Executive Summary

Heritage assesses that U.S. Navy F-76 fuel delivery during a high-intensity Taiwan conflict is critically dependent on the survivability of underway replenishment assets, especially Kaiser-class T-AO oilers and CONSOL-capable chartered tankers. U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) operates 15 T-AOs, with 7–8 typically forward deployed and can surge 12–15 replenishment vessels within 30–60 days, based on historical precedents from Desert Storm and RIMPAC. However, the loss of even 2–3 T-AOs would likely reduce daily throughput by 50,000–80,000 barrels per day (bpd), pushing sustained fuel delivery below 200,000 bpd.

PLA doctrine explicitly prioritizes strikes on logistics vessels and fielded missile and submarine systems capable of targeting fleet oilers within the first island chain. U.S. wargames and past Pacific exercises confirm that tanker attrition routinely produces operational paralysis, reinforcing the need for modeling degraded throughput scenarios.

Heritage’s simulation baseline of 265,000–280,000 bpd reflects optimal surge posture with no losses, while Tier 2 CONSOL assets are held as limited surge margin. As such, logistics planning must account for early PLA targeting of UNREP platforms and dynamically simulate partial interdiction effects on sustained naval operations.

Methodology

This assessment is structured using a four-part methodology framework designed to support simulation modeling of U.S. Navy replenishment tanker survivability and its impact on F-76 fuel throughput in a high-intensity Taiwan conflict scenario.

Role. This analysis models the critical dependency of U.S. naval fuel logistics on the operational availability and survivability of underway replenishment (UNREP) platforms—primarily Kaiser-class T-AO fleet oilers and Tier 2 CONSOL-capable MSC tankers. The goal is to simulate how partial attrition of these platforms, particularly in the early weeks of conflict, would affect daily theater F-76 throughput and long-term maritime operational endurance. The model allows analysts to test scenarios in which U.S. fuel distribution is degraded due to PLA strike targeting of mobile logistics vessels operating within or near the first island chain.

Identifier. The model tracks force posture and threat exposure across three variables:

• Baseline availability: Assumes 15 total Kaiser-class T-AOs, with 7–8 forward-deployed at conflict onset and the remainder surge-capable within 30–60 days.
• Attrition scenarios: Simulates partial losses of 2–4 replenishment ships from missile, submarine, or cruise missile attack, consistent with PLA doctrine and capability.
• Throughput degradation: Each tanker loss is modeled to reduce daily sustainable throughput by ~25,000–30,000 bpd, based on per-oiler UNREP capacity and mission cycle constraints validated through prior F-76 throughput modeling.

This structure enables degradation to be layered dynamically into simulations calibrated to operational tempo, risk posture, and defense saturation of replenishment lanes.

Process. The model overlays survivability-adjusted throughput curves onto the validated 265,000–280,000 bpd baseline from the 2025 F-76 Throughput Estimate in Appendix B. In full-availability scenarios, the U.S. maintains maximum daily distribution. In partial attrition scenarios, the loss of 2–3 T-AOs reduces effective throughput to 185,000–215,000 bpd. The degradation curve is implemented as a dynamic variable and is time-phased to reflect vessel loss within the first 7–21 days of conflict onset. Attrition likelihood is based on:

• PLA campaign doctrine emphasizing logistics ship interdiction (e.g., Science of Campaigns).
• Known strike system coverage (e.g., DF-26, YJ-18, PLAN SSNs).
• Historical U.S. wargames and RIMPAC data showing logistic chokepoints.
• Survivability buffers such as EMCON routing, dispersion, and defensive escorts are acknowledged but not assumed to prevent all losses. Replenishment surge capability from CONUS is phased in over 30–60 days to offset early degradation, though these vessels must transit contested zones to be effective.

Data. The model is grounded in:

• U.S. Navy and MSC fleet structure reports (e.g., Navy Fact File, T-AO class specs).
• DVIDS deployment logs and RIMPAC exercise releases, confirming forward-deployed T-AOs and at-sea CONSOL activity.
• Historical sealift data from Desert Storm and OIF (e.g., 80 percent fleet activation within 45 days).
• PLA doctrine and targeting priorities, drawn from Science of Campaigns, Business Insider reporting, and the 2023 China Military Power Report.
• Strike platform data from ONI and DoD, including missile ranges and submarine targeting profiles.
• Internal Watch simulation model outputs, which define baseline throughput ceilings and adjust for tanker loss intervals.
• INDOPACOM Joint Force Energy Wargame insights on fuel vulnerability and logistics disruption.

