SALT II: The Basic Arguments

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SALT II: The Basic Arguments

September 5, 1979 35 min read Download Report
Jeffrey G.
Senior Fellow and Director of Government Finance Programs

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98 September 5, 1979 SALT It: THE BASIC ARGUMENTS INTRODUCTION The debate on the merits of SALT I1 has now been raging for more than two years In this period of time, individuals and groups on both sides of the issue have written dozens of articles delivered hundreds of speeches, and answered thousands of questions about SALT 11. SALT I1 is not an easy sub j ect to grasp. There are indeed many intricate technical considerations involved in the agreements. And yet, it is important that the American public attempt to acquaint itself with at least a basic knowledge of SALT 11, because it is readily apparent that the final decision on the SALT agreemepts will have a decisive impact on the future course of the United States.

The purpose of this study is to simplify public consideration of some of the major issues of SALT I1 by aligning the arguments for and against . Unfortunately, in the barrage of statements speeches, and articles on SALT 11, there has, up to this point been little attempt made to set forth the opposing arguments in a readily comprehensible fashion. It is hoped that this study will help to remedy this situation.

Probably the most useful way to form a judgement about the utility of the SALT I1 agreements is on the basis of its net advantages and disadvantages. This is simply stated Are we better off with SALT I1 or without it The Carter Administrati on naturally argues that the United States is in a better position to the agreements argue instead that the country is better off without them. In both cases, the judgments are based upon a particular set of assumptions concerning the purposes of arms con t rol and the re.ality of Soviet behavior. In the case of the Administration, some of the assumptions are: 1) the Soviet Union with the SALT I1 agreements in force, while leaders in opposition 2 shares with the United States a belief that the dangers of nuc l ear war make real strategic arms limitation an absolute and overriding necessity 2) both countries have strategic forces which are essentially equal in power and therefore that marginal disparities in the components of these forces have no importance; 3) i t is vitally important to keep the SALT process alive by signing the new agreements; and 4) the goodwill deriving from the SALT process will spill over into other areas of Soviet-American activity. In the case of the SALT I1 opponents, the assumptions are just the reverse: 1) the Soviet Union does not share our overriding interest in limiting strategic arms but has agreed to play along with us for purposes of its own; 2) the United States' strategic forces are becoming inferior to Soviet strategic forces a n d therefore that even seemingly marginal disparities in force components in the Soviet Union's favor tend to accelerate American strategic inferiority; 3) the SALT process is only as useful as the agree ments that come from it; and 4) hopes that goodwill w ill spill over into other areas of Soviet-American contact are illusory because detente is nothing but a temporary tactic used by the Soviet Union to acquire certain benefits from the West otherwise unobtainable. It is from such assumptions, often unstate d in the speeches and articles on SALT, that both sides make their judg ments about the value of the SALT I1 agreements.

The quotations used in this study were taken from a wide range of sources, including Administration speeches, anti-SALT articles, pamph lets, and congressional testimony. The complete description of the sources used is to be found at the end of the study. The intention in selecting the quotations was to find not only quotations on certain points of SALT I1 representative of each side's vi ewpoint, but also to find those quotations that were well-reasoned and persuasive.

POLIT I CAL 1) The SALT I1 treaty will be the foundation for-a more enduring political relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Yes In addition to its role in maintaining the stability of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, SALT I1 is the founda tion for a more enduring poli tical relationship between two nations with awesome power.Il SALT I1 The Reasons Why, U. S.

Department of St ate No Such persons assume that in engaging in negotiations the Russians, like ourselves are more anxious to agree than to disagree and are willing to make concessions in order to get agreement. They assume a commonality of interests and aims that does no t exist. They 3 ItWetre trying to reach out a hand of friendship to past differences, and to provide for world peace It President Carter Remarks accepting the Martin Luther King, Jr. Non violent Peace Prize But carefully drawn SALT agreements can accomplis h a great deal They can contribute to a healthier poli tical environment-an environ ment less freighted with sus picion and more conducive to further restraint. Defense Secretary Harold Brown EY 1980 DOD Report We have tried to evolve an agreement with the Soviet Union which would lay a basis for increased friendship be tween us and the Soviet Union It President Carter, News Conference, 26 January 1979 The SALT process itself is important to the further deve lopment of U.S.-Soviet and overall East-West rela tions.

SALT' is the foundation for progress in establishing an enduring political relationship with the Soviets that reduces tensions, and sets important visible boundaries to our ideological, and political and military, competition. De fense Secretary Har old Brown Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association seek camaraderie and tend to exude goodwill and assume that occasional beer hall type affability on the part of the Russians represents a similar proclivity on the ir side. They also find evidence of a 'newt Soviet approach that is charac terized as Iserious and busi nesslike and hence sure to lead at long last to genuine cooperation If Foy Kohler SALT 11: How Not To Negotiate With The Russians.

IIArms treaties with Moscow have been repeatedly oversold--by both Republican and Democratic Administrations--as the touch stone of good relations between the superpowers. We ,are pro mised, if SALT succeeds, a generation of peace; if it fails, we are threatened with a return of the Cold War and a ruinous arms race. The Soviets know better Moscow has always regarded SALT as a campaign rather than an objec tive. The Politburo utilizes arms talks as part of its grand design to further alter the correlation of forces in its favor . I' Frank Barnett Preface to The Fateful Ends And Shades Of SALT Past Pre sent And Yet To Come The Soviet Union understands that it has no choice other than to wage protracted con flict against the United States Objectively viewed, the United States is an e nemy and there can be no recognition--save for reason of short-term tactical conveni ence--of legitimate American interests, nor can there be any acceptance of the notion that the two countries can negotiate or even simply evolve towards a stable relation ship of power."

