3SI—to promote their own initiatives, emphasizing that government intervention and support should be restricted to cases where domestic firms are competing with unfairly subsidized Chinese firms or to cases where there are overriding national security priorities.

References

9. Walter Lohman and Justin Rhee, eds., 2021 China Transparency Report (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2021), http://thf_media.s3 .amazonaws.com/2021/China_Transparency_Report.pdf.

10. Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2022), https:// www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2022/book/2022_IndexOfEconomicFreedom_FINAL.pdf; Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf; and Dan Negrea and Matthew Kroenig, Do Countries Need Freedom to Achieve Prosperity? Introducing the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2022), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Freedom-and-Prosperity-Report .pdf (accessed February 14, 2023).

11. See, for instance, Michael Cunningham, “Xi Jinping’s Power Grab Is a Gift to the United States,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 15, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/xi-jinpings-power-grab-gift-the-united-states, and Michael Cunningham and Ilan Hulkower, “Life of the Party: Xi’s New Politburo and China’s Technological ambitions,” The Washington Times, November 30, 2022, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news /2022/nov/30/life-party-xi-jinpings-new-politburo-and-chinas-te/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

12. See Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon; Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, rev. edition (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/139710/1998-09_Chinese_View_Future_Warfare_40-Chap.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023); and Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti /pdfs/ADA421925.pdf (accessed Marcy 13, 2023).

13. For such proclamations by Beijing, see Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, “China’s Leaders Vow Tech ‘Self-Reliance,’ Military Power and Economic Recovery,” The New York Times, October 29, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/29/world/asia/china-five-year-plan-communist-party.html (accessed February 14, 2023).

14. For the data showing that the United States was the top donor to the U.N. in 2021, see United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, “Revenue by Government Donor,” https://unsceb.org/fs-revenue-government-donor (accessed December 7, 2022). For American contributions to the International Monetary Fund and its status as the largest shareholder of that organization, see Martin A. Weiss, “The International Monetary Fund,” Congressional Research Service, In Focus, updated March 7, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF10676.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023).

15. On how China has managed to subvert international organizations to its will, see U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “China’s Manipulation of International Organizations,” November 30, 2020, https://ge.usembassy.gov/chinas-manipulation-of-international-organizations/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

16. Sebastian Rotella and Kirsten Berg, “Operation Fox Hunt: How China Exports Repression Using a Network of Spies Hidden in Plain Sight,” ProPublica, July 22, 2021, https://www.propublica.org/article/operation-fox-hunt-how-china-exports-repression-using-a-network-of-spies-hidden-in-plain-sight (accessed February 14, 2023).

17. Mary E. Lovely and Tianlei Huang, “China Has Few Options to Revive Lagging Economic Growth,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 24, 2022, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/china-has-few-options-revive-lagging-economic-growth (accessed February 14, 2023).

18. Stella Yifan Xie, Jason Douglas, and Lingling Wei, “China’s Shrinking Population Is Deeper Problem Than Slow Growth for Its Economy,” The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-economy-faces-deeper-problems-than-its-slowing-growth-11673963577 (accessed February 13, 2023).

19. Dexter Tiff Roberts, “Can China’s Communist Party Defuse Its Demographic Time Bomb?” Atlantic Council, December 21, 2021, https://www .atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/can-chinas-communist-party-defuse-its-demographic-time-bomb/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

20. For protests against the zero-COVID-19 policy hitting multiple Chinese cities in November 2022, see John Ruwitch, “China’s Lockdown Protests and Rising COVID Leave Xi Jinping with ‘2 Bad Options,’” NPR, November 29, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/11/29/1139509250/china-lockdown -protests-xi-jinping-zero-covid-policy (accessed February 14, 2023). For a broader timeline of discontent revolving around the zero-COVID-19 policy that precedes November, see “A Timeline of Covid-related Protests in China,” Barron’s, November 28, 2022, https://www.barrons.com/news /a-timeline-of-covid-related-protests-in-china-01669626906 (accessed February 14, 2023).

21. For how China’s once-positive image has collapsed globally due to its “warrior wolf” diplomacy and its economic coercion of state and non-state actors, see Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Collapsing Global Image: How Beijing’s Unpopularity Is Undermining Its Strategic, Economic, and Diplomatic Goals,” Council on Foreign Relations Discussion Paper, July 2022, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Kurlantzick_DP _ChinasCollapsingGlobalImage.pdf?_gl=1*1z0q7i5*_ga*MTU2MzA5Mzc3OS4xNjcwNTMxNjcz*_ga_24W5E70YKH*MTY3MDUzMTY3Mi4xLjAuMTY3MDUzMTY4MS4wLjAuMA (accessed February 14, 2023).

22. For examples of Chinese malpractice in trade and denouncements of Chinese practices, see Titli Basu, “Securing Japan from Chinese ‘Predatory Economics,’” The Japan Times, July 20, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/07/20/commentary/japan-commentary/securing-japan -chinese-predatory-economics/ (accessed February 14, 2023); Bonnie S. Glaser, “Time for Collective Pushback against China’s Economic Coercion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 13, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/time-collective-pushback-against-chinas-economic -coercion (accessed February 14, 2023); and “Pompeo Says China Trade Policies ‘Predatory,’” Reuters, July 18, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us -usa-trade-pompeo/pompeo-says-china-trade-policies-predatory-idUSKBN1JE2QK (accessed February 14, 2023).

23. James Jay Carafano, “A Conservative’s Guide to Getting Foreign Policy Right,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 6, 2022, https://www.heritage .org/conservatism/commentary/conservatives-guide-getting-foreign-policy-right.

24. Carafano et al., “Foreign Policy: Strategy for a Post-Biden Era,” p. 7.

25. For the weak ranking of the overall state of American military power, see Wood, 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, p. 21. Also see Julia Musto, “US Military Ranked ‘Weak’ for First Time: Heritage Foundation Report,” Fox News, October 19, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-military -ranked-weak-first-time-heritage-foundation (accessed February 14, 2023).

26. U.S. Department of the Treasury, FiscalData, “What Is the National Debt?” https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-debt/ (accessed February 3, 2023).

27. The White House, “National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2018, p. 2, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp -content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). For estimates of the annual costs of (mainly Chinese) intellectual property theft from the United States, which runs from $225 billion to $600 billion that would amount to trillions of dollars in theft over a period of a decade or more, see The National Bureau of Asian Research, “Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy,” 2017, p. 1, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/IP _Commission_Report_Update.pdf (accessed February 14 2023).

28. See Jethro Mullen, “How China Squeezes Tech Secrets from U.S. Companies,” CNN, August 14, 2017, https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/14/news /economy/trump-china-trade-intellectual-property/index.html (accessed February 14, 2023). On reports about the practice of the Chinese state transferring such intellectual property to Chinese companies and/or Chinese state-owned enterprises, see Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, March 22, 2018, pp. 37 and 38, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF (accessed February 14, 2023).

29. U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Japan,” https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5880.html (accessed February 3, 2023).

30. For overall U.S. imports from China, see Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The People’s Republic of China: U.S.–China Trade Facts,” https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china#:~:text=U.S.%20goods%20and%20services%20trade,was%20 %24285.5%20billion%20in%202020 (accessed December 8, 2022).

31. Trading Economics, “US Imports by Country,” 2021 figures, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/imports-by-country (accessed December 19, 2022).

32. For top imports from China, see ibid.

33. Chinese goods exports to the United States amount to about 3 percent of Chinese GDP. See Derek Scissors, “US and China 2021 Trade Numbers,” America Enterprise Institute, February 9, 2022, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/us-and-china-2021-trade-numbers/#:~:text=At %20the%20macroeconomic%20level%2C%20China‘s,2%20percent%20of%20our%20GD (accessed February 14, 2023). For claims about millions of Chinese jobs being related to their trade to the United States, see Michelle Toh, “Tariffs Could Cost Millions of Chinese Jobs, Boost US Prices,” CNN, August 2, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/business/live-news/tariffs-on-china-reaction#h_219a676ad279264699ad2aa3f94bf360 (accessed February 14, 2023).

34. For the adverse economic impact of the zero-COVID-19 policy, see Min-Hua Chiang, “China Paying a Price for Xi’s Zero-COVID-19 Policy,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 13, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-paying-price-xis-zero-covid-19-policy.

35. For the high number of workplace safety incidents and the lax culture of inspection and lack of follow up when businesses are cited for violations, see China Labour Bulletin, “Work Safety,” last modified September 2021, https://clb.org.hk/content/work-safety (accessed February 14, 2023).

36. “Lockdowns and Inspections Disrupt China’s Plans to Ramp Up Coal,” Bloomberg, March 23, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022 -03-23/lockdowns-and-inspections-disrupt-china-s-plans-to-ramp-up-coal?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 14, 2023).

37. For the exact distribution of shares from January 2022–January 2023, see GlobalStats Statcounter, “Operating System Market Share China,” https://gs .statcounter.com/os-market-share/all/china (accessed December 8, 2022).

38. See Rob Wile, “The US Is Sitting on a 200-Year Supply of Oil,” Business Insider, March 19, 2012, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-200-year-supply -oil-2012-3 (accessed February 14, 2023).

39. Nicolas Loris and Coleman Raush, “How the Shale Revolution Became the MVP of U.S. Energy Production,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 8, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/energy-economics/commentary/how-the-shale-revolution-became-the-mvp-us-energy-production.

40. Adrian Cho, “U.S. Department of Energy Rushes to Build Advanced New Nuclear Reactors,” Science, May 20, 2022, https://www.science.org/content /article/us-department-energy-rushes-build-advanced-new-nuclear-reactors (accessed February 14, 2023).

41. On China’s attempt to exchange possible climate-change reforms in exchange for a softening or silencing of American concerns over Chinese human rights violations, see Kenneth C. Brill, “China Needs to Collaborate, Not Seek Political Concessions at Glasgow,” The Hill, October, 26, 2021, https:// thehill.com/opinion/international/578429-china-needs-to-collaborate-not-seek-political-concessions-at-glasgow/ (accessed February 14, 2023), and Ellen Knickmeyer, “Advocates Fear US Weighing Climate vs. Human Rights on China,” Associated Press, September 18, 2021, https://apnews.com /article/business-religion-china-environment-and-nature-united-states-92243b29f1161b4cd4eb30fd8aa84b35 (accessed February 14, 2023).

42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on April 14, 2022,” April 14, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202204/t20220414_10668055.html (accessed February 14, 2023).

