Pursuing Universal Retirement Security
Through Automatic IRAs
Joint Written Statement of David C. John
and J. Mark Iwry
Testimony before Subcommittee
on
Long-Term Growth and Debt Reduction
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
June 29, 2006
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Kerry,
and Senator Grassley, we appreciate the opportunity to testify
before you.
We are submitting our testimony as a single joint statement because
we believe strongly in the need for a common strategy to expand
retirement savings, and in the importance of approaching these
issues in a manner that transcends ideological and partisan
differences.
At the request of Committee staff, this
written statement focuses on our proposal to expand retirement
savings for small business workers - the automatic IRA. We are
pleased by the positive reaction the proposal has received and are
grateful to our colleagues, including those in government and in
various stakeholder organizations, who have contributed to these
ideas.
With the looming retirement security
crisis facing our country, policy-makers from both parties are
focused on ways to strengthen pensions and increase savings. Our
proposal for automatic IRAs would provide a relatively simple,
cost-effective way to increase retirement security for the
estimated 71 million workers whose employers (usually smaller
businesses) do not sponsor plans. It would enable these employees
to save for retirement by allowing them to have their employers
regularly transfer amounts from their paycheck to an
IRA.
We are by no means suggesting that the
automatic IRA proposal is the only step that should be taken to
expand retirement savings for small business workers. In fact, we
have long believed in the primacy of employer-sponsored retirement
plans as vehicles for pension coverage. Additionally,
we continue to advocate strongly for the expansion of pension
coverage through automatic features in 401(k) and similar
retirement savings plans.
The automatic 401(k) approach makes
intelligent use of defaults - the outcomes that occur when
individuals are unable or unwilling to make an affirmative choice
or otherwise fail to act - to enlist the power of inertia to
promote saving. Automating enrollment, escalation of contributions,
investment, and rollovers expands coverage in several ways.
Enrolling employees in a plan unless they opt out increases
significantly the number of eligible employees who participate in
the plan. Escalating the amount of the default contribution tends
to increase the amount people save over time. Providing for a
default investment (which participants can reject in favor of other
alternatives) reflecting consensus investment principles such as
diversification and asset allocation tends to raise the expected
investment return on contributions. Finally, making retention or
rollover of benefits rather than consumption the default when an
employee leaves a job furthers the long-term preservation of
retirement savings for their intended purposes. By helping improve
performance under the nondiscrimination standards and generally
making plans more effective in providing retirement benefits, the
automatic 401(k) can also encourage more employers to sponsor or
continue sponsoring plans.
The automatic IRA builds on the success
of the automatic 401(k). Moreover, as explained below, we would
intend and expect the introduction of automatic IRAs to expand the
number of employers that choose to sponsor 401(k) or SIMPLE plans
instead of offering only automatic IRAs. But for millions of
workers who continue to have no employer plan, the automatic IRA
would provide a valuable retirement savings opportunity.
The automatic IRA proposal is set out in
the remainder of this written statement.
[1]David John is a
Senior Research Fellow for Retirement Security and Financial
Institutions at the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy
Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Mark Iwry is Senior Advisor to
The Retirement Security Project, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution, Research Professor at Georgetown University,
and formerly the Benefits Tax Counsel, in charge of national
private pension policy and regulation, at the U.S. Department of
the Treasury.
The Retirement
Security Project is supported by The Pew Charitable Trusts in
partnership with Georgetown University's Public Policy Institute
and the Brookings Institution.
[2]
"Think Tanks:
Allow automatic IRA payroll deductions" USA Today, February
23, 2006; Crenshaw, Albert., "Automatic IRAs - a Quick Fix for
Workers Without Pensions?" Washington Post, February 19,
2006; "The Way to Save" Editorial, New York Times, February
20, 2006; Bernard, Tara, "Groups Propose Payroll Deductions for
IRAs" The Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2006; Iwry, J.
Mark and David John, "The Other 71 Million" The Washington Times,
March 24, 2006; Editorial, Newsday, Feb. 22, 2006; Marketwatch.com
(Feb. 16, 2006). The automatic IRA proposal emerged as one of the
leading recommendations of the 2006 National Summit on Retirement
Savings (Saver Summit).
We have previously
written and testified before Congress on various aspects of
employer-sponsored retirement plans. David John has written and
testified about the funding problems faced by defined benefit
pension plans and about the United Kingdom's pension situation.
Mark Iwry led the Executive Branch efforts in the 1990s to develop
the SIMPLE plan for small business, the startup tax credit for
small employers that adopt new plans, and the saver's credit for
moderate- and lower-income workers, as well as the Executive Branch
initiatives to define, approve and promote 401(k) automatic
enrollment, automatic rollover to restrict pension leakage, and
automatic 401(k) features generally. See also William G. Gale, J.
Mark Iwry and Peter R. Orszag, "The Saver's Credit" (The Retirement
Security Project, Policy Brief No. 2005-2; available at http://www.retirementsecurityproject.org).
[4]
William G.
Gale, J. Mark Iwry and Peter R. Orszag, "The Automatic 401(k): A
Simple Way to Strengthen Retirement Savings," (The Retirement
Security Project, Policy Brief No. 2005-1; available at http://www.retirementsecurityproject.org);
William G. Gale and J. Mark Iwry, "Automatic Investment: Improving
401(k) Portfolio Investment Choices" (The Retirement Security
Project, Policy Brief No. 2005-4; available at http://www.retirementsecurityproject.org).
A second major motivation
for using 401(k) auto enrollment in many companies is management's
sense of responsibility or concern for employees and their
retirement security. Many executives involved in managing employee
plans and benefits have opted for auto enrollment because they
believe far too many employees are saving too little and investing
unwisely and need a strong push to "do the right thing" and take
advantage of the 401(k) plan. This motivation-by no means present
in all employers-is especially unlikely to be driving an employer
that merely permits payroll deposit to IRAs without sponsoring a
retirement plan.
Third, employers might have greater
concern about potential employee reaction to auto enrollment in the
absence of an employer matching contribution. The high return on
employees' investment delivered by the typical 401(k) match helps
give confidence to 401(k) sponsors using auto enrollment that they
are doing right by their employees and need not worry unduly about
potential complaints from workers who failed to read the
notice.
Finally, an employer concern that has
made some plan sponsors hesitate to use auto enrollment with 401(k)
plans might loom larger in the case of auto enrollment with direct
deposit IRAs. This is the concern about avoiding a possible
violation of state laws that prohibit deductions from employee
paychecks without the employee's advance written authorization.
