Rhetoric vs. Reality: How the State Department Betrays the ReaganVision


Rhetoric vs. Reality: How the State Department Betrays the ReaganVision

January 31, 1986 36 min read Download Report
Milton R.
Senior Visiting Fellow

(Archived document, may contain errors)

. 484 January 31, 1986 RHETORIC VS. REALITY HOW THE STATE DEPARTMENT BETRAYS THE REAGAN VISION INTRODUCTION President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz have articula ted a welcome and long overdue foreign policy doctrine have said that the goal of freedom loving people should be to roll back Soviet gains, not merely Itcontain them.Il validity of the doctrine enunciated by the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that on c e a country becomes communist it can never leave the Soviet camp. The liberation of Grenada was vitally important to this new Reagan Doctrine because it was the first step in discrediting the Brezhnev Doctrine They They have denied the There are today a n u mber of national liberation movements attempting to overthrow Marxist regimes in countries of key strategic interest to the U.S. As with most indigenous revolutions, these are anti-colonialist in nature. They seek to'oust rulers installed by an outside po w er. Unlike insurgent uprisings of the past two decades today's national liberation movements are anti-communist and threaten to topple Soviet colonial governments. This is an historic turn of events for the Free World, one that may mark the first stage in the unraveling of MOSCOW~S empire.

Both Reagan and Shultz have said consistently that free people have a moral obligation to support indigenous and nationalist anti-communist resistance movements wherever they occur. Both have said that freedom and autono my are not privileges limited to.the West.

After five years, however, the Reagan Administrationls liberation rhetoric still bears little relationship to actual U.S. foreign policy. It is not'easy to identify exactly where the blame lies forthis distressin g-and embarrassing--gap between the rhetoric and the reality. But it is increasingly apparent that the obj.ectives stated by Ronald Reagan and George Shultz-are not being furthered by the Administration's foreign policy problem is at the State Department w here a persistent effort is made to derail and betray the Reagan Doctrine policy doctrine into reality. There are at least eight pro-Western anti-communist revolutionary movements now operating inside Soviet-controlled countries. Yet the U.S. is actively s upporting only one, the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. Even there, while the Administration's endorsement of the anti-communist movement is strong the practical follow-through is less so And it is also clear that the major Global conditions currently favo r turning. the new..Reagan foreign In Mozambique, the pro-Western insurgent group, RENAMO, actually seems on the verge of defeating the Soviet-backed regime of Samora Machel. Yet the U.S. State Department is now asking Congress to appropriate 27 million in aid to prop up the failing Marxist government well-trained guerrillas battling the Soviet-installed Angolan government propped up by 35,000 Cuban troops one-third of the country, and with U.S. moral and material support could win and install a pro-Western , or at least anti-communist government, thus diminishing Soviet influence in the region. But the U.S. State Department did nothing to help those congressmen who succeeded in overturning the 1976 Clark Amendment, which had prohibited the U.S. from supporti n g Savimbi. The State .Department, in fact, seems to view UNITA, the forces fighting Soviet and Cuban colonialism as more of an impediment than a help to U.S. interests in the region In Angola, Jonas Savimbi's pro-Western UPkTA movement has 60,000 Savimbi n ow controls Nor is the thelU.S. giving solid support to the Solidarity movement in Poland, or the anti-communist fighters in Ethiopia. In Afghanistan, the limited U.S. support for the Mujahideen freedom fighters is the result of congressional, not State D e partment initiative. For years, the State Department has, in fact, been dragging its heels on providing aid to Afghans fighting the Soviet invasion and occupation of their country 1. While U.S. policy in Eastern Europe is not treated explicitly in the Rea g an Doctrine-as it is strictly defined-the eventual weakening and elimination of Soviet domination over the East bloc nations is certainly implied, and, in fact, has been explicitly stated as a goal of U.S. foreign policy by both President Reagan and Secre tary Shultz on numerous occasions 2Liberal Congressman Stephen Solarz, the New York Democrat successfully pushed through Congress' legislation to send assistance to the Cambodian Freedom Fighters over the objections of the State Department.

COImUnist gover nments of Eastern. Europe There is BulgariaFs implication in the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul 11, General Wojciech Jaruzelskils brutal crackdown on the trade unions led by Solidarity in Poland, the murder of Major Arthur Nicholson, Jr., in East Germ a ny, the killing and imprisonment of religious leaders in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and the involvement in a worldwide terrorist network on the part of all these countries. Yet the U.S. is trying to improve relations with these regimes by offer i ng them favorable trade and credit arrangements--in effect, subsidizing such aggression against Western interests Reagan and Shultz have denounced repeatedly the activities of'the Both Reagan and Shultz have declared war on terrorism implicating at variou s times (and selectively) Iran, Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Libya, Bulgaria, East Germany Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and North Korea. Terrorist acts have been directed almost exclusively against Western interests.

Despite t he deaths of more than 300 Americans at the hands of terrorists in the 19808, the U.S. almost entirely has failed to launch swift and effective retaliation,Il as the President promised. The Administration has responded effectively to the killing of only o n e American--Leon Klinghoffer. Meanwhile, it has been demonstrated that I of a particular area and diminish American prestige. Some 39 Americans were held hostage by terrorists on TWA flight 847, one was tortured, and another murdered. The U.S. was humilia ted on worldwide television for three weeks response to this incident.

There has yet to be an effective U.S.

Then there was the disgraceful handling of the episode involving the Ukrainian sailor, Miroslav Medvid, who tried twice to defectmin October 1985 by jumping ship when it was docked in New Orleans. Yet the State Department acquiesced when Medvid-kicking and screaming-was handed back to the Soviet authorities, evidently in an effort to avoid an Ilincident" before the Geneva summit. This was in clear violation of the stated commitment on the part of Reagan and Shultz to welcome refugees fleeing communist tyranny.