43. See, for example, U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2022 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/2022_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023); Michael McCaul, “China Task Force Report,” prepared for the use of the China Task Force, 117th Cong., 2020, https://gop-foreignaffairs.house .gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/China-Task-Force-Final-Report-11.6.20.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023); Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power”; and Cheng and Carafano, “Responding to the China Challenge: Blueprint 2.0.”

44. U.S. Department of Education, Office of the General Counsel, “Institutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965,” October 2020, p. 3, https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/institutional-compliance-section-117.pdf (accessed July 19, 2022).

45. See, for example, the relationship between the MSS (China’s civilian intelligence agency) feeder school, the University of International Relations, and two U.S. institutes, Marietta College and University of Massachusetts-Boston. China Defence Universities Tracker, “University of International Relations,” last updated November 25, 2019, https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/university-of-international-relations/ (accessed February 14, 2023). These programs are highlighted in Daniel Golden, Spy Schools: How the CIA, FBI, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2017).

46. Cristina Maza, “China’s Military Sends Undercover ‘Students’ to Western Universities to Steal Technology, Research Reveals,” Newsweek, November 1, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/china-military-sends-undercover-students-american-universities-steal-1197652 (accessed March 13, 2023).

47. Estimates put Chinese nationals as comprising 16 percent of all graduate STEM students at American universities. See Jacob Feldgoise and Remco Zwetsloot, “Estimating the Number of Chinese STEM Students in the United States,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 2020, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/estimating-the-number-of-chinese-stem-students-in-the-united-states/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

48. “What Are Chinese ‘Confucius Institutes’ and Why Rishi Sunak Wants to Ban Them in UK,” Outlook, July 26, 2022, https://www.outlookindia.com /international/what-are-chinese-confucius-institutes-and-why-rishi-sunak-wants-to-ban-them-in-uk-news-212085 (accessed February 14, 2023); “UK PM Rishi Sunak to Take Big Step Against China, May Shut Confucius Institutes,” Firstpost, November 3, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/world/uk-pm -rishi-sunak-to-take-big-step-against-china-may-shut-confucius-institutes-11563681.html (accessed February 14, 2023); Hristio Boytchev, “Confucius Institutes Under Scrutiny from Germany,” Research Professional News, May 10, 2022, https://www.researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-news-europe -germany-2022-5-confucius-institutes-under-scrutiny-from-germany/ (accessed February 14, 2023); Nadine Wojcik, “How Does Germany Deal with Chinese Censorship?” Deutsche Welle, October 29, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-how-does-it-deal-with-chinese-censorship/a-59653971 (accessed February 14, 2023); and “Confucius Institutes in India’s Days Numbered?” Tibetan Review, April 28, 2022, https://www.tibetanreview.net /confucius-institutes-in-indias-days-numbered/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

49. Michael Cunningham, “Chinese Spies Violate U.S. Sovereignty and Americans’ Rights,” The Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2022, https://www.wsj.com /articles/chinese-spies-violate-u-s-sovereignty-and-americans-rights-operation-sky-net-xi-illegal-victim-repatriated-smuggle-human-rights -11651848282 (accessed February 14, 2023).

50. Masood Farivar, “FBI Investigating Chinese ‘Police Station’ in New York,” Voice of America News, November 18, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/fbi -investigating-chinese-police-station-in-new-york/6839791.html (accessed February 14, 2023).

51. Safeguard Defenders, “110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild,” October 29, 2022, https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default /files/pdf/110%20Overseas%20%28v5%29.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023).

52. “Obama Admin Warns China About Agents Operating in U.S.,” CBS News, August 17, 2015, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-admin-warns -china-about-agents-operating-in-u-s/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

53. Michael Cunningham, “The United States Must Go to War Against China’s Spies,” The National Interest, November 27, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org /feature/united-states-must-go-war-against-china%E2%80%99s-spies-205935 (accessed February 14, 2023).

54. James Griffiths and Nicole Gaouette, “US Orders Closure of Chinese Consulate in Houston,” CNN, July 22, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/22 /politics/china-us-houston-consulate-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed February 14, 2023).

55. Zach Dorfman, “The Disappeared: China’s Global Kidnapping Campaign Has Gone on for Years. It May Be Reaching Inside U.S. Borders,” Foreign Policy, March 29, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/29/the-disappeared-china-renditions-kidnapping/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

56. Arkim Karpal, “Huawei Says It Would Never Hand Data to China’s Government. Experts Say It Wouldn’t Have a Choice,” CNBC, March 4, 2019, https:// www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/huawei-would-have-to-give-data-to-china-government-if-asked-experts.html (accessed February 22, 2023).

57. Emily Baker-White, “TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned to Use TikTok to Monitor the Physical Location of Specific American Citizens,” Forbes, October 20, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-white/2022/10/20/tiktok-bytedance-surveillance-american-user-data/?sh=4698d19f6c2d (accessed February 14, 2023); Felix Krause, “iOS Privacy: Announcing InAppBrowser.com—See What JavaScript Commands Get Injected Through an In-App Browser,” Felix Krause blog, August 18, 2022, https://krausefx.com/blog/announcing-inappbrowsercom-see-what-javascript-commands -get-executed-in-an-in-app-browser (accessed February 14, 2023); and Paul Mozur, Ryan Mac, and Chang Che, “TikTok Browser Can Track Users’ Keystrokes, According to New Research,” The New York Times, August 19, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/19/technology/tiktok-browser -tracking.html (accessed February 14, 2023).

58. See, for example, Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operation (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2015).

59. Emily A. Vogels, Risa Gelles-Watnick, and Navid Massarat, “Teens, Social Media and Technology 2022,” Pew Research Center, August 10, 2022, https:// www.pewresearch.org/internet/2022/08/10/teens-social-media-and-technology-2022/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

60. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104–294.

61. H.R. 5841, Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on May 16, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5841/text (accessed February 14, 2023).

62. Andrew Adams, “Updated: Where Is TikTok Banned? Tracking State by State,” Government Technology, December 14, 2022, https://www.govtech.com /biz/data/where-is-tiktok-banned-tracking-the-action-state-by-state (accessed February 14, 2023).

63. Sameer Yasir and Hari Kumar, “India Bans 118 Chinese Apps as Indian Soldier Is Killed on Disputed Border,” The New York Times, September 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/world/asia/india-bans-china-apps.html (accessed February 22, 2023).

64.National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Safeguarding Our Future: Protecting Government and Business Leaders at the U.S. State and Local Level from People’s Republic of China (PRC) Influence Operations,” July 2022, p. 1, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents /SafeguardingOurFuture/PRC_Subnational_Influence-06-July-2022.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023).

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 5.

67. “Statement of William R. Evanina, CEO, the Evanina Group, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at a Hearing Concerning the Comprehensive Counterintelligence Threat to America’s Corporations and Academic Institutions,” U.S. Senate, 117th Cong., September 21, 2022, https:// www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/os-wevanina-092122.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023).

68. Michael Cunningham, “Why State Legislatures Must Confront Chinese Infiltration,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 259, July 27, 2022, pp. 28–31, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/SR259_0.pdf.

69. Katie Bo Lillis, “CNN Exclusive: FBI Investigation Determined Chinese-Made Huawei Equipment Could Disrupt US Nuclear Arsenal Communications,” CNN, July 25, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/23/politics/fbi-investigation-huawei-china-defense-department-communications-nuclear/index .html (accessed February 14, 2023).

70. News release, “Cotton, Tuberville Introduce Bill to Prohibit the Chinese Communist Party from Purchasing American Land,” Office of U.S. Senator Tom Cotton, August 2, 2022, https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cotton-tuberville-introduce-bill-to-prohibit-the-chinese-communist -party-from-purchasing-american-land. (accessed February 14, 2023).

71. On state prohibitions, see James Jay Carafano and Dustin Carmack, “A Plan for Decisive Action Against the Threat of CCP Land Use in the U.S.,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5285, August 1, 2022, p. 4, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/plan-decisive-action-against-the-threat-ccp -land-use-the-us.

72. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Meet the U.S. Officials Now in China’s Sphere of Influence,” The Daily Beast, November 21, 2018, https://www .thedailybeast.com/meet-the-us-officials-who-now-lobby-for-china (accessed February 14, 2023).

73. Zack Smith, Thomas Jipping, and Paul J. Larkin, Jr., “Can Congress Limit the Ability of China (or Foreign Nations) to Lobby U.S. Officials? Statutory and Constitutional Considerations,” Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 307, July 18, 2022, p. 5, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files /2022-07/LM307_0.pdf.

74. Mark Morgan, Ken Cuccinelli, and Mike Howell, “Greg Abbott Has a Plan to Secure the Border. America Must Support Him,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 22, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/greg-abbott-has-plan-secure-the-border-america-must -support-him, and Hans von Spakovsky and Charles Stimson, “Enforcing Immigration Law: What States Can Do to Assist the Federal Government and Fight the Illegal Immigration Problem,” Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 254, October 8, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default /files/2019-10/LM254_0.pdf.

75. Lora Ries, “The Biden Border Crisis Has Gone on Long Enough (How Congress Can Help),” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/the-biden-border-crisis-has-gone-long-enough-how-congress-can-help.

76. Lora Ries, “Securing the Border and Fixing Our Broken Immigration System,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 21, 2020, https://www .heritage.org/immigration/commentary/securing-the-border-and-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system.

77. John J. Coleman and Robert L. DuPont, “Fentanyl as Sentinel: The Deadly Threat of Illegal Synthetic and Counterfeit Drugs,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3436, September 4, 2019, p. 4, https://www.heritage.org/public-health/report/fentanyl-sentinel-the-deadly-threat-illegal-synthetic -and-counterfeit-drugs, and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “Drug Fact Sheet: Fentanyl,” April 2020, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files /2020-06/Fentanyl-2020_0.pdf.

78. Families Against Fentanyl, “Frequently Asked Questions,” https://www.familiesagainstfentanyl.org/fentanyl-faqs (accessed December 14, 2022).

79. Rhitu Chatterjee, “Overdose Deaths Continued to Rise in 2021, Reaching Historic Highs,” NPR, May 11, 2022, https://www.npr.org/sections/health -shots/2022/05/11/1098314220/overdose-deaths-continued-to-rise-in-2021-reaching-historic-highs (accessed February 15, 2023).

80. David Shortell, “How the Trump Administration Won a Major Policy Shift from the Chinese on Fentanyl,” CNN, May 2, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019 /05/02/politics/chinese-fentanyl-trump-backstory/index.html (accessed February 15, 2023).

81. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “China and Synthetic Drugs Control: Fentanyl, Methamphetamines, and Precursors,” Brookings Institution, March 2022, https:// www.brookings.edu/research/china-and-synthetic-drugs-control-fentanyl-methamphetamines-and-precursors/ (accessed February 15, 2023); Emily Feng, “‘We Are Shipping to The U.S.’: Inside China’s Online Synthetic Drug Networks,” NPR, November 17, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/11 /17/916890880/we-are-shipping-to-the-u-s-china-s-fentanyl-sellers-find-new-routes-to-drug-user (accessed February 15, 2023); and Hans A. von Spakovsky and Peyton Smith, “China Is Poisoning America with Fentanyl,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 5, 2019, https://www.heritage .org/crime-and-justice/commentary/china-poisoning-america-fentanyl.

82. See, for example, Paul Rosenzweig et al., “Drones in U.S. Airspace: Principles for Governance,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2732, September 20, 2012, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2732.pdf. On the application of civilian activities to military competition, see James Jay Carafano, “Esports and National Security: DOD Should Invest Effort Now to Reap Benefits in the Future,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 24, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/esports-and-national-security-dod-should-invest-effort-now-reap-benefits-the.

83. Bruce Einhorn and Todd Shields, “Drones Take Center Stage in U.S.–China War on Data Harvesting,” Bloomberg, December 19, 2021, https://www .bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-19/drone-wars-us-china-fight-over-big-data-shifts-from-tiktok-wechat-to-the-sky?leadSource=uverify%20wall.

84. For an example of fears that Chinese-made drones could be used to spy on Americans, see Bryan Bender and Andrew Desiderio, “Senators Alarmed Over Potential Chinese Drone Spy Threat,” Politico, November 23, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/23/drones-chinese-spy-threat -senate-00070591 (accessed February 15, 2023).

85. For a comprehensive overview of all the claims of this paragraph, see John Venable and Lora Ries, “Chinese-Made Drone: A Direct Threat Whose Use Should Be Curtailed,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3521, August 19, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/BG3521 .pdf.

86. Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military–Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” China Brief, Vol. 19, No. 18 (2019), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in -military-affairs/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

87. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021, November 3, 2021, p. 95, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF (accessed February 15, 2023).

88. For an example, see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “SARS Update- May 19, 2004,” May 19, 2004, https://www.cdc.gov/sars/media/2004 -05-19.html (accessed February 15, 2023).

89. On Chinese refusal to acknowledge its Cold War–era biological weapons program, see Peter Brooks, “China’s Secretive Work in Biotechnology,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 31, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/chinas-secretive-work-biotechnology. See also the claim that China had weaponized “ricin, botulinum toxins, and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, and tularemia” in U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” April 2022, p. 35, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2022-Adherence-to-and-Compliance-with-Arms-Control-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament -Agreements-and-Commitments-1.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

90. On the creation of these centers, see Olivia Gazis, “CIA Creates New Mission Centers Focused on China and Technology,” CBS News, October 7, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-creates-new-mission-centers-china-and-technology/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

91. Andres B. Schwarzenberg and Karen M. Sutter, “U.S.–China Investment Ties: Overview,” Congressional Research Service, In Focus, updated January 15, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11283.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

92. Yvonne Lau, “Why China’s Booming IPO Market Isn’t Exactly Good News for the Country’s Economy,” Fortune, August 10, 2022, https://fortune.com /2022/08/10/china-booming-ipo-market-economy-real-estate-crisis/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

93. Federal Reserve Economic Data, “Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita,” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A939RX0Q048SBEA (accessed December 12, 2022).

94. Peter St. Onge and Gideon Fernald, “China’s Stars Dim for Investors,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 8, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia /commentary/chinas-stars-dim-investors.

95. Paul Bonner, “Biden Proposes Higher Corporate Tax Rate, 20% Billionaire Minimum Tax,” Journal of Accountancy, March 28, 2022, https:// www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2022/mar/biden-proposes-higher-corporate-tax-rate-20-billionaire-minimum-tax.html (accessed February 22, 2023).

96. Patrick McLaughlin, Nita Ghei, and Michael Wilt, “Regulatory Accumulation and Its Costs: An Overview,” Mercatus Center, November 14, 2018, https:// www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/regulatory-accumulation-and-its-costs (accessed February 15, 2023), and The Heritage Foundation, “Heritage Explains: The ESG Pushback,” May 15, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/environment/heritage-explains/the-esg-pushback.

97. See the executive summary in The Heritage Foundation, Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023, https://www.heritage.org/budget/.

98. Katie Tarasov, “Inside TSMC, the Taiwanese Chipmaking Giant That’s Building a new plant in Phoenix,” CNBC, October 16, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com /2021/10/16/tsmc-taiwanese-chipmaker-ramping-production-to-end-chip-shortage.html (accessed February 22, 2023).

99. Dustin Carmack, “CHIPS Is a Missed Opportunity for Real Security,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 2, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia /commentary/chips-missed-opportunity-real-security.

100. Emma Kinery, “TSMC to Up Arizona Investment to $40 Billion with Second Semiconductor Chip plant,” CNBC, December 6, 2022, https://www.cnbc .com/2022/12/06/tsmc-to-up-arizona-investment-to-40-billion-with-second-semiconductor-chip-plant.html (accessed February 15, 2023).

101. Dustin Carmack, “With CHIPS on Table, Leave It to Congress to Drop Ball on Semiconductor Subsidies,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 22, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/technology/commentary/chips-table-leave-it-congress-drop-ball-semiconductor-subsidies.

102. News release, “Interior Seeks Public Comment on Draft List of 35 Minerals Deemed Critical to U.S. National Security and the Economy,” U.S. Department of the Interior, September 29, 2021, https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-seeks-public-comment-draft-list-35-minerals-deemed -critical-us-national (accessed February 15, 2023). Indeed, the identification of 35 critical minerals, which include REEs, was noted previously in a 2019 government report. See U.S. Department of Commerce, “A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” June 4, 2019, pp. 6 and 15, https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/Critical_Minerals_Strategy_Final.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). A 2017 report by a different governmental agency, however, lists 23 mineral commodities as being critical. See Klaus J. Schulz et al., eds., “Critical Mineral Resource of the United States—Economic and Environmental Geology and Prospects for Future Supply,” U.S. Geological Survey, 2017, pp. v, A1, and A6, https://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1802/pp1802_entirebook.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). This 2017 report with its 23 figure was, in turn, cited by another 2019 governmental report: March Humphries, “Critical Minerals and U.S. Public Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report No. R45810, June 28, 2019, pp. 6 and 10, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20190628_R45810_b3112ce909b130b5d525d2265a62ce8236464664.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

103. Stephen Moore and Nicolas Loris, “Time to Capitalize on Rare Earth Abundance in the United States,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/environment/commentary/time-capitalize-rare-earth-abundance-the-united-states.

104. Amanda Lee, “How China’s Rare Earth Dominance Spurs US and Its Allies to Diversify Supply Chain of Critical Minerals,” South China Morning Post, July 21, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3185968/how-chinas-rare-earth-dominance-spurs-us-and-its-allies (accessed February 15, 2023).

105. Jacopo Dettoni, “‘Rare Earths Are Not that Rare,’” FDI Intelligence, October 12, 2022, https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/interview/rare-earths -are-not-that-rare-81560 (accessed February 15, 2023).

106. For the decade claim to receive governmental approval, see Moore and Loris, “Time to Capitalize.”

107. National Mining Association, “Regulating U.S. Mining,” https://nma.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Mining-Law-Fact-Sheet.pdf (accessed December 13, 2022).

108. See Daren Bakst, “Some States Abuse This Provision to Block Critical Projects. Here’s What Congress Can Do,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 13, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/agriculture/commentary/some-states-abuse-provision-block-critical-projects-heres-what-congress-can; Daren Bakst, “The Biden Administration’s Shocking Scientific Abuses at EPA,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 9, 2022, https://www.heritage .org/environment/commentary/the-biden-administrations-shocking-scientific-abuses-epa; Daren Bakst and Tony Francois, “Congress Must Protect Innocent Property Owners from Section 404 Civil and Criminal Penalties,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5275, June 21, 2022, https://www .heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/IB5275.pdf; and Robert Gordon, “Take It Back: Extending the Endangered Species Act’s ‘Take’ Prohibition to All Threatened Animals Is Bad for Conservation,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3267, December 7, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites /default/files/2017-12/BG3267.pdf.

109. Karen M. Sutter, “Trade Dispute with China and Rare Earth Elements,” Congressional Research Service, In Focus, June 28, 2019, p. 2, https://crsreports .congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11259 (accessed February 15, 2023).

110. James M. Roberts and Brett D. Schaefer, “The U.S. Development Finance Corporation Is Failing to Counter China,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3649, September 17, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/BG3649.pdf.

111. Thilo Hanemann and Daniel H. Rosen, “Chinese Investment in the United States: Recent Trends and the Policy Agenda,” prepared for the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, December 2016, p. 6, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Chinese_Investment_in_the _United_States_Rhodium.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

112. American Enterprise Institute, “China Global Investment Tracker,” https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ (accessed December 14, 2022). Note: When interacting with the dataset, set to “Chinese Investments & Contracts in the US (2016),” which will reveal a sum of $53.48 billion.

113. News release, “Cornyn, Feinstein, Burr Introduce Bill to Strengthen the CFIUS Review Process, Safeguard National Security,” U.S. Senator John Cornyn of Texas, November 8, 2017, https://justfacts.votesmart.org/public-statement/1204881/cornyn-feinstein-burr-introduce-bill-to-strengthen-the-cfius -review-process-safeguard-national-security (accessed February 15, 2023).

114. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “CFIUS Real Estate Instructions (Part 802),” https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee -on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius/cfius-real-estate-instructions-part-802 (accessed December 14, 2022).

115. American Enterprise Institute, “China Global Investment Tracker” dataset (set to “Chinese Investments & Contracts in USA (2021)).

116. European Commission,” EU Investment Screening and Export Control Rules Effectively Safeguard EU security,” September 2, 2022, https://ec.europa .eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5286 (accessed February 15, 2023).

117. Meghan Arbegast, “Path Opens for Fufeng Project After Federal Agencies Determine Land Deal Was ‘Not Covered’ by CFIUS,” Grand Forks Herald, December 13, 2022, https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/north-dakota/path-opens-for-fufeng-project-after-federal-agencies-determine-land -deal-was-not-covered-by-cfius (accessed February 15, 2023).

118. Morrison Foerster, “Commerce Department Plan to Nix ‘Emerging’ and ‘Foundational’ Technologies Distinction in Export Controls,” June 24, 2022, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/220624-emerging-and-foundational-technologies-distinction (accessed February 15, 2023).

