Inside Communist Nicaragua: The Miguel Bolanos Transcripts

Report Americas

Inside Communist Nicaragua: The Miguel Bolanos Transcripts

September 30, 1983 24 min read Download Report
Milton R.
Senior Visiting Fellow

(Archived document, may contain errors)

2 94 September 30, 1983 INSIDE COMMUNIST NICARAGUA THE MIGUEL BOLANOS TRANSCRIPTS INTRODUCTION In July 1979, a coalition spearheaded by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the governme nt of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua reforms and free elections met with enthusiastic support from those who viewed Somozats regime as corrupt and repressive.

Among those early revolutionaries was 20-year-old Miguel Bolanos Hunter. Bolanos joined the Sandi nista State Security apparatus and rapidly rose through the ranks to become a counter intelligence officer in section F-2--the second highest level of the organization. The higher Bolanos rose, however, the more disillusioned he became Sandinista promises of progressive He soon discovered that the Sandinistas! promises were empty. state in Nicaragua and to export revolution to the other nations of the hemisphere. To meet their goals, the Sandinistas created a regime more repressive than Somoza's, controlli n g virtually every aspect of life in Nicaragua. With the support of Cuba and the Soviet-Union, Nicaragua has become the centerpiece of the commufist plan to undermine Latin America and the main channel for arms and guerrillas to communist insurgents in Hon d uras Costa Rica, and El Salvador In fact, they had a hidden agenda--to establish a Marxist On May 7, 1983, Bolanos commandeered a private airplane and Because his mother is an American citizen, escaped to Costa Rica he was able to enter the United States. He.has since provided American authorities with valuable and verifiable first-hand information on the Nicaraguan threat to Latin America.

The unedited excerpts that follow are taken from a series of interviews with Bolanos conducted by Heritage Policy Ana lyst 2 Richard Araujo at The Heritage Foundation during June and July 1983 BACKGROUND There is new strategy of communism in Central America. Its goal is complete control, not through region wide Revolution, but in sinister incremental steps. Marxism is al ienating the Democratic forces opposed to it from their potential supporters and is simul- taneously masquerading as l1progressiveI1 for world public opinion.

Soon communism will establish itself firmly, and those opposed to it will still be girding for battle in the war they have already lost.

Central America. That is the process now underway in all the countries of The goal of communism is the gradual destruction of any non-communist obstacle blocking its access to total control political parties, freedo m of the press, the electoral process, the influence of the Church, and the power of private enterprise In Nicaragua, all these sectors are being neutralized and destroyed by State Security forces before the elections of 19

85. At that time; the Sandhistas will hold sham elections and thus prove to the international community their claim of existence of political pluralism.

Before coming to power, the Sandinistas signed accords with the free enterprise sector, the Catholic Church, and the existing politic al parties, in order to unite the entire country against Somoza. Once that was accomplished, however, all these sectors were betrayed. Private enterprise has been virtually destroyed by State controls and nationalizations. Although freedom of ex= pression was promised, it lasted no longer than three months after the triumph of the Revolution. The Church is now being attacked and maligned, as a result of disturbances provoked by the Sandinista front to discredit and neutralize its political power. Today, th e Church recognized by the Sandinistas as legitimate representatives of the Catholic followers is the l'Church of the Poor,Il previously known as the IIPeoples Church.l# The new church is not recognized by Rome and Archbishop Obando y Bravo of Managua has officially discredited its activities.

When the Sandinistas assumed control of the government in 1979, they had to share power,with democratic forces; a situation which they never had any intention of maintaining. They con- solidated their position by taki ng control of all the propaganda media, the army, the internal police, the prisons and a very large part of what by then appeared to be a democratic political system.

Thus, as the revolution developed, opposing political forces did not have any opportunity to argue their case against the changes imposed by the Marxist Sandinistas.

During the campaigns, the Sandinistas subtly discredited those opposi'tion elements that the FSLN leadership wished to portray as 3 aligned with the Somozist National Guard. Through the use of dis 5nformation, front organizations, youth organizations, teacher I organizations, and a barrage of Sandinista propaganda, the Marxists successfully p revented the opposition from becoming recognized as a viable alternative to communism, thus assuring that no force within the opposition became a political threat to them.