Ultimately, of course, responsibility for the Administrationls failure to carry out the Reagan Doctrine leads to the Oval Office. But the Pre sident has.made his views clear on the most critical foreign policy matters As such, he is not being well served by those who are supposed to execute his policies pursue its own agenda, seemingly independently of the White House's stated goals The State D e partment continues to 3Most of the Foreign Service is still in the old mind-set apparently remembering the days when Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara led revolutions. In the minds of the vast majority in the U.S. foreign pol.icy establishment, t h e main goal of the West should be the preservation of the status quo, even when'this means accommodating, and at times defending, existing Soviet-installed governments Support for.pro-Western .insurgencies goes agahst this don't-rock-the-boat approach. Th e result is that Reagan Administration foreign policy rhetoric and reality diverge dramatically--and needlessly.

AFGHANISTAN RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan on the Afghans in an ABC News interview on March 9, 1981: IIThosie are freedom fighters. Those are people f ighting for their own country and not wanting to become a satellite state of the Soviet Union, which came in and established a government of its own choosing there,'without regard to the feelings of the Afghans On February 16, 1983, six Afghan freedom fig h ters met privately with Reagan in the' Oval Office. He was moved by stories of Soviet atrocities in the country and, according to U.S. News and World ReDort, phoned Soviet leader Yuri Andropov the next day and urged him to change Soviet policies in Afghan istan, stressing that this would be a precondition to improved relations.

George-Shultz to the Commonwealth Club of California on February 22, 1985: IIOur moral principles compel us to give material assistance to those struggling against the imposition of Communist tyranny. have a legal right to do so the OAS reaffirm the inher e nt right of collective self-defense against aggression of the kind committed by the Soviets in Afghanistan How can we as a country say to a young Afghan...learn to live with oppression. Only we, who already have freedom, deserve to pass it on to our child r en We The charters of the United Nations and George Shultz to Afghans at a refugee camp in Pakistan in 1984 We are with you, we are beside you, we are behind you. America will never let you down.Il POLICY REALITY: When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Jimmy Carter expressed outrage and imposed 13 sanctions, some very strong, including a grain embargo, tighter controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union, revocation of Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters, the recall of the U.S.

Ambassador from Moscow, suspension of all U.S.-Soviet official exchanges, and the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics I-4With the possible exception of controls on high technology exports to the Soviet'Union, the Reagan Administration has lif ted all of these sanctions. The U.S. government still has an embassy in the Afghan capital of Kabul and deals with the Soviet-backed rulers there. During the last several months, both Secretary of Agriculture John Block and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm B aldrige visited Moscow to secure more U.S.-Soviet agreements enhance trade;l.and expand agricultural cooperation.

Most Favored Nation trade status with the United States despite the fact that Congress passed legislation in 1985 giving the State Department authority to revoke it. MFN means lower tariffs and favorable credit arrangments with the U.S., and is a privilege ordinarily reserved for friendly nations with good human rights records.

Afghanistan's MFN status,.apparently for fear of displeasing the Kr emlin The Soviet-installed regime in Afghanistan, in fact, still enjoys The State Department has been reluctant to revoke Far from providing adequate military, or even humanitarian assistance to the Mujahideen freedom fighters, the State Department actual l y has opposed congressional Legislation calling for increased aid to the Afghans. When aid at last was authorized for 1985, it took the Department of State seven months to allocate a mere $6 million to the relief agencies The State Department has been cru e lly slow in making funds available that were intended to be made available by Congress for humanitarian aid," complains Senator Gordon Humphrey, the New Hampshire Republican, "We pounded on their door and rang their phones week after week, just to get the m to spend the paltry amount we appropriated, and even with that kind of pressure the footdragging and heel digging continue I Congress recently appropriated an additional $15 million under the Foreign Relations Bill and 10 million under the Defense Author i zation Bill of 1986 for humanitarian aid, with no help from the State Department. Without congressional initiative there would have been no new money at all private volunteer medical and charitable organizations that have been working with the wounded Afg han freedom fighters and refugees Many of these groups say that either they are not getting the funds promised them by State Department officials or they are not getting them in a timely way.

International Medical Corps to treat wounded Afghans mostly vill agers staff the field clinics in Afghanistan. Congress appropriated 2 million specifically for medical work performed by the IMC in Much of this aid is supposed to go to One example: Dr. Robert Simon, a physician at UCLA, founded the Simon recruited more than two hundred volunteer doctors to 5Afghanistan. Of the $2 million earmarked by Congress for Simonls organization, State granted the IMC only $650,0

00. State then refused an American were captured, it would feed Soviet propaganda that it's Americans wh o are causing all the trouble in Afghani~tan to the IMC for their medical work inside Afghanistan. Getting humanitarian aid to the Mujahideen and the villagers in Afghanistan not only Pakistan, is now official U.S. policy is deliberately obstructing the w i ll of Congress and stated Reagan policy for peaceful settlement of the Afghan war: 1) withdrawal of Soviet troops: 2) a guarantee that refugees could return to Afghanistan in a safe and honorable fashion: 3) a guarantee of Afghanistan's neutrality: and 4) a recognition of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination I I to release any money at all until Simon promised not to send American personnel inside Afghanistan. Said one State Department official: "If I I But Congress had specifically mandate d.that.the funds be granted The State Department I The Carter Administration required Moscow to meet four conditions I The Shultz State Department, however, softened the Carter conditions of Soviet withdrawal of its troops.