119. Michael J. Ellis, “DOJ Emboldens China by Ending Initiative Against Our Greatest Counterintelligence and Economic Espionage Threat,” Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 297, March 4, 2022, p. 8, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/LM297.pdf.

120. See, for example, Dean Cheng, “Chinese Cyber Attacks: Robust Response Needed,” The Heritage Foundation, February 23, 2013, https://www.heritage .org/defense/report/chinese-cyber-attacks-robust-response-needed.

121. Cybereason, “Operation CuckooBees: Cybereason Uncovers Massive Chinese Intellectual Property Theft Operation,” Malicious Life blog, May 4, 2022, https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-cuckoobees-cybereason-uncovers-massive-chinese-intellectual-property-theft-operation (accessed February 15, 2023).

122. Michael J. Ellis and Kara Frederick, “Big Tech’s National Security Red Herring,” Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 311, October 27, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/technology/report/big-techs-national-security-red-herring.

123. Jon Bateman, “Limiting Chinese National Security Espionage,” in U.S-China Technological “Decoupling”: A Strategy and Policy Framework (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022), pp. 65–71, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Bateman_US-China _Decoupling_final.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

124. See Jon Bateman, “Choosing a Strategy,” in U.S.–China Technological “Decoupling,” pp. 38 and 39.

125. Jack Corrigan and Michael Kratsios, “U.S. State and Local Governments Still Buy Banned Chinese Tech,” Foreign Policy, November 1, 2022, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/01/china-technology-huawei-zta-banned-us/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

126. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Criteria for Security and Trust in Telecommunications Networks and Services,” May 2020, https://csis -website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200511_Lewis_5G_v3.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

127. Kiron Skinner, Dustin Carmack, and James Jay Carafano, “Protecting the Cyber Commons: A Band of Brothers Approach,” The National Interest, November 18, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/protecting-cyber-commons-band-brothers-approach-205899 (accessed February 15, 2023).

128. For China controlling 90 percent of the market on the global supply of inputs needed to make generic antibiotics, see Rosemary Gibson, “China Has Cornered the Market on Antibiotics, So the U.S. Must Rebuild Its Manufacturing Capacity,” MarketWatch, April 28, 2021, https://www.marketwatch .com/story/china-has-cornered-the-market-on-antibiotics-so-the-u-s-must-rebuild-its-manufacturing-capacity-11619640612 (accessed February 15, 2023); U.S. Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2020,” January 2020, p. 132, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020 .pdf (accessed February 15, 2023); and Danielle Pletka and Derek Scissors, “We’re Too Dependent on China for Too Many Critical Goods. Especially Medicine,” American Enterprise Institute, March 21, 2020, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/were-too-dependent-on-china-for-too-many-critical-goods -especially-medicine/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

129. For a whole host of examples of China’s extensive manipulating of its business relations in Taiwan itself to serve its own interests and manipulating its trade with other countries to sway them to adopt a more pro-China policy, see Chia-Chien Chang and Alan H. Yang, “Weaponized Interdependence: China’s Economic Statecraft and Social Penetration against Taiwan,” Orbis, Vol. 64, No. 2 (2020), pp. 317–332, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc /articles/PMC7102596/pdf/main.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). For how China uses economic coercion to silence its critics and achieve political aims globally, see the litany of testimony derived from: Congressional–Executive Commission on China, “How China Uses Economic Coercion to Silence Critics and Achieve its Political Aims Globally,” December 7, 2021, https://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings/how-china-uses-economic -coercion-to-silence-critics-and-achieve-its-political-aims (accessed February 15, 2023). For a shorter yet also informative account of China’s global weaponization of its economic policy, see Matt Schrader, “Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, April 22, 2020, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp-content /uploads/2020/05/Friends-and-Enemies-A-Framework-for-Understanding-Chinese-Political-Interference-in-Democratic-Countries.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

130. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2022 Report to Congress, pp. 178 and 729.

131. Adam Michel, “The U.S. Tax System Unfairly Burdens U.S. Business,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3217, May 16, 2017, https://www.heritage .org/taxes/report/the-us-tax-system-unfairly-burdens-us-business.

132. Gulveen Aulakh, “US Supports Firms Weighing India as Alternative to China,” The Economic Times, April 30, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes .com/news/international/business/us-supports-firms-weighing-india-as-alternative-to-china/articleshow/75437352.cms?from=mdr (accessed February 15, 2023), and Arjun Kharpal, “‘India Has a Big Role to Play’: New Delhi Is Trying to Turn the Country into a Chip Powerhouse,” CNBC, September 25, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/26/how-india-is-trying-to-turn-itself-into-a-semiconductor-powerhouse.html (accessed February 15, 2023).

133. For an example of how “blue states” pressure businesses to adopt ESG goals, see The City of New York Office of the Comptroller Brad Lander, “Re: BlackRock Inc.’s Commitment to Net Zero Emissions,” letter to BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink, September 21, 2022, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp -content/uploads/2022/09/Letter-to-BlackRock-CEO-Larry-Fink.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

134. For comments and data on the Chinese control of the supply chain for components for green tech, see Alex Fitzsimmons, “To Escape China’s Supply Chain, Embrace a Diverse Clean Energy Portfolio,” The Hill, June 10, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/3517676-to-escape-chinas -supply-chain-embrace-a-diverse-clean-energy-portfolio/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

135. China’s total energy consumption has more than tripled since 2000, fueling the country’s rapid economic growth. See Hannah Ritchie, Max Roser, and Pablo Rosado, “China: Energy Country Profile,” Our World in Data, undated, https://ourworldindata.org/energy/country/china (accessed December 12, 2022), and Hannah Ritchie, Max Roser, and Pablo Rosado, “Energy Production and Consumption,” Our World in Data, undated, https://ourworldindata .org/energy-production-consumption (accessed December 12, 2022).

136. John Barrasso, “End China’s ‘Developing Country’ Advantage,” Newsweek, October 28, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/end-chinas-developing -country-advantage-opinion-1755223 (accessed February 15, 2023); Philippe Benoit and Kevin Tu, “Is China Still a Developing Country? And Why It Matters for Energy and Climate,” Center on Global Energy Policy, July 23, 2020, pp. 11 and 18, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications /china-still-developing-country-and-why-it-matters-energy-and-climate (accessed February 15, 2023); and “China’s Environmental Data: The World’s Biggest Polluter in Numbers,” The Straits Times, April 16, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinas-environmental-data-the-worlds -biggest-polluter-in-numbers (accessed February 15, 2023).

137. Walter Lohman, “Climate Change, Taiwan and US Foreign Policy,” Taipei Times, May 10, 2021, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives /2021/05/10/2003757126 (accessed February 15, 2023).

138. See for example, Kevin D. Dayaratna, Katie Tubb, and David Kreutzer, “Trading an Energy-Scarcity Agenda for Energy Abundance Pays Dividends,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3717, July 29, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/BG3717_0.pdf, and Katie Tubb, “Washington Knows Best What Car You Should Drive: Electric Vehicles. Seriously?” The Daily Signal, August 3, 2022, https://www.dailysignal.com /2022/08/03/washington-knows-best-what-car-you-should-drive-electric-vehicles-seriously/.

139. See Katie Tubb, “Fueling the Climate Crisis: Examining Big Oil’s Climate Pledges,” testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, February 8, 2022, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20220208/114392/HHRG-117-GO00-Wstate-TubbK -20220208.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

140. Daren Bakst and Peter St. Onge, eds., “Inflation: Policymakers Should Stop Driving It and Start Fighting It,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 252, January 20, 2022, pp. 22–26, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/SR252.pdf.

141. Edward Wong, “On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing’s Air Quality Tops ‘Crazy Bad’ at 755,” The New York Times, January 12, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com /2013/01/13/science/earth/beijing-air-pollution-off-the-charts.html (accessed February 15, 2023).

142. For example, protectionist policies in the 1950s through 1980s around uranium enrichment grossly distorted supply and ultimately created new competitors of American allies also working to compete against the Soviet Union. For details, see Katie Tubb, “National Security Imperative Lacking, Protectionism Abounding in Section 232 Uranium Case,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3360, November 2, 2018, p. 6, https://www.heritage .org/sites/default/files/2018-11/BG3360.pdf.

143. Katie Tubb, “Needed: An Effective Nuclear Energy Policy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3633, July 1, 2021, pp. 15–17, https://www.heritage .org/sites/default/files/2021-07/BG3633.pdf, and Katie Tubb, “Policy Proposals for Reducing Record-High Gasoline Prices,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3708, May 2, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/energy-economics/report/policy-proposals-reducing-record-high-gasoline-prices.

144. Michael Stumo, “Wall Street CEOs Funding China’s Military and Human Rights Abuses. Here’s Why,” Fox News, December 5, 2022, https://www .foxnews.com/opinion/wall-street-ceos-funding-china-military-human-rights-abuses (accessed February 15, 2023).

145. For a list of some of these Chinese entities sanctioned by the U.S. government, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, “U.S. Sanctions List,” March 2022, https://uhrp.org/sanctions/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

146. The Heritage Foundation, “Heritage Explains: What Is ESG?” https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/heritage-explains/what-esg. Also see Heritage Action for America, “What Is ESG?” ESGhurts.com.

147. See, for example, Patty-Jane Geller, “China’s Nuclear Expansion and Its Implications for U.S. Strategy and Security,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 14, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/chinas-nuclear-expansion-and-its-implications-us-strategy-and -security.

148. Brent Sadler, “One Year After Indo–Pacific Command’s Prediction About Taiwan, Where Do We Stand?” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 10, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/one-year-after-indo-pacific-commands-prediction-about-taiwan-where-do-we-stand.

149. On the U.S. Navy’s state of unpreparedness, see Wood, ed., 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, pp. 16 and 17. On the Navy’s aging warship problem, see Megan Eckstein, “Heritage Report: Aging Navy Fleet Complicates Tradeoff Between Buying New Ships, Fixing Old Ones,” U.S. Naval Institute News, October 4, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/10/04/heritage-foundation-index-aging-navy-fleet-complicates-tradeoff-between-spending-on-new -ships-maintaining-old-ones (accessed February 15, 2023).

150. See discussion in James Jay Carafano, “Getting a Game Plan for the Guardian of America’s Global Interests,” The National Interest, September 12, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/getting-game-plan-guardian-america%E2%80%99s-global-interests-193480 (accessed February 15, 2023).