Assuming most direct deposit IRA arrangements are not employer
plans governed by ERISA, such state laws, as they apply to
automatic IRAs, may not be preempted by ERISA because they do not
"relate to any employee benefit plan." For reasons such as these,
without a meaningful change in the law, most employers that are
unwilling to offer a qualified plan today are unlikely to take the
initiative to automatically enroll employees in direct deposit
IRAs.[13]
Not Requiring Employers to Use Automatic
Enrollment
One possible response would be to
require employers to use automatic enrollment in conjunction with
the direct deposit IRAs (while giving the employers a tax credit
and legal protections). The argument for such a requirement would
be that it would likely increase participation dramatically while
preserving employee choice (workers could always opt out), and
that, for the reasons summarized above, employers that do not
provide a qualified plan (or a match) are unlikely to use auto
enrollment voluntarily. The arguments against such a requirement
include the concern that a workforce that presumably has not shown
sufficient demand for a qualified retirement plan to induce the
employer to offer one might react unfavorably to being
automatically enrolled in direct deposit savings without a matching
contribution. (In addition, some small business owners who have
only a few employees and work with all of them on a daily basis
might take the view that automatic enrollment is unnecessary
because of the constant flow of communication between the owner and
each employee.)
It is noteworthy, however, that recent
public opinion polling shows strong support among registered voters
for making saving easier by making it automatic, with 71 percent of
respondents favoring a fully automatic 401(k), including automatic
enrollment, automatic investment, and automatic contribution
increases over time, with the opportunity to opt out at any
stage.[14]
A vast majority (85 percent) of voters said that if they were
automatically enrolled in a 401(k), they would not opt out, even
when given the opportunity to do so. In addition, given the choice,
59 percent of respondents preferred a workplace IRA with automatic
enrollment to one without.
Requiring Explicit "Up or Down" Employee
Elections While Encouraging Auto Enrollment
An alternative approach that has been
used in 401(k) plans and might be particularly well suited to
payroll deposit savings is to require all eligible employees to
submit an election that explicitly either accepts or declines
direct deposit to an IRA. Instead of treating employees who fail to
respond as either excluded or included, this "up or down" election
approach has no default. There is evidence suggesting that
requiring employees to elect one way or the other can raise 401(k)
participation nearly as much as auto enrollment does. Requiring an
explicit election picks up many who would otherwise fail to
participate because they do not complete and return the enrollment
form due to procrastination, inertia, inability to decide on
investments or level of contribution, and the like.[15]
Accordingly, a possible strategy for
increasing participation in payroll deposit IRAs would be to
require employers to obtain a written (including electronic) "up or
down" election from each eligible employee either accepting or
declining the direct deposit to an IRA. Under this strategy,
employers that voluntarily auto enroll their employees in the
direct deposit IRAs would be excused from the requirement that they
obtain an explicit election from each employee because all
employees who fail to elect would be participating. This
exemption-treating an employer's use of auto enrollment as an
alternative means of satisfying its required-election
obligation-would add an incentive for employers to use auto
enrollment without requiring them to use it. Any firms that prefer
not to use auto enrollment would simply obtain a completed election
from each employee, either electronically or on a paper form. And
either way-whether the employer chose to use auto enrollment or the
required-election approach-participation would likely increase
significantly, perhaps even approaching the level that might be
achieved if auto enrollment were required for all payroll deposit
IRAs.
This combined strategy for promoting
payroll deposit IRA participation could be applied separately to
new hires and existing employees: thus, an employer auto enrolling
new hires would be exempted from obtaining completed elections from
all new hires (but not from existing employees), while an employer
auto enrolling both new hires and existing employees would be
excused from having to obtain elections from both new hires and
existing employees.
The required election would not obligate
employers to obtain a new election from each employee every year.
Once an employee submitted an election form, that employee would
not be required to make another election: as in most 401(k) plans,
the initial election would continue throughout the year and from
year to year unless and until the employee chose to change it.
Similarly, an employee who failed to submit an election form and
was auto enrolled by default in the payroll deposit IRA would
continue to be auto enrolled unless and until the employee took
action to make an explicit election.
To maximize participation, employers
would receive a standard enrollment module reflecting current best
practices in enrollment procedures. A nationwide website with
standard forms would serve as a repository of state-of-the-art best
practices in and savings education. The use of automatic enrollment
(whereby employees automatically are enrolled at a statutorily
specified rate of contribution - such as 3% of pay -- unless they
opt out) would be encouraged in two ways. First, the standard
materials provided to employers would be framed so as to present
auto enrollment as the presumptive or perhaps even the default
enrollment method, although employers would be easily able to opt
out in favor of simply obtaining an "up or down" response from all
employees. In effect, such a "double default" approach would use
the same principle at both the employer and employee level by auto
enrolling employers into auto enrolling employees. Second, as
noted, employers using auto enrollment to promote participation
would not need to obtain responses from unresponsive
employees.
Compliance and Enforcement
Employers' use of the required-election
approach would also help solve an additional problem-enforcing
compliance with a requirement that employers offer direct deposit
savings. As a practical matter, many employers might question
whether the IRS would ever really be able to monitor and enforce
such a requirement. Employers may believe that, if the IRS asked an
employer why none of its employees used direct deposit IRAs, the
employer could respond that it told its employees about this option
and they simply were not interested. However, if employers that
were required to offer direct deposit savings had to obtain a
signed election from each eligible employee who declined the
payroll deposit option, employers would know that the IRS could
audit their files for each employee's election. This by itself
would likely improve compliance.
In fact, a single paper or e-mail notice
could advise the employee of the opportunity to engage in payroll
deduction savings and elicit the employee's response. The notice
and the employee's election might be added or attached to IRS Form
W-4. (As noted, the W-4 is the form an employer ordinarily obtains
from new hires and often from other employees to help the employer
comply with its income tax-withholding obligations.) If the
employer chose to use auto enrollment, the notice would also inform
employees of that feature (including the default contribution level
and investment and the procedure for opting out), and the
employer's records would need to show that employees who failed to
submit an election were in fact participating in the payroll
deduction savings.
Employers would be required to certify
annually to the IRS that they were in compliance with the payroll
deposit savings requirements. This might be done in conjunction
with the existing IRS Form W-3 that employers file annually to
transmit Forms W-2 to the government. Failure to offer payroll
deposit savings would ultimately need to be backed up by an
appropriate sanction, such as the threat of civil monetary
penalties or an excise tax.
Portability of Savings
IRAs are inherently portable. Unlike a
401(k) or other employer plan, an IRA survives and functions
independently of the individual saver's employment status. Thus the
IRA owner is not at risk of forfeiting or losing the account or
suffering an interruption in the ability to contribute when
changing or losing employment. As a broad generalization, the
automatic IRAs outlined here presumably would be freely
transferable to and with other IRAs and qualified plans that permit
such transfers. (However, as discussed below, the investment
limitations and other cost-containment features of these IRAs raise
the issue of whether transferability to other types of vehicles
should be subject to restrictions.)
