Executive Summary

Heritage assesses that, as of 2025, the United States could likely sustain a maximum wartime F-76 delivery throughput of 265,000–280,000 barrels per day (bpd) to operational end-users in a Taiwan conflict.

This estimate is network-constrained and reflects the convergent capacity of three distinct routes:

1. U.S. sealift and DFSP-based delivery (capped at ~200,000 bpd);
2. Additive bilateral access nodes contributing ~65,000–80,000 bpd; and
3. Surge-only prepositioned afloat supply, excluded from sustainable totals.

All values reflect final delivery to ships or ground units reliant on petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), with no double counting of shared nodes. Refinery, port, and sealift capacity are not limiting under non-degraded conditions; at-sea replenishment remains the structural bottleneck.

JP-5 logistics are comparatively resilient due to hardened airbase infrastructure and distributed refueling options. Of note, estimated throughput falls short of the modeled F-76 demand ceiling (~370,000 bpd).

Methodology

This assessment is structured using a four-part methodology framework designed to support simulation modeling of daily F-76 fuel delivery throughput available to U.S. operational forces in a high-intensity Taiwan conflict scenario.

Role. This analysis models the sustainable daily throughput capacity of F-76 naval distillate deliverable to U.S. warships and ground-based POL-dependent forces in theater. The goal is to determine the maximum bpd of F-76 that can reach operational end-users across the Indo-Pacific region through three distinct distribution routes: (1) the primary U.S. sealift and DFSP-based supply chain, (2) bilateral and contingency access nodes not reliant on U.S. sealift, and (3) prepositioned afloat reserves. Only throughput directly deliverable to end-users is included, and all modeling excludes double counting of shared assets such as fleet oilers or port offload sites.

Identifier. Throughput is measured as the combined, non-overlapping daily delivery capacity from the following:

• Route 1: U.S. Core Network. Includes domestic refining, DLA-contracted sealift, DFSP terminal offload, and MSC fleet oiler UNREP operations, capped at ~200,000 bpd due to distribution friction, not refinery or sealift limitations.
• Route 2: Bilateral Access Points. Includes independent host-nation fuel terminals (Subic Bay, Cam Ranh Bay, Port Blair, Sabang) able to issue fuel directly to U.S./allied ships or load regional tankers. These are conservatively estimated at 65,000–80,000 bpd net throughput.
• Route 3: Prepositioned Afloat Assets. Includes T-AOs and CONSOL-capable chartered tankers (e.g., MT Empire State) delivering up to ~80,000 bpd in opening phases. Excluded from the additive total due to reliance on Route 1 distribution capacity.

Final throughput reflects only consumable fuel delivered to the last-mile user. Intermediate storage or double handling (e.g., depot to oiler to ship) is excluded unless additive throughput is confirmed.

Process. Each delivery route is modeled independently and then aggregated while subtracting overlap to avoid duplication. Route 1 capacity is capped by U.S. fleet oilers and last-mile fuel transfer constraints rather than upstream supply. Route 2 capacities are tallied only where bilateral nodes can deliver fuel directly to consumers or replenish tankers outside the U.S. sealift chain. Route 3 is modeled separately as a surge vector but not included in the sustainable throughput total due to its dependence on shared refueling infrastructure.

The simulation assumes:

• 100 percent activation of U.S. and chartered distribution assets under high-tempo conditions.
• No interdiction, battle damage, or diplomatic denial unless specified in scenario variants.
• Full host-nation cooperation at designated bilateral sites under strategic alignment pressures.

The resulting throughput band (265,000–280,000 bpd) represents the maximum network-constrained delivery achievable under idealized but plausible wartime logistics posture.

Data. This model draws from over 30 sources, including:

• Upstream capacity references: EIA, IEA, and national refinery production reports for U.S. and partner nations (Japan, Australia, Korea, Singapore).
• Distribution modeling: DLA Energy releases, GAO and CSBA studies on T-AO throughput, fleet oiler specs (e.g., Kaiser- and John Lewis-class capacity).
• Bilateral infrastructure: Open-source confirmation of fuel handling capacity and political access at Subic Bay, Cam Ranh Bay, Sabang, and Port Blair.
• MSC replenishment capability: CSBA analysis of CONSOL operations and surge vessel usage (e.g., MT Empire State fuel transfer rates).
• Historical wartime refueling performance: RIMPAC, PACRES, and NDTA accounts validating at-sea replenishment constraints and surge tanker contributions.