151. See Frederico Bartels, “China’s Defense Budget in Context: How Under-Reporting and Differing Standards and Economies Distort the Picture,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 225, March 25, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/SR225.pdf.

152. Brent D. Sadler, “A Modern Naval Act to Meet the Surging China Threat,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3732, October 24, 2022, pp. 5 and 6, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/BG3732.pdf.

153. Mike Gallagher, “Battle Force 2025: A Plan to Defend Taiwan Within the Decade,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 17, 2022, https:// www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/02/17/battle-force-2025/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

154. Bryant Harries, Stephen Losey, and Joe Gould, “Republicans Push Back on Okinawa F-15 Withdrawal,” Defense News, November 1, 2022, https://www .defensenews.com/congress/2022/11/01/republicans-push-back-on-okinawa-f-15-withdrawal/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

155. Marco Rubio et al., letter to The Honorable Lloyd Austin, July 20, 2022, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/5fe164ff-9745-49e1-b727 -05e5d5ece8f0/A1894459F41C49ED976B27FF41D09818.07.20.22-rubio-letter-to-secdef-re-ground-based-missiles.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).

156. David Vergun, “China, Russia Pose Strategic Challenges for U.S., Allies, Admiral Says,” DOD News, August 12, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News /News-Stories/Article/Article/2729519/china-russia-pose-strategic-challenges-for-us-allies-admiral-says/ (accessed January 24, 2023).

157. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022, p. 98, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS -INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF (accessed February 15, 2023).

158. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021, Table. “China’s Rocket Force,” p. 163, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF (accessed January 24, 2023).

159. U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of Charles A. Richard, Commander, United States Strategic Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 8, 2022, p. 3, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2022%20USSTRATCOM%20Posture%20Statement%20-%20SASC%20Hrg%20FINAL.pdf (accessed January 24, 2023).

160. Patty-Jane Geller, “The U.S. Must Strengthen Its Nuclear Forces to Deter Growing Nuclear Threats,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3736, pp. 2 and 3, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-us-must-strengthen-its-nuclear-forces-deter-growing-nuclear-threats.

161. Ibid., pp. 12–18.

162. Bryant Harris, “Document Reveals $14 Billion Backlog of US Defense Transfers to Taiwan,” Defense News, April 14, 2022, https://www.defensenews .com/pentagon/2022/04/14/pandemic-delays-spark-14-billion-backlog-of-us-defense-transfers-to-taiwan/ (accessed February 15, 2023).

163. Kathleen H. Hicks (@DepSecDef), “#America’s support to #Ukraine is in no way negatively affecting our ability to support #Taiwan. Lessons learned out of Ukraine will be critical to our ability to continue to support the Taiwan Relations Act—as well as our allies & partners. @AspenSecurity,” Twitter, December 15, 2022, https://twitter.com/DepSecDef/status/1603448093290250241 (accessed February 15, 2023).

164. For an overview of the Jones Act and how it has hindered America’s maritime industry, see Brian Slattery, Bryan Riley, and Nicolas D. Loris, “Sink the Jones Act: Restoring America’s Competitive Advantage in Maritime-Related Industries,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2886, May 22, 2014, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2886.pdf.

165. Brent Sadler, “Collisions, Groundings and Fires: Is the Navy Ready for War?” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 29, 2021, https://www .heritage.org/defense/commentary/collisions-groundings-and-fires-the-navy-ready-war.

166. Riley Bunch, “18 Cargo Ships Wait to Dock in the Savannah Port. Now the Federal Government Is Stepping In,” Georgia Public Broadcasting, November 10, 2021, https://www.gpb.org/news/2021/11/10/18-cargo-ships-wait-dock-in-the-savannah-port-now-the-federal-government-stepping (accessed February 16, 2023); Grace Kay, “The Largest Port in the US Hit a New Ship-Backlog Record Every Day Last Week, as 65 Massive Container Boats Float Off the California Coast,” Business Insider, September 20, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/largest-us-port-breaks-multiple-record-cargo -ships-import-delays-2021-9 (accessed February 16, 2023); Grace Kay, “California Ports Aren’t the Only Ones Facing Record Backlogs of Cargo Ships—3 Other US Ports Have Hit Historic Highs,” Business Insider, October 2, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-ports-face-record-backlogs-of-ships -east-coast-2021-10 (accessed February 16, 2023); and Lori Ann LaRocco, “Cancelled Sailings, Stuck Vessels, Warehouse Prices Show U.S. Ports Are Still Struggling,” CNBC, August 25, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/25/china-shipments-are-way-down-but-us-ports-are-still-struggling.html (accessed February 16, 2023).

167. Lisa Baertlein, “Port of Los Angeles October Imports Tumble, Pressured by Labor Worries,” Reuters, November 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com /business/autos-transportation/port-los-angeles-october-imports-tumble-pressured-by-labor-worries-2022-11-15/ (accessed February 16, 2023); and Lisa Fickenscher, “US Companies Sweat Out Labor Talks Ahead of Possible Supply-Chain Crisis,” New York Post, June 10, 2022, https://nypost.com /2022/06/10/us-companies-have-west-coast-labor-talks-amid-supply-chain-crisis/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

168. Gary Peters, “Shipping 2030: Technologies that Will Transform the Industry,” Ship Technology, February 9, 2016, https://www.ship-technology.com /features/featureshipping-2030-technologies-that-will-transform-the-industry-4716366/ (accessed February 16, 2023); Susanne Hauner, “Maritime 4.0 Shapes the Digital Shipyard of the Future,” Naval Technology, May 5, 2022, https://www.naval-technology.com/homepage/maritime-4-0 -shapes-the-digital-shipyard-of-the-future/ (accessed February 16, 203); and Ajay Menon, “10 Smart Ship Technologies for the Maritime Industry,” Marine Insights, June 18, 2021, https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/10-smart-ship-technologies-that-maritime-industry/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

169. U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Additive Manufacturing Strategy,” January 2021, https://www.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2021 /01/dod-additive-manufacturing-strategy.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

170. Brent D. Sadler, James Di Pane, and Chad Wolf, “Securing U.S. Maritime Rights in Our Unguarded Waters,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3692, March 14, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/BG3692.pdf.

171. U.S. Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27 /2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (accessed March 1, 2023)

172. Congressional Research Service data using State and Foreign operations congressional budget justification and supporting documents. Also see Foreignassistance.gov, updated March 3, 2023 (accessed March 13, 2023).

173. Cate Cadell and Ellen Nakashima, “American Technology Boosts China’s Hypersonic Missile Program,” The Washington Post, October 17, 2022, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/10/17/china-hypersonic-missiles-american-technology/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

174. Dechert LLP, “House Passes CFIUS Reform as Trump Administration Reiterates Support,” June 28, 2018, https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/onpoint /2018/6/house-passes-cfius-reform-as-trump-administration-reiterates-support.html (accessed February 16, 2023).

175. Rebecca Arcesati and Antonia Hmaidi, “Industry, Allies and Partners Face Tough Choices as US–China Tech War Escalates,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, October 20, 2022, https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/industry-allies-and-partners-face-tough-choices-us-china-tech-war-escalates (accessed February 16, 2023).

176. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Commerce Control List: Controls on Certain Marine Toxins,” Proposed Rule, Request for Comments, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 99 (May 23, 2022), p. 31195, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-23/pdf/2022-10907.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

177. News release, “Commerce Implements New Export Controls on Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” Bureau of Industry and Security, October 7, 2022, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom /press-releases/3158-2022-10-07-bis-press-release-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-controls-final/file (accessed February 16, 2023).

178. Karen Freifeld and Alexandra Alper, “Huawei, SMIC Suppliers Received Billions Worth of Licenses for U.S. Goods–Documents,” Reuters, October 21, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-china-huawei-tech-exclusive-idTRNIKBN2HB2D7 (accessed February 16, 2023).

179. Ana Swanson, “Trump Officials Battle Over Plan to Keep Technology Out of Chinese Hands,” The New York Times, October 23, 2019, https://www .nytimes.com/2019/10/23/business/trump-technology-china-trade.html (accessed February 16, 2023).

180. H.R. 9241, Prioritizing National Security in Export Controls Act of 2022, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on October 28, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/9241?s=1&r=1 (accessed February 16, 2023).

181. “Xi Jinping’s Assault on Tech Will Change China’s Trajectory,” The Economist, August 14, 2021, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/08/14/xi -jinpings-assault-on-tech-will-change-chinas-trajectory (accessed February 16, 2023).

182. John Pomfret, “China’s Leader Attacks His Greatest Threat,” The Atlantic, January 25, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/01 /china-xi-jinping-business-entrepreneurs/617777/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

183. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, “§ 734.9 Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) Rules,” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/licensing/reexports-and -offshore-transactions/direct-public-guidelines#:~:text=Foreign%2Dproduced%20items%20located%20outside,a%20foreign%2Dproduced%20item %20is (accessed December 13, 2022).

184. See, for example, Joe Gould, “AUKUS Still Faces Red Tape, Australian Officials Say,” Defense News, December 8, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com /pentagon/2022/12/08/aukus-still-faces-red-tape-australian-officials-say/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

185. Derek Scissors, “Will US Business Undermine China Policy Again?” American Enterprise Institute, June 16, 2022, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and -defense-policy/will-us-business-undermine-china-policy-again/ (accessed February 16, 2023), and U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Securities (C): Annual Cross-U.S. Border Portfolio Holdings,” https://home.treasury.gov/data/treasury-international-capital-tic-system-home-page/tic-forms -instructions/securities-c-annual-cross-us-border-portfolio-holdings (accessed December 20, 2022).

186. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, “List of Parties of Concern,” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern (accessed December 13, 2022).

187. Matt Pottinger and David Feith, “The Most Powerful Data Broker in the World Is Winning the War Against the U.S.,” The New York Times, November 30, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/opinion/xi-jinping-china-us-data-war.html (accessed February 14, 2023).

188. Ibid.

189. The White House, “Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” May 15, 2019, https:// trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/ (accessed February 14, 2023).