State Department policy statemen ts are such phrases as "We recognize that the Soviets have a right to a non-hostile Afghanistan on their southern border," and IIWe recognize that Afghanistan is in the Soviet sphere of influence,Il and '#The United States and the Soviet Union will guaran t ee Afghanistan's ne~trality But the Soviets already had a peaceful southern border before they attacked their neighbor in fact, had treaties with Moscow of mutual assistance and peaceful co-existence. It is puzzling, moreover, that the State Department ap parently has begun assigning nonaligned and neutral nations to the Soviet "sphere of infl~ence Ronald Reagan repeatedly has denounced the 1945 Yalta conference for doing, among other things, just that.

Ignoring Reagan's dictates, the State Department consi stently inserts conciliatory language into what previously had been tough statements of U.S. policy Beginning to slip into I Afghanistan was a threat to no one and ANGOLA RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan in June 1985 sent a letter to Lewis Lehrman, president of Ci t izens for America, praising him for organizing a conference in Angola of anti-communist resistance movements. The letter, in part, stated: IIAround the world we see people joining together to get control of their own affairs and to free their nations from outside domination and ideology Those of us lucky enough to live in democratic lands have to be moved by the 6 I A example of men and women who struggle every day, at great personal risk, for rights that we have enjoyed from birth goals I Their goals are o ur George Shultz to the.Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on February 22, 1985 We must in short, stand firmly with the forces of democracy around the world. To abandon them would be a shameful betrayal-a betrayal-not-only of brave men and women, but of o u r highest ideals I POLICY REALITY: The U.S. Congress.has now repealed the Clark Amendment. Passed in 1976, this measure prevented the U.S. from providing assistance of any kind to UNITA, the anti-communist guerrilla movement, which is tryingzto overthrow the Soviet-installed regime in Luanda, Angola's capital.

Led by Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's 60,000 well-trained troops are the most potent anti-communist nationalist movement in the world. At one point, they controlled an area in Angola approximately the size o f Texas and have operated fully over 95 percent of the territory. UNITA has suffered setbacks in 1985 only because the Soviets, sensing a possible overthrow of their puppet regime in Luanda, recently provided 2 billion in military assistance, including ad v anced weapons helicopter gun ships, and advisors to back up the Cuban and Angolan government forces. Despite this latest Soviet offensive, UNITA still controls one-third of Angola and is self-sufficient in food; Luanda imports 70 percent of its food needs , and.constantly seeks humanitarian aid to alleviate hunger killed in Angola by UNITA forces since 1975.

At least 8,000 Cubans have been U.S. policy encourages American firms to invest in Angola. The U.S. Export-Import Bank, for example, has given more tha n $200 milli in concessionary loans for projects that the Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of 'Chevron, and the Luanda government are jointly undertaking in Angola's Cabinda oil fields. Angola also purchases airplanes, food, and other products made in the U . S. The U.S., in fact, is Angola's largest trading partner on When a Cuban-backed faction, known as the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), grabbed power in 1975, President Ford severed informal relations that existed between the U.S. and Angola 2. The Clark Amendment was particularly devastating to Western interests because, not only did it prevent the U.S. government from assisting the anti-communists in Angola overthrow the Moscow-backed government in Luanda, it made it almost impossibl e for other Western African and Arab governments to help UNITA, since the U.S. was perceived as being opposed to the anti-communist effort. Thus, repeal of the Clark Amendment by Congress opens the way, not only for U.S. support of the Angolan freedom figh t ers, but also support from other pro-Western nations 7The Cuban presence in the country continued to escalate, with 13,000 troops arriving in 1975, increasing to 35,000 over the next several years, thus filling a power vacuum left by the departing Portugu e se colonists. President Carter maintained President Ford's policy of refusing to'carry on formal or informal relations with the new Marxist regime in Luanda on the grounds that Cuba's installation of the MPLA as the government of Angola was in clear viola tion of the Alvor agreement promising free and open elections the teeth out of the Carter policy.

As with Afghanistan, however, the Reagan Administration has taken The Shultz State Department has reestablished informal relations with the MPLA. What is more surprising, the State Department failed to actively support congressional repeal of the Clark Amendment that would permit the U.S. to aid UNITA. Indeed, congressional observers feel that the State Department actually opposed the successful attempt to rep e al the Amendment. Since then, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker has stressed that ''there are no plans to aid Savimbi, adding that "we intend $0 maintain our diplomatic efforts to achieve a Cuban withdrawal. These efforts ha ve been a dismal failure despite five years of trying.

Meanwhile, efforts are under way in the U.S. Congress to aid UNITA. Congressman Mark Siljander, the Michigan Republican who is the ranking minority member of the African subcommittee of the House Forei gn Affairs Committee, submitted a bill calling for $27 million in military aid to UNITA. Congressman Bill McCollum, the Florida Republican, introduced legislation that would impose economic sanctions against the Marxist regime in Angola if it did not open discussions with UNITA aimed at creating a coalition government leading to democratic elections in Angola by November 1986.

Even liberal Democrat Congressman Claude Pepper of Florida, the Chairman of the House Rules committee, introduced legislation calli ng for $27 million in humanitarian aid to UNITA. He immediately picked up Republican cosponsors Jack Kemp of New York and Jim Courter of New Jersey. Following the repeal of the Clark Amendment, it was clear that there was a bipartisan consensus in the Con gress on the need to aid UNITA.