Making a Savings Vehicle
Available
Most current direct deposit arrangements
use a payroll-deduction savings mechanism similar to the 401(k),
but, unlike the 401(k), do not give the employee a ready-made
vehicle or account to receive deposits. The employee must open a
recipient account and must identify the account to the employer.
However, where the purpose of the direct deposit is saving, it
would be useful to many individuals who would rather not choose a
specific IRA to have a ready-made fallback or default account
available for the deposits.
Under this approach, modeled after the
SIMPLE-IRA, which currently covers an estimated 2 million
employees, individuals who wish to direct their contributions to a
specific IRA would do so. The employer would follow these
directions as employers ordinarily do when they make direct
deposits of paychecks to accounts specified by employees. At the
same time, the employer would also have the option of simplifying
its task by remitting all employee contributions in the first
instance to IRAs at a single private financial institution that the
employer designates.[16]
However, even in this case, employees would be able to transfer the
contributions, without cost, from the employer's designated
financial institution to an IRA provider chosen by the
employee.
By designating a single IRA provider to
receive all contributions, the employer could avoid the potential
administrative hassles of directing deposits to a multitude of
different IRAs for different employees, while employees would be
free to transfer their contributions from the employer's designated
institution to an IRA provider of their own choosing. Even this
approach, though, still places a burden on either the employer or
the employee to choose an IRA. For many small businesses, the
choice might not be obvious or simple. In addition, the market may
not be very robust because at least some of the major financial
institutions that provide IRAs may well not be interested in
selling new accounts that seem unlikely to grow enough to be
profitable within a reasonable time. Some of the major financial
firms appear to be motivated at least as much by a desire to
maximize the average account balance as by the goal of maximizing
aggregate assets under management. They therefore may shun small
accounts that seem to lack much potential for rapid
growth.
The current experience with automatic
rollover IRAs is a case in point. Firms are required to establish
these IRAs as a default vehicle for qualified plan participants
whose employment terminates with an account balance of not more
than $5,000 and who fail to provide any direction regarding
rollover or other payout. The objective is to reduce leakage of
benefits from the tax-favored retirement system by stopping
involuntary cashouts of account balances between $1,000 and $5,000.
(Plan sponsors continue to have the option to cash out balances of
up to $1,000 and to retain in the plan account balances between
$1,000 and $5,000 instead of rolling them over to an IRA.) Because
plan sponsors are required to set up IRAs only for "unresponsive"
participants-those who fail to give instructions as to the
disposition of their benefits-these IRAs are presumed to be less
likely than other IRAs are to attract additional contributions.
Accordingly, significant segments of the IRA provider industry have
not been eager to cater to this segment of the market. As a result,
plan sponsors have tended to reduce their cashout level from $5,000
to $1,000 so that new IRAs would not have to be
established.
For somewhat similar reasons, IRA
providers might expect payroll deposit IRAs to be less profitable
than other products. As a result, employers and employees might
well find that providers are not marketing to them aggressively and
that the array of payroll deposit IRA choices is comparatively
limited.
The prospect of tens of millions of
personal retirement accounts with relatively small balances likely
to grow relatively slowly suggests that the market may need to be
encouraged to develop widely available low-cost personal accounts
or IRAs. Otherwise, for "small savers," fixed-cost investment
management and administrative fees may consume too much of the
earnings on the account and potentially even erode principal.[17]
A Standard Default Account
Accordingly, to facilitate saving and
minimize costs, we believe that a strong case can be made for a
default IRA that would be automatically available to receive direct
deposit contributions without requiring either the employee or
employer to choose among IRA providers and without requiring the
employee to take the initiative to open an IRA. Under this
approach, for the convenience of both employees and employers,
those who wish to save but have no time or taste for the process of
locating and choosing an IRA would be able to use a standard
default, or automatic, account. If neither the employer nor the
employee designated a specific IRA provider, the contributions
would go to a personal retirement account within a plan that would
in some respects resemble the federal Thrift Savings Plan (the
401(k)-type retirement savings plan that covers federal government
employees).
These standard default accounts would be
maintained and operated by private financial institutions under
contract with the federal government. To the fullest extent
practicable, the private sector would provide the investment funds,
investment management, record keeping, and related administrative
services. To serve as a default account for direct deposits that
have not been directed elsewhere by employers or employees, an
account need not be maintained by a governmental entity. Given
sufficient quality control and adherence to reasonably uniform
standards, various private financial institutions could contract to
provide the default accounts, on a collective or individual
institution basis, more or less interchangeably-perhaps allocating
customers on a geographic basis or in accordance with other
arrangements based on providers' capacity. These fund managers
could be selected through competitive bidding. Once individual
default accounts reached a predetermined balance (e.g., $15,000)
sufficient to make them potentially profitable for many private IRA
providers, account owners would have the option to transfer them to
IRAs of their choosing.
Cost Containment
Both the direct deposit IRAs expressly
selected by employees and employers and the standardized direct
deposit IRAs that serve as default vehicles would be designed to
minimize the costs of investment management and account
administration. It should be feasible to realize substantial cost
savings through index funds, economies of scale in asset management
and administration, uniformity, and electronic
technologies.
In accordance with statutory guidelines
for all direct deposit IRAs, government contract specifications
would call for a no-frills approach to participant services in the
interest of minimizing costs. By contrast to the wide-open
investment options provided in most current IRAs and the high (and
costlier) level of customer service provided in many 401(k) plans,
the standard account would provide only a few investment options
(patterned after the Thrift Savings Plan, if not more limited),
would permit individuals to change their investments only once or
twice a year, and would emphasize transparency of investment and
other fees and other expenses.[18]
Specifically, costs of direct deposit
IRAs might be reduced by federal standards that, to the extent
possible,
- Exclude brokerage services and retail
equity funds from the investment options available under the
IRA.
- Limit the number of investment options
under the IRA.
- Allow individuals to change their
investments only once or twice per year.
- Specify a low-cost default investment
option and provide that, if any of an individual's account balance
is invested in the default option, all of it must be.
- Prohibit loans (IRAs do not allow them
in any event) and perhaps limit pre-retirement
withdrawals.
- Limit access to customer service call
centers.
- Preclude commissions.
- Make compliance testing
unnecessary.
- Give account owners only a single
account statement per year (especially if daily valuation is built
into the system and is available to account owners).
- Encourage the use of electronic and
other new technologies (including enrollment on a web site) for
fund transfers, record keeping, and communications among IRA
providers, participating employees, and employers to reduce
paperwork and cost. Electronic administration has considerable
potential to cut costs.
