Testimony by
Dana R Dillon
Senior Policy Analyst
Asian Studies Center
The Heritage Foundation
Before
The House International Relations Subcommittee
on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation
Regarding
Evolving Counterterrorism Strategy
September 29, 2005
Thank you, Mr.
Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me to speak
today on the evolving counterterrorism strategy. I must begin my
testimony with the disclaimer that the following statements are my
personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Heritage Foundation.
The question before us is whether or not the current national
strategy for the war on terrorism is sufficient to defeat the
evolving terrorist threat. The short answer is yes, but with a
change in emphasis from direct military action to more indirect
methods.
The introduction of the February 2003 National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism calls for "direct and continuous action against
terrorist groups." This operational approach has dislocated
al-Qaeda from its base in Afghanistan, destroyed more than
two-thirds of its leadership, and disrupted its ability to plan
attacks against the United States. However, al-Qaeda's global
following is at least as strong today as it was on September 11,
2001. If this ability to regenerate itself is not neutralized, no
amount of military action will prevent further attacks against the
United States and its allies.
On the other hand, successes against terrorists in South and
Southeast Asia may point to a new approach in the war on terrorism.
Major terrorist groups have been either destroyed or neutralized in
this region with little direct American participation. Three of the
most important achievements in the war on terrorism in South and
Southeast Asia since 9/11 are the ceasefire agreement between India
and Pakistan; the negotiated peace settlement between the
government of Indonesia and the separatist Free Aceh Movement, also
known by its Indonesian acronym GAM for Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; and
the neutralization of al-Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah in
Southeast Asia. All three of these victories resulted from local
solutions involving tough military or security measures combined
with a political process.
It is well known that before 9/11, Pakistan was a state sponsor of
terrorism, particularly against India. Since 9/11, however,
President Pervez Musharraf has diligently worked to put a lid on
the terrorist groups in his country. On April 18, 2005, Musharraf
and India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, signed a declaration
heralding a peace process that they announced was irreversible.
Since then, cross-border terrorist attacks from Pakistan into India
declined by 60 percent. An Indian-built anti-infiltration fence
along the border also contributed to the reduction in cross-border
access for terrorists. Although final resolution of the differences
between the two countries still seems distant, there appears to be
little desire for a return to military confrontation or sponsorship
of terrorism. Peace between Pakistan and India is key to the war on
terrorism, and in order to achieve this outcome, letting India and
Pakistan develop the peace process at a pace that they are
comfortable with is the best possible solution.
In Southeast Asia, a comprehensive strategy of military muscle and
political compromise defeated a chronic insurgency linked to
regional terrorists.
Although the devastation of the tsunami in Aceh is often credited
with bringing the Indonesian government and GAM to the negotiating
table, the peace agreement is actually the result of a number of
activities started long before the tsunami struck.
Two years before the tsunami, the Indonesian military had launched
a comprehensive campaign in Aceh that not only attacked the GAM
military, but also sought to win over the Acehnese people. The
strategy was successful because of the ongoing reform in the
Indonesian military to reduce human rights abuses, as well as the
inability of GAM to restrain the abuses of its military forces and
its "tax collectors." By the time the tsunami struck, GAM's
military was suffering from combat fatigue, and its civilian base
was severely eroded[1].
More important, but complementary to the military campaign, was
Indonesia's democratic transition. In 1998, Indonesia was an
authoritarian government propped up by the military. By 2004,
Indonesia was a full democracy and the military was finally, albeit
not absolutely, accountable to an elected civilian leadership.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had national and international
credibility not enjoyed by any of his predecessors. In one stroke,
GAM's reputation transformed from an insurgency fighting an
authoritarian government to a terrorist group with ties to
al-Qaeda.
When the tsunami struck, GAM was already on the ropes and ready to
compromise. The subsequent peace agreement between GAM and the
Indonesian government put a hole in the regional terrorist network
and provided a good example of a successful anti-terrorist
strategy.
The most dangerous al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group in Southeast
Asia was Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), responsible for the Bali bombing in
2002, the Marriot bombing in 2004, and suspected of a host of other
bombings across Southeast Asia. But in September 2005, Gareth
Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, declared that
JI was "effectively smashed" and "no longer constituted a serious
threat."
This remarkable change of fortune for JI came about because of good
police work and the democratic transition in Indonesia. The United
States, Australia, and the international community invested heavily
in training and equipping Southeast Asia's police, prosecutors, and
judiciaries. Although the legal system in Indonesia and much of
Southeast Asia is still rife with corruption, under staffed, and
subject to political influence, these reforms have shown notable
results.
Additionally, while the police have arrested and courts convicted
active JI members, the democratic transition in Indonesia has
apparently dried up the recruit pool. Jemaah Islamiyah originally
was founded to oppose Indonesia's authoritarian government. With
former dictator Suharto out and a democratically elected president
and legislature in, the armed struggle no longer had a purpose to
many of its supporters.
The lessons for America's evolving national security strategy are
that the reasons and motivations behind the actions of terrorist
groups are complex. As much as possible, local solutions must be
found and supported. As the terrorists move underground, military
operations increasingly will be replaced with police work and
intelligence sharing. The evolving national counterterrorism
strategy should emphasize an indirect approach by supporting
democracy, the rule of law, and economic development.
[1] Kirsten E.
Schulze, "The Helsinki Peace Process: Reaching Understanding in
Aceh in the Wake of the Tsunami," Unpublished draft, 2005.
Dana
Dillon is a senior policy analyst in the Asian
Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation.