America has had a "one China" policy for as long as I can remember
- and - being a historian, I claim a long memory. But the problem
with bumper-sticker diplomacy is that it encourages sloppy
thinking. And sloppy thinking in foreign policy leads to dangerous
misperceptions. The latest dust-up over Taiwan President Chen
Shui-bian's assertion that there are, in fact, two China's - "one
country on each side [of the Taiwan Strait]" - is a case in
point.
"One China" does not mean that the United States accepts Beijing's
claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. It simply means that the United
States recognizes one Chinese government at a time. The State
Department understands this and is very careful about the
phraseology. But the concept is recondite and the oft-repeated
phrase "one China policy" breeds intellectual laziness outside
Foggy Bottom. In May, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, speaking
off-brief went so far as to say that the United States' non-support
of Taiwan independence was "another of saying we're opposed to"
Taiwan independence. Worried telegrams from Taipei flooded the
State Department and a few days later Wolfowitz, responding to
virtually the same question, admitted that he should not have
improvised his response.
"Sometimes," he explained, "the Russians say that repetition is
the mother of learning (and) it's better to say the same thing over
and over again than to improvise and I think I even had a lesson a
few days ago."
Wolfowitz was obviously suffering from "one China" syndrome, the
most visible symptom of which is thinking that "one China" means
Taiwan is part of China. It doesn't and it isn't.
This was reaffirmed by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
recently in Beijing when he said "by saying we do not support
(Taiwan Independence), it's one thing, it's different from saying
we oppose it." Of course, Deputy Secretary Armitage may have been
frustrated by the Chinese invitation to the Iraqi Foreign Minister
to visit Beijing the day after Armitage's visit. Armitage,
well-versed in the nuance of Taiwan policy, no doubt has his own
slings and arrows to send Beijing's way in a guerrilla campaign of
nuance. No - "one China" does not mean Taiwan is part of
China.
The American view of "one China" is that there is only one legal
government of China at a time. It is a guilt-ridden remnant of the
1920s when paying lip-service to China's "territorial integrity"
had become an international pass time which permitted no less than
nine world powers and semi-powers to claim extra-territorial rights
in the vast collection of warlordies that was China.
On July 25, 1928, driven by a legalistic concern (but not
necessarily a practical respect) for the integrity of China's
landmass, the United States concluded that Chiang Kai-shek's
"Republic of China" was about as close as anyone would get to a
viable Chinese regime and decided Chiang could represent all of
China. Through the 1930s, World War II and the Chinese Civil War,
Washington continued to view the "R.O.C." as the sole legal
government of China. The R.O.C., however, was defeated by the
Communists in 1949 and for all practical purposes, it was replaced
by the "People's Republic of China."
This is where "one China" broke down. The exiled R.O.C. authorities
had decamped to the former Japanese colony of Taiwan where they
continued to call themselves the government of China. Rather than
having official ties with two Chinas (as Great Britain did until
1972), the Americans continued a "one China" policy and in May 1950
prepared to abandon the R.O.C. in Taipei and accept the PRC in
Peking. But in June 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War made that
impossible, and the Americans resigned themselves to continuing the
fiction that Chiang Kai-shek was the legal ruler of the mainland.
But Washington never acknowledged him as the sovereign ruler of
Taiwan.
The corruption of the Chiang regime in mainland China through the
War and after left Washington with a bad taste in its mouth.
Washington was unmoved when Chiang's troops were finally defeated
by the communists. But the brutality of Chiang's army in Taiwan led
Secretary of State Dean Acheson to report in April 1947 in a letter
to Senator Ball, that the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to
China "has not yet been formalized." It is a little-noted fact of
diplomatic history that since March 1947, Washington has repeatedly
and explicitly NOT recognized R.O.C. sovereignty over Taiwan, and
has less repeatedly and not so explicitly refrained from commenting
on Beijing's claims to Taiwan - except to "acknowledge" that
Beijing has such claims.
Which is why Washington is in the delicate position
vis-à-vis Beijing over Taiwan now.
In Nixon's landmark "Shanghai Communiqué" of February 1972,
the "U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States
Government does not challenge that position."
Fair enough. As long as both sides claimed to be China, that was
their business. But the Chinese side of the Shanghai
Communiqué insisted that China "firmly opposes any
activities which aim at the creation of 'one China, one Taiwan',
'one China, two governments', 'two Chinas', an 'independent Taiwan'
or advocate that 'the status of Taiwan remains to be determined'.
In short, China demanded free rein to impose its will on
Taiwan.
In the following decade, the United States joined in two more communiqués with China, each carefully noncommittal on the matter of Taiwan. In August 1982, exactly twenty years ago, President Ronald Reagan approved the last such communiqué which rhetorically reassured Beijing that the U.S. "has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan.'" Yet just one month earlier, Reagan had communicated to Taiwan president Chiang Ching-kuo "six assurances" on the meaning of the upcoming communiqué and averred that "the U.S. has not altered its long-standing position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan." Shortly afterward, the Department of State assured the U.S. Senate that "the United States takes no position on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty."
One month ago, when Taiwan's president had the temerity to say
"Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied,
downgraded, marginalized, nor treated as a local government," was
he wrong? When he insisted that "Taiwan is not a part of any other
country, nor is it a local government or province of another
country. Taiwan can never be another Hong Kong or Macau, because
Taiwan has always been a sovereign state," he was stating a
historical fact. But when he said "in short, Taiwan and China
standing on opposite sides of the Strait, there is one country on
each side," distracted policy-makers in Washington had the uneasy
feeling that the Taiwan leader was violating some tenet of the "one
China" policy. He wasn't.
Washington should have learned its lesson in June 1990 when the
U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad told the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein
that " . . . we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like
your border disagreement with Kuwait. Our only concern is that they
be resolved peacefully." This is unsettlingly close to our Taiwan
policy: "we take no position, we only want it solved
peacefully."
Taiwan is truly the most dynamic and vibrant democracy in Asia, its
human rights record is exemplary, it is one of America's top ten
export markets. The United States has a security commitment to the
island embodied in U.S. domestic law, the Taiwan Relations Act.
And, finally, U.S. law treats Taiwan as an independent state. But
the misuse of the term "one China" policy has persuaded
policy-makers in Washington that somehow we must humor China into
thinking that we accept its claims to Taiwan. This is dangerous.
When he was Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger asked his top China
hands "if Taiwan is recognized by us as part of China, then it may
become irresistible to them, our saying we want a peaceful solution
has no force, it is Chinese territory, what are we going to do
about it?" To which Arthur Hummel, then assistant secretary and
later ambassador to Beijing responded, "down the road, perhaps the
only solution would be an independent Taiwan." Hummel understood
the nuance of "one China." But the term has lost its meaning. It is
time we were rid of it. Maybe the policy should be called "one
China at a time."
Originally appeared in Taiwan News.