Colin Gray A Strategic Sym- posium SALT and U.S. Defense Policy I I 4 2 The ratification of the SALT I1 treaty will provide impetus for further SALT treaties-treaties which will embody signi ficant reductions of strategic nuclear forces on both sides Yes And of course SALT I1 is the absolutely indispensible pro duction for moving on to much deeper and more significant cuts in strategic armaments in SALT I I I I President Carter Speech to Congress on SALT 11 IINecessary strategic force moder n ization must and will move forward, just as the SALT process must and will move forward. In SALT I11 we will work for further reductions and qualitative limits Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Speech to the Royal Institute of Inter national Affairs I No Tl h ey contend that the process opens up a prospect for SALT. 111, SALT IV, SALT V, and so on SALT I1 does make a start at controlling offen sive nuclear arms. But is it a good start? It limits the wrong things. The limits are imprecisely defined. They are to o high--they are so high as to have nothing' to do with effective arms control With such a precedent what should we expect from SALT 1113 Unless we promptly act to reverse current trends, the strategic power realities reflected in the SALT I11 ne gotiation s will be even more unfavorable to us than those which have been reflected- in the SALT I1 negotiations.ff Paul Nitze 1s SALT I1 a Fair Deal for the United States 3) Rejection of SALT' I1 will harm future arms control efforts perhaps irreparably.

Yes If th e agreement were rejected The painstaking process of strategic arms control would be dealt a profound blow. The progress we have already made would be jeopardized. The prospect for further steps toward restraining strategic arms and limiting other aspects of military competition-in cluding the spread of nuclear weapons--would be set back immeasurably If "SALT I1 The Reasons Why,Il U.S. Depart ment of State No It is my opinion that they need this treaty more than we do It is my conviction that the treaty ca n and should be negotiated on an even-handed basis. It's not too late Lieutenant Gener a1 Edward Rowny, USA (Ret Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 12, 1979.

Wefll yell, scream, shout. We'll write nasty editorials in Pravda. We'l l call you warmon5 ItWithout SALT, the long process of arms control--so central to building a safe world--would be dealt a crippling, and perhaps a fatal, blow. President Carter, Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Associa tion But it would be th e height of irresponsibility to ignore the possible consequences of a failure to ratify the treaty.

These consequences would in clude vastly increased dangers of nuclear pro 1 i fer a tion among other nations throughout the world II President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT 11 4) The SALT I1 agreements were gers and all sorts of things.

And ultimately we'll go back and we'll talk to you because it's in both our interests to do so.It Soviet Americanologist Georgii Arbatov, as quoted by Senator Jake Garn In another version, withhold ing ratification of SALT I1 would impair or even wreck detente, with all its purported boons. More specifically, not to ratify SALT I1 would endan ger further United States Soviet cooperation in halting nuclear proliferation. I n answer--the Soviet Union has solid reasons for opposing nuclear proliferation. That opposition, based on self interest, is not likely to be renounced in pique over a stillborn SALT I1 pact. Any way, the argument is topsy turvey, because the basic stimul us to nuclear prolifera- tion is anxiety traceable to the palpable erosion of our relative strategic strength as discerned by the nations directly or indirectly protec ted by it in the past."

Charles Burton Marshall, "Look ing for Clock.

It the result and compromises on both sides.

Yes First, and most important, the SALT I1 treaty is not an agree ment based on trust. It stands on its own merits based on common interest, expressed in hard bargaining and compro mises.

It Presidential Adviser Dr. Zbigniew B rzezinski, Re marks at the Annual Members Dinner of the Chicago Committee Eggs in a Cuckoo of hard bargaining No The Soviets, needless to say have not been oblivious to the propensity of their American opposites to show such. concern for their sensitiviti e s and of the opportunities this provides them. They have increasingly staked out extreme demands and stuck doggedly to them and waited for the U.S. to decide 6 of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations They are tough bargainers; we are, too I think thei r positions, along with ours have been adequately hard. We have negotiated very firmly and there has been a steady progress.Il President Carter News Conference 26 January 1979. upon the concessions necessary for a 'breakthrough The U.S response has been to constantly shift positions in attempts to accommodate to Soviet instran sigence. In other words, the Soviets have capitalized on our concern to reach agreement by inducing us to accept proposi tions, which, by any measure of prudence, we ought to have tre ated as unnegotiable on our own part Foy Kohler, SALT 11: How Not To Negotiate With The Russians Several points emerge. The first is a difference of ap proach to the negotiations.

The purposes of the two sides were discrepant from the out set. We wished for equal limi tations designed to diminish the impact of nuclear weapons upon world politics. The Soviet side viewed the negoti ations as an engagement between adversaries. The Sov i et task was to achieve the right to that nuclear predominance which we appeared willing to relin quish Paul Nitze Is SALT I1 a Fair Deal for the United States 5) Rejection of SALT I1 will lend support to hard-line members of the Soviet elite by demonstrat ing to the SoviGts that the United States is not prepared to sign a serious arms control agreement No Yes It is a delusion to believe that rejection of a SALT treaty would somehow induce the Soviet Union to exercise new re straints in troubled areas.

The a ctual effect or [sic rejecting such a treaty might be precisely the opposite. The most intransient [sic] and There have been at least five periods of peaceful coexistence since the Bolshevik seizure of power, one in each decade of the Soviet state Each wa s hailed in the West as ushering in a new era of reconciliation and as signifying the long awaited final change in Soviet 7 hostile elements of a Soviet political power structure would certainly be encouraged and strengthened by our rejection of a SALT.agr e ement.I' Presi dent Carter Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association 1 shall only say that the consequences of a failure to ratify the agreement will be very grave and dangerous for both countries. Our people apart from other things, would h ave to conclude that one cannot do serious business with the Americans at all Georgii Arbatov The Soviets On SALT purposes. Each ended abruptly with a new period of intransi gence, which was generally ascribed to a victory of Soviet hard-liners rather tha n to the dynamics of the system Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy It is quite probable that the composition of Politburo fac tions changes considerably from issue to issue Furthermore it is difficult to imagine that Brezhnev would, or could, be oust ed by a coalition of hard liners on grounds that he is insufficiently 'tough For in a sense, all members of the hierarchy are hard-liners; the Soviet milieu is hardly condu cive to liberal politics.Il J.

Judson Mitchell The Soviet Succession: Who, And What Will Follow Brezhnev 6) Senate rejection of SALT I1 will give the United States the reputation of being a warmonger nation We are struggling 'to have the image in the nonaligned coun tries of a nation that's admir able and which has, as our present polic y, the implementa tion of principles and ideals on which our country was founded in its initial days.

All Df these efforts which have been shared not only by me but by every President since President Eisenhower would be endangered if we now reject this tre aty. We would be looked upon as a warmonger not as a peaceloving nation by many other people of the world. President Carter Remarks at a White House Break fast for the American Retail Federation No T]he Soviets have made a near art of utilizing extremist- type arguments of American SALT pro ponents to influence U.S. de cisions. Americans are end lessly quoted to saddle the U.S. with unique responsibility for achieving agreement, and for the dire consequences that will presumably follow failure.

Thus, Presid ent Carter's asser tion that the U.S. will be branded as a 'warmonger' if the Senate fails to ratify SALT I1 is being continually cited by Soviet spokesmen, as are his remarks about damage to U.S Soviet relations and the danger to world peace Foy Kohler S ALT 11: How Not To Negotiate With The Russians. 0 ECONOMIC 1 The United States will have to spend considerably less on its strategic weapons programs with SALT I1 than without it.

Yes With or without SALT I1 we must modernize and strengthen our strategic f orces--and we are doing so. SALT' I1 makes this task easier, surer and less expensive Without the SALT treaty we would be forced to spend extra billions each year in a dangerous nuclear arms race I President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT 11.

IIFirst, SALT will not reduce current defense expenditures. It will enable us to spend less than we would in the absence of an agreement. With a SALT agreement, expenditures on strategic nuclear forces are likely to rise from 20 to 40 percent in the coming 'years without SALT, the same expendi tures would rise 50 to 60 per cent. It Bureau of Politico-Mil itary Affairs Director Leslie Gelb, Speech before the San Diego World Affairs Council.

IIFurthermore, with SALT, it would be signicantly less expensive (perhaps a s much as 30 billion less expensive over the next decade) for the United States to maintain that balance than without a SALT I1 agree ment Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Associa tion T h e cost for the United States to maintain the strategic balance would be less under agreed SALT I1 limits than if No I'As for the claim that a SALT I1 treaty will reduce the cost of our defense programs General George M. Seignious 11 the new director of th e Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said on December 13 that t

e SALT I1 agreement, as it seemed likely to emerge, coupled with the further development of the Soviet nuclear arsenal made possible by the agreement 1s going to require additional money to m odernize the strate gic systems we have B]y establishing certain quantitative limits, the treaty would shift Soviet efforts to the quest for qualitative superiority. The effort to match qualitative improvements based on active research and the development of new techno logies, is hardly more economi cal than the repetitive manu facture of old-model weapons.

Yet the proponents of SALT I1 claim that the failure to ratify the treaty would add as much as $100 billion to our defense budgets over a five-year per iod. Those fi gures of extra costs if the Senate refuses to consent to the treaty, are just as fanciful as President Nixon's claims [at the time of SALT I that he had ended the cold war and achieved detente I Eugene Rostow The Case Against SALT

11. It De spite the dire predictions of some that the nonapproval of SALT would require a massive crash program of American those limits were not in force Cost estimates of illus trative forces which the United States might deploy in re sponse-so as to maintain the strategic balance in the face of such a Soviet buildup-range between $60 and $80 billion in FY 79 dollars for the'period FY 1980 through EY 1985 With SALT, currently planned U.S. forces will cost about $50 billion for the same period Thus, an additional $ 1 0 to 30 billion could be incurred over the next five years, in addition to expansions already planned. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 23, 1979 9 spending on strategic systems this is in fact not the case.

All that would be required to maintain the strategic balance including the survivability of all three legs of the triad would be to pursue the same prudent program that was in effect until the Carter cut backs in 1977 Despite the wild claims of s ome admini- stration spokesmen, these programs can be carried out within the constraints of a three percent real growth budget, using the base line of the EY-1977 budget submission.