190. “Permanent normal trade relations” is equivalent to “most favored nation” status. See Stephen Ezell, “False Promises II: The Continuing Gap Between China’s WTO Commitments and Its Practices,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, July 2021, https://www2.itif.org/2021-false -promises.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Countries Ineligible for NTR/MFN Duty Rates,” November 2, 2020, https://help.cbp.gov/s/article/Article-250?language=en_US (accessed February 16, 2023); and Jack Detsch, “U.S.–China Trade War Could Heat Up,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/15/u-s-china-trade-war-wto-sanctions-xi-jinping-biden-trump/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

191. News release, “3.7 Million Jobs Lost to China Since 2001,” Alliance for American Manufacturing, December 20, 2022, https://www .americanmanufacturing.org/press-release/3-7-million-jobs-lost-to-china-since-2001/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

192. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “2021 Report to Congress On China’s WTO Compliance,” February 2022, pp. 14 and 15, https://ustr.gov /sites/default/files/enforcement/WTO/2021%20USTR%20Report%20to%20Congress%20on%20China‘s%20WTO%20Compliance.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

193. See U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2022 Report to Congress, pp. 175–183.

194. See the executive summary in ibid., pp. 1–33.

195. World Trade Organization, “Accession of the People’s Republic of China,” WT/L/432, November 23, 2001, p. 5, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS /directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/L/432.pdf&Open=True (accessed February 16, 2023).

196. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2022 Report to Congress, p. 176.

197. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts.

198. World Trade Organization, “China—Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products: Report of the Panel,” WT/DS517/R, April 18, 2019, https://docs .wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=253415,253416& CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True (accessed February 16, 2023).

199. H.R. 7193, China Trade Relations Act of 2022, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on March 21, 2022, https://www .congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7193/text (accessed February 16, 2023).

200. S. 785, China Trade Relations Act of 2021, 117th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in the U.S. Senate on March 17, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th -congress/senate-bill/785/text (accessed February 16, 2023).

201. For the effect on the American labor market and on deindustrialization, see Phelim Kine, “China Joined Rules-Based Trading System—Then Broke the Rules,” Politico, December 9, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/09/china-wto-20-years-524050 (accessed February 16, 2023), and Council on Foreign Relations, “What Happened When China Joined the WTO?” https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/trade/what-happened -when-china-joined-wto (accessed December 21, 2022).

202. Raf Casert and the Associated Press, “Europeans Furious About Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act Are Threatening a Trade Spat: ‘Nobody Wants to Get into a Tit-for-Tat,’” Fortune, November 25, 2022, https://fortune.com/2022/11/25/europeans-furious-about-joe-bidens-inflation-reduction-act-are -threatening-a-trade-spat-nobody-wants-to-get-into-a-tit-for-tat/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

203. Ezell, “False Promises II: The Continuing Gap,” and Riley Walters, “How to Use the World Trade Organization to Deal with China,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6022, October 29, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/IB6022.pdf.

204. Davide Furceri et al., “Are Tariffs Bad for Growth? Yes, Say Five Decades of Data from 150 Countries,” Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2020), pp. 850–859, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2020.03.009 (accessed February 22, 2023).

205. Senate Committee on Health Education, Labor, and Pensions Minority Oversight Staff, “An Analysis of the Origins of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Interim Report,” October 2020, p. 4, https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/report_an_analysis_of_the_origins_of_covid-19_102722.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

206. Brett D. Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “What the World Health Organization Must Do to Earn Back U.S. Support,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5098, August 7, 2020, pp. 2 and 3, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/IB5098_0.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

207. House Foreign Affairs Committee Report Minority Staff, “The Origins of COVID-19: An Investigation of the Wuhan Institute of Virology,” August 2021, https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ORIGINS-OF-COVID-19-REPORT.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023), and Senate Committee on Health Education, Labor, Pensions Minority Oversight Staff, “An Analysis of the Origins of COVID-19 Pandemic.”

208. Robert E. Moffit and Doug Badger, “Forging a Post-Pandemic Policy Agenda: A Road Map for COVID-19 Congressional Oversight,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 265, January 19, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/forging-post-pandemic-policy-agenda-road-map -covid-19-congressional.

209. Brett D. Schaefer and Steven Groves, “Why the U.S. Should Oppose the New Draft WHO Pandemic Treaty,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5306, February 27, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/why-the-us-should-oppose-the-new-draft-who-pandemic-treaty.

210. Steven Groves and Brett D. Schaefer, “A WHO Pandemic Treaty Must Not Infringe on U.S. Sovereignty,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5266, June 27, 2022, pp. 3 and 4, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/IB5266.pdf.

211. See, for example, Morgan A. Martin and Clinton J. Williamson, “Mapping Chinese Influence in Hollywood,” Kenney Papers on Indo-Pacific Security Studies, No. 4 (January 2023), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/KP_04_Martin_Mapping_Chinese_Influence_in _Hollywood.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and Mark Fainaru-Wada and Steve Fainaru, “ESPN Analysis: NBA Owners Mum on China Relationship, Have More than $10 Billion Invested There,” ESPN, May 19, 2022, https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/33938932/nba-owners-mum-china -relationship-more-10-billion-invested-there (accessed February 16, 2023).

212. Ralph Jennings, “Censorship of Hollywood Blockbuster Films Intensifies in China,” Voice of America, May 4, 2022, https://www.voanews.com /a/censorship-of-hollywood-blockbuster-films-intensifies-in-china-/6557850.html (accessed February 16, 2023).

213. Mike Gonzales and Katharine C. Gorka, “How Cultural Marxism Threatens the United States—and How Americans Can Fight It,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 262, November 14, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/report/how-cultural-marxism-threatens-the-united-states-and -how-americans-can-fight.

214. The Heritage Foundation, “China Transparency Project,” https://www.heritage.org/china-transparency-project.

215. Lindsay Maizland, “The Surprising Reason Why China Is Blocking South Korean Music Videos and TV,” Vox, May 7, 2017, https://www.vox.com/latest -news/2017/3/3/14795636/china-south-korea-pop-culture-kpop-attacks-thaad (accessed March 16, 2022); Mitch Phillips, “Clubs Unlikely to Bite the Chinese Hand That Feeds,” Reuters, December 16, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-arsenal-china/clubs-unlikely-to-bite-the -chinese-hand-that-feeds-idUKKBN1YK26H (accessed March 16, 2023); and Jessie Yeung, “The NBA Is Caught Once Again between Free Speech and the Lucrative Chinese Market,” CNN, October 22, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/22/business/enes-kanter-tibet-nba-mic-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed March 14, 2023).

216. The WHO, for instance, has been bashed as “China-centric” and as “severely mismanaging” the COVID-19 pandemic by world leaders, such as President Trump. See Srinivas Mazumdaru, “What Influence Does China Have Over the WHO?” Deutsche Welle, April 17, 2020, https://www.dw.com /en/what-influence-does-china-have-over-the-who/a-53161220 (accessed February 16, 2023). For more details on the ties between the director-general of the World Health Organization and China, see Michael Collins, “The WHO and China: Dereliction of Duty,” Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound (blog), February 27, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/who-and-china-dereliction-duty (accessed February 16, 2023).

217. James Jay Carafano et al., “International Organizations Are the Devil’s Playground of Great Power Competition,” The National Interest, May 15, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/international-organizations-are-devil%E2%80%99s-playground-great-power-competition-154706?page=0%2C1 (accessed February 16, 2023).

218. Until 1971, China was represented in the U.N. by the Republic of China (Taiwan). U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC as the “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” and affirmed that PRC representatives would represent the nation in the U.N. and its affiliated organizations. Resolution 2758 did not resolve the status of Taiwan, but Beijing has misused the resolution to support its one-China principle, assert claims over Taiwan, and pressure the U.N. to limit Taiwanese participation in U.N. organizations and meetings. See Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, “The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Drun%26Glaser-distortion-un-resolution-2758-limit-taiwans-access.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

219. Brett D. Schaefer, “Countering China’s U.N. Influence: A Blueprint for the United States,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3726, September 13, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/BG3726.pdf.

220. Mark Magnier, “Singapore Official Will Head UN Intellectual Property Agency After Beating China’s Nominee, Wang Binying,” South China Morning Post, March 5, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3065078/singapore-official-set-win-leadership-un-intellectual-property-agency (accessed February 16, 2023).

221. On the campaign by China to oppose the release of the U.N. report, see Asim Kashgarian,“Long-Awaited Uyghur Human Rights Report Due This Month,” Voice of America, August 11, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/long-awaited-uyghur-human-rights-report-due-this-month-/6698581.html (accessed February 16, 2023). For the report itself, see United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China, August 31, 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default /files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

222. “An Anatomy of Erasure: How a Free and Open Hong Kong Became a Police State,” The Economist, July 1, 2022, https://www.economist.com /interactive/essay/2022/07/01/how-hong-kong-became-a-police-state (accessed February 16, 2023); Apa Lhamo, “Why the Chinese Communist Party Sees Tibetan Monks as ‘Troublemakers,’” The Diplomat, March 10, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/why-the-chinese-communist-party -sees-tibetan-monks-as-troublemakers/ (accessed February 16, 2023); “‘Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots’: China’s Crimes Against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims,” Human Rights Watch, April 19, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage -break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting (accessed February 16, 2023); “Dismantling a Free Society: Hong Kong One Year after the National Security Law,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/feature/2021/06/25/dismantling-free-society/hong-kong-one-year -after-national-security-law (accessed December 14, 2022); Olivia Enos, “How China Targets Chinese Christians,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 9, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/how-china-targets-chinese-christians; and Olivia Enos and Hannah So, “Religious Persecution in China Intensifies with Brainwashing Camps for Christians,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 12, 2021, https://www.heritage.org /religious-liberty/commentary/religious-persecution-china-intensifies-brainwashing-camps-christians.

223. For how the numbers can be credibly totaled to 1 million, see Jessica Batke, “Where Did the One Million Figure for Detentions in Xinjiang’s Camps Come From?” ChinaFile, January 8, 2019, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/where-did-one-million-figure-detentions-xinjiangs -camps-come (accessed February 16, 2023); Stephanie Nebehay, “U.N. Says It Has Credible Reports that China Holds Million Uighurs in Secret Camps,” Reuters, August 10, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un/u-n-says-it-has-credible-reports-that-china-holds-million -uighurs-in-secret-camps-idUSKBN1KV1SU (accessed February 16, 2023); and U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby,” December 4, 2018, p. 1, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

224. “US: China ‘Committed Genocide Against Uighurs,’” BBC, January 20, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55723522 (accessed February 16, 2023).

225. Emilie Kao and Brett Schaefer, eds., First Principles on Human Rights (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2021), http://thf_media .s3.amazonaws.com/2021/FirstPrinciplesonHumanRights.pdf. See also, U.S. Department of State, “Report of the Commission on Unalienable Rights,” 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023).