The availability to savers of a major
low-cost personal account alternative in the form of the standard
account may even help, through market competition, to drive down
the costs and fees of IRAs offered separately by private financial
institutions. Through efficiencies associated with collective
investment and greater uniformity, the standard account should help
move the system away from the retail-type cost structure
characteristic of current IRAs. It should also help create a broad
infrastructure of individual savings accounts that would cover most
of the working population.[19]
In conjunction with these steps,
Congress and the regulators may be able to do more to require
simplified, uniform disclosure and description of IRA investment
and administrative fees and charges (building on previous work by
the Department of Labor relating to 401(k) fees). Such disclosure
should help consumers compare costs and thereby promote healthy
price competition.
Another approach would begin by
recognizing the trade-off between asset management costs and
investment types. As a broad generalization, asset management
charges tend to be low for money market funds, certificates of
deposit, and certain other relatively low-risk, lower-return
investments that generally do not require active management.
However, it appears that limiting individual accounts to these
types of investments would be unnecessarily restrictive. As
discussed below (under "Default Investment Fund"),
passively-managed index funds, such as those used in the Thrift
Savings Plan, are also relatively inexpensive.[20]
A very different approach to cost
containment would be to impose a statutory or regulatory limitation
on investment management and administrative fees that providers
could charge. One example is the United Kingdom's limit on
permissible charges for management of "stakeholder pension"
accounts-an annual 150 basis point fee cap for five years that is
scheduled to drop to 100 basis points thereafter. [21]
As another and more limited example, the U.S. Department of Labor
has imposed a kind of limitation on fees charged by providers of
automatic rollover IRAs established by employers for terminating
employees who fail to provide any direction regarding the
disposition of account balances of up to $5,000. Labor regulations
provide a fiduciary safe harbor for auto rollover IRAs that
preserve principal and that do not charge fees greater than those
charged by the IRA provider for other IRAs it provides.
Presumably, a mandatory limit would give
rise to potential cross-subsidies from products that are free of
any limit on fees to the IRAs that are subject to the fee limit --
a result that could be viewed either as an inappropriate distortion
or as a necessary and appropriate allocation of resources. We would
view a mandatory limit as a last resort, preferring the
market-based strategies outlined above.
Default Investment Fund
Both the IRAs offered independently by
private financial institutions and explicitly selected by employees
or employers and the default IRAs would serve the important purpose
of providing low-cost professional asset management to millions of
individual savers, presumably improving their aggregate investment
results. To that end, all of these accounts would offer a similar,
limited set of investment options, including a default investment
fund in which deposits would automatically be invested unless the
individual chose otherwise. This default investment would be a
highly diversified "target asset allocation" or "life-cycle" fund
comprised of a mix of equities and fixed income or stable value
investments, and probably relying heavily on index funds. (The
life-cycle funds recently introduced into the federal Thrift
Savings Plan are one possible model.) A portion or all of the fixed
income component could be comprised of Treasury inflation protected
securities ("TIPS") to protect against the risk of
inflation.
The mix of equities and fixed income
would be intended to reflect the consensus of most personal
investment advisers, which emphasizes sound asset allocation and
diversification of investments-including exposure to equities (and
perhaps other assets that have higher-risk and higher-return
characteristics), at least given the foundation of retirement
income already delivered through Social Security and assuming the
funds will not shortly be needed for expenses. The use of index
funds would avoid the costs of active investment management while
promoting wide diversification.[22]
This default investment would actually
consist of several different funds, depending on the individual's
age, with the more conservative investments (such as those relying
more heavily on TIPS) applicable to older individuals who are
closer to the time when they might need to use the funds.
Individuals who selected the default fund or were defaulted into it
would have their account balances entirely invested in that fund.
However, they would be free to exit the fund at specified times and
opt for a different investment option among those offered within
the IRA.
The standard automatic (default)
investment would also serve two other key purposes. It would
encourage employee participation in direct deposit savings by
enabling employees who are satisfied with the default to simplify
what may be the most difficult decision they would otherwise be
required to make as a condition of participation (i.e., how to
invest). Finally, the standard default investment should encourage
more employers to use automatic enrollment (thereby boosting
employee participation) by saving them from having to choose a
default investment. This, in turn, would make it easier to protect
employers from responsibility for IRA investments, especially
employers using automatic enrollment (as discussed
below).
We would not fully specify the default
investment by statute. It is desirable to maintain a degree of
flexibility in order to reflect a consensus of expert financial
advice over time. Accordingly, general statutory guidelines would
be fleshed out at the administrative level after regular comment by
and consultation with private-sector investment experts.
An additional and major design issue is
whether the standard, limited set of investment options for payroll
deposit IRAs should be only a minimum set of options in each IRA,
so that the IRA provider would be permitted to provide any
additional options it wished. Limiting the IRAs to these specified
options would best serve the purposes of containing costs,
improving investment results for IRA owners in the aggregate, and
simplifying individuals' investment choices. At the same time, such
restrictions would constrain the market, potentially limit
innovation, and limit choice for individuals who prefer other
alternatives.
One of the ways to resolve this tradeoff
would be to limit direct deposit IRAs to the prescribed array of
investment options without imposing any comparable limits on other
IRAs, and to allow owners of direct deposit IRAs (including default
IRAs) to transfer or roll over their account balances between the
two classes of accounts. Under this approach, the owner of a direct
deposit IRA could transfer the account balance to other
(unrestricted) IRAs that are willing to accept such transfers (but
perhaps only after the account balance reaches a specified amount
that would no longer be unprofitable to most IRA providers). While
such a transfer to an unrestricted IRA would deprive the owner of
the cost-saving advantages of the no-frills, limited-choice model,
such a system would still enable individuals to retain the
efficiencies and cost protection associated with the standard
low-cost model if they so choose.[23]
Employers Protected from any Risk of
Fiduciary Liability
Employers traditionally have been
particularly concerned about the risk of fiduciary liability
associated with their selection of retirement plan investments.
This concern extends to the employer's designation of default
investments that employees are free to decline in favor of
alternative investments. In the IRA universe, employers
transferring funds to automatic rollover IRAs and
employer-sponsored SIMPLE-IRAs retain a measure of fiduciary
responsibility for initial investments.
By contrast, under our proposal,
employers making direct deposits would be insulated from such
potential liability. These employers would have no liability or
fiduciary responsibility with respect to the manner in which direct
deposits are invested in default IRAs or in nondefault IRAs
(whether selected by the employer or the employee), nor would
employers be exposed to potential liability with respect to any
employee's choice of IRA provider or type of IRA. This protection
of employers is facilitated by statutory designation of standard
investment types that reduces the need for continuous professional
investment advice. To protect workers against inappropriate IRA
providers or inappropriate employer selection of IRA providers
while continuing to insulate employers from fiduciary
responsibility, employers could be precluded from imposing a
particular IRA provider on its employees other than the
government-contracted default IRA or could be constrained to choose
among an approved list of providers based on capital adequacy,
soundness, and other criteria.