All these systems can be de ployed while keeping the de fense budget belo w six percent of the GNP John Lehman A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy.Il MILITARY 1) The SALT I1 treaty will reduce the risks of nuclear war and enhance strategic stability.

Yes IlFirst and foremost, SALT I1 will contribute to our securi tY By imposing important limits on the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, SALT I1 will reduce the risk of nuclear war SALT I1 The Reasons Why U.S. Department of State A SALT agreement, of course cannot substitute for wise diplomacy or a strong defense nor will it end the danger of nuclear war. But it will certainly reduce that danger.

President Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23 1979 The emerging SALT I1 agreement will mean greater stability and No The claim that a SALT I1 agreement would be politically stabilizing is just as empty [of logic as the idea that a bad agreement with the Soviets is better than no agreement at all]. We have had the Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement with the Soviet Union--SALT I--since 19

72. Far from stabilizing world politics, the Interim Agreement has been an important structural feature of the most turbulent and dangerous period of the cold war (the period ironi cally known as I de tente I Eugene Rostow, "The Case Against SALT 11 The parity that the United States thought it was endorsing 10 predictability in the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.I Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan, Remarks at the Department of State IFor a SALT agreement is a fundamental element of strate gic and political stability in a turbulent world-stability which can provide the necessary political basis for us to contain contain the kinds of crises th a t we face today, and to prevent,their growing into a terrible nuclear confronta tion II President Cart e r Remarks at a Special Convoca tion of the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1972 with SALT was a parity that, in and of itself, would contribute to s tability. In practice, the SALT I package contributed to instability rather than to stability I Colin Gray, "A Strategic Sympo sium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy It III believe SALT 11, as now envisaged, will not reduce the risks of war. On the contrary i t can increase the risks of war if it reinforces the judg ment that we are militarily stronger than the USSR at a time when we are not. War and defeat can arise from just such gross misjudgments of relative military capabilities by the weaker of two opposi n g powers.Il Paul Nitze 1s SALT I1 a Fair Deal for the United States 2) The new SALT treaty slows and even reverses the Soviet Union's strategic momentum The SALT I1 agreement will slow the growth of Soviet arms and limit the- strategic compe tition, and b y helping to define future threats that we might face, SALT I1 will make our defense planning much more effective President Carter Address to the American News paper Publishers Association.

IISALT Two will be a major brake on the momentum of strategic arms competition.lI Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Address before the Royal Institute for International Affairs It is in our interest because it slows--even reverses--the momentum of the Soviet strate gic arms buildup. President Carter, Speech to Congress on SALT 11 No Because the treaty does not actually put a brake on the momentum of the massive Soviet buildup, the United States will for the first time not be able to maintain essential equiva lence or nuclear Lieutenant General Rowny, USA (Ret before the Se n ate Relations Committee 1979 parity. 11 Edward Testimony Foreign July 12 What we have gained from these concessions has been a series of relatively unimportant ad justments in what otherwise would have been the Soviet program for deployments over the next six years, in part balanced by even less signifi cant adjustments in our pro grams for future deployments In essence, most of the negoti 11 Ant it will slow the momentum of Soviet strategic programs thus reducing the threats we would otherwise face. I' Se c re tary of State Vance, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9 1979 ating process has been one of trading marginal adjustments to their large strategic program versus marginal adjustments to our much smaller one Paul Nitze Conside r ations Bearing On The Merits Of An Agreement For the Soviet Union to sign on for a SALT regime, that regime either has to be rela tively innocuous in terms of its very probable impact .on Soviet programs, while being likely to encourage 'progres sive forc e s' in the West in their struggle against Pentagon militarism and the like, or it has to be a severe regime endorsed reluctantly only because it is the least unde sirable alternative. I' Colin Gray A Strategic Symposium SALT and U.S. Defense Policy.Il I 3) The SALT I1 agreements will strategic nuclear forces of Yes SALT I1 goes beyond SALT I, in all these provisions, by set ting equal ceilings for the categories of weapons it covers This negotiated principle of equality will require an actual reduction in t h e Soviet Union's interconti nental forces. They will have to eliminate more than 250 systems, and the importance of this step should not be under estimated. It may well be the forerunner of more substantial and significant reductions by both sides. If Pre s idential Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski Remarks at the Annual Members Dinner of the Chicago Committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations With the treaty, both sides will be limited, through 1985 No Under the terms of the SALT I1 agreement, both side are to reduce their overall forces to 2,250 weapons by the end of 19

81. It will be noted that bookkeeping tricks aside, the United States is already below that ceiling. The Soviet Union, however, will have to eliminate some 250 weapons.

The administrati on claims that this is a very important provi sion of the agreement. In fact, the Soviet weapons to be withdrawn consist of rather primitive ballistic missiles comparable to U.S. Minuteman I ICBM's (unilaterally withdrawn a decade ago) and Mya-4 jet bombe rs built in the 1950's which are now quite decrepit.

