June 6, 2013 | Backgrounder on Europe
Developments within the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) threaten to undermine transatlantic security cooperation between the U.S. and its European partners. Far from improving the military capabilities of European countries, the CSDP decouples the U.S. from European security and will ultimately weaken the NATO alliance. U.S. policymakers should watch CSDP developments closely and discourage the EU from deepening defense integration. It is clear that an EU Army is the ultimate goal of the CSDP. The consequences would be great: The U.S. would lose influence in European security matters, and NATO would become a second-tier priority for most European countries. Finally, it would mean an end to Europe being a serious security actor on the global stage. The veto power of the EU’s five neutral members, coupled with the bureaucratic inertia of Brussels, would lead to paralysis in decision making and likely mean that EU forces would rarely, if ever, be sent on overseas combat operations. The CSDP does more harm than good, and the U.S. should oppose it.
When it comes to defense and military capability in the 21st century, it is clear that Europe is not pulling its weight. Spending and investment in defense across Europe has steadily declined since the end of the Cold War. The political will to deploy troops into harm’s way when it is in the national interest has all but evaporated for most EU countries. During the recent Libya operation, European countries were literally running out of munitions. Many European nations are racing for the exit in Afghanistan. In Mali, European countries have been able to scrape together only 150 instructors to train the Malian military.
The EU is not the answer to Europe’s military woes. Instead, the U.S. should be pushing for more NATO-centric solutions ensuring that all advancements in European defense capabilities are done through NATO or at least on a multilateral basis. This will ensure NATO’s primacy over, and the right of first refusal for, all Europe-related defense matters, and will guarantee that the U.S. has the amount of influence relative to the level of resources the U.S. has committed to Europe.
Some argue that the answer to Europe’s declining military is deeper EU defense integration. This view has not been challenged in Washington, and many American policymakers support deeper EU defense integration without considering the implications for NATO or transatlantic relations. American enthusiasm for EU defense integration is explained by a lack of basic understanding and knowledge about the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), along with the misguided hope that EU defense integration will lead to more military involvement by EU members.
American policymakers are so desperate for Europe to do more to improve its military capabilities that many of them look to the EU as a panacea for Europe’s ills. Believing that a stronger EU role in defense matters will encourage European countries to invest more in defense means assuming that the EU will be able to do something that NATO has not been able to do since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, U.S. policymakers who hold this view are likely to be disappointed.
The EU as an institution can never be a serious defense actor, if for no other reason than the fact that its membership includes five neutral countries claiming legal or historical reasons for refusing to join military alliances. Furthermore, the EU can never be a credible partner for NATO because EU member Cyprus is at constant loggerheads with NATO member Turkey, continuously blocking NATO–EU cooperation.
Many European politicians prefer to wrap themselves in the EU’s safety blanket believing that the EU can and should be responsible for almost every aspect of life in Europe. The reality is that it cannot—as seen with the current economic crisis across the continent. This is especially true in the area of defense and security.
Since its creation in 1992, the EU has pushed for a stronger role in defense policy and has been constructing defense and military institutions by duplicating NATO roles and responsibilities—military planning cells, an EU Military Staff, an EU Military Committee, the European Defence Agency, and the EU Battlegroups to name just a few. While these advancements may seem like they will assist NATO, none has brought any serious, credible capabilities or resources to the alliance.
There are developments that the U.S. should be watching closely regarding recent EU defense initiatives:
The Obama Administration—like previous U.S. Administrations—has been far too supportive, almost blindly, of an “ever closer union” of European states. This is nothing new. After all, the U.S. was the prime driver of European integration in the late 1940s and early 1950s—because U.S. national interests were at stake. The creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in the late 1940s, designed to more effectively distribute Marshall Plan funds across Europe, was perhaps the first instance of U.S. promotion of European economic integration.
The U.S. supported the OEEC for a practical reason—ensuring that Marshall Plan funds were seamlessly and quickly distributed. This was in America’s interest in the wake of the Cold War. American support for European economic integration at the time was more about ensuring that Europe could begin to rebuild after World War II, and less about supporting a European superstate.
Consequently, U.S. policy toward European integration has been, and should be, based on pragmatism and national interests. It suited U.S. foreign policy aims immediately after World War II and throughout most of the Cold War to support integration. However, the post war social, economic, and political circumstances, which led to the creation of the European Union, no longer apply today.
An organization that started narrowly focused on the coal and steel industry in the 1950s has morphed into a supranational organization touching almost every aspect of life across Europe. Over the years, power has incrementally shifted to Brussels, away from the national capitals of the member states. As a result, power has been moved further away from those who are impacted most. The key decision-making bodies in the EU are largely unelected and largely unaccountable to the national governments. For many European politicians, deeper integration has become a secular religion that serves only the interests of a small group of political elites in Brussels.