Aid to UNITA rose to the top of the agenda in the executive branch as well. According to published reports, the National Security Council, CIA, and the Pentagon all favored providing milita ry and humanitarian support to UNITA. In fact, they were preparing this October to push for a $200 to $300 million covert military assistance program. Recent reports say that as much as $5 million in military 3. The New York Times, July 14, 1985 I -aassis t ance could be flowing to UNITA through CIA channels as early as February, despite opposition from the State Department with nfgotiations is running out," said one'congressional source that the President would support Pepper's bill. In Reagan's October 24, 1985, address to the United Nations General Assembly, he called for negotiations in Angola between the communist government and the UNITA freedom fighters, and said that "Of course, until such time as these negotiations result in definite progress, Americ a 's support for struggling democratic resistance forces must not and shall not cease I State is pretty well isolated in the Administration. Patience In addition, private assurances were given. by-the White House The State Department apparently was not list e ning to the President. The State Department has made it clear that it is dead set against aid to UNITA. On October 12, Shultz wrote a "for your eyes only11 letter to House Republican Minority Leader Robert Michel asking him to use his influence to lldisco u ragell the proposed legislation that would help UNITA. The Shultz letter argued that talks with the MPLA regime had reached a delicate stage to contradict his public statements that to abandon democratic anti-communist forces would be 'la shameful betraya l . I ShultzIs plea, calling aid to UNITA ''not only a geostrategic, but a moral necessity I Shultzls private letter seemed Michel rej ected Three weeks later the State Department backtracked slightly and released a statement declaring that "we want to be s u pportive of UNITA.I1 The statement, however, was vaguely worded and did not commit the State Department to any specific position. More recently, though Shultz has indicated that he opposes the efforts of Democrat Pepper Republican Siljander, and the White House to provide funds, overtly or covertly, to UNITA.

The Angolan government apparently hopes that the State Department will succeed in holding off congressional efforts to aid UNITA and succeed in convincing South Africa to pull its army out of neighbor ing Namibia. This would set the stage for a victory in Namibia by the South West African People's Organization, or SWAPO, which is backed by Cuba and the Marxist MPLA regime in Angola. According to an agreement arranged by the State Department, in return f or South Africa giving up control of Namibia and ending its support of UNITA, Luanda would ask the Cubans to agree to a phased withdrawal from Angola. This State Department deal would be a great gain for Moscow. The Soviets would have a secure puppet gove r nment in Angola, recognized in the 4. The Washington Times. December 23, 1985 9diplomatic community as legitimate, with friendly Marxist-Leninist neighbors negotiations with the Communists in Luanda IW..S. officials have made it clear that they consider U N ITA to be an internal Angolan problem and not part of the equation in seeking a pouthern African peace settlement, reported The; Washhaton Post If: the State Department, by undercutting the public statements of Reagan and Shultz, succeeds in its plans for a negotiated settlement for the region, Moscow will have legitimized its hold on another satellite in an area of key strategic importance To date, U.S. diplomats have not involved Savimbi in any MOZAMBIQUE I I RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan on February 16, 1985 T ime and again we've aided those around the world struggling for freedom, democracy independence and liberation from tyranny In the 19th century we supported Simon Bolivar, the great liberator patriots, the French resistance and others seeking freedom. It' s not in the American tradition to turn away who loved democracy 200 years ago didn't turn away from us."

George Shultz in his Commonwealth Club speech on February 22 1985: "America has a moral responsibility to support the freedom fighters leader of the f ree world. There ks no one else to take our place We supported the Polish I And lucky for us that those The lesson of the post-war era is that America must be the I POLICY REALITY: Despite the noble rhetoric, the State Department in January 1985 moved to h elp the Soviet-installed I government of Mozambique, asking Congress initially to appropriate $40 million in aid, including $1.1 million in military assistance. The State Department ran up against opposition in the Senate, however, and scaled back its req u est to 27 million in humanitarian aid for 1986 The State Department also pressed the British government to commit 650,000 for training Mozambique's government troops, by British officers, to combat Mozambique's anti-communist resistance movement RENAMO. M o reover, in September 1985 the State Department brought Samora Machel, Mozambique's Marxist dictator, to Washington in order to make a personal appeal to President Reagan for U.S financial diplomatic, and even military support. This reverses Jimmy Carter's policy of banning all assistance to Mozambique on the grounds that, following the exit of the Portuguese colonialists, the country had become a Soviet puppet, had an abysmal human rights record, and that such aid would contribute to terrorism and increase d oppression 5. The Washington Post February 22, 1985 10 When news of the State Department's policy reversal reached Afonso Dhlakama, leader of RENAEPO, he told Jack Wheeler of the Freedom Research Foundation: "My own opinion is that there is a clique in y o ur State Department that has a fantasy of wooing away a Communist dictator from the Soviets through their greatest diplomatic skills and foreign aid bribes I the movement was founded in 1977, two years after Samora Machel supported by the Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans, seized control-of Mozambique. With its 20,000-man guerrilla army, RENAMO is now fighting Machel's forces in all ten of Mozambique's provinces.

In Mozambique, as in Angola, the communist regime is weak and under siege has a chance.to fulfill Reagan's vow to help nationalist anti-colonialist movements, while simultaneously pursuing an anti-communist foreign policy.

Machel is "an avowed Marxist-Leninist whose country's voting record at the United Nations is, from the American point of view, one of the worst Dhlakama's RENAMO forces have grown steadily in strength since Like Angola, Mozambique is a country in which the U.S According to The New York Times Mozambique's human rights record in the past decade ranks with the world's worst as well Two years ago, for example, the Machel government began evacuating the cities, herding people into the countryside to work in the fields. To many observers, this was reminiscent of Pol Pot's evacuation of Phnom Penh after the Khmer Rouge took control of C ambodia in 19

75. Reported The Washinaton Post 50,000 Mozambicans have been forcibly evicted from major cities during the past three months and resettled in drought stricken areas hundreds of miles to tpe north in a government crackdown on unproductive ind ividuals economic policy, the country, once a food exporter, now suffers severe shortages; one to two million inhabitants face starvation Because of Mozambique's Marxist In view of the nature of the Machel regime and of the Reagan Doctrine, the State Depa rtment should be working to help RENAMO.