Public Opinion Polling
Recent public opinion polling has shown
overwhelming support for payroll-deduction direct deposit saving.
Among registered voters surveyed, 83 percent of respondents said
they would be agreeable to having their employer offer to sign them
up for an IRA and allow them to contribute to it through direct
deposit of a small amount from their paycheck to help them save for
retirement. Similarly, 79 percent of registered voters expressed
support (and 54 percent expressed "strong" support) for giving
taxpayers the option to have part of their income tax refund
deposited into a retirement savings account such as an IRA by just
checking a box on their tax return.
In addition, the polling shows very
strong support for a requirement that goes far beyond our proposal,
that every company offer its employees some kind of retirement
plan-such as a pension or 401(k), or at least an IRA to which
employees could contribute. Among registered voters surveyed in
August 2005, 77 percent supported such a requirement (and 59
percent responded that they were "strongly" in support).[24]
As discussed, the approach described in this paper would not
require employers to offer their employees retirement plans, but
would give firms a financial incentive to offer their employees
access to payroll deduction as a convenient and easy means of
saving, and would require firms above a certain size and maturity
to extend this offer to their employees.
The Importance of Protecting
Employer Plans
Employer-sponsored pension,
profit-sharing, 401(k), and other plans can be particularly
effective - more so than IRAs -- in accumulating benefits for
employees. As noted earlier, the participation rate in 401(k)s, for
example, tends to range from two thirds to three quarters of
eligible employees, in contrast to IRAs, in which fewer than 1 in
10 eligible individuals participates. Employer plans tend to be far
more effective than IRAs at providing coverage because of a number
of attributes: for one thing, pension and profit-sharing plans, for
example, are funded by employer contributions that automatically
are made for the benefit of eligible employees without requiring
the employee to take any initiative in order to participate.
Second, essentially all tax-qualified employer plans must abide by
standards that either seek to require reasonably proportionate
coverage of rank-and-file workers or give the employer a distinct
incentive to encourage widespread participation by employees. This
encouragement typically takes the form of both employer-provided
retirement savings education efforts and employer matching
contributions. The result is that the naturally eager savers, who
tend to be in the higher tax brackets, tend to subsidize or bring
along the naturally reluctant savers, who often are in the lowest
(including zero) tax brackets.
Employer-sponsored retirement plans also
have other features that tend to make them effective in providing
or promoting coverage. As noted, the proposal outlined here seeks
to transplant some of these features to the IRA universe. These
include the automatic availability of a saving vehicle, the use of
payroll deduction (which continues automatically once initiated),
matching contributions (further discussed below), professional
investment management, and peer group reinforcement of saving
behavior.
The automatic IRA must thus be designed
carefully to avoid competing with or crowding out employer plans
and to avoid encouraging firms to drop or reduce the employer
contributions that many make to plan participants. Owners and
others who control the decision whether to adopt or continue
maintaining a retirement plan for employees should continue to have
incentives to sponsor such plans. The ability to offer employees
direct deposit to IRAs should be designed so that it will not
prompt employers to drop, curtail, or refrain from adopting
retirement plans.
Probably the single most important
protection for employer plans is to set maximum permitted
contribution levels to the automatic IRA so that they will be
sufficient to meet the demand for savings by most households but
not high enough to satisfy the appetite for tax-favored saving of
business owners or decision-makers. The average annual contribution
to a 401(k) plan by a nonhighly compensated employee is somewhat
greater than $2,000, and average annual 401(k) contributions by
employees generally tend to be on the order of 7 percent of pay.[25]
A $3,000 contribution is 7.5 percent of pay for a family earning
$40,000, and 6 percent of pay for a family earning
$50,000.
Yet IRA contribution limits are already
higher than these contribution levels. IRAs currently allow a
married couple to contribute up to $8,000 ($4,000 each) on a
tax-favored basis, and an additional $1,000 ($500 each) if they are
age 50 or older. By 2008, these figures are scheduled to rise to
$10,000 plus $2,000 ($1,000 each) for those age 50 or older. These
amounts-the current $9,000 a year for those age 50 and over ($8,000
for others) and the post-2007 $12,000 annual amount for those age
50 and over ($10,000 for others)-may well be enough to satisfy the
desire of many small-business owners for tax-favored retirement
savings. Even some small-business owners that might consider saving
somewhat more than $10,000 or $12,000 per year might well conclude
that they are better off not incurring the cost of making
contributions and providing a plan for their employees because the
net benefit to them of having a plan for employees is not greater
than the net benefit of simply saving through IRAs and giving their
employees access to IRAs.
Accordingly, at the most, payroll
deposit IRAs should not permit contributions above the current IRA
dollar limits, and could be limited to a lower amount such as
$3,000. (A 3% of pay contribution would remain below $3,000 for
employees whose compensation did not exceed $100,000.) Imposing a
lower limit on the payroll deduction IRA would reduce to some
degree the risk that employees will exceed the maximum IRA dollar
contribution limit because of auto enrollment, combined with
possible other contributions to an IRA.[26]
That is already a risk under current law, but the automatic nature
of auto enrollment increases the risk, especially if auto
escalation is implemented. There is a tradeoff between the
desirability of limiting the contribution amount (to mitigate both
this risk and the risk of competing with employer plans) and the
simplicity of using an existing vehicle (the IRA) "as
is".
In any event, the employee - not the
employer - would be responsible for monitoring any of all of their
IRA contributions to comply with the maximum limit (in part because
employees can contribute on their own and through multiple
employers). The ultimate reconciliation would be made by the
individual when filing the federal income tax
return.
In addition, the automatic IRA should be
designed to avoid reducing ordinary employees' incentives to
contribute to employer-sponsored plans such as 401(k)s. If workers
perceive a program such as direct deposit savings to IRAs as a more
attractive destination for their contributions than an
employer-sponsored plan (for example, because of better matching,
tax treatment, investment options, or liquidity), it could
unfortunately divert employee contributions from employer plans.
This in turn could have a destabilizing effect by making it
difficult for employers to meet the nondiscrimination standards
applicable to 401(k)s and other plans and therefore potentially
discouraging employers from continuing the plans or their
contributions. While a detailed discussion of these points is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to maintain a
relationship between IRAs and employer-sponsored retirement plans
that preserves and protects the employer plans.