As seen in the ongoing eurozone crisis, the architects of a centralized Europe will do whatever it takes, no matter how strongly it goes against the most basic Western norms of democracy and accountable government, in order to achieve the dream of a United States of Europe—which will include a common defense policy that will rival NATO.
As with all matters related to America’s foreign and defense policy, U.S. national interests must come first. Transatlantic security is no different. Similar to European economic policy, there was a time soon after World War II that the U.S. pushed for deeper European integration in the area of defense. Because the Soviet threat was increasing in Europe and U.S. troops in West Germany were needed for the Korean War, the U.S. sought acceptable ways to facilitate rearmament of West Germany.
Although there were early French reservations about allowing West Germany to rearm and join NATO, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the U.S. position in support of the West German endeavor very clear during a 1950 NATO Ministerial Meeting in New York.
The French were outraged by this proposal and put forward the so-called Pleven Plan—named after French Prime Minister René Pleven, a month later in October 1950. Under the Pleven Plan, a supranational European army would be created that would be “tied to political institutions of a united Europe.” The Pleven Plan declared:
The money for the European army would be provided by a common budget. The European minister of defense would be responsible for the implementation of existing international obligations and for the negotiation and implementation of new international engagements on the basis of directives received from the council of ministers. The European armament and equipment programs would be decided and carried out under his authority.
A few months later, the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community, an early predecessor of the EU, convened an intergovernmental conference to establish what became known as the European Defence Community (EDC). The U.S. reluctantly agreed to the EDC on the basis that it would allow West Germany to rearm.
Although, somewhat paradoxically, the French parliament voted against the EDC in 1954, the U.S. was able to use the political capital acquired from supporting the EDC to pave the way for West Germany’s eventual membership into NATO. In this case the U.S. was able to achieve its aim by supporting the EDC and European integration—a rearmed West Germany that was able to contribute to Europe’s continental defense against the Soviet Union, via NATO channels, while at the same time alleviating some of the American military burden in West Germany. U.S. support for European defense integration in the 1950s was more about rearming West Germany to free up U.S. troops to fight in Korea than it was about advancing the European project.
By the time the French parliament voted down the EDC proposal, the Korean War had ended and the immediate threat to Western Europe from the Soviet Union was frozen in the Cold War. Consequently, due to the politically contentious debate in Europe regarding defense integration, and because of the strong role played by NATO during the Cold War, European countries did not raise the issue of defense integration again in any meaningful way until the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which created the EU. However, it was not until the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2003 Treaty of Nice that real advancements in EU defense integration started to gain momentum.
The defining moment of EU defense integration occurred during a meeting between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac at the French port city of St. Malo in December 1998. This summit, which paved the way for future EU defense integration, released a Summit Communiqué stating:
To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.
The meeting at St. Malo sent alarm bells ringing in the U.S. The words “autonomous action” were taken to mean “without NATO” and therefore without a role for the U.S.
To many in the U.S. this was unacceptable, especially after decades of American commitment to Europe during the Cold War, and because Europe had failed repeatedly to act in the Balkans. Rightly, the Clinton Administration wanted to see a strong and enlarged NATO continue under U.S. leadership. Consequently, after the St. Malo meeting, the U.S. drew red lines on what it would find acceptable for EU defense integration for the first time.
At the time, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made America’s concerns and position very clear in an op-ed in the Financial Times. Her outline of U.S. policy on EU defense integration has since become known as “Albright’s three D’s”:
Through the end of the Clinton Administration and into the early days of George W. Bush’s first Administration, Albright’s three D’s had formed the foundation of American policy toward EU defense integration. Bush’s first Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, made his views on EU defense integration clear during a 2001 speech in Germany: “Actions that could reduce NATO’s effectiveness by confusing duplication or by perturbing the transatlantic link would not be positive.” He went on to say that EU defense initiatives should be inclusive and “open to all NATO members who wish to take part.” Clearly, this has not been the case with Turkey.
Even so, during the latter half of Bush’s first term and into his second term, U.S. views on Europe took a different focus. Many in Washington at this time were willing to turn a blind eye to EU defense initiatives for two reasons.
First, the White House wanted to gain support for more pressing U.S. policy objectives in Europe—namely European support for the invasion of Iraq, the establishment of a missile defense capability, and promoting an agenda of NATO enlargement.
Second, after experiencing Europe’s shortcomings in Afghanistan in relation to Europe’s inability, or lack of political will, to deploy a sizable number of frontline combat troops, the U.S. was desperate for Europeans to improve their military capabilities at any cost. This desire to see a more capable European defense actor was similar to the way the U.S. was desperate to see West Germany rearmed in the 1950s. Consequently, the U.S. was willing to tolerate more EU defense integration with the hope that it would actually improve military capability.