Instead the Department wants to aid Machel. The State Department also has upgraded what was informal U.S. diplomatic representation in Mozambique to that of official ambassadorial level. The State Department's curre nt request for $27 million for Machel equals the support the U.S. is giving the Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua. The two policies seem contradictory: that Marxist Mozambique can be weaned away from the Soviets, but that Marxist Nicaragua cannot 6. December 3 , 1984 7. October 9, 1983 11 - In addition, the State Department. is asking American corporations to invest in Mozambique. "It is indeed our policy to encourage trade and investment in Mozambique," says James Laird of the State Department's Bureau of Afri can Affairs.

This too contradicts U.S. policy in view of the trade embirgo on Nicaragua. While Sandinista. human rights .abuses are reprehensible they are no worse and possibly not as bad as the repression in Mozambique. Furthermore, the drive by some in t he West to impose economic sanctions on South Africa is based upon the idea that investment by U.S. corporations lends legitimacy to a regime guilty of gross human rights violations to Angola or Mozambique, where Chevron and other U.S. multinational compa n ies provide income that keeps Marxist regimes in power Yet that same concept is not applied The New York Times reported from Mozahbique: "There are few Westerners here who would argue that the improved relationship signifies a lessening of Mozambique's fu ndamental commitment to a Marxism that defines Moscow as a 'natural ally. r118 Mozambique is of key.strategic importance to the Soviet Union. It boasts one of Africa's longest coastlines, three deep water ports, and large mineral deposits.

Union's strategi c objective of destabilizing South Africa. If all this works according to MOSCOW'S plan--which the State Department seems to be facilitating--the Soviet Union could end up dominating southern Africa Mozambique is also crucial to the Soviet CAMBODIA RHETOR I C: Ronald Reagan in his January 24, 1984, State of the Union Address: "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent...to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. Support for freedom fig hters is self-defense."

President Reagan in his May 5, 1985, address at the Bitburg Air Force Base, West Germany Twenty-two years ago, President John F. 0 Kennedy went to the Berlin Wall and proclaimed that he, too, was a Berliner. Today, freedom loving pe ople around world must say, I am a Berliner I am a Jew in a world still threatened by anti-Semitism, I am an Afghan and I am a prisoner of the Gulag. I am a refugee in a crowded boat off the coast of Vietnam. I am a Laotian, a Cambodian, a Cuban, and a Mi s kito Indian in Nicaragua. I, too, am a potential victim of totalitarianism 8. June 3, 1984 12 Secretary Shultz, in his February 22, 1985, Commonwealth Club speech Six years after its invasion, Vietnam does not control Cambodia The Vietnamese still need an occupation army of 170,000 to keep order in the country divisions to mount the recent offensive How can we as a country say to a young Cambodian: 'Learn to live with oppression: only those who have freedom deserve to pass it on to our children In a speech on February 20, 1985, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost identifies "failure to redress the imbalance within the Cambodian resistance as one of the future challenges for U.S. policy toward Asia.

POLICY REALITY: U.S. policy toward Cambodia provides another graphic example of the glaring gap between the Reagan rhetoric and the State Department reality So great is this gap that even liberal Democrat Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York was prompted to lead the fight to provi de support for the Cambodian anti-Soviet resistance movements over State Department objections.

It has been seven years since the Soviet-backed Hanoi regime put its puppet Heng Samrin regime in power in Cambodia. He is kept in power by Vietnamese troops. M oscow subsidizes Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia with about $1 billion a year in military and economic aid.

In October 1979, Son Sann, a former Prime Minister of Cambodia, pulled together several guerrilla bands to form the Khmer People's National Libera tion Front (KPLNF Today it numbers 14,000 fighters and about 160,000 refugees. By 1981, Prince Sihanouk had established base camps for his Armee Nationaliste Sihanoukiste (ANS which today claims about 10,000 troops in addition to 35,000 in refugee camps. The Khmer Rouge, in 1979, reverted to its former existence as a guerrilla movement. They are the largest group, with about 30,000 troops season offensive in December, 19

84. All three resistance groups were attacked and forced int o Thailand. Throughout last year, the Vietnamese built a barrier along the Thai-Cambodian border using forced Cambodian labor. In response to the Vietnamese offensive, the ASEAN countries issued a joint communique on February 7, 1985, calling for internat i onal assistance to the Cambodian resistance. The U.S refused They even had to bring in two new As this resistance mounted, Hanoi responded with a brutal dry Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz told Solarz's House Foreign Affairs Asia-Pacific Subco m mittee on February 20, 1985: "We do not believe it is right to get into a position where this is our conflict With regard to possible U.S. military assistance, he said Their most immediate need now, in the wake of this f.ighting on the border is not addit i onal weapons Earlier, a Press Guidance Page from Wolfowitz's Office for January 22, 1985, declared A negotiated settlement would not be any easier if the U.S. were involved militarily in the hostilities 13 Despite the State Department's efforts, Solarz's s ubcommi,,ee on March 8 voted for up to $5 million in economic and military support to the KPNLF and ANS--but not to the communist Khmer Rouge. This measure was passed by the full Foreign Affairs Committee on April 3, 1985 support. At this point, the State Department. changed. its position slightly, announcing on April 9 that it would not categorically rule out supplying assistance to the non-communist resistance forces million in aid to the Cambodian resistance. The House passed the measure in June. This d id not please the State Department. To emphasize its pique, it said that it was not going to carry out any program until the authorized aid became appropriated-a minor point.

