When Moon Met Kim: Why South Korea Needs To Push North Over Denuclearization

COMMENTARY Asia

When Moon Met Kim: Why South Korea Needs To Push North Over Denuclearization

Apr 30, 2018 5 min read
COMMENTARY BY
Bruce Klingner

Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia

Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia.
South Korean President Moon Jae In (R) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un take a walk near the border between their countries in Panmunjeom on April 27, 2018. Kyodo/Newscom

Key Takeaways

Tougher U.N. resolutions and U.S. laws prevent Moon from providing the unconditional South Korean economic largesse of the past.

By adopting a stance of mutual arms control rather than unilateral North Korean denuclearization, Kim seeks to gain recognition as a nuclear weapons state.

The path ahead is uncertain, but the next few months may prove critical for the Korean Peninsula.

During this week’s inter-Korean summit, South Korean President Moon Jae-in has a choice. He can lay a strong foundation of resolve against North Korean transgressions and create positive momentum for the summit. Or he could follow the precedent of his progressive predecessors and sacrifice important principles on the altar of Korean reconciliation.

Last year, Moon adopted a more centrist policy toward North Korea than originally expected, given his left-of-center background. Moon reversed several of his earlier positions. For example, he allowed the U.S. to deploy THAAD missile defenses in South Korea, admitted that reopening the joint Kaesong economic venture with North Korea would violate U.N. resolutions, and emphasized the primacy of pressure over engagement.

Moon may have been driven to adopt a tougher policy by North Korean misbehavior as well as by stronger international and domestic constraints on any softening of policy toward the regime. Tougher U.N. resolutions and U.S. laws prevent Moon from providing the unconditional South Korean economic largesse of the past. Also, South Korean public opinion is far more supportive of the U.S. alliance, more critical of Pyongyang, and more skeptical that diplomacy will alter regime behavior than during previous inter-Korean summits.

Siren Song Of Engagement And Reconciliation 

That said, Washington remains concerned that Moon will respond to Pyongyang’s siren’s song of engagement and reconciliation. Recently, Moon has been striking a more conciliatory tone towards Pyongyang. He claims North Korea has abandoned its long-standing demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. But Pyongyang has made similar remarks in the past -- only to subsequently demand such a step -- along with abrogating the bilateral defense treaty and removing the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee.

In 1992, previous leader Kim Jong-il indicated the North would accept having U.S. troops remain in the South, while former U.S. negotiator to the Six Party Talks Robert Gallucci recalled he had been told by his North Korean counterpart in 1994 that “we don’t actually require that the U.S. remove its troops from the South.” During the 2000 inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong-il told South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, “It is desirable that U.S. troops stay as a peacekeeping force in Korea, instead of a hostile force against the North."

Moon has also telegraphed a desire to work towards achieving a permanent peace treaty to replace the armistice which ended the 1950-53 Korean War. Of course, North Korea previously agreed several times in the past to work with South Korea on creating peace, only to abrogate the armistice in 2009 and 2013, along with all inter-Korean mutual non-hostility agreements.

Rather than announcing an end to the Korean War or signing a peace agreement, Moon should limit South Korea to a joint statement pledging steps towards reducing the risk of military conflict, such as initiating discussions on confidence- and security-building measures. Since South Korea is not a signatory to the armistice, a formal peace treaty would require participation by the U.S. (signing for the U.N.) and China -- both signatories to the armistice -- as well as U.N. approval.

Denuclearization Bluff?

President Moon has also adopted a benign interpretation of North Korea’s declaration last week of a nuclear and missile test moratorium. Moon welcomed the North Korean announcement as showing regime “sincerity for complete denuclearization [so that] expectation is growing that the goal may be achieved faster than initially predicted.”

The North has previously announced nuclear and missile moratoriums, only to later break them. This month’s pledge is also easily reversible. Moreover, Kim Jong-un declared that “no nuclear test and intermediate-range and ICBM test-fire are necessary [since] the work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets was finished.” Pyongyang is declaring that it won’t test because it no longer needs to.

Most importantly, North Korea’s statement did not include any indication of an intention to commit to denuclearize during the forthcoming summit meetings. Rather than a signal of acquiescence, the North Korean declaration is a gesture of defiance. Instead, the regime declared that “suspension of nuclear testing is an important process for global nuclear disarmament.

By adopting a stance of mutual arms control rather than unilateral North Korean denuclearization, Kim seeks to gain recognition as a nuclear weapons state. Such a stance, however, runs directly counter to U.N. resolutions requiring complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean denuclearization.

Bold And Creative Steps

In the run-up to the summit, Moon has advocated concessions from all sides and stressed the need for “bold and creative” steps -- which in the past always meant Seoul calling on the U.S. for yet more compromises. South Korean officials have signaled they favor a phased approach to denuclearization with reciprocal steps by all sides.

This is strongly at odds with the U.S. emphasis on North Korea expeditiously abandoning its nuclear weapons prior to receiving benefits. Indeed, U.S. law (the North Korean Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act Sections 401 and 402) stipulates precise steps Pyongyang must take before U.S. sanctions can be suspended or terminated.

By vigorously pressing for diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang, President Moon caused the Korean Peninsula to step back from the seemingly inevitable abyss of military conflict. For this, he is to be highly commended.

But the manner in which he engages with Kim will impact international efforts to induce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear arsenal as well as Seoul’s bilateral relationship with the United States. Moon should press Pyongyang to initiate denuclearization and emphasize that pressure will continue as long as the triggering behavior continues.

This year has already experienced many startling, even historic developments. The path ahead is uncertain, but the next few months may prove critical for the Korean Peninsula. Let’s hope Presidents Moon and Trump are up to the challenge.

This piece originally appeared in Forbes on 4/26/18 https://www.forbes.com/sites/insideasia/2018/04/26/when-moon-meets-kim-why-south-korea-needs-to-push-north-over-denuclearization/#18eb6f004221