226. Wing Kuang, “Jimmy Lai Has Been China’s Target for Decades. Now a Small Change to Hong Kong’s Legal Tradition Could See Him Jailed for Life,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, December 12, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-13/jimmy-lai-trial-in-hong-kong-starts-this -week/101754544 (accessed February 16, 2023); Olivia Enos, “China’s Ongoing Persecution of Christians and the Case of Pastor Wang Yi,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 4, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/chinas-ongoing-persecution-christians-and-the-case-pastor -wang-yi; and Sophie Richardson, “25 Years After ‘Disappearing’ Tibetan Panchen Lama, China Is No Nearer to Its Goal,” The Diplomat, May 15, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/25-years-after-disappearing-tibetan-panchen-lama-china-is-no-nearer-to-its-goal/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

227. Olivia Enos, “Why the U.S. Should Extend ‘Priority 2’ Refugee Status to Uyghurs and Hong Kong Citizens,” Heritage Foundation Factsheet No. 225, February 4, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/why-the-us-should-extend-priority-2-refugee-status-uyghurs-and-hong-kong-citizens.

228. See Marti Flacks and Madeleine Songy, “The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Goes into Effect,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 27, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-goes-effect (accessed February 16, 2023).

229. Eleanor Albert, “Christianity in China,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/christianity-china (accessed February 16, 2023).

230. James Jay Carafano and Stefano Graziosi, “The Vatican Should Abandon Its Agreement With Beijing,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 16, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/commentary/the-vatican-should-abandon-its-agreement-beijing.

231. “After Vatican–China Deal, Chinese Bishop Imprisoned for 23 Years Is Not Yet Released,” Catholic News Agency, May 8, 2019, https://www .catholicnewsagency.com/news/41231/after-vatican-china-deal-chinese-bishop-imprisoned-for-23-years-is-not-yet-released (accessed February 23 2023); “China Arrests Vatican-Approved Bishop, Priests, Seminarians,” Union of Catholic Asian News, May 24, 2021, https://www.ucanews.com /news/china-arrests-vatican-approved-bishop-priests-seminarians/92587 (accessed February 16, 2023); Billy Hallowell, “Communist China Is Reportedly Rewriting the Bible and Calling Jesus a ‘Sinner.’ But That’s Not All...” CBN News, September 24, 2022, https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews /cwn/2022/february/china-rsquo-s-communist-government-is-reportedly-rewriting-the-bible-and-calling-jesus-a-lsquo-sinner-rsquo-but-that -rsquo-s-not-all-hellip (accessed February 16, 2023); Lukas Mikelionis, “Chinese Officials Burn Bibles, Close Churches, Force Christian to Denounce Faith Amid ‘Escalating’ Crackdown,” Fox News, September 10, 2018, https://www.foxnews.com/world/chinese-officials-burn-bibles-close-churches -force-christian-to-denounce-faith-amid-escalating-crackdown (accessed February 16, 2023); and Caleb Parke, “China Demolishes Government-Run Church After 7-Year Standoff,” Fox News, July 1, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-church-demolished-beat-christian-members (accessed February 16, 2023).

232. ChinaAid, “About: Religious Freedom for All in China,” https://chinaaid.org/about/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

233. H.R. 4821, Combating the Persecution of Christians in China Act, 117th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on July 29, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4821 (accessed February 16, 2023).

234. European Parliament, “Motion for a Resolution on the Arrest of Cardinal Zen and the Trustees of the 612 Relief Fund in Hong Kong,” July 5, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2022-0361_EN.html (accessed February 16, 2023).

235. Jeff M. Smith, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Implications and International Opposition,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3331, August 9, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-strategic-implications-and-international-opposition.

236. The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership,” June 12, 2021, https://www .whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w -partnership/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

237. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “The Blue Dot Network: A Proposal for a Global Certification Framework for Quality Infrastructure Investment,” 2022, https://www.oecd.org/daf/blue-dot-network-proposal-certification.pdf (accessed February 23, 2023).

238. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “The Launch of Multi-Stakeholder Blue Dot Network,” November 4, 2019, https://www.dfc.gov /media/opic-press-releases/launch-multi-stakeholder-blue-dot-network (accessed February 23, 2023).

239. Ibid.

240. For information on how the Abraham Accords, which facilitated the normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab nations, could serve as the foundation for greater economic and security cooperation, see James Jay Carafano, “Time for a Collective Defense in the Middle East,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 23, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/time-collective-defense-the-middle-east.

241.Collin Koh, “The Future of China’s Maritime Militia in the ‘New Situation’: A Primer,” in Walter Lohman and Justin Rhee, eds., 2021 China Transparency Project Report (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation 2021), pp. 101–104, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2021/China_Transparency_Report .pdf, and Gregory B. Poling, Tabitha Grace Mallory, and Harrison Prétat, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies and Center for Advanced Defense Studies, November 2021, pp. 1–2, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public /publication/211118_Poling_Maritime_Militia.pdf?Y5iaJ4NT8eITSlAKTr.TWxtDHuLIq7wR (accessed February 16, 2023).

242. For economic and environmental costs of this illegal practice, see figures that run into the billions of dollars in Bruce Vaughn and Ben Dolven, “China’s Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, R47065, April 12, 2022, p. 2, https://crsreports .congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47065 (accessed February 16, 2023). For shorter accounts of this problem, see Philip Heijmans, “Chinese Firms Are Driving Illegal Fishing Globally, Study Says,” Bloomberg, October 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/chinese-firms-are -driving-illegal-fishing-globally-study-says?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 16, 2023); and Paula Knack, “The Environmental Costs of China’s Maritime Ambition,” The Diplomat, July 28, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-environmental-costs-of-chinas-maritime-ambition/ (accessed February 16, 2023).

243. “China Fishing Fleet Defied US in Standoff on High Seas,” Voice of America, November 1, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-fishing-fleet -defied-us-in-standoff-on-high-seas-/6815717.html (accessed February 16, 2023).

244. James Jay Carafano et al., “Securing the High Seas: America’s Global Maritime Constabulary Power,” The Heritage Foundation, March 12, 2008, https:// www.heritage.org/defense/report/securing-the-high-seas-americas-global-maritime-constabulary-power.

245. James Di Pane and Chad F. Wolf, “U.S. Coast Guard: Three Priorities for FY 2022,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5209, August 26, 2021, https:// www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/IB5209.pdf.

246. Dean Cheng, “Why Taiwan Matters to Beijing,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3725, September 23, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites /default/files/2022-09/BG3725.pdf.

247. For additional constructive recommendations on support for Taiwan, see U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2022 Report to Congress, pp. 734 and 735; McCaul, “China Task Force Report,” pp. 18 and 19; and Cheng and Carafano, “Responding to the China Challenge: Blueprint 2.0.”

248. For the 11 United Nations resolutions reference, see Bruce Klingner, “This is Not the Time to Abandon North Korean Denuclearization,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 8, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/not-the-time-abandon-north-korean-denuclearization. For exact resolutions, including mention of the two condemnatory resolutions passed before the 2006 sanctions resolution, see Arms Control Association, “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” January 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North -Korea (accessed February 16, 2023).

249. James Jay Carafano and H. R. McMaster, “U.S. Benefits from Stronger Bond between Seoul and Tokyo,” The Washington Times, October 27, 2021, https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/oct/27/us-benefits-stronger-japan-south-korea-bond/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

250. The “limit and freeze” approach did not work when North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (1985), International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (1992), the inter-Korean nuclear agreement (1992), or the Agreed Framework (1994).

251. These various points about the failure of “limit and freeze” are made in Klingner, “Not the Time to Abandon North Korean Denuclearization.”

252. Mamuka Tsereteli and James Jay Carafano, “Russia Is Watching: Why NATO Must Welcome Ukraine and Georgia,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/russia-watching-why-nato-must-welcome-ukraine-and-georgia.

253. Victoria Coates, “The Russia–Ukraine War at One Year: The Biden Administration Owes the 118th Congress More Answers,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5301, January 18, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-russia-ukraine-war-one-year-the-biden-administration-owes -the-118th-congress-more, and Max Primorac, “Ukraine’s Post-War Reconstruction Strategy: Breaking Free of the Soviet Economic Legacy,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5287, October 6, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/ukraines-post-war-reconstruction-strategy-breaking-free -the-soviet-economic-legacy.

254. James Jay Carafano and Stephano Grazioso, “Europe Needs to Go All In on Diversifying Oil and Gas,” The National Interest, August 10, 2022, https:// nationalinterest.org/feature/europe-needs-go-all-diversifying-oil-and-gas-204084 (accessed February 17, 2023).

255. Iain Rogers, “Germany to Miss Military Spending Target Next Year, Study Says,” Bloomberg, December 4, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news /articles/2022-12-05/germany-to-miss-military-spending-target-next-year-study-says (accessed February 17, 2023).

256. U.S. Department of Defense, “Indo–Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 33, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023).

257. Jeff M. Smith, “South Asia: A New Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3721, August 29, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default /files/2022-08/BG3721.pdf.

258. Ibid., p. 22.

259. Jeff M. Smith, “The Future of the Quad Is Bright,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 11, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics /commentary/the-future-the-quad-bright.

260. Christopher Cairns and April Herlevi, “China and the Solomon Islands: Drivers of Security Cooperation,” CNA Corporation, April 13, 2022, https://www .cna.org/our-media/indepth/2022/04/china-and-the-solomon-islands (accessed February 17, 2023).

261. Simone McCarthy and Lizzy Yee, “China Plays for Influence in South Pacific with Security Proposal and Diplomatic Tour,” CNN, May 27, 2022, https:// www.cnn.com/2022/05/26/asia/china-pacific-islands-security-pact-wang-yi-tour-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed February 17, 2023).

262. News release, “Rubio, Schatz Lead Colleagues in Urging Biden Administration to Renew COFA, Defend Against CCP Expansion in the Indo–Pacific,” Office of U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, April 7, 2022, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/4/rubio-schatz-lead-colleagues-in-urging -biden-administration-to-renew-cofa-defend-against-ccp-expansion-in-the-indo-pacific (accessed February 17, 2023).

263. Alexander B. Gray, “Beijing Eyes Pacific Islands, Exploiting U.S. Strategic Vacuum,” Foreign Policy, June 21, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/21 /china-us-pacific-islands-bases-military-geopolitics-kiribati-solomon-australia-papua-new-guinea-micronesia/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

264. Ibid.

265. U.S. Department of State, “U.S.–Pacific Island Country Summit,” September 28–29, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-pacific-islands-country-summit/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

266. Damien Cave, “Why China Is Miles Ahead in a Pacific Race for Influence,” The New York Times, May 31, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31 /world/australia/china-united-states-pacific.html (accessed February 17, 2023).

267. Shannon Tiezzi, “Xi Arrives in Papua New Guinea for First-Ever Visit by a Chinese President,” The Diplomat, November 16, 2018, https://thediplomat .com/2018/11/xi-arrives-in-papua-new-guinea-for-first-ever-visit-by-a-chinese-president/#:~:text=Chinese%20President%20Xi%20Jinping%20arrived %20in%20Port%20Moresby%2C,in%20Port%20Moresby%20from%20November%2017%20to%2018 (accessed February 17, 2023).

268. Grant Wyeth, “With Blinken’s Visit to Fiji, the US Returns to the Pacific,” The Diplomat, February 16, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/with -blinkens-visit-to-fiji-the-us-returns-to-the-pacific/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

269. Meaghan Tobin, “Mike Pompeo’s Visit to Micronesia Highlights US Anxiety About Rising Chinese Influence in Pacific,” South China Morning Post, August 5, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/3021435/mike-pompeos-visit-micronesia-highlights-us-anxiety-about (accessed February 17, 2023).

270. H.R.7900, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, 117th Congress (2021–2022), October 11, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th -congress/house-bill/7900 (accessed February 17, 2023).

271. Alexandre Dayant, Meg Keen, and Roland Rajah, “Chinese Aid to the Pacific: Decreasing, But Not Disappearing,” The Lowy Institute, January 25, 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-aid-pacific-decreasing-not-disappearing (accessed February 17, 2023).

272. Shailendra Bahadur Singh, “Waiting for the Thaw: The Pacific Hopeful on Australia–China Reset,” The Lowy Institute, October 21, 2022, https://www .lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/waiting-thaw-pacific-hopeful-australia-china-reset (accessed February 17, 2023).

273. Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),” https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean#:~:text=U.S.%20foreign%20direct%20investment%20(FDI,%2C%20manufacturing%2C%20and%20wholesale%20trade.&text=ASEAN's%20FDI%20in%20the%20United,up%203.2%20percent%20from%202019 (accessed February 17, 2023).

274. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Occupation and Island Building,” https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/ (accessed February 3, 2022).

275. Jeff M. Smith, “Biden Must Keep Challenging China on Freedom of Navigation,” Foreign Policy, February 16, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/16/biden-south-china-sea-spratlys/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

276. Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).”

277. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo–Pacific,” January 2021, https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023).

278. James Carafano et al., “Why the United States Needs an Atlantic Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3577, December 23, 2020, p. 2, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-12/BG3577_0.pdf.

279. Ankit Panda, “Chinese, Russian, South African Navies Conduct Trilateral Naval Exercises,” The Diplomat, November 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/chinese-russian-south-african-navies-conduct-trilateral-naval-exercises/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

280. Alice Amelia Thomas, “Russia, China, and Venezuela Clash in Road Paving Contests at ‘War Olympics,’” Newsweek, August 26, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-china-venezuela-clash-road-paving-war-olympics-1737334 (accessed February 17, 2023), and Adam Kredo, “Iran, Russia, China to Run War Drills in Latin America,” The Washington Free Beacon, July 5, 2022, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/iran-russia-china-to-run-war-drills-in-latin-america/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

281. Peter Aitken, “US ‘Should Be Concerned’ by Chinese Influence in Latin America: Military Commander,” Fox News, July 20, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/world/us-concerned-chinese-influence-latin-america-military-commander (accessed February 17, 2023); Brenda Goh, “China State Firms Eye Land Around Panama Canal: Waterway Authority,” Reuters, March 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-canal-land/china-state-firms-eye-land-around-panama-canal-waterway-authority-idUSKBN16Y13J (accessed February 17, 2023); James M. Roberts, “Chinese Challenge in Panama,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 21, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/chinese-challenge-panama; Daniel F. Runde, “Key Decision Point Coming for the Panama Canal,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 21, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/key-decision-point-coming-panama-canal (accessed February 17, 2023); and Nahal Toosi,“‘Frustrated and Powerless’: In Fight with China for Global Influence, Diplomacy Is America’s Biggest Weakness,” Politico, October 23, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/23/china-diplomacy-panama-00062828 (accessed February 17, 2023).

282. Michael M. Phillips, “China Seeks First Military Base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds,” The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-first-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-u-s-intelligence-finds-11638726327 (accessed February 17, 2023); Brent D. Sadler, “Effective Naval Statecraft Can Prevent Communist Chinese Naval Bases in Africa,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3688, March 10, 2022, pp. 1–3, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/BG3688.pdf; and Brent D. Sadler, “China’s Bid for Global Hegemony: One Base at a Time,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 4, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/chinas-bid-global-hegemony-one-base-time.

283. Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang, and Gaoqi Zhang, “Northern Expedition: China’s Arctic Activities and Ambitions,” Brookings Institution, April 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/research/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic-activities-and-ambitions/ (accessed February 17, 2023), and Swee Lean Collin Koh, “China’s Strategic Interest in the Arctic Goes Beyond Economics,” Defense News, May 12, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/11/chinas-strategic-interest-in-the-arctic-goes-beyond-economics/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

284. Jacob Gronholt-Pederson, “In Arctic Push, US Extends New Economic Aid Package to Greenland,” Reuters, September 15, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/arctic-push-us-extends-new-economic-aid-package-greenland-2021-09-15/ (accessed February 17, 2023), and Lisa Mascaro, “US to Open Greenland Consulate Amid Increased Interest,” Associated Press, August 23, 2019, https://apnews.com/article/5119c18eba764c98b1ccb988f2b59bb5 (accessed February 17, 2023).

285. “China Remains Africa’s Largest Trading Partner for 12 Consecutive Years,” China-Lusophone Brief, March 2, 2022, https://www.clbrief.com/china-remains-africas-largest-trading-partner-for-12-consecutive-years/ (accessed February 17, 2023), and Diana Roy, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, April 12, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri (accessed February 17, 2023).

286. Luke Coffey, “The U.S. Cannot Neglect Its Backyard—It Is Time for an Atlantic Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5246, February 9, 2022, p. 3, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/IB5246.pdf.

287. Carafano et al., “Why the United States Needs an Atlantic Strategy,” pp. 4 and 5.

288. Kiron Skinner, James Jay Carafano, and Dan Kochis, “Forging New Leadership for the Atlantic World,” The National Interest, July 30, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/forging-new-leadership-atlantic-world-203864 (accessed February 17, 2023).

289. This souring has occurred even within China itself. See, for example, Abhishek Kumar, “Is China Souring on its Belt and Road Initiative?” International Policy Digest, October 23, 2022, https://intpolicydigest.org/is-china-souring-on-its-belt-and-road-initiative/ (accessed February 17, 2023).

290. James Jay Carafano and Anthony B. Kim, “Sovereignty, Security, Prosperity, and the Future of the Eurasia Project,” The Market for Ideas, https://www.themarketforideas.com/sovereignty-security-prosperity-and-the-future-of-the-eurasia-project-a789/ (accessed December 19, 2022).

291. See, for example, proposed legislation, S. 4509, “The Black Sea Security Act of 2022,” 117th Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in the U.S. Senate on July 12, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4509 (accessed February 17, 2023), and Luke Coffey and Brent Sadler, “U.S. Leadership Needed to Improve Maritime Security in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3641, May 3, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/BG3614.pdf.

292. For the great-power economic contestation over the “Middle Corridor” and the investment in it being in Europe’s and America’s interest, see James Jay Carafano and Silviu Nate, “The West Should Welcome the Middle Corridor,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, October 3, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/the-west-should-welcome-the-middle-corridor.

293. Jeff M. Smith, “The Future of the Quad Is Bright,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 11, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/the-future-the-quad-bright.

294. For additional recommendations, see Jeff M. Smith, “The Quad 2.0: A Foundation for a Free and Open Indo–Pacific,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3481, July 6, 2020, pp. 16–22, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/BG3481.pdf, and Cheng et al., “Assessing Beijing’s Power,” pp. 32 and 33.

295. James Jay Carafano, “It’s Not NATO, But Quad Can Get Results in Asia,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, October 19, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/its-not-nato-quad-group-can-get-results-asia.

296. U.S. Department of State, “Blue Dot Network,” https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/ (accessed December 14, 2022), and U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed December 14, 2022).

297. Government of Canada, “Canada’s Indo–Pacific Strategy,” 2022, p. 7, https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/assets/pdfs/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique-en.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023).

298. “Canada to Review ‘Disconcerting’ Police Radio Deal with Ties to China, Says Trudeau,” The Guardian, December 7, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/08/canada-to-review-disconcerting-police-radio-deal-with-ties-to-china-says-trudeau (accessed February 17, 2023), and Leyland Cecco, “Canada Orders China to Divest from Country’s Mining Companies,” The Guardian, November 3, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/03/canada-china-mining-companies-divest (accessed February 17, 2023).

299. Meng Wanzhou, “Meng Wanzhou and the Two Michaels: A Timeline,” The Guardian, September 24, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/25/meng-wanzhou-and-the-two-michaels-a-timeline (accessed February 17, 2023).

300. James Jay Carafano, “Top 5 To-Do List for Rebooting U.S.–Canadian Security Cooperation,” The National Interest, November 1, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/top-5-do-list-rebooting-us-canadian-security-cooperation-171666 (accessed February 17, 2023).

301. Andy Blatchford, “Joly: Canada Is Working to Rekindle Relations with Beijing,” Politico, May 19, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/19/canada-looking-to-rekindle-relations-with-beijing-00033798 (accessed February 23, 2023).

302. James Jay Carafano et al., “A Partnership Approach to America’s International Economic Relations,” The National Interest, September 30, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/partnership-approach-america%E2%80%99s-international-economic-relations-205091 (accessed February 17, 2023).

303. U.S. Department of State, “Deal Teams,” https://www.state.gov/deal-teams/ (accessed December 16, 2022).

304. News release, “Interagency Launch of D.C. Central Deal Team Takes Economic Statecraft to the Next Level,” International Trade Administration, February 25, 2020, https://www.trade.gov/press-release/interagency-launch-dc-central-deal-team-takes-economic-statecraft-next-level (accessed February 17, 2023).

305. James Jay Carafano and Anthony B. Kim, “Sovereignty, Security, Prosperity, and the Future of the Eurasia Project,” The Market for Ideas, https://www.themarketforideas.com/sovereignty-security-prosperity-and-the-future-of-the-eurasia-project-a789/ (accessed December 15, 2022).

306. “China’s Imports from Lithuania Collapsed Amid Diplomatic Spat,” Bloomberg, March 21, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-21/china-s-imports-from-lithuania-collapses-amid-diplomatic-spat (accessed February 17, 2023).