After the triumph of the Revolution, the Sandinista Front rejected democratic forces such as the MDN (Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguenese) and the Conservative Party of Nicaragua, which played important roles in the Revolution, claiming that the FSLN was the lone force that overthrew Somoza.and remains the only al ternative to Somoza. , T he Marxists scorned the role of the Church and Archbishop Obando y Bravo, who sometimes acted as mediator between the FSLN and Somoza The Sandinistas now claim that Arch bishop Obando y Bravo performed this role solely for personal interests. This is part of the propaganda used today against him.

Archbishop Obando y Bravo always maintained his neutrality; he criticized the Somoza regime as well as the Sandinista idea of a military victory.

HOW STATE SECURITY IS ORGANIZED a The line of governmental command to neutralize the opposition There are numerous sectors charged with is extremely well organized in Nicaragua and is under the super vision of State Security broad responsibilities. Sector F-1 is responsible for interroga tion and capture; F-2 for survei l lance of foreign embassies F-3 deals with counter-revolutionaries; F-4 with political parties churches, and independent labor unions F-5 with economic control F-6 with operations, technology, telephone and mail interception the clandestine searching of di p lomats, internal intelligence and filming of events surrounding area, the suburbs, and mob control can Embassy (Unit A), Latin American Embassies (Unit B European and Asian Embassies (Unit C), and hotel accommodations for the press. There are about thirty to forty people in this section alone Sector F-7 has responsibility for the Sector F-2 has a number of units, covering the CIA and Ameri Lenin Cerna is the Chief of Security. This includes all in telligence and counterintelligence. All the F Sections are counter intelligence units and'come under the direct command of Cerna.

Through the State Security operations, the Sandinistas have been able to virtually control all aspects of.Nicaraguan lifestyle domestically and politically. With their counterintelligen ce surveillance they have infiltrated all levels of Nicaraguan society THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CHURCH SI The project to neutralize the Church, the most powerful force opposing the Sandinistas, is directed toward denigrating the Church 4 hierarchy, associ ating it with the Somoza guard, and identifying it with the U.S. and the Nicaraguan wealthy classes.

The Sandinistas have used different types of operations to accomplish this. One is the use of government-organized mobs, called "divine mobsif by Commander Tomas Borge. Such mobs are placed in parishes, where they pose as devout Catholics. They gradually gain power by supporting priests who back the revolution.

The idea is to divide the Church and to make it look as though the Church establishment is the enemy and these llprogressivelf priests are for the people.

For example, it was an F-4 operation that discredited Father The woman he Carballo, who was dragged through the streets naked and appeared on the front page of local newspapers and on television, a fter supposedly having been caught by a jealous husband. was accused of having been caught with actually was a Sandinista prostitute considered to be the mistress of the High Command. She lived in the hills, but was sent to Father Carballo's parish on the opposite side of town. This woman approached Father Carballo and said she was a Sandinistawho wanted to repent and seek his counsel.

The whole incident was orchestrated to discredit the priest because he is the manager of the Catholic radio station. The w hole operation was so skillfully orchestrated that, prior to the priest's being accosted, mobs had been placed outside the house TV cameras and newspaper photographers were ready, and an officer of the F-7 section was selected to play the role of the jeal o us husband (the woman was not married). In front of the house a van with dark colored windows from the F-1 section was parked. It carried two important observers, Lenin Cerna and Tomas Borge, two governing directors of the Sandinista regime. The F-7 agent posing as her l1husbandlf tore the clothes of the priest inside the house and hit him, dragging him to the front door where the mobs were gathered. The woman, meanwhile, took her clothes off in accordance with the plan and was carried out to the police st ation, giving credibility to the story.

In another related incident, Archbishop Obando y Bravo removed a pro-Sandinista priest from a parish in Santa Rosa. In retalia tion, the Sandinista mobs played the role of parishoners and creat ed an uprising taking over the church. sacraments and turned the building into a warehouse. The govern- ment filmed the 'Ispontaneousll incident for propaganda purposes The mob took away church The mobs that heckled the Pope during his visit to Nicaragua were also organized by State Security. vented large numbers of Catholics who wanted to participate in the papal mass from getting close to John Paul 11 They simultaneously pre ANTI-BUSINESS HARASSMENT Harassment of the business community began in 1980 with the assassination of b usiness leader Jorge Salazar, head of the Nicara5 guan Businessmen's Association (COSEP I am personally aware of this incident as the head of all the F sections, Alejandro Royero, gave me details of all the players and how-it was planned to send Jose Monc a da, Cerna's assistant, as a double agent to provoke Salazar to join the armed movement against the Sandinistas that Moncada led. Salazar was killed when he and Moncada went to a gas station to pick up arms. Moncada was armed and Salazar was not. The secur ity guards shot at Salazar only. Following the incident Moncada was sent to Cuba. He returned from Cuba in 1983 and holds a high position in State Security.