The Russians will certainly not lose any real military options they have plenty of high-grade impose important limits on the both sides. 12 to an equal overall number of long-range bombers and systems fo r launching long-range mis siles. The agreed total--2,250 is lower than the present Soviet level and above our present level. Therefore, to comply with the treaty, the Soviets will have to destroy or dismantle about 10 of their systems. These will be the f irst agreed reductions in the history of nuclear Sec retary of State Vance, State ment be'fore the Council on World Affairs, St. Louis Missouri But SALT I1 is a. clear and valuable, though limited, step toward curtailing the numbers and types of weapons t h at can be added by either side, and even towards reducing--by some measures--the number of weapon systems that the Soviet Union already has on hand Defense Secretary Brown, Statement before the Senate Armed Ser vices Committee, July 23, 1979 missile capab i lity in their large new ICBM's, and to re place the antique Mya-4's they have brand-new Backfire bombers, which have artifi cially been excluded from the SALT I1 ceilings.1t Edward Luttwak Ten Questions about SALT 11 The fourth casualty has been true redu c tions. Although the number of Soviet launchers will decline from around 2,500 to 2,250 during the term of the treaty, the more significant indices of nuclear power will rise dramatically on the Soviet side, and to a lesser extent on our side as well. From the beginning of 1978 to the end of 1985, the number of Soviet warheads will have doubled ours will have increased, by a half. The area destructive capabilities of Soviet weapons will have increased by a half ours by a quarter. The capabi lity of their we apons to knock out hardened targets, such as missile silos, will have in creased tenfold; even if our cruise missile, still under development, fulfill present expectations, our capability will have increased fourfold.

Paul Nitze 16 SALT I1 a Fair Deal for the United States?11 4) Rejection of SALT I1 will lead to a new surge in the strate gic arms race.

Yes If the agreement were rejec ted: There could be a danger ous and wasteful new surge in the strategic arms race. We would have to keep pace at a cost of tens of billions of additional dollars and with the added risk that accompanies an intense military buildup.It No llAccording to the recently submitted CIA report to the Joint Economic Committee of the Senate, Soviet defense spend ing, which has been incr easing by about four to five percent a year since 1967, will continue to take between 11 and 13 per cent of the GNP of the Soviet 13 SALT I1 The Reasons Why,"

U S Department of State.

IIWithout SALT, the Soviets will be unconstrained and capable of--and p robably committed to-an enormous further build UP Without SALT, there would have to be a much sharper rise in our own defense spending, at the expense of other necessary programs for our people.It President Carter, Address to the American Newspaper Pub li s hers Association It SALT I1 will limit to 1,200 the number of launchers of MIRVed strategic ballistic missiles the Soviets are allowed to deploy. We estimate that they could have as many as 500 more than this in 1985 without this limit SALT I1 will limit t o 820 the number of Soviet launchers of MIRVed interconti nental ballistic missiles. We estimate that without this limit they could have more than 1100 by 1985, and these are their most threatening wea pons. It ACDA Director George Seignious, Speech befor e the Conference on U.S. Security and the Soviet Challenge, Richmond Virginia lI[T]he fact is that in the absence of the SALT I1 treaty the Soviets would not only keep these weapons [the 250 sche duled for dismantling they could add far more new and modern systems. Based on their past experiences, they could be expected to acquire several entirely new types of strategic land-based missiles by 1985; the treaty holds them to one.

Our best estimates are that they could have 3,000 launchers by 1985--750 more th an they Union with or without a SALT agreement In other words with the current level of Soviet strategic spending approximately three times that of the United States, the Soviets are permitted by SALT I1 to do all that their high and growing level of spen d ing would permit them to do in any case. Far from the alarmist projections put forward by adminstration spokesmen, the principal difference between Soviet actions under SALT and in the absence of SALT would seem to be their retention in the force of some 2 00-300 older SS-7 and 8 missiles that would be dismantled to meet the SALT ceilings. Their level of MIRVed ICBMs would probably not exceed 900, and their number of MIRVed SLBMs would almost certainly not be able to exceed some 300 missiles. In summary the increment of threat de ployed by the Soviets without SALT is small.Il John Lehman A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy.ft The Soviets are already at or very near maximum levels of armament development and' de ployment, using at least 15% of their gross national product and spending $50 billion more per year than the U.S. on military hardware. CIA esti mates on Soviet military spend ing confirm that no element of the SALT I1 treaty will slow down the Russian effort. The Soviets have been driv i ng for a war-winning military supremacy over the United States and have agreed to nothing in SALT I1 which would slow down that drive. It is doubtful that the Soviets could significantly increase their efforts without doing intolerable damage to their eco n omy 20 Questions 14 will be permitted with the treaty. And they could have several thousand more indivi dual weapons than the treaty would allow If Secretary of State Vance, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9, 1979 About SALT 1 1," The Coalition for Peace Through Strength The simplistic answer that without SALT a return to the anus race may impose an intol erable cost' will not bear scrutiny. The Russians are already on the near edge of mobilization for war, spending 40% more th a n we do for arms from a GNP roughly half our own. In brief, Moscow is near to her weapons peak right now while we have been resting on a lower plateau. But for not more than an added 1.5% of the GNP for U.S. defense=-a per centage less than we spent in Ei s enhower's day--we could procure the means to shield the nation from a first strike a more important goal than induc ing Brezhnev to initial more paper. Frank Barnett, Preface from The Fateful Ends And Shades Of SALT 5) SALT I1 will allow the United States to continue the planned development of all needed new strategic weapon systems.

Yes SALT I1 preserves our options to build the forces we need to maintain our strategic bal ance I' President Carter Speech to gress on SALT 11 SALT I1 will permit the neces s ary modernization of each of these three forces This fall we will begin fitting our Poseidon submarines with the longer range Trident I missile. By the middle of 1981, the first of our new Trident submarines, the U.S.S Ohio, will be deployed We are enhanc i ng the effectiveness of our B-52 bombers with air-launched cruise missiles No What is more significant is that the agreement, coupled with the Carter defense pro- grams i .e cancellation of the B-1 bomber virtually assures the disappearance of the manned p enetrating leg of the American triad in the period shortly following the term of the agreements. The air-launched cruise missile was conceived as an implement to extend the life of the B-52 force and, when deployed on approximately 250 of them to provide a counter to increasing Soviet air defense, and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the penetrating force of 240 B-1 bombers. With the provi sions contained in SALT I1 15 The President has decided to proceed with a new land based missile, the M-X, which w ill deliver more warheads with greater accuracy than our existing Minuteman missiles.

Indeed, SALT I1 allows us to move ahead with each of these necessary modernization programs It Secretary of State Vance, Testimony before the Senate F oreign Relations Com mittee, July 9, 1979 SALT 11, while forestalling this unproductive numbers race will leave us the flexibility to carry out the important qualitative programs to. deal with the challenges the treaty will not eliminate. We can develop, t est, and deploy each of our planned programs-cruise missiles, Trident, MX--in the fashion, and on the schedule that we have planned. Apart from putting some distinguish ing features on our ALCMIs and cruise missile carriers (to aid counting under SALT we will not be forced by SALT I1 to alter our strategic programs which we need to balance Soviet programs that are allowed in SALT I1 and that are, in large measure, already in place."

Defense Secretary Brown, State ment before the Senate Foreign Relations Co mmittee, July 9 1979 limiting the number to 120 of B-52s able to be equipped with these ALCMs, the air-launched cruise missile force ceases to be an effective threat against projected Soviet air defenses.

By accepting the Soviet demand that sea-launched c ruise missiles be limited to a straight-line distance of 325 nautical miles, the SALT agree ments also preclude with one blow two very promising and inexpensive options. First with the Carter policy of severely paring the Navy to a level of about 400 ship s, the ability to do even a much reduced mission of sea control would be greatly enhanced by a long-range antiship cruise missile. Such an option is prohibited by these agreements.

Second, the valuable option of using sea-launched cruise missiles for theat er nuclear deterrence in the European flanks and in the Pacific is similarly prohibited By accepting the Soviet demand to prohibit deployment of. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) beyond a range of 325 nautical miles, the Protocol excludes the very v aluable option of relieving the 600-odd fighter-bombers now assigned to the nuclear strike role in Europe Conven tional precision attack roles for the GLCM also are prohibit ed by the John Lehman A Strategic Symposium SALT and U.S. Defense Policy.11 The a d ministration claims that the SALT I1 Protocol limits only the deployment of CMIs cruise missiles] and only until the end of 1981; it also claims that ground-launched and sea-launched CMI s could not have been deployed within that 16 6 The SALT I1 igreemen t s will of our Allies Yes Allied security will also be preserved and enhanced by the SALT TWO agreement. The U.S has consulted closely with the NATO allies throughout the course of the negotiations, and has taken into account allied security concerns in it s nego tiating positions I The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks U.S. Department of State We have assured our Allies that their interests will be fully met by this treaty. The best evidence of the success of our continual efforts to work with our Allies on S A LT I1 can be seen in their response strong support for this treaty by Allied leaders, inc'luding public statements at Guadeloupe by Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Minister Callaghan, and Presi dent Giscard. Presidential Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski Remarks at t h e Annual Members Dinner of the Chicago Committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations America's allies fully support the SALT XI treaty. Just as our partners look to us for leadership in strengthening the military position of our alli ances--which w e are doing--they also expect and want us to lead in the quest for greater secur time anyway. That result was of course contrived by manipu lating the scheduling of the CM program: we could have had CM's by 1980, given the will to acquire them Edward Lutt w ak Ten Questions about SALT 11 1 preserve and enhance the security No Whenever it appears that in pursuit of the United States own security, the Americans may have sacrificed a direct Euro pean interest, the Europeans find themselves in a difficult dilemm a which they approach in varied styles. Typically, the German or British preference is to adapt to the American view on the grounds both that the Americans may understand the technicalities better and that in any case, allied solidarity or at least the app e arance of it, generally Outweigh6 speci fic defense policy decisions in the deterrent balance. The French style is notoriously different, tending to emphasize differences of opinion as renewed justification for an independent course of action I Laurence M artin A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S.

Defense Policy I IHaving gained a measure of superiority over the United States in strategic nuclear capability, it was inevitable that the USSR should attempt to achieve a similar advantage in what has become kno wn as Euro strategic nuclear capability in which nuclear delivery systems based in the Soviet Union pose a strategic nuclear threat to European hard and soft targets This is precise17 ity and stability through arms control Our allies had specific interest s and concerns in connection with SALT 11. The questions they raised were related to specific points, not to the enterprise as a whole.

