See, e.g., One Nation Under Arrest: How Crazy Laws, Rogue Prosecutors, and Activist Judges Threaten Your Liberty (Paul Rosenzweig & Brian W. Walsh eds., 2010); Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Heritage Found. & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law (2010); Daniel Dew, No Joke: Man Jailed for Laughing in Own Home, The Foundry (Mar. 13, 2013), http://blog.heritage.org/2013/03/13/no-joke-man-jailed-for-laughing-in-own-home/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
 See, e.g., Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. of Crim. L. & Criminology 725 (2012); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Defanging the Lacey Act: The Freedom from Over-Criminalization and Unjust Seizures Act of 2012, The Heritage Foundation, Legal Memorandum No. 78 (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/defanging-the-lacey-act-the-freedom-from-over-criminalization-and-unjust-seizures-act-of-2012 (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
 That is the lesson of recent Supreme Court decisions construing the Commerce Clause. See infra note 29.
 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 11.5, at 630–47 (5th ed. 2010).
 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (the arson of an owner-occupied dwelling not used for commercial purposes does not involve property used in interstate commerce or in an activity affecting interstate commerce and therefore cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006)).
 The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, title I, subtitle A, § 101(a), 106 Stat. 3384 (1992) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006)).
 See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 4, § 18.1, at 933–47, §§ 19.1–19.8, at 966–1030.
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime 152 & n.23 (2006); Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 729, 730–31, 740 (1999).
 See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish et al., Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 956 (8th ed. 2007); John Kaplan et al., Criminal Law: Cases and materials 861–66 (5th ed. 2004); LaFave , supra note 4, §§ 19.1–19.5, at 966–95, § 19.7, at 1006–24; Paul J. Larkin Jr., When Fighting Crime Becomes Piling On: The Overcriminalization of Fraud, The Heritage Foundation, Legal Memorandum No. 76 (Jan. 9, 2012), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/when-fighting-crime-becomes-piling-on-the-overcriminalization-of-fraud (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
 The classic case is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Court upheld Congress’s power to regulate the amount of homegrown wheat on an individual’s farm on the ground that, if everyone else also grew wheat, the combined amount of wheat produced would affect the wheat price on the national market.
 See, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding unconstitutional, as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power, a statute making rape a federal offense); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding unconstitutional on the same ground a federal statute making it a crime to possess a firearm in the vicinity of a school). The Court revisited this issue in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), which involved the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Five justices concluded that Congress’s Commerce Clause power is not plenary, but there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito concluded that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to adopt that law, see Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577–609 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2642–76 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting), but they were not all on the same side of the judgment. On the other hand, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan concluded that the statute fell within Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Id. at 2609–42 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). Later cases will reveal how the law will play out in this area.
 Consider the case of Carol Anne Bond. After discovering that her husband had had an affair with and had impregnated one of her close friends, Bond decided to retaliate against her friend by placing caustic substances on items that the friend was likely to touch. Not surprisingly, the friend touched them and received burns. Rather than leave the matter to the local authorities, the federal government decided to prosecute her for violating a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2006), designed to implement a chemical weapons treaty ratified by the United States. The statute forbids knowing possession or use, for nonpeaceful purposes, of a chemical that “can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans.” Id. § 229(a), 229F(1), (7) & (8). The facts of the case would appear to amount to an assault, which could easily have been prosecuted under state law. Instead, the case has been through the federal system for years, with two separate trips to the Supreme Court. It is difficult to believe that this federal prosecution constituted a wise use of limited federal resources.
 The President appoints the Attorney General, U.S. Attorneys, the Director of the FBI, and other senior federal law enforcement officials. Those officials, in turn, appoint subordinate federal officers. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 532–533, 541–542 (2006).
 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 506, 509–519 (2006).
 See 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2006); Victoria L. Killion, Comment, No Points for the Assist: A Closer Look at the Role of Special Assistant United States Attorneys in the Cooperative Model of Federal Prosecutions, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 789 (2009).
 The Intergovernmental Personnel Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (2006), authorizes the head of a federal agency to assign federal personnel to states or localities “for work that [he or she determines] would be of mutual concern to [both parties].” See also id. § 3373. The Attorney General has assigned Justice Department lawyers to act as local prosecutors. See Peter F. Neronha, United States Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, State, Federal Prosecutors Cross-Designated to Prosecute Drugs, Firearms and Neighborhood Crimes, News Release (Mar. 9, 2010) (“U.S. Attorney Peter F. Neronha and R.I. Attorney General Patrick C. Lynch today jointly announced the cross-designation of several senior prosecutors to bolster the prosecution of neighborhood crimes, particularly crimes involving drugs and firearms. * * * Cross-designation permits prosecutors to cross-over and prosecute cases in either a state or federal court. Targeted cases are jointly reviewed to determine appropriate charges, appropriate jurisdiction and in which court appropriate penalties are likely to be realized. Senior prosecutors experienced in firearms, drugs, organized crime and neighborhood prosecution have been cross-designated.”).
 See Office of the United States Attorneys, U.S. Attorneys Manual, 9–2186, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02186.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
 See Office Of The United States Attorneys, U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL, 9–938, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00938.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
 U.S. Department of Justice, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center and International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center System 2 (June 1, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opcl/crime-taskforce.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
 See U.S. Department of Justice, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/taskforces/ocdetf.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
 See Joe Palazzolo, Rival Agencies Agree to Halt Turf Battles, Main Justice (August 10, 2009), http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/08/10/justice-department-and-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-forge-new-partnership/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to enhance protection and resiliency (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
 Id. at iii. DHS has the responsibility to support “the formation and development of regional partnerships, including promoting new partnerships,” and to enable “information sharing.” Id. at 17.
 Id. at 22.
 A 2012 memorandum prepared by the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel concludes that federal law enforcement officers have only the arrest power granted them by federal law. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, State and Local Deputation of Federal Law Enforcement Officers During Stafford Act Deployments 4–5 (Mar. 5, 2012) (OLC Stafford Act Memo) (so stating and citing earlier OLC opinions to that effect).
 See Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding unconstitutional, as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power, a statute making rape a federal offense); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding unconstitutional on the same grounds a federal statute making it a crime to possess a firearm in the vicinity of a school); supra note 5.
 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10501–03 (2006) (Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act, allowing the Attorney General to provide law enforcement assistance to states during crime emergencies) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act allows (inter alia) deployment of federal law enforcement officers after the President declares a major disaster or emergency).
 See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”); 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (“Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.”).
 OLC Stafford Act Memo 8 (internal quotations omitted).
 See 28 U.S.C. § 561(f).
 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.112. The Marshals Service has programs that allow each member of local law enforcement in certain areas to be “deputized as a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal, thereby giving each member the ability to travel in an effort to apprehend the worst criminal offenders.” U.S. Marshals Service, Southern District of Ohio, Task Force Information, http://www.usmarshals.gov/district/oh-s/taskforces/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
 5 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (2006); see supra note 17.