Business leaders have also been subjected to harassment. The jailing of nine businessmen in Februar y 1982 was part of an operation to scare them into leaving the country and to make them aware that they were not immune from Sandinista repression. idea is to make it so those who remain will cooperate with the Sandinistas.

The OPERATION SPIDERWEB This op eration was one of the final strategic projects which involved discrediting political leaders, the Catholic Church, the private sector, and independent labor unions, with the idea of painting American imperialism as the manipulator of these organi- zation s. This propaganda scheme was organized in efforts of obtaining their control of them by 1985, making the FSLN the only legitimate political party in power in Nicaragua.

For the last two years, I had been assigned on various occa sions to tape, follow, photograph, and bug political officers and other diplomats of the U.S. Embassy in conversations with different political, church, and independent union leaders in Managua. T he idea for propaganda was to show the lllinksll between these officers and the different local leaders. In particular, I was in charge of following U.S. political officer Linda Pfeifel from June to December of last year. I was able to learn everything ab o ut her. We were ordered to do a number of films of her activities and edit the film to show a conspiracy against the revolution. We would provoke American double agents, telling the agents to lead 'the Americans into forming a group in opposition to the r egime. In this manner we could frame diplomats and expose them as CIA agents, completing the internal propaganda campaign in efforts of getting support from the populace and proving their propaganda correct.

Upon my departure on May 7, the operation to dis credit the Americans was temporarily halted. taken place in April but, due to lack of sufficient evidence it was postponed. Knowing that I would disclose the operation, they speeded up the operation and decided on criminal charges against Linda Pfeifel Th e original expos6 was to have The films that were shown to the international press impli cating Miss Pfeifel were in reality a compilation of films that had been collected since January 1982. 6 All the plans for Operation Spiderweb were under the direct su p ervision of a Cuban. General Roberto (nom de guerre) was the former head of counterintelligence in Cuba and now is an advisor to the chief of security in Nicaragua. F-2, who collect the information was called "Pancho The Cuban advisor in section The incid ent with the Americans is only one of many planned for other foreign diplomats of Western nations.

PRESS MANIPULATION Since 1979 the Sandinistas have been working with the foreign press through F-2 Section D. It collects information about all the correspon dents who come to Nicaragua, categorizing those who are useful, manageable, or hostile. For example on numerous occasions, whenever a network crew would arrive at their hotel, members of the F-2 D section were secretly sent to their rooms to review video t apes made by groups such as CBS, NBC, or ABC. Some times the tapes were confiscated and replaced with blank tape. Their notes were read and cassette tapes listened to--all this while the crew was on assignment for a long period away from the hotel. The Mi n ister of Tourism has assisted in creating a center for sur- veillance of the international press, which on a regular basis bugs reporters1 rooms. Hotel clerks are in reality security agents, all coordinated by State Security. This process really begins at the airport where passports of reporters are photographed and files are kept o'n them.

The more serious censorship of journalists is done upon their All passports exiting the country at the airport. without their knowledge while they await departure are checked against the files taken on their arrival.

During my last few months as a counterintelligence officer I discovered a plan to keep even better control of journalists.

This entailed the F-2 D section assigning colored ID cards to all journalists. The se would be according to how favorable they had been to the Sandinistas. Those who have been favorable will have better access to all areas of importance, including the coverage of the fighting in the North of the country.