And in each case we have devel oped mutually acceptable solu tions. Thus, the NATO allies have endorsed the SALT I1 trea ty on two levels They are convinced that it preserves all essential defense options, to surstain deterrence in Europe; and They believe the treaty serves a necessary role in the overall East-West political and strategic relationship I Secretary of State V a nce Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee July 10, 1979 ly what Moscow' has now a chieved, while NATO watches with growing apprehension, but little sign that positive action will be taken to redress the imbalance: indeed, the ban on crui s e missiles with a range exceeding 600 km and the inhi bition on the transfer of cruise missile technology apparently agreed in SALT I1 places further obstacles in the way of doing so Stewart Menual, SALT 11: The Eurostra tegic Imbalance Any such European f ears about the deterioration of the Ameri can relative strategic nuclear capability are exacerbated to the extent that SALT contri butes to direct deterioration in the theatre balance. There are, in fact, a number of such contributions, although it would b e going too far to say that none of the unfavorable consequences would have ensued in the absence of an explicit agreement. Tolerating the Soviet Backfire bomber so long as it is not deployed in an anti-United States mode--that is, so long as it is deploy ed against areas bordering the Warsaw Pact--is only the most explicit instance of going beyond merely neglecting threats to allies to actually diverting them in that direc tion, behavior of which Stalin suspected Chamberlain in 1939.

At least equally unsatis factory from the European point of view is the treatment of the cruise missile in SALT

11. On this issue Europe is caught two ways. Restriction on the deployment of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) classi fies it as a system subject to noncircum vention understand ings. A moratorium on deploy ment of other forms of' cruise 18 missiles capable of more thaii short, tactical ranges, threat ens to deprive NATO of a very attractive option for a medium to intermediate range system for interdiction or r etaliation within the European theatre."

Laurence Martin A Strategic S ympos ium SALT and U.S.

Defense Policy.,t1 7) SALT I1 will enhance the United States' ability to compete with the Soviet Union around the world.

Yes SALT will not stop our ability to compete around the world with the Soviets In fact SALT .will enhance it. For example, would we be better able to meet the Soviet chal lenge to NATO, or in Africa and Asia, without SALT 11--while spending even larger sums on nuclear, rather than conven tio n al forces?Il ACDA Director George Seignious, Speech before the Conference on U.S. Security and the Soviet Challenge Richmond, Virginia No TO some of us who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Cuban crisis in 1962 or the Middle East crisis in 1973 , the last and key judgment in this chain of reasoning that an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences--comes as a shock It is hard to see what factors in the future are apt to disconnect internation al politics and diplomacy from the underlying real power balances..

The nuclear balance is only one element in the overall power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all other levers of influence--military, economic or political-re st It Paul Nitze, IIConsiderations Bearing On The Merits Of An Agreement My principal worry is not only this growing vulnerability of our land-based forces-though this must be remedied--but the growing invulnerability of Soviet land-based forces. The dete r rent effect of our strate gic forces in defense of allies will continually decline; our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to offset 19 the Soviet capacity for region- a1 intervention. And this capacity will be reinforced by the growing edge i n Soviet theater nuclear forces, a naval and airlift capability which immeasurably extends the reach and preponderance of Soviet Henry conventional power It Kissinger, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Commit tee, August 2, 1979 8) The SALT I1 ag reements will be adequately verifiable.

Yes AS I have said many times SALT I1 is not based on trust.

Compliance will be assured by our own nation's means of verification, including ex tremely sophisticated satel lites, powerful electronic systems, and a vast intelli gence network. Were the Soviet Union to take the enormous risk of trying to violate the t r eaty in any way that might affect the strategic balance, there is no doubt that we would discover it in time to respond fully and effectively. It President Car ter, Speech to Congress on SALT 11 The SALT I1 agreement is adequately verifiable. We are confi dent we can detect any violation by the Soviets which would pose a significant mili tary risk or adversely affect the strategic balance.

In SALT we don't rely on trust. Trust is not a basis for national survival. We verify Soviet compliance with the provis ions of the agreement by using our diverse, powerful and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. ACDA Director George Seignious, Statement before the Senate Foreign No This long-standing intelli gence imbalance has become worse of late. We have lost crit ical observation facilities in Iran, and some of our most important satellite systems have been fatally compro mised Beyond that, we have virtually eliminated the CIA'S ability to collect intel ligence overseas by covert means.

We can still identify and count large, fixed objects of classic form such as uncamou flaged ICBM silos. Beyond that, everything is a matter of relative uncertainty and claims to the contrary are either dishonest or ill-informed.

Stansfield Turner, the director of Central Intelligenc e, did his honorable duty when he testified before Congress that the SALT I1 agreements could not be verified reliably at the present time, and that it would take five years to acquire the necessary capabilities.

Edward Luttwak Ten Questions about SALT 11 I The SALT I1 agreements, as signed at Vienna, are not sufficiently precise to give an adequate base for [interpreting 20 Relations Committee, July 10, what the agreements permit or 1979. do not permit In the absence of reasona bly precise definitions of what is to be limited and how it is to be limited, the very founda tion on which compliance would rest is lacking Paul Nitze Statement before the Senate Intelligence Committee, July 30, 1979.

Jeffrey G. Barlow Policy Analyst 21 List of Quoted Sources Arbatov, Georgii The Soviets On SALT." Newsweek. May 28, 1979.

Barnett, Frank R. Preface to The Fateful Ends And Shades Of SALT Russak Company, Inc., 1979). Reprint by the National Past Present And Yet To Come? (New York: Crane Strategy Information Center, In c Brown, Harold. "SALT I1 and the National. Defense I (Remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 5, 1979). In "SALT 11: Two Views.lI Current Policy No.

