The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (2012), authorizes several places of confinement: (1) an approved tribal correctional center; (2) the nearest appropriate federal correctional facility; (3) a state or local government-approved correctional center; or (4) a tribal alternative rehabilitation center. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1)(A)–(D).
 See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169–70 (1994) (“The parties do not dispute that military judges, because of the authority and responsibilities they possess, act as ‘Officers’ of the United States.”); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (concluding that special trial judges of Tax Court are officers); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
 The selection process varies from tribe to tribe: “The education and selection of tribal court judges is as varied as the tribes themselves. Many tribal councils appoint judges to serve for discrete terms. Some tribes choose tribal judges by popular election. Some tribes use a mixed system; the tribal council of the Navajo tribe, for example, which has jurisdiction over close to half of the Indian population subject to tribal courts, appoints its judges for terms of two or three years. If, at the end of that period, the tribal council affirms the appointment, the judge serves for life.” Wright, supra note 8, at 1403.
 See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 , 658 (1997) (“Under the Appointments Clause, Congress could not give the Judge Advocate General power to ‘appoint’ even inferior officers of the United States; that power can be conferred only upon the President, department heads, and courts of law.”).
 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see also United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1988) (upholding a restriction on the removal authority of an inferior officer).
 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 216 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“But even if the statute were less clear, I would not interpret it as a delegation of federal power. The power to bring federal prosecutions, which is part of the putative delegated power, is manifestly and quintessentially executive power.... Congress cannot transfer federal executive power to individuals who are beyond ‘meaningful Presidential control.’ ... And this means that, at a minimum, the President must have some measure of ‘the power to appoint and remove’ those exercising that power.” (citations omitted)). Congress cannot rely on the Indian Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify noncompliance with the requirements of the Appointments Clause. The Supreme Court has ruled that Congress must comply with the dictates of the Appointments Clause regardless of the power that Congress invokes to justify its legislation. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991); Metro. Wash. Airport Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 271 (1991); Larkin & Luppino-Esposito, supra note 1, at 22–24.
 See, e.g., Stern v. Marshal, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–50 (1986); William R. Castro, If Men Were Angels, 35 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 663, 666 (2012).
 For this reason, for example, under the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. (2012), a United States magistrate judge cannot become involved in the disposition of a criminal case if the defendant objects. That is so even though magistrate judges are appointed by the relevant U.S. district court to a specific term and are subject to de novo review by a district court judge in a particular case. See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
 See Wright, supra note 8, at 1403; supra note 15. The new law does not grant tribal court judges any tenure, let alone life tenure, or protect their salary against diminution.
 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
 Court-martial trial judges are drawn from the officer corps. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994) (describing the military justice system).
 See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
 The Enclave Clause provides as follows: “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings[.]” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17,
 Congress may allow administrative agencies to adjudicate disputes regarding “public rights”—i.e., rights that exist only because Congress has created them by statute. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585–89 (1985); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 454–55 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50, 53 (1932); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
 The New States Clause of the Constitution provides as follows: “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. The Property Clause of the Constitution provides as follows: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). The Supreme Court’s territorial decisions make no effort to square their results with the text of Article III. See Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 853, 888–94, 907–08 (1990).
 Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 175 U.S. 373, 389 (1902); see also id. at 389–90; United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 737 (1986); Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 402–03 (1896).
 Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 260–61 (1901) (“This District [of Columbia] had been a part of the States of Maryland and Virginia. It had been subject to the Constitution, and was a part of the United States. The Constitution had attached to it irrevocably. There are steps which can never be taken backward.”).
 See Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242–45 (1850) (once a territory is admitted to the union as a state, Congress no longer can regulate it as a territory).
 See, e.g., PPL Montana LLC v. Montana, 132 U.S. 1215, 1227–28 (2012); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). The term “equal footing” comes from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided that each new state admitted to the union from that territory would enter on an “equal footing” with existing states. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222 (1845).
 Article IV of the Constitution forbids Congress from carving a new state out of the land of an existing state without the latter’s consent. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. It would follow that Congress cannot do the same for the purpose of creating a new “territory.”
 Cf., e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598–2600 (2012) (the meaning of the term “tax” for purposes of the Direct Taxes Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, Cl. 4, is for the courts, not Congress, to define).