Roberto Sanchez is the public re lations man for the .army and is in charge of taking journalists to the war zone. The security section decides who can go, and these are always judged,the most flexible and favorable. There is an understanding that they are going out at their own risk, bu t F-2 D never really takes them to an area of combat. have to give the Sandinistas copies of everything they film. The Sandinistas would prepare an area beforehand, taking them to an area where there is some fighting and where the Sandinistas con- trol the anti-Sandinista groups It is important to show that the Sandinistas are winning the war All information is reviewed According to prior agreement,'television crews 7 The Sandinistas have also worked in ways of manipulating local international press represe ntatives in efforts of controlling their activities. One correspondent in Managua for a widely respected American press organization has been working as an agent of the F-2 D section since December 19

82. Though he is not being paid, he is receiving direct ion from State Security. He is sometimes critical of the Sandinistas in his dispatches, but it is only to maintain credibility. For example, he will do interviews with democratic officials and then give the information to the Sandinistas His employer does not know that he is working for the Sandinistas. However, he is not a full agent because State he could be a double agent. working like him of the Sandinistas abroad the Catholic Maryknoll Order of Missionaries. Foreign Minister, Miguel D'Escoto, is a Mar y knoll priest and the former editor of Mar knoll magazine, a Catholic publication which has printed stories avor le to the Sandinistas and very critical of the rest of the governments of Latin America. DIEscoto has used his influence in the Catholic Church in the United States to gain support for the Sandinistas force both in Latin America and in the United States. The Sandi- nistas have realized they need the promotion of a religious group to have a credible image in the U.S. several religious organization s in support of the Sandinista regime that promotes the FSLN abroad Security believes that the CIA could have planted him and that I I There are many other journalists Journalists are not the only ones used to promote the image A number of religious repres e ntatives have been manipulated: one of the most prominent among them is I The Sandinistasl I The Maryknoll Order represents a very influential Catholic Maryknoll is only one of The Sandinistas have skillfully taken advantage of U.S minority groups such as the American Indians, to project an image of people oppressed by the U.S. At one time, representatives of the American Indian caucus were taken to Managua, where the Sandi nistas claimed they were together as oppressed victims of the United States. Follow i ng the Indian representatives! return to the U.S they spoke in solidarity with the Sandinistas. But the campaign failed to affect the whole American Indian community as they did not share a unanimous consent with their visiting representatives ENMAN RIGHT S DENIALS The Sandinista security forces systematically employ methods When the Sandinistas bring someone in for interro They apply the KGB method of psycho of interrogation against their opponents that deny their basic human rights. gation, they usually n e ed only to confirm information or to obtain names they do not yet have. logical torture. Even the jails are constructed for psychological torture; their layouts have been brought from Cuba and are based on KGB models. 8 The F-1 interrogators are trained b y Cubans who themselves They have the ability Outside Managua trained for five years in the Soviet Union to reduce anyone's resistance within two days the methods are not so sophisticated In the north, anti-Sandinista rebels are often brutally killed en ma s se. foraebriefing, where they are put on TV, and the rest will be killed vest cut In this, the prisoner's arms and legs are cut off while he is alive, and he is left to bleed to death. It is an old technique used by Somoza and Sandino of those who was psy c hologically tortured. formation than he realized. Due to the interrogation, he negoti ated with the Sandinistas. Later, however, we realized it was an intelligent move on his part, because it allowed him to get away. Argentine Victor Frances was interroga t ed in this manner when he was kidnapped in Costa Rica and brought back to Managua. It was then that he was forced to make statements about U.S. and Argentine involvement in helping the anti-Sandinista rebels If fifteen are captured, two will be taken to M a nagua Often they are killed by stabbing, but there is also the Stedman Fagoth, the leader of the Miskito Indians, was one He gave F-1 more in COMMUNIST BLOC INVOLWMENT Intervention by Cubans, Soviets, and other elements of the Socialist bloc exists on a g r and scale in all areas of Nicaraguan society today. as a consequence, there is rapid movement toward a Marxist economy. There is already a plan to establish firm economic ties with the Soviet Union There are Soviet and Cuban political advisors and Renan M o ntero (nom de guerre commander of Nicaraguan intel- ligence service, was a former colonel in Cuba's intelligence ser- vice, who became a nationalized Nicaraguan citizen. He was ordered to work with the Sandinistas fifteen years ago, in efforts to help the m seize power and set up communism in Nicaragua. leader Tomas Borge was so pleased with his work that he asked Fidel Castro to allow him to remain permanently in Nicaragua.

Sandinista Today, Nicaragua has 3,000 Cuban soldiers (not counting high- level advisors, and a covert team of 2,000 soldiers working as technical advisors building roads and handling heavy machinery.

Their purpose is to help Nicaragua in case of an attack or emer- gency. and 40 high-level officials on the staff of the regular army. Ther e are 200 Soviet military advisors in Nicaragua, of whom 50 are high-level officials working with the Army. There are also high-level Cuban and Soviet advisors working with intelligence and counterintelligence. The Cubans' role with the regular Army invol v es military training of low ranking Nicaraguan soldiers, as well as developing all aspects of Army security and defense There is a total of 400 Cuban advisors to the Army alone, 9 In the counterintelligence section where I worked (F-2A there are two Sovie t and a Cuban advisor. There can be at least seven to ten Cubans at any given time; the Soviets only come occa- sionally to review and brief the F-2 unit. Soviet advisors involved in all aspects of Nicaraguan state security, along with some 400 Cubans. The r e are 40 to 50 East Germans and about 20 to 25 Bulgarians. The Bulgarians have a center of operation dealing with counterintelligence matters where they process information gathered by our office and then make re- commendations on the operations. Bulgaria n s are expert analysts in matters of counterintelligence. The East Germans also get to see data we collect and will give their analysis of our findings. The F-2 section, which has the surveillance of foreign embassies, has several East German advisors. The i r interest is mainly con cerned with operations directed against the West German Embassy. East Germany has provided Nicaragua with their latest surveillance and bugging equipment. The Soviets'have as well given technical equipment for security and counter i ntelligence operations In total there are 70 The State Security forces have hand guns which are the same as those the KGB uses 9mm short Makarof which were gifts from the Soviets. The whole structure of the security system, the methods and means of workin g , are from handbooks and studies given in Cuba and Bulgaria. for State Security in Nicaragua. The Soviets have already built a school The PLO and Libyans have also established headquarters in Nic'aragua as a convenient Western Hemisphere base from which t o work against Israel help, including light planes especially designed for anti-terrorist activities.

Libya is also sending military and financial SOVIET ARMS Arms from the communist bloc network have flowed freely into Nicaragua. Today the army, the milit ia, and the police, including the security police, special troops, and commandos, are outfitted with Soviet arms.

Union to Nicaragua include bazookas, machine guns, mines, and hand guns. All cannons are Soviet-made, including Katuska recoilless and .45 re coilless guns the head of the Nicaraguan Air Force, 80 Soviet MiGs are waiting in Cuba until Nicaraguan pilots return from training in Bulgaria.

There are also armored transport vehicles of Soviet manufacture and Soviet-made artillery. guided surface-to-a ir missiles and the heat-seeking SAM-7 missile Armaments that have been sent by the Soviet There are 100 Soviet tanks in Nicaragua and, according to Nicaragua has also received radar Two subterranean missile bases have been placed in Nicaragua. One is loc a ted in the Sandino International Airport; the other in a restricted area near Managua, in a project called IIGranja 10 The Soviets have rented the port of South San Juan. are expected to repair and recondition it for receiving their large fishing vessels. But, while they need the port for economic reasons, international communism also needs this port for the pur- pose of arms delivery directly to Central America They Afterwards of course, there is the possibility of submarine use I Furthermore, the Soviets are already building a channel through Nicaragua so they will not have to depend on the Panama Canal If Panama breaks ties with Nicaragua, the Soviets will have to build much faster. Aside from the port they are building in San Juan del Sur, on the Pacifi c , they are also going to build two more ports-one on the Lake of Managua, close to the capital city, and another on the Lake of Nicaragua. the San Juan River to the Atlantic. It is the same route that Americans thought of using instead of the Panama Canal at the be ginning of the century Then they will dredge EXPORTING REVOLUTION Nicaragua has become the.base of operations for the spread of international communism in the Western Hemisphere. island and easily watched. However, Nicaragua has a commercial air p ort, and ships can leave Nicaragua more easily than Cuba It is the psychological center of support to reawaken the revolu- tionary consciousness. The M19, Montoneros, E'MLN, EGP of Guatemala. and the armed groups of Costa Rica and Argentina all have their center of operations in Nicaragua. These are preparing for a new invasion of Argentina and Colombia advice, and direction on how to manage both.the war and interna- tional politics. Salvadoran guerrillas have been and continue to be trained in Nicaragua. T he Sandinistas have helped the Salva- dorans with their air force, army, and navy, in transporting arms into El Salvador. Some of the arms come from Cuba via Nicaragua Cuba is an Nicaragua has become the center for revolutionary reawakening 6 In El Salvad o r, the Sandinistas are offering total help The Salvadorans have two command centers in Nicaragua: one for communications and the other to meet with the Nicaraguan high command. The Salvadoran high command stays in Managua all the time, unless they go back to rally the troops. flown in for a day and flown back. homes in Nicaragua designated to certain individuals already. carefully thought out: mand the armed forces They are then The political people have The insurgents have all the positions' in their ilgo vernmentll who shall have a Ministry, who will com- They have everything very well calculated.

