For decades, the United States has contended with smaller adversaries without the ability to disrupt U.S. aerial logistics. It will not have that luxury in a great-power conflict with China.
In a potential conflict with China, the United States would need to rapidly mass men and equipment throughout the Western Pacific, covering vast distances in a far more challenging geographic environment than the Middle Eastern or European theaters. The success of such efforts will hinge on the airlift capacity of the Air Force—and in particular on the size of the C-17 Globemaster fleet.
The airlift capacity currently offered by U.S. C-17s is plainly insufficient to support large-scale combat operations across the sprawling Pacific theater. To ensure that U.S. forces will be able to stay in the fight against China, the United States must restart C-17 production.
Why the C-17 Globemaster Matters
The C-17 Globemaster is a transport aircraft that delivers large equipment, supplies, and troops to airfields all over the world. It is the second-largest U.S. cargo plane in service, behind only the C-5M Super Galaxy, but is considerably newer than the Super Galaxy and is expected to last far longer.
Boeing, the C-17’s manufacturer, delivered 223 of the aircraft to the U.S. Air Force between 1993 and 2013, out of a total of 279 built for all customers. Today, the Air Force operates 157 active-duty C-17s, with the remaining aircraft being assigned to National Guard and Air Force Reserve units.
Following the completion of the Air Force order, production of C-17s for export continued at Boeing’s Long Beach plant until 2015. The production line was finally closed upon the delivery of the final batch of four Qatar-bound C-17s; it has remained dormant since.
Recent conflicts have placed considerable pressure on the Air Force’s limited C-17 inventory. Between February 28 and June 30, U.S. Transportation Command conducted more than 1,500 air missions into the Middle East. This flight count included frequent periods of high-tempo airlift operations, during which 30 to 40 cargo flights ferried military equipment and personnel into the Middle East each day.
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Air Force C-17s are the linchpin of any major movement of troops and equipment. In the weeks leading up to Operation Absolute Resolve, the seizure of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro from Caracas, open-source data identified 83 C-17 flights arriving at Caribbean bases over a 16-day period. At least 160 transport aircraft were observed moving through Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East in the 13 days before the Operation Midnight Hammer strikes of June 2025.
The intense demand for this overworked transport force is likely to grow in future years. New requirements for mobile radars and improvements to existing weapons systems point to a growing cargo catalogue that C-17s will be tasked with transporting.
In addition to carrying new C-17-standardized cargo, Air Force officials envision employing the aircraft as a strike platform. The deployment of palletized munitions from C-17s may provide U.S. forces with a flexible and affordable way to saturate enemy airspace. However, each combat patrol performed by C-17s will eat away at the Air Force’s aggregate airlift capacity.
America Doesn’t Have Enough C-17s for a Great-Power War
Put simply, as the C-17 fleet ages and its maintenance needs grow, the Air Force is being asked to do more with less. This comes at a time when the nation’s strategic airlift force is already reaching its limits. In 2024, the commander of U.S. Transportation Command testified that a single large-scale combat operation would consume America’s existing airlift capacity.
A conflict with China would demand an airlift far more substantial than the one observed during Operation Epic Fury. U.S. forces fighting in the Western Pacific would depend on consistent deliveries of reinforcements, weapons systems, and munitions into contested and austere environments. China’s heavy investment in A2/AD capabilities will further compound the logistical burden on America’s C-17 fleet. A 2025 transfer of a single Patriot battalion from Asia to the Middle East reportedly took 73 C-17 flights to complete, for example.
In addition to carrying new C-17-standardized cargo, Air Force officials envision employing the aircraft as a strike platform. The deployment of palletized munitions from C-17s may provide U.S. forces with a flexible and affordable way to saturate enemy airspace. However, each combat patrol performed by C-17s will eat away at the Air Force’s aggregate airlift capacity.
America Doesn’t Have Enough C-17s for a Great-Power War
Put simply, as the C-17 fleet ages and its maintenance needs grow, the Air Force is being asked to do more with less. This comes at a time when the nation’s strategic airlift force is already reaching its limits. In 2024, the commander of U.S. Transportation Command testified that a single large-scale combat operation would consume America’s existing airlift capacity.
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A conflict with China would demand an airlift far more substantial than the one observed during Operation Epic Fury. U.S. forces fighting in the Western Pacific would depend on consistent deliveries of reinforcements, weapons systems, and munitions into contested and austere environments. China’s heavy investment in A2/AD capabilities will further compound the logistical burden on America’s C-17 fleet. A 2025 transfer of a single Patriot battalion from Asia to the Middle East reportedly took 73 C-17 flights to complete, for example.
America Can Still Restart the C-17 Production Line
The U.S. has been working diligently recently to ensure that it possesses the requisite warfighters, technology, and equipment required to defend the first island chain. However, these assets can only make an impact if they make it to the fight. To do so, the logic is clear: the United States needs to expand its C-17 fleet.
Restarting the C-17 production line is essential to building the airlift capacity required to sustain flight operations across the Pacific theater. Past small-scale conflicts with inferior adversaries have permitted the U.S. to overlook this requirement. Today, it must once again be prepared to fight a prolonged campaign in the Western Pacific against the rapidly expanding Chinese military.
Reopening the assembly line in Long Beach will not be an easy task. Boeing’s skilled labor force for this system has probably dispersed across California in the 11 years since the plant’s closure. Furthermore, the supply chains providing the materials for C-17 production will need to be re-established. Machinery and industrial equipment will also need to be re-sourced or retooled.
Nevertheless, it is vital that this long process begins now. The Air Force would need expanded airlift capacity the moment conflict were to break out along the first island chain. Delaying action until a crisis emerges may mean failure to deliver the airlift capacity the joint force requires when it is needed most.
This piece originally appeared in The National Interest