All sources are cited in ICD 206-compliant format and include extracted operational or engineering values directly supporting throughput estimates.

Key Judgment

Heritage judges that, as of 2025, the United States and its allies could likely sustain a maximum wartime fuel delivery throughput of approximately 265,000–280,000 bpd of F-76 or equivalent naval distillate to operational end-users during a moderate-to-high intensity conflict over Taiwan.

This figure reflects the total network-constrained daily fuel flow to naval warships at sea and forward-deployed ground forces, derived from the combined output of the primary U.S. logistics network and parallel bilateral or contingency access channels. All calculations exclude any double counting of overlapping nodes. This estimate assumes no interdiction or degradation and presumes full mobilization and political cooperation across the fuel distribution system.

The final throughput figure is based on three distinct and partially independent fuel delivery routes:

1. The primary U.S. logistics chain from refinery to end user via sealift, port offload, and fleet distribution;
2. Prepositioned afloat fuel assets enabling at-sea replenishment independent of shore throughput; and
3. Bilateral or contingency access facilities operated by trusted partner nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia.

Each route is modeled to contribute only at the point of final delivery to end-users. Prepositioned afloat assets are excluded from additive totals because they rely on the same fleet oiler and UNREP systems modeled in Route 1. Bilateral access nodes are counted only if they issue fuel directly to consumers or replenish tankers without taxing U.S. sealift or DFSP throughput.

Reason 1: The U.S. primary supply chain supports up to 200,000 bpd to end-users, capped by distribution.

• The U.S. and allies operate a global logistics network with ample upstream capacity—refining output well above 1 million bpd, sealift of 300,000–500,000 bpd, and port throughput of >500,000 bpd.1
• However, final fuel delivery to consumers is constrained by physical distribution limits: U.S. and allied fleet oilers, expeditionary POL assets, and tactical pipelines can sustain approximately 180,000–200,000 bpd of daily throughput.2
• This represents the primary bottleneck in the supply chain. Regardless of upstream availability, only this amount can be consistently delivered to end-users under steady-state, high-tempo operations.3

Reason 2: Bilateral and contingency access facilities add 65,000–80,000 bpd of independent, parallel throughput.

• U.S. contingency contracts and diplomatic agreements provide access to high-capacity commercial terminals at Subic Bay (Philippines), Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam), Port Blair (India), and Sabang (Indonesia).4
• These facilities collectively support 50,000–80,000 bpd of fuel delivery, depending on political permissions and terminal utilization.5
• These nodes can deliver fuel directly to U.S. or allied ships or load it onto replenishment oilers in theater without taxing U.S. sealift or DFSP capacity.6
• Heritage assumes that host-nation cooperation will more likely than not enable these sites during a Taiwan crisis, based on prior host-nation cooperation, fuel access agreements, and selective hedging behavior in prior U.S. exercises or refueling events, though this assumes that regional states do not reverse access commitments under political, economic, or coercive pressure from China.7
• Because these routes bypass the sealift and port chain, their fuel is additive to U.S. distribution capacity so long as their use does not require shared U.S. fleet oilers.
• Heritage conservatively assesses ~65,000 bpd as the additive bilateral access throughput likely to be issued to end-users in theater.

Reason 3: Prepositioned afloat assets are not additive under this cap but critical for timing

• U.S. prepositioned oilers and chartered tankers in theater (e.g., MSC T-AOs and CONSOL-capable commercial ships) can deliver up to ~80,000 bpd of F-76 directly to combat units in the opening days of conflict.8
• However, these ships rely on the same UNREP and distribution network counted in the 200,000-bpd cap.9
• Therefore, their capacity is not additive to the core throughput total but is instrumental in front-loading delivery and accelerating tempo in the initial phase.10
• Heritage excludes this category from the additive count to prevent double counting, while recognizing its importance for operational surge flexibility.