In response to congressional pressure, State finally sent a team to Thailand to i nvestigate the needs of the KPNLF and ANS. The result was a list of aid options, which, in addition to paramedical vocational and secondary education to refugee camps, also included political warfare training. With the passage of the congressional appropr i ation on December 18, 1985, which specifically earmarked up to 5 million for the KPNLF and ANS, State is now compelled to formulate a program that fulfills the Reagan Doctrine by assisting Cambodia's freedom fighters Son Sann and Sihanouk were in Washingt on that week to seek Congressional support mounted. On May 16 the Senate approved $5 It is doing so reluctantly.

NICARAGUA RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in Tampa, Florida, on August 12, 1983 Today, our nation is confronted wit h a challenge of supreme importance. A faraway, totalitarian power has set its sights on our friends and our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean If we don't meet our responsibilities there, we will pay dearly for it.11 Reagan's Address to the n a tion, May 9, 1984 The Sandinistas who rule Nicaragua, are communists whose relationship and ties to Fidel Castro of Cuba go back a quarter of a centu ry Nicaragua's unelected government is trying to overthrow the duly elected government of a neighboring c o unt ry Let us show the world that we want no hostile communist colonies here in the Americas--South Central or North I George Shultz to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on February 22, 1985: "The Sandinistas have...a new brutal tyranny that respects no frontiers. Basing themselves on strong military ties tothe Soviet Union, the Sandinistas are attempting, as rapidly as they can, to force Nicaragua into a totalitarian mold whose pattern is all too familiar. They are suppressing internal dissent, clamp ing down on the press, persecuting the Church, linking up with the terrorists in Iran, .Libya, and the PLO, and seeking to undermine the legitimate and increasingly democratic governments of their neighbors."

Reagan considers more important than a Soviet-b acked incursion in the American hemisphere, as has happened in Nicaragua. Indeed, the views expressed by State Department officials, up until recently, have been nearly as tough as the President's on the issue. U.S. diplomats have criticized the Sandinist a s for breaking their 1979 promise, formally written to the Organization of America States, to have free and open elections. The State Department has denounced strongly Nicaragua's enormous military build-up, its publicly proclaimed alliance with Moscow, a n d its abuse of fundamental human rights. Furthermore, the State Department consistently has made the case for supporting Nicaragua's anti-communist insurgency was a noticeable relaxation in the tone of State Department spokesmen regarding the Sandinistas. On October 30, 1985, for example, The Washinaton Post reported: "Harry W. Shlaudeman, U.S. Special envoy for Central America, met with Nicaraguan Ambassador Carlos Tunnerman here yesterday in the two nations' first senior-level contact since early this ye a r State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb said the meeting reflects our wish to maintain regular diplomatic contactIt1 with the Sandinistas POLICY REALITY: There is. no foreign policy. issue -that..Ronald But, as the November Reagan-Gorbachev sununit appr o ached, there While Ronald Reagan refers to the Sandinista government as "a communist reign of terror State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb insists that U.S. strategy in Nicaragua is almost purely ltdiplomatic'l in nature. Though tougher than in other ar eas of the world, State still fails to press for direct military assistance to the Freedom Fighters, thus contradicting Reagan's public statements.

The State Departmentsalso unwisely has given blanket endorsement to the Contadora process been its failure to recognize the nature of the Nicaraguan regime.

The Sandinistas, for example, publicly proclaim themselves a launching pad for a Itrevolution without frontiers The weakness of the Contadora process has Sandinista leader Daniel 9. The ongoing Central Amer ican negotiations have been called the Contadora process since Mexico, Colombia, Panama and.Venezuela first met in January 1983 on Contadora Island to draft a regional peace settlement 15 - Ortega was quoted by La Prensa as saying, "Never again will the p o wer of the people be defeated by either bullets or Tomas Borge, the country's Interior Minister To disarm for us is impossible now."ll the negotiations as a way to give them needed time to consolidate power and squelch the few private, potentially democra tic institutions that still gemain Contadora is a retaining wall and a pathway said Borge.

Another factor working against the U.S and democratic forces within Central America is the State Department's acquiescence in the exclusion of Nicaragua's freedom fi ghters from the talks. Both Reagan and Shultz have insisted that the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) is fighting for freedom against an illegitimate tyranny. But the State Department continues to deny the FDN a voice in the talks, and treats the freedom movement as if it were merely an internal problem for the communist Sandinistas Adds Borge has also said that the Sandinistas view 0 Such a policy violates the President's stated intentions. For by relaxing pressure against the Ortega junta, the Contadora process as I currently conceived, and with State Department approval, is far more likely to entrench the Sandinistas and legitimize another Soviet satellite than to serve the cause of freedom and democracy.

SOVIET-CONTROLLED EASTERN EUROPE RHETORIC: Ronal d Reagan in Bonn, West Germany, on June 10 1982: "Since World War 11, the record'of tyranny has included Soviet violation of Yalta agreements leading to the domination of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the Berlin Wall--a grim gray monument to repression th a t I visited just a week ago. It includes the takeovers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the ruthless repression of the proud people of Poland 10. December 5, 1983 11. The Washington Post, June 25, 1984 12. Christopher Dickey Quagmire to Caldron," Foreinn Af f airs, Vol. 62, No. 3, Winter 1983 13. In early September 1985, Contadora foreign ministers se.t for themselves a 45-day deadline to get a signed treaty. When the November 20 deadline arrived, the Sandinistas refused to sign. The foreign ministers allowed t hemselves another month, but still could not put together an agreement. The talks have since been suspended for several months--but the Contadora process is not yet dead L 16 Reagan in Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983 Yes, let us pray for the salvation of a ll those who live in that totalitarian darkness--pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and' predict its eventual d o mination of all peoples on earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world George Shultz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15, 1983: l1One of the most important recent achievements in East-West relations was the negotiation of the He lsinki Final Act, with its pledges concerning human rights and national independence in Europe.