62. Bureau of Public Affairs United States Department of State.

Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 23, 19

79. Copy of a typescript document.

Statements before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, July 9 and 11, 19

79. In SALT I1 Senate Testimony July 9-11, 19

79. Current Policy No. 72A. Bureau of Public Affairs, Unites States Department of State.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "SALT I1 and National Security Remarks at the Annual Members Dinner of the Chicago Committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations at the Art Institute of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, April 4, 1979) In "SALT 11: Two Views." Curr ent Policy No.

62. Bureau of Public Affairs United States Department of State.

Carter, Jimmy. "American Retail Federation Remarks at a White House Breakfast, May 10, 1979) Weekly Compilation of Presi dential Documents. Vol. 15 (Monday, May 14, 1979 Carte r.'s Speech to Congress Asking Approval of Treaty Speech to a Joint Session of Congress on the SALT I1 agree ments, June 18, 1979) The New York Times. June 19, 1979.

Presidential News Conference--January 26, 19

79. Excerpted in Selected Statements 79-2 ( March 1, 1979). United States Department of Defense SALT Agreement an Important Task Remarks at a Special Convocation of the Georgia Institute of Technology, February 20, 1979). Excerpted from Selected Statements 79-2 (March 1, 1979). United States Depart m ent of Defense SALT Treaty Will Protect Nation's Security.Il (Remarks accepting the Martin Luther King, Jr. Nonviolent Peace Prize, Atlanta, Georgia, January 14, 1979) Excerpted in Selected Statements 79-2 (March 1, 1979). United States Department of Defe nse 22 SALT 11: The Path of Security and Peace Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, New York, April 25, 1979) Current Policy No.

66. Bureau of Public Affairs United States Department of State.

Duncan, Charles W. "SALT and the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance.Il Remarks at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., on February 21, 1979) Current Policy No.

58. Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State.

Garn, Jake. Quoting Soviet Americanologist Georgii Arbatov.

Debate during "SALT 11: What It Means To The United StatesIl An Editorial Seminar sponsored by The Heritage Foundation Washington, D.C., June 4, 1979.

Gelb, Leslie 3 The Facts of SALT 11 Speech before the San Diego World Affairs Council, January 30, 1979).Current Policy No.

65. Bureau of Public Affairs, Unites States Department of State.

Gray, Colin. Contribution 'to "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S.Defense Policy.Il The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 2 (Winter 1979).

Kissinger, Henry A:American Foreign Policy. Quoted in Bernard S. Albert The Strategic Competition With the USSR--What is It and How are We Doing?" Comparative Strategy. Vol. 1 (No 3, 1979).

Statement With Respect To The Treaty On Strategic Arms Limitation Before The Committee On Armed Services Of The United States Senate Thursday, August 2, 1979 2:OO P.M. Copy of a typescript document.

Kohler, Foy D. SALT 11: How Not To Negotiate With The Russians Coral Gables. Florida: Advanced International Studies Institute In Association With The University Of Miami 1979).

Lehman, John. Contribution to "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy.If The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 2 Winter 1979 Luttwak, Edward N Ten Questions about SALT 11 Commentary VOl. 68 (August 1979).

Marshall, Charles Burton. IILooking for Eggs in a Cuckoo Clock."

Committee on The Present Danger. 22 January 1979 I Martin, Laurence. Contribution to "A Strategic Symposium: SALT and U.S. Defense Policy.If The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 2 Winter 1979 23 Menua l, Stewart. "SALT 11: The Eurostrategic 1mbalance.I' Conflict Mitchell, J. Judson The Soviet Succession: Who, And What, Will Follow Brezhnev?" Orbis. Vol. 23 (Spring 1979).

Nitze, Paul H Considerations Bearing On The Merits Of An Agree ment." 15 January 19

79. Copy of a typescript document Is SALT I1 a Fair Deal for the United States?" Committee on The Present Danger. 16 May 1979.

Prepared Statement For Presentation Before The Select Commit tee On Intelligence Of The United States Senate On July 30 19

79. Copy of a typescript document Studies. No. 104 (February 1979).

Rostow, Eugene V The Case Against SALT 11 Commentary. Vol. 67 Rowny, Edward L. Quoted in Charles W. Corddry. 'I2 who negotiated February 1979).

SALT. call it threat to security The Baltimore Sun. July 13, 1979.

Quoted in Robert G. Kaiser. "SALT Called Danger to U.S.

Security.Il The Washington Post. July 13, 1979.

United States Department of State Speech before the Conference on U.S. Security and the Soviet Challenge, Richmond, Virginia, June 12, 1979) U.S.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 79-27 (June 12, 1979).

Statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, July 10, 19

79. In SALT I1 Senate Testimony July 9-11, 19

79. Current Policy No. 72A. Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks." May 19

79. Special Report 46 (Revised). Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Depart ment of State SALT I1 The Reasons Why.It May 19

79. Bureau of Public Affairs Seignious, George M 11 SALT I1 And Our Nation's Security 20 Questions About SALT 11 The Coalition for Peace Through Strength. 1979.

Vance, Cyrus. "Excerpts From Text of Vance's Speech in London Speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs London, England, December 9, 1978) The New York Times.

December 10, 1979 SALT 11: The Choice Statement before the Council on World Affairs, St. Louis, Missouri, August 1, 1979) Current Policy No 79. Bureau of Public Affairs, United State D epart ment of State. 24 Testimony on the SALT I1 agreement before the Senate Commit tee on Foreign Relations, July 9 and 10, 19

79. In SALT I1 Senate-Testimony July 9-11, 19

79. Current Policy No. 72A Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State.


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