Everything has been 11 ARMS TRANSFERS There are many routes used by th e Sandinistas to transfer arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas. At one time, one of the routes was from Mexico, through Guatemala into El Salvador; they used trucks and mules for transport. There is an international arsenal of arms in Mexico where these weap ons come from.

Other routes have been through Honduras, along the border with El Salvador and Nicaragua, and along the Pacific coast of El Salvador in fast speedboats that made landings on deserted beaches. The bulk of the arms were delivered in the early part of 1980 to 19

81. This is when the Sandinistas delivered some 6,000-7,000 machine guns and rifles. At this time the Salvadorans do not need any more arms, only ammunition. They already have five times more than the Sandinistas had when they overthrew Somoza.

Recently, aircraft small enough to land on highways have been used, usually two planes a day. at a time, along with logistic supplies. Because of radar inter- vention, the Sandinistas use parachute drops to deliver their supplies, when it is diff icult to make a landing. This is one of the reasons guerrillas in El Salvador hold onto areas of highways for several hours These planes drop 30-40 rifles GUERRILLA ASSISTANCE TO HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA There was never a guerrilla group in Honduras until 1980-1981, when they got organization from this international communist group.

The Hondurans They realize that, if the guerrillas win in El Salvador, they will spread into their country. The Honduran guerrillas are the Cinchoneros. There are 400 Cinchoneros in Honduras. They have been trained in Nicaragua since 1979 There is a special interest by Nicaragua to destabilize the Honduran government--so much that they have created a special commando force to covertly go into Honduran territory and at tack. Last year, they had a test run of attacks against anti-Sandinista rebels. They crossed into Honduran territory and wiped out a camp of two hundred rebels. These attacks have been repeated, though with fewer casualties.

There is a major plan by the Sa ndinistas to test the Honduran military to see how far they will venture into entering Nicaraguan territory in efforts to provoke an attack on Honduras. I became aware of this plan through interviews with other agents I had to use for additional operation s relating to counterintelligence.

My first awareness of the interest Nicaragua had against Honduras was early after the triumph of the revolution in October 19

79. At that time there were five Soviet generals as advisors to the Sandinistas. In one of the ir sessions, they displayed the map of Honduras with their military capabilities and next to it 12 was what was left militarily of Nicaragua. It was decided and ad vised at that time that Nicaragua had to concentrate on a military buildup to fight against Honduras. Today, Nicaragua is capable of defeating Honduras militarily in a matter of days.

Since 1979, there has been a plan to neutralize democracy in Costa Rica. The Sandinistas have been doing it covertly in Costa Rica. They are training guerrilla gro ups and infiltrating unions to cause agitation. The strategy is aimed at causing internal struggle in Costa Rica between the labor unions and the govern- ment, and to challenge Costa Rica's police security giving them a military image. When the economy ge t s worse, they will be able to organize popular forces aided by the guerrilla forces already there NEW COMMUNIST CLASS The slogan of the Sandinistas is "Only workers and peasants will obtain power and last until the end." Why? Because they are used to feel ing inferior and are without high expectations In transferring to a Marxist process, they cannot see the differ- ence between the privileged classes under Somoza and the new pri- vileged class under the Marxists.

In a few sectors, the poor do live better, but it is a limited standard preventing them from any achievements. come professionals and work for themselves; they will be controlled as they are in Cuba. And, as in Cuba, the people who belong to the Sandinista party will remain the privileged class, h aving good salaries and living in the best places.

Despite talk about the "new society of Nicaragua,If the leaders who were going to construct this new society spend money on themselves. The commanders feed themselves with the best food while the people are reduced to rationing.