President Obama has continued U.S. support for EU integration in all areas, including defense. In fact, whereas President Bush’s support was more implicit, President Obama’s has been explicit. During his first NATO Summit in 2009, President Obama endorsed deeper EU defense integration in his town hall address when he called on Europe to develop “more robust defense capabilities.” The final Summit declaration stated that “NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense.” In both cases, to the Europeans listening, the word “Europe” was synonymous with the EU.
The EU has had high expectations for a common defense, but the CSDP has failed to deliver on improving the capabilities of Europe’s militaries. EU member states have slowly been constructing institutions to build an EU defense identity by duplicating NATO institutions. These developments read well on paper but deliver very little in practice.
Since the establishment of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992 under the Treaty of Maastricht, all foreign affairs and defense policy issues had been part of the intergovernmental Second Pillar of the European Union. However, the pillar system was abolished under the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 when the EU acquired a legal identity. Since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, defense and foreign policy is now a shared policy competency between the member states and the EU Commission.
Recent developments inside the CSDP go beyond institutional building. EU defense initiatives have diverted scarce resources away from NATO. This has led to an acceptable culture in Europe of “double hatting” national troops, for both EU and NATO commitments, in order to give the appearance of increased military capability on paper but not in practice.
The EU has made multiple failed attempts at establishing rapid reaction forces. First was the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). One year after the St. Malo meeting, the EU established a military capability target, known as the Helsinki Headline Goal, to deploy 50,000 to 60,000 troops, capable of conducting the full range of crisis-management “Petersberg tasks” before the end of 2003. Unsurprisingly, the EU never came close to meeting this goal.
When it became clear in 2003 that the HHG would not be achievable the EU lowered its level of ambition and agreed to the EU Battlegroup (EUBG) concept, also commonly referred to as the Headline Goal 2010. EU Battlegroups in their generic composition, depending on the mission, consist of about 1,500 personnel. EU member states earmark national troops that could be used to form a EUBG on a rotating basis.
However great EUBGs may sound, they have not delivered much increased military capability. Although in theory EUBGs still exist today, not a single EUBG has ever deployed beyond national borders or into harm’s way. The EU requirement is to have two battlegroups on standby at any given time. Sadly, even this modest requirement has recently proved too difficult for the EU to accomplish.
The EU-led military missions that have taken place have been modest in their scope and scale. Since 2003, there have been a total of eight EU-led military operations. Out of these eight missions, half have taken place in francophone Africa and were largely French missions cloaked in an EU flag. For example, Operation Artimis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo totaled 2,200 troops, of which 1,785 were French. Of the 3,700 troops that formed the EU’s military mission to Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008, approximately 2,500 were French. While there is no reason to doubt that these military missions had a positive local effect on the ground, they were nothing more than small military operations in a semi-permissive security environment. Hardly an indication that the EU is an emerging military power.
On paper it appears that the EU has made good progress since the 1998 St. Malo agreement on improving Europe’s military capabilities. However, this is not the case in practice. U.S. policymakers must see the CSDP for what it really is: a paper tiger that has not delivered increased military capability for the U.S. or NATO.
Developments within the CSDP have not encouraged European countries to increase defense spending or the size of their militaries. As an intergovernmental security alliance, NATO is only as strong as its member states. Of NATO’s 28 members, 26 are European. Of these, 21 are also in the EU. European countries collectively have more than two million men and women in uniform, yet, by some estimates only 100,000—a mere 5 percent—of them have the capability to deploy outside national borders.
This is a sad situation that the CSDP has done nothing to resolve. Nothing since the 1998 British–Franco agreement at St. Malo, which effectively launched what is known today as the CSDP and paved the way for deeper defense integration, has led to more military capability or higher defense spending in Europe. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that American support for deeper EU defense integration will lead to more European military capability.
For example, the size of the armed forces of some of Europe’s biggest defense spenders has decreased. Germany’s armed forces have shrunk from 333,000 in 1998 to 205,000 in 2011. France’s armed forces have been reduced from 449,000 in 1998 to 227,000 in 2011. Italy’s armed forces have been reduced from 402,000 in 1998 to 192,000 in 2011.
The CSDP has also done nothing to encourage Europeans to spend more on defense. Since 2008, the 16 European members of NATO have reduced their military spending. Reductions in many NATO countries have exceeded 10 percent. In 2012, just four of the 28 NATO members—the United States, Estonia, Britain, and Greece—spent the required 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. France fell below the 2 percent mark in 2011.