Poland's experience in the past two years can be considered a major test of the Soviet Union's respect--or lack of it--for these commitments meaningful national autonomy for its satellites, let alone real independence induce Soviet restraint. While in some versions it recognized the need to resist Soviet geopolitical encroachments, it also hoped that the anticipation of benefits from expanding economic relations and arms control' agreements would restrain Soviet behavior relationship may have eased some of the domestic Soviet economic constraints that might have at least marginally inhibited Moscowls behavior on Soviet bloc' trade that would inhibit Western freed om of action toward the East more than it would dictate prudence to the USSR.

Similarly, the SALT I and SALT I1 processes did not curb the Soviet strategic anus buildup, while encouraging many in the West to imagine that security concerns could now be placed lower on the agenda."

POLICY REALITY U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe is called llDifferentiation By this the U.S tries to reward the llgoodtl Warsaw Pact nations that are attempting to become more I1independentt1 of Moscow, while penalizing the more repressive East bloc regimes which display intense animosity toward the U.S. This policy has led to Most Favored Nation trading status for Hungary and Romania, but not for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, or East Germany. Most Favored Nation status is wo rth hundreds of millions of dollars in exports annually to Romania and Hungary.

The awarding of Most Favored Nation Status to a communist country means the U.S. must waive the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Moscow clearly remains unwilling to countena nce The policy of detente, of course, represented an effort to TJnfortunately, experience has proved otherwise. The economic It also raised the specter of a future Western dependence 14 14. Juliana Geran Pilon Why Romania No Longer Deserves to be a Most F avored Nation,"

Heritage Foundation Backnrounder No. 441, June 26, 1985 17 - Trade Act, which prohibits the use of government tariffs on imDorts from "non-market" (communist credits and lower countries unless they I demdnstrate pkogress in human rights.

Favored Nation Status despite the fact that it shows no signs of becoming more independent of the Soviet Union More serious is the case of Romania, which is one of the most repressive dictatorships in the Soviet Bloc, according to the State Department's o wn published Hungary was awarded Most I reports. I When David Funderburk resigned in early 1985 as U.S. Ambassador to Romania, he outlined how State Department officials glossed over to justify continuing Most Favored Nation status.

Department l1network,'l charges Funderburk, Ilworks frantically to denigrate the latest information from the field regarding human rights violations and technology transfers. For example, every piece of sensitive technology that came up for review for sale to Romania, was agree m ent with,the Soviet Union to turn over to Moscow any technology obtained from the U.S. and Western Europe continues to subsidize bank loans to the Warsaw Pact, particularly Hungary and Romania, through the International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans t o the repressive East German regime, which has in turn, loaned Department is also advocating the admission of Poland to the IMF even Jaruzelski regime I that prohibits the importing of goods produced by slave labor evidence indicates that as much as half o f the imports from the USSR have been manufactured through use of slave labor. To force the State Department to abide by the law, Senator William Armstrong, the Colorado Republican, has introduced legislation that would require the U.S. to enforce the Tar i ff Act against countries who use slave labor Romania's human rights record and its close relationship with Moscow I The State supported blindly by the State Department Romania has a formal I The U.S. government, encouraged by the State Department And the S tate Department has encouraged huge new commercial bank millions to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The State I though there have been no substantive changes in the policy of the I 11 The State Department opposes enforcing the Tariff Act of 1930 T h e The State Department consistently has opposed requiring the reduction in the number of Soviet bloc personnel assigned to the United Nations Secretariat in New York, and limiting their movements within the U.S. Again, it took congressional action (the Ro th travel by Soviet bloc personnel. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that these employees are heavily involved in espionage, in violation of not only U.S. law, but also the U.N. Charter.

The State Department consistently has undermined Ronald Reagan's attempts to focus on the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime.

Each year, on the November 7 anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution I Amendment in 1985) to finally force the State Department to restrict 18 the State Department sends a letter of congratu lations to the Soviet people. On October 24, 1985, Senator James McClure, the Republican from Idaho, introduced an amendment to forbid the State Department to send such a letter. Explained McClure to the Senate: "Because the captive Soviet people have lit t le to celebrate, it is totally inappropriate for. the State Department to congratulate them or to help celebrate the Bolshevik Rev~lution McClure's amendment would also require that the State Department prepare's report 'Idescribing-Cthe Secretary's] plan for proclaiming the sympathy of the American people for the bondage of the enslaved peoples of the Soviet empire and the hope that they will soon recover their freedom and national integrity This would be in line with the President's policy.

McClure's amendment passed in the Senate with no dissenting vote.

TERRORISM RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan welcoming the hostages back from Iran in January 1981: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of sw ift and effective retaliation.11 George Shultz on June 24, 1984: When the Soviet Union and its clients provide financial, logistic and training support for terrorists worldwide they hope to shake the West's self-confidence and sap its will to resist aggre s sion and intimidati~n George Shultz on October 26, 1984: "We must be willing to use military force to combat international terrorism understand before the fact that there is potential loss of life of some of our fighting men and the loss of life of some i n nocent people. If The public must POLICY REALITY: Following the murder of Robert Stethem, the torture of another passenger, and the eventual release of the 39 other hostages kidnapped on June 14, 1985, aboard TWA flight 847, four masked terrorists appeare d in front of Western newsmen. They declared that the U.S. had been adequately luhumiliated,ll and that the hijacking was a demonstration of how the world's Iloppressedll can succeed in its small wars of ''liberation against the Great Satan." Indeed, in th e face of terrorism, the U.S. has wavered.