Automatic Payroll Deduction Can Promote
Marketing and Adoption of Employer Plans
Our approach is designed not only to
avoid causing any reduction or contraction of employer plans, but
actually to promote expansion of employer plans. Consultants,
third-party administrators, financial institutions, and other plan
providers could be expected to view this proposal as providing a
valuable new opportunity to market 401(k)s, SIMPLE-IRAs and other
tax-favored retirement plans to employers. Firms that, under this
proposal, were about to begin offering their employees payroll
deduction saving or had been offering their employees payroll
deduction saving for a year or two could be encouraged to "trade
up" to an actual plan such as a 401(k) or
SIMPLE-IRA.
Especially because these plans can now
be purchased at very low cost, it would seem natural for many small
businesses to graduate from payroll deduction savings and complete
the journey to a qualified plan in order to obtain the added
benefits in terms of recruitment, employee relations, and larger
tax-favored saving opportunities for owners and
managers.
The following compares the maximum
annual tax-favored contribution levels for IRAs, SIMPLE-IRA plans
and 401(k) plans in effect for 2006:
|
|
IRA
|
SIMPLE-IRA
|
401(k)
|
|
Under age 50
|
$4,000 per spouse ($5,000 after
2007)
|
$10,000
|
$15,000
|
|
Age 50 and above
|
$4,500 per spouse ($6,000 after
2007)
|
$12,000
|
$20,000
|
In addition, as noted, small employers
that adopt a new plan for the first time are entitled to a tax
credit of up to $500 each year for three years. As discussed, the
proposed tax credit for offering payroll deposit would be smaller,
so as to maintain the incentive for employers to go beyond the
payroll deduction or direct deposit IRA and adopt an actual plan
such as a SIMPLE, 401(k), or other employer plan.
Encouraging Contributions by
Nonemployees
The payroll deposit system outlined thus
far would not automatically cover self-employed individuals,
employees of the smallest or newest businesses that are exempt from
any payroll deposit obligation, or certain unemployed individuals
who can save. A strategy centered on automatic arrangements can
also make it easier for these people to contribute to
IRAs.
Encouraging Automatic Debit
Arrangements
For individuals who are not employees or
who otherwise lack access to payroll deduction, automatic debit
arrangements can serve as a counterpart to automatic payroll
deduction. Automatic debit enables individuals to spread payments
out over time and to make payments on a regular and timely basis by
having them automatically charged to and deducted from an
account-such as a checking or savings account or credit card-at
regular intervals on a set schedule. The individual generally gives
advance authorization to the payer that manages the account or the
recipient of the payment, or both. The key is that, as in the case
of payroll deduction, once the initial authorization has been
given, regular payments continue without requiring further
initiative on the part of the individual. For many consumers,
automatic debit is a convenient way to pay bills or make payments
on mortgages or other loans without having to remember to make each
payment when due and without having to write and mail
checks.
Similarly, as an element of an automatic
IRA strategy, automatic debit can facilitate saving while reducing
paperwork and cutting costs. For example, households can be
encouraged to sign up on-line for regular automatic debits to a
checking account or credit card that are directed to an IRA or
other saving vehicle. With on-line sign-up and monitoring, steps
can be taken to familiarize more households with automatic debit
arrangements and, via Internet websites and otherwise, to make
those arrangements easier to set up and use as a mechanism for
saving in IRAs.
Facilitating Automatic Debit IRAs
Through Professional or Trade Associations
Professional and trade associations
could facilitate the establishment of IRAs and the use of automatic
debit and direct deposit to the IRAs. Independent contractors and
other individuals who do not have an employer often belong to such
an association. The association, for example, might be able to make
saving easier for those members who wish to save by making
available convenient arrangements for automatic debit of members'
accounts. Association websites can make it easy for members to sign
up on line, monitor the automatic debit savings, and make changes
promptly when they wish to. Although such associations generally
lack the payroll-deduction mechanism that is available to
employers, they can help their members set up a pipeline involving
regular automatic deposits (online or by traditional means) from
their personal bank or other financial accounts to an IRA
established for them.
Facilitating Direct Deposit of Income
Tax Refunds to IRAs
Another major element of a strategy to
encourage contributions outside of employment would be to allow
taxpayers to deposit a portion of their income tax refunds directly
into an IRA by simply checking a box on their tax returns.[27] Currently,
the IRS allows direct deposits of refunds to be made to only one
account. This all-or-nothing approach discourages many households
from saving any of the refund because at least a portion of the
refund is often needed for immediate expenses. Allowing households
instead to split their refunds to deposit a portion directly into
an IRA could make saving simpler and, thus, more likely.
The Bush administration has supported
divisible refunds in its last three budget documents; however, the
necessary administrative changes have yet to be implemented. Since
federal income tax refunds total nearly $230 billion a year (more
than twice the estimated annual aggregate amount of net personal
savings in the United States), even a modest increase in the
proportion of refunds saved every year could bring about a
significant increase in savings.
Extending Direct Deposit to Independent
Contractors
Millions of Americans are self-employed
as independent contractors. Many of these workers receive regular
payments from firms, but because they are not employees, they are
not subject to income tax or payroll tax withholding. These
individuals might be included in the direct deposit system by
giving them the right to request that the firm receiving their
services direct deposit into an IRA a specified portion from the
compensation that would otherwise be paid to them.
Compared to writing a large check to an
IRA once a year, this approach has several potential advantages to
independent contractors, which might well encourage them to save.
These include the ability to commit themselves to save a portion of
their compensation before they receive it (which, for some people,
makes the decision to defer consumption easier); the ability to
avoid having to make an affirmative choice among various IRA
providers; remittance of the funds by the firm by direct deposit to
the IRA; and, where payments are made to the independent contractor
on a regular basis, an arrangement that, like regular payroll
withholdings for employees, automatically continues the pattern of
saving through repeated automatic payroll deductions unless and
until the individual elects to change.
In many cases, the independent service
provider will not have a sufficient connection to a firm that
receives the services, or both the independent contractor and the
firm will be unwilling to enter into a payroll deposit type of
arrangement. In such instances, the independent contractor could
contribute to an IRA using automatic debit (as discussed above) or
by sending together with the estimated taxes that generally are due
four times a year.
Matching Deposits as a Financial
Incentive
A powerful financial incentive for
direct deposit saving by those who are not in the higher tax
brackets (and who therefore derive little benefit from a tax
deduction or exclusion) would be a matching deposit to their direct
deposit IRA. One means of delivering such a matching deposit would
be via the bank, mutual fund, insurance carrier, brokerage firm, or
other financial institution that provides the direct deposit IRA.
For example, the first $500 contributed to an IRA by an individual
who is eligible to make deductible contributions to an IRA might be
matched by the private IRA provider on a dollar-for-dollar basis,
and the next $1,000 of contributions might be matched at the rate
of 50 cents on the dollar. The financial provider would be
reimbursed for its matching contributions through federal income
tax credits.[28]
Recent evidence from a randomized
experiment involving matched contributions to IRAs suggests that a
simple matching deposit to an IRA can make individuals
significantly more likely to contribute and more likely to
contribute larger amounts.[29]
Matching contributions-similar to those
provided by most 401(k) plan sponsors-not only would help induce
individuals to contribute directly from their own pay, but also, if
the match were automatically deposited in the IRA, would add to the
amount saved in the IRA. The use of matching deposits, however,
would make it necessary to implement procedures designed to prevent
gaming-contributing to induce the matching deposit, then quickly
withdrawing those contributions to retain the use of those funds.
Among the possible approaches would be to place matching deposits
in a separate subaccount subject to tight withdrawal rules and to
impose a financial penalty on early withdrawals of matched
contributions.[30]
****
American households have a compelling
need to increase their personal saving, especially for long-term
needs such as retirement. This paper proposes a strategy that would
seek to make saving more automatic-hence easier, more convenient,
and more likely to occur-largely by adapting to the IRA universe
practices and arrangements that have proven successful in promoting
401(k) participation. In our view, the automatic IRA approach
outlined here holds considerable promise of expanding retirement
savings for millions of workers.
Notes
The views expressed in this testimony
are those of the authors alone and should not be attributed to the
Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, Georgetown
University's Public Policy Institute, or the Pew Charitable
Trusts.
1.This
testimony does not address any issues relating to Social Security
reform. The proposal is intended to have no implications, one way
or the other, regarding proposals to finance individual accounts
using Social Security taxes or to offset Social Security benefits
by individual accounts. Also outside the scope of this testimony
are potential reforms to the private pension system (including
employer-sponsored defined contribution and defined benefit
plans).
2.This
testimony is intended only to outline the proposal, not to resolve
all of the specific but significant design and implementation
issues that cannot readily be addressed within the limited scope of
this testimony.
3.Craig
Copeland, "Employer-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic
Differences and Trends: Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue
Brief No. 286," October 2005 (referred to below as "Copeland, EBRI
Issue Brief No. 286"), Figure 1, p. 7. The nonparticipants include
those who are not eligible for their employer's plan as well as
those who are eligible but who fail to participate. Among the
subset of approximately 92 million full-time, full-year wage and
salary workers between the ages of 21 and 64, 65 percent work for
an employer that sponsors a plan, and 57 percent participate in an
employer-sponsored plan. Id.
4.Copeland, EBRI Issue Brief No. 286, Figure 1, p.
7.
5.See,
for example, Alicia H. Munnell and Annika Sunden, Coming Up
Short: The Challenge of 401(k) Plans (Brookings Institution
Press, 2004).
6.In
the Conference Report to the Tax Reform Act of 1997, Congress
stated that "employers that choose not to sponsor a retirement plan
should be encouraged to set up a payroll deduction [IRA] system to
help employees save for retirement by making payroll-deduction
contributions to their IRAs" and encouraged the Secretary of the
Treasury to "continue his efforts to publicize the availability of
these payroll deduction IRAs" (H.R. Rep. No. 220, 105th Cong., 1st
Sess. 775 [1997]).
7.Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 99-1
(June 18, 1999), 29 C.F.R. 2509.99-1(b); IRS Announcement 99-2.
8.Neither the IRS nor the Department of Labor
guidance addressed the possible use of automatic enrollment in
conjunction with direct deposit IRAs (discussed at length
below).
9.
William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, and Peter R. Orszag, "The Automatic
401(k): A Simple Way to Strengthen Retirement Savings," (The
Retirement Security Project, Policy Brief No. 2005-1; available at
http://www.retirementsecurityproject.org);
10.In 2004, the IRS affirmed that plans are
permitted to increase the automatic contribution rate over time in
accordance with a specified schedule or in connection with salary
increases or bonuses. See letter dated March 17, 2004, from the
Internal Revenue Service to J. Mark Iwry. The idea of coordinating
automatic contribution increases with pay increases was developed
by Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi. See Thaler and Benartzi,
"Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase
Employee Saving," Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 1,
pt.2, pp. S164-87.
11.Brigitte Madrian and Dennis Shea, "The Power
of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings
Behavior," Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 4
(November 2001): 1149-87; and James Choi and others, "Defined
Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the
Path of Least Resistance," in Tax Policy and the Economy,
vol. 16, edited by James Poterba (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2002), pp. 67-113. See also Sarah Holden and Jack VanDerhei, "The
Influence of Automatic Enrollment, Catch-Up, and IRA Contributions
on 401(k) Accumulations at Retirement," Employee Benefit Research
Institute Issue Brief No. 283 (July 2005).
12.Any such statutory provision could usefully
make clear that automatic enrollment in direct deposit IRAs is
permitted irrespective of any state payroll laws that prohibit
deductions from employee paychecks without the employee's advance
written approval. Assuming that most direct deposit IRA
arrangements are not employer plans governed by ERISA, such state
laws, as they apply to automatic IRAs, may not be preempted by
ERISA because they do not "relate to any employee benefit
plan."
13.The absence of an employer match might make
some employers more willing to offer auto enrollment on direct
deposit IRAs because increased participation would not come at the
cost of increased employer matching contributions. On the other
hand, the absence of the match tends to make participation in the
plan less attractive to workers, which could exacerbate employee
concerns or complaints about having been enrolled in a program that
reduces their take-home pay without their explicit prior written
authorization. As a result, the absence of a match might also make
employers more apprehensive about possible complaints from
employees who failed to read the auto enrollment notice.
14.
Between August 28 and 31, 2005, in a survey commissioned by The
Retirement Security Project, The Tarrance Group, in conjunction
with Lake, Snell, Mermin/Decision Research, interviewed 1,000
registered voters nationwide about retirement security issues. A
full report of the survey findings can be found at http://www.retirementsecurityproject.org.
15.James Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian,
and Andrew Metrick, "Active Decisions" NBER Working Paper No. 11074
(January 2005).
16.Employers that sponsor a SIMPLE-IRA plan may
deposit all employee contributions in IRAs at a single designated
financial institution selected by the employer (IRS Notice 98-4,
1998-2 I.R.B. 25).
17.Considerable challenges are involved in
building and implementing a workable universal saving system based
on employer direct deposits of contributions to IRAs. These
challenges include dealing with the contingent workforce, with
employees who have multiple jobs, who work part-time, and often who
earn relatively low wages, and with small employers. A somewhat
different and thoughtful approach to designing such a system can be
found in the evolving work of the Conversation on Coverage, a
collaborative effort among individuals (including one of the
authors) drawn from a diverse range of stakeholder organizations.
See Conversation on Coverage, "Covering the Uncovered," Report of
Working Group II (2005). For a recently published analysis by a
non-partisan expert panel (including one of the authors) of the
issues involved in designing arrangements for distributions from
individual accounts, see National Academy of Social Insurance,
Uncharted Waters: Paying Benefits from Individual Accounts in
Federal Retirement Policy (2005). There have been various
other efforts to design such systems or programs, which this
testimony does not attempt to catalogue.
18.Until recently the federal Thrift Savings Plan
had five investment funds: three stock index funds (S&P 500,
small and midcapitalization U.S. stocks, and mostly
large-capitalization foreign stocks), a bond index fund consisting
of a mix of government and corporate bonds, and a fund consisting
of short-term, nonmarketable U.S. Treasury securities. Effective
August 1, 2005, the Plan added a set of life-cycle funds, each one
of which is composed of a mix of the other five investment
funds.
19.
This was part of the impetus behind the 2001 statutory provision to
the effect that the Secretaries of Labor and Treasury may provide,
and shall give consideration to providing, special relief with
respect to the use of low-cost individual retirement plans for
purposes of automatic rollovers and for other uses that promote the
preservation of assets for retirement income (Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Public Law 107-16, 115 Stat.
38, Section 657[c][2][B]). In a similar vein, one of the co-authors
has proposed a strategy for States to act as a catalyst in
expanding coverage under standardized, low-cost payroll-deposit
IRAs, SIMPLE-IRA plans, and 401(k) plans by facilitating the
pooling of small businesses to offer these vehicles. The proposal
has been outlined in "Expanding Retirement Savings at the State
Level," Written Statement of J. Mark Iwry to the Legislature of the
State of Washington (April 2003), and is more fully described in a
separate written statement by Iwry, separately submitted for the
record, and scheduled to be published in the NYU Review of Employee
Benefits and Executive Compensation 2006 and the BNA Tax Management
Compensation Planning Journal.
20.The difference in expense between passively
managed index funds and actively managed mutual funds has been
estimated to be-as a broad generalization-roughly 100 basis points
(1 percent) a year (William F. Sharpe, "Indexed Investing: A
Prosaic Way to Beat the Average Investor" presented at the Spring
President's Forum, Monterey Institute of International Studies (May
2002).
21.One of the authors has testified before
Congress regarding the British retirement plan system and has been
critical of the UK's attempt to impose a limit on charges. See
David C. John, testimony before the Subcommittee on Social Security
of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives
(June 16, 2005); David C. John, "What the United States Can Learn
from the UK's Pensions Commission Report" (forthcoming).
22.As noted, the federal Thrift Savings Plan
consists mainly of index funds, which are the building blocks for
the recently added life-cycle funds. The Thrift Savings Plan
informational materials state that the life-cycle funds " provide a
way to diversify your account optimally, based on professionally
determined asset allocations. This provides you with the
opportunity to achieve a maximum amount of return over a given
period of time with a minimum amount of risk. . . " (Federal Thrift
Savings Plan website, www.tsp.gov). To the extent that a
professionally run "managed account" could achieve similar results
at no greater cost, that might be another attractive option, and
managed accounts are growing in popularity as an option in 401(k)
plans. A question may be raised as to whether, managed accounts are
a better fit for 401(k) plans than for automatic IRAs, because
401(k)s tend to have more substantial account balances and greater
flexibility to accommodate individual preferences while allocating
costs to individuals who opt for costlier alternatives.
23.The question of how best to fit the direct
deposit IRAs, with their improved and simplified investment
structure, into the larger IRA universe is related to a broader
issue: the potential simplification of IRAs. We favor
simplification and revision of the current array of IRA options.
However, the specifics of any such proposals are beyond the scope
of this testimony.
24.The retirement security poll referred to in
note 14, above, had a margin of error of 3.1 percent. The question
that elicited these results was as follows: "Would you support or
oppose a requirement that every company offer their employees some
sort of retirement plan-either a traditional pension, a 401(k) or
an IRA that the employer sets up but does not contribute to. The
company would choose which one they wanted to offer employees.
Would you support or oppose requiring every employer to give
employees at least one of these options?" A full report of the
survey findings can be found at
www.retirementsecurityproject.org.
25.See Craig Copeland, "Retirement Plan
Participation and Retirees' Perception of Their Standard of
Living," Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 289
(January, 2006), pp. 1-6, Figure A4.
26.It is conceivable that the risk of exceeding
the IRA dollar limit could be mitigated to some degree through
enrollment procedures that cap automatic enrollment at, say, $250 a
month (for an annual total of $3,000) or $300 a month. However,
because automatic enrollment would be administered at the employer
level and might be based on paychecks provided weekly or every two
weeks, the maximum dollar amount would need to be adjusted
accordingly (e.g., $60 if weekly, $120 if every two weeks, or $250
if monthly).
27.J. Mark Iwry, "Using Tax Refunds to Increase
Savings and Retirement Security" (Retirement Security Project,
Policy Brief No. 2006-1, Jan. 2006; available at
www.retirementsecurityproject.org).
28.Among the issues such an approach would need
to address is the means of reimbursing those private financial
institutions that have no federal income tax liability to offset
because they are tax exempt or in a loss position.
An alternative mechanism would modify the existing saver's
credit (a federal income tax credit to households with income below
$50,000 for contributing to an IRA or employer plan) to convert it
to a direct matching deposit to an IRA or other savings account.
(As currently structured, the saver's credit reduces the
household's federal income tax liability and is nonrefundable;
thus, it is not automatically saved.) A variation would be to have
such a direct matching deposit delivered by the financial
institution that sponsors the IRAs or serves as financial provider
to the 401(k) plan to which the individual contributes. One of the
authors was involved in developing the Saver's Credit and, in
congressional testimony and writings, has advocated its extension
and expansion. See, e.g., William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, and Peter
R. Orszag, "The Saver's Credit: Expanding Retirement Savings for
Middle- and Lower-Income Americans" (Retirement Security Project
Policy Brief No. 2005-2, March 2005; available at
www.retirementsecurityproject.org). However, issues relating to the
Saver's Credit and its potential expansion are beyond the scope of
this testimony. Another significant asset-building approach
targeted to lower- and moderate-income households is reflected in
the Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). See, e.g., Michael
Sherraden, Assets and the Poor: A New American Welfare
Policy (M. E. Shapre, 1992), and Ray Boshara, "Individual
Development Accounts: Policies to Build Savings and Assets for the
Poor" (Brookings, Policy Brief, March 2005).
29.
Esther Duflo, William Gale, Jeffrey Liebman, Peter Orszag, and
Emmanuel Saez, "Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income
Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block"
(Retirement Security Project, May 2005; available at http://www.retirementsecurityproject.org).
30.A
detailed treatment of the matching deposit option is beyond the
scope of this testimony.