People want to join the party because that is where the good life is. nine commanders. It is called "money of the people.If The poor cannot be The Sandinistas recently bought 70 new cars for their All the commanders have foreign bank accounts.

When Cerna and Borge returned from a trip to the Soviet Union, they gathered 600 top government and party officials together to show them all the things they bought with the money that belonged to the ministry. Bulgarian wine and caviar. Amon g their purchases were many cases of For party members, there are no waiting lines, but a commis- sary well stocked with items which in the open market are heavily rationed and in great shortage. The Nicaraguan people have real- ized that the Sandinista d i rectorate has become like the members of the Somoza family they fought so'hard against. 13 CONCLUSION The Sandinista leadership was trained in Cuba since the early 1960's. Their training was ideologically, politically and militarily supervised by Fidel Ca s tro. guan revolution is merely a revolution of character is naive, it is to be at the margin of reality To think that the model of the Nicaraguan revolution is unique, and to think that there exists the possibility that this revolution be different from o thers is as well naive A revolution is never spontaneous, and in recent history, all revolutions have been motivated and created by one of two forces, capitalism or communism.

International support was given to the revolution, not as a communist revolution, but as a spontaneous revolution. The Sandinistas fabricated propaganda for domestic and international consumption portraying the Nicaraguan revolution and the FSLN as one an d the same. Thus, little by little, world public opinion was led to believe that the radicalization of the revolution was actually a normal response to domestic conspiracy against the revolution To think that the Nicara The window which international commu n ism has opened in Nicaragua must be closed. rebels but also playing "hard ball with the international forces supporting the Sandinistas. They include the Socialist Interna tional, Mexico, Venezuela and some sectors of France. The United Statesemust persua d e these international forces to cut the support they give the Sandinistas into defining themselves and their revolution This involves not only aiding the This will pressure the Sandinistas The U.S. has a moral responsibility to educate the Western world a bout the reality of the Sandinistas. organized propaganda campaign, the Sandinistas are viewed as democrats who will permit elections in 19

85. The U.S. must warn the world about the Sandinistas as it warned about the Nazis in World War 11. The Nazi strate gy is the same as the communist today, the ambition to conquer the world. The Sandinistas are today's Nazis. Though their propaganda and rhetoric proclaim them to be anti-Nazi, they are the moulders of minds and enslavers of human souls Who could be more f ascist than they Through a well U.S. policy should give far more attention to Latin America. The U.S. must open up Latin export economies and increase its economic assistance to the region fits of these actions-but not if communism triumphs in the America n Hemisphere.

The U.S. will reap the bene The most direct assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas is coming from the Sandinista Front, not the Cubans, in the same way in which the Cubans gave assistance to the Nicaraguan Revolution. The practical experienc e needed to conquer El Salvador is based in Managua. The Salvadoran government must be helped, militarily and economically. Pressure must continue against Marxist rebels 14 I The U.S. should not force the Salvadoran government to give the rebels the legit imacy they should earn only through the democratic process.

The U.S. should provide Honduras and Guatemala with military training and assistance. In the case of Honduras, it is a neces- sity to prepare the Honduran military to defend themselves from an attack by Nicaragua.

Nicaraguan military strategy. Costa Rica is as well threatened by Nicaragua but not militarily as much as politically. democratic forces of the U.S. must realize that the Costa Rican democracy is now threatened by Nicaraguan triumph Hond uras has been a prime target of The i The Sandinistas have been fighting for twenty years to im plant communism. It is totally illogical to think that they would have friendly relations with the U.S. when they believe that it is their historic mission to e xport communism to the rest of Latin America. Those Americans who naively think that negotia- tions will solve the problems don't know the Sandinistas. Negoti ations only serve to buy time for the Sandinistas. This is something they tell you quite openly within the Sandinista organi- zation; negotiatlon is only used to buy time to consolidate power.

Communism has come to this hemisphere because the area is of vital economic and strategic importance to the United States. The only option for the U.S. is to s upport those who are trying to defeat the Sandinista regime. If the United States refuses to aid the anti-Sandinista forces, who are growing stronger in in ternal support, it will be morally responsible for selling the Nicaraguan people into slavery. And in a few years, the U.S. will have to respond to communist gains throughout the rest of the American Hemisphere.


Milton R.

Senior Visiting Fellow