Key Judgment

Heritage assesses that the U.S. Navy’s ability to sustain F-76 fuel throughput at scale during a high-intensity Taiwan conflict is highly dependent on the survivability and operational availability of its underway replenishment (UNREP) platforms, especially T-AO fleet oilers and CONSOL-capable tankers. While a surge of up to 15+ replenishment vessels is feasible within 30–60 days, the loss of even 2–3 T-AOs would likely reduce total daily sustainable throughput below 200,000 barrels per day (bpd)—compromising U.S. maritime combat endurance.

Reason 1: Forward-deployed replenishment tankers provide baseline F-76 throughput capacity.

• U.S. Military Sealift Command operates 15 Kaiser-class T-AOs, with 7–8 typically forward-deployed in the Pacific or Middle East, according to the Navy’s official fleet fact file.1
• Ships such as USNS Pecos, Tippecanoe, Guadalupe, Rappahannock, and John Ericsson are regularly based out of Yokosuka, Guam, or transiting Indo-Pacific patrols, as documented in DVIDS deployment updates.2
• Long-term chartered tankers like MT Empire State and MT Maersk Peary are CONSOL-capable and frequently staged near Hawaii or Guam to replenish T-AOs, with operations confirmed during at-sea refueling events in DVIDS exercise coverage.3

Reason 2: A surge deployment of nearly all T-AOs is doctrinally feasible within 30–60 days.

• Historical precedent from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Desert Storm shows that MSC can forward-deploy over 80 percent of its logistics fleet during crisis scenarios, with surge vessels reaching full deployment within 35–45 days of mobilization.4
• During RIMPAC and other Indo-Pacific exercises, 12–15 replenishment vessels (including charters) have supported sustained logistics operations, according to press releases and photo logs published by DVIDS.5
• Surge routing via the Panama Canal and Pearl Harbor enables CONUS-based T-AOs to reach Guam within four weeks under optimal sea lane access, allowing for leapfrog resupply via MSC charter tankers.6

Reason 3: PLA doctrine explicitly calls for strikes on U.S. replenishment ships.

• PLA literature and officer interviews confirm that logistics vessels are considered “soft targets,” including the Science of Campaigns (2006), which explicitly states that “destroying the enemy’s logistics support system is an effective means to paralyze its operational system.”7
• U.S. strategic commentary, such as Admiral Roughead’s public statements and related reporting in Business Insider, highlight PLA intent to prioritize the destruction of fleet oilers in the initial salvos of conflict.8
• Strike systems relevant to this mission include DF-21D and DF-26 ASBMs, YJ-12 cruise missiles, PLAN SSNs with torpedoes, and H-6K bombers with air-launched cruise missiles—capabilities well-documented in the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2023 China Military Power Report.9

Reason 4: PLA is capable of inflicting partial attrition (2–4 tankers), but full interdiction is unlikely.

• Forward-deployed tankers operating near the first island chain are within range of PLA long-range fires and PLAN submarines armed with YJ-18 cruise missiles and wake-homing torpedoes, as confirmed by the 2023 China Military Power Report and Office of Naval Intelligence assessments.10
• Submarine ambush, port missile strikes on sites like Apra Harbor or Yokosuka, and cruise missile raids are validated by historical exercises—such as RIMPAC 2016—and U.S. Naval War College simulations, where the loss of logistics ships often triggered operational paralysis.11
• However, full kill of the entire replenishment fleet is considered unlikely due to U.S. use of dispersion tactics, defensive escorts, and emissions control (EMCON)-based routing.

Implications for U.S. Fuel Throughput Modeling

• The full modeled capacity of 265,000–280,000 bpd reflects optimal surge conditions, as defined in Heritage’s 2025 F-76 Throughput Estimate simulation report and supported by aggregated MSC fuel delivery modeling assumptions.12
• A loss of 2–3 T-AOs (approximately 20 percent of the fleet) would degrade throughput by 50,000–80,000 bpd, reducing sustained delivery to ~200,000 bpd.
• Simulation models should incorporate attrition-adjusted throughput curves, as reflected in findings from the INDOPACOM Joint Force Energy Wargame, which highlighted how logistics ship losses degrade tempo and endurance across the joint force.13