The U.S. did win one modest victory against terrorism apprehending some of those involved in the murder of Leon Klinghoffer after their hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro.

Yet the diplomatic effor t to get the hijackers extradited to the U.S was a failure. More important, the State Department has failed to emphasize that the Klinghoffer killing was not a random act of violence. He was selected for execution because he was an American and a Jew. Jew ish Americans have become the preferred targets of 19 Middle East terrorists, in large part because terrorists apparently feel that they need not fear retaliation if they pick on Americans.

Indeed, the U.S. has yet to respond to the April 1983 bombing of the U.S.'Embassy in Beirut, the October 1983 bombing of the Marine compound at the Beirut airport, the December 1983 bombing of the U.S.

Embassy in Kuwait, the September 1984 bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut, the December 1984.murder.of two American. officials aboard a Kuwait airliner hijacked to Iran, and the June 1985 murder of Navy diver Robert Stethem aboard hijacked TWA flight 847.

Until the State Department stops equivocating in its response to the murder of U.S. citizens by hostile powers, the President's stated foreign policy agenda will be ill-served.

POLITIC'AL ASYLUM RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan on July 19, 1984: "We have a moral responsibility to support those who aspire to live in a true democracy I Ronald Reagan at naturalization ceremonies f or new United States citizens on October 1 1984 Some of you came from places that sadly, have not known freedom and liberty. Some of you have come from places that don't offer.opportunity. Some of you are probably here because you are by nature, adventuro u s. And some of you no doubt came here for a new start to wipe the slate clean and begin your life anew. These strike me as all good reasons. In fact, they're the very same reasons that our forefathers came here. And they did pretty well--so well, in fact, that two centuries after they invented this country it is still what they intended it to be: a place where the comfort' and chance oppressed, the lost, the adventurous can come for sanctuary and George Shultz to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, September 11, 1984: "We can all take justifiable pride that the United States is recognized throughout the world for its leadership in humanitarian assistance to and the protection of refugees we have also benefited from the talents and hard work of the many refugees whom we have accepted for resettlement in the United States.

Beyond the contributions of such well-known figures as Solzhenitsyn and Rostropovich, thousands of other refugees from persecution have greatly enriched our national life wit h their talents and hard work We have given much to help the refugees of the world, but POLICY REALITY: The U.S. has a longstanding commitment to welcome those fleeing communist oppression. The granting of political asylum to anyone who requests it--espec i ally defectors from the Soviet Union-by U.S. law and custom is virtually automatic. It was thus 20 I inexplicable when the State Department refused to give sanctuary to Miroslav Medvid, the Ukrainian sailor who twice jumped off a Soviet freighter near New Orleans on October 24, 19

85. He was returned to Soviet officials handcuffed, kicking and screaming. Puzzled and angered by this, Senators Gordon Humphrey, the New Hampshire Republican, and Alan Dixon, the Illinois Democrat, have introduced legislation co-sponsored by 50 other Sen a tors to investigate the State Department's handling of the incident concerning its involvement in the incident said the U.S. government had concluded that Medvid wished to return to the Soviet Union, even though he appeared to be heavily sedated leaped in t o the water and swam to shore to escape Soviet authorities was ignored by the State Department a professor of Russian Studies at Monterey Institute in Monterey California, says "there has been in the past a pattern of mistreatment or inept handling of def e ctors by American bureaucrats I1' Professor Krasnov also questions the requirement that Soviets be present when U.S. officials interrogate the would-be defector. Such a rule seems more calculated to avoid displeasing the Moscow government than at finding out if the Soviet citizen in question genuinely seeks his freedom and truly wants to be admitted to the United States.

The Medvid case regrettably typifies the State Department's modus oDerandi, which appears designed more to accommodate hostile powers tha n defend the rights of those unlucky enough to have to live under repressive governments and Shultz and the pledge implied in the Reagan Doctrine to help those who want to.reject communist rule A statement issued on October 29 by the State Department The f act that he twice The Medvid case is not an isolated incident. Vladislav Krasnov This mocks the state policy of Reagan CONCLUSION Ronald Reagan won two enormous landslide elections. The American people assume that they were voting for policies'that the Pr e sident and his cabinet Secretaries) have articulated. If the President and his Secretary of State say that it is U.S. policy to support freedom fighters battling communist tyranny in their native lands, most Americans would think such a policy was being e xecuted by those in government paid to execute it.

Administration's repeatedly stated commitments to wage war against terrorism; to support the oppressed people of Eastern Europe and.to The same is true for the 15. Juliana Geran Pilon It's Time for a Senat e Probe of U.S. Handling of Political Asylum," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 104, December 13, 1985 21 - demonstrate U.S. unwillingness to recognize Soviet control there as legitimate; and to welcome to America's shores those who are fleein g communist repression.

In almost every area, however, these noble'objectives, which Ronald Reagan has espoused throughout his political life, bear little resemblance to the policies being carried out by his State Department.

Instead, his policies and goals often.are being betrayed ,'by the foreign policy establishment.

George Shultz articulated the Reagan Doctrine well when he said in February 1985 that When the United States supports those resisting totalitarianism...we do so not only out of our histori cal sympathy for democracy and freedom, but also, in many cases, in the interests of national security And Ronald Reagan told the nation in his second Inaugural Address: "America must remain freedom's staunchest friend for freedom is our best ally and it' s the world's only hope to conquer poverty and preserve peace."

It is time for this lofty rhetoric by the President and his Secretary of State to be reflected in the actual foreign policy of the United States.

Ben j amin Hart Director Lectures Seminars


Milton R.

Senior Visiting Fellow