The lack of defense investment by Europeans has had a direct impact on recent overseas operations. At the height of the combat operations in Afghanistan, many European NATO members were having difficulties deploying just dozens of troops at a time. Many non-NATO EU members barely deployed troops at all. Currently, Ireland has seven troops in Afghanistan; Austria has two. When Europeans do send troops, many are often restricted by numerous caveats, such as no flying at night or no combat patrols beyond a certain distance from a base.
Even though on a much smaller scale compared to Afghanistan, the recent campaign in Libya fared little better. What began as a French–U.K.-inspired military operation had to be quickly absorbed into a NATO operation because the EU did not have the political will or military capability (without the U.S.) to see the mission through to completion. Regarding Europe’s contribution to the Libya operation, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates summed it up:
However, while every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities simply aren’t there.
This is mainly the result of a decrease in defense investment by the members of NATO since the end of the Cold War, and the lack of political will to use military capability when and where it is needed.
If NATO was having problems during the Libya operation, then the EU’s military role there was all but non-existent. The EU’s military contribution to the crisis in Libya was the establishment of a skeleton military headquarters in Italy at the cost of almost €8 million (about $10 million). Its objective was to eventually lead a military humanitarian mission in Libya. However, the mission never got off the ground, leaving one prominent European news website to ask: “Was Eufor Libya an April Fool’s Joke?”
The EU is currently faring only slightly better in Mali. Since January 2013, a French-led, African-backed military operation has taken place to remove opposition forces from northern Mali and reassert the central government’s control across the whole of the country. In order to help build the security capabilities of the Malians, the EU has established a training mission for the Malian military.
The mission agreed to by the EU Council calls for the deployment of only 500 troops (of which 150 are actual trainers) and will have an operating budget of about €12 million (about $15 million) per year—all of this for a country that is twice the size of Texas. The NATO training mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) calls for 2,700 trainers, and in 2012 had an operating budget of $11.2 billion. Basically, every 12 hours, NATO spends the same amount training the Afghans that the EU will spend all year on training the Malian Army.
It is in the interest of the U.S. that all defense policy and planning regarding Europe take place inside NATO structures, or at least on a multilateral nation-state to nation-state level. This will ensure not only that American leaders will have the amount of influence appropriate to the level of military resources the U.S. has committed to Europe, but also ensures that defense policy will remain intergovernmental and not supranational—and that NATO will retain its primacy in all European defense matters.
Slowly and incrementally, the supranational institutions of the EU, primarily the EU Commission and the European Parliament, but also, in certain areas, the European Court of Justice, are trying to gain more power over the member states’ defense policy. The U.S. should not back a situation where European countries that are members of NATO place themselves in a subservient role to the EU regarding defense policy.
The EU Commission is slowly gaining a toehold in the area of defense policy. One of the biggest changes introduced by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty was merging the Second Pillar (intergovernmental) position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy with the First Pillar (supranational) position of European Commissioner for External Relations, into one powerful position called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In addition, this position also serves as the First Vice President of the EU Commission—adding the supranational element.
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy worked directly for the member states (in the same way as the Secretary General of NATO does) and the European Commissioner for External Relations worked directly for the president of the EU Commission. With the two positions now merged, the High Representative in the EU answers to both the member states and to the EU Commission. This is unacceptable since this, for the first time, blurs the line between what is intergovernmental and supranational within EU foreign and defense policy development and implementation.
While simultaneously serving as the First Vice President in the EU Commission, the new role of High Representative gives the EU Commission a foothold in foreign and defense policy it has never had before. In addition to being responsible for coordinating the EU’s foreign and defense policies the High Representative/First Vice President has the power to formally propose, but not authorize, EU-led military operations.
In addition, under the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative is also the head of the European Defence Agency, is in charge of the External Action Service (the EU’s diplomatic corps), and will preside over the Foreign Affairs Council, a job previously carried out by the foreign minister of the country holding the EU presidency. This consolidates foreign and defense policy power in a way never seen before in the EU.
Supporters of this new position in the Lisbon Treaty argue that it will help establish coherence and consistency among the various supranational and intergovernmental institutions in the EU on foreign policy issues. However, this should be seen as the first step of an incremental and long-term process that will eventually place EU foreign and defense policy under the control of the EU Commission.
The EU Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice are also seeking to maximize influence and power in the sensitive area of defense procurement. A recent EU Commission directive attempts to limit the amount of flexibility that EU members (including the 21 EU members that are also members of NATO) currently have in avoiding EU single-market rules on the grounds of national security when procuring defense goods.
EU rules allow member states the option of protecting national security interests by invoking a provision known as Article 346 of the Lisbon Treaty. Article 346 guarantees that member states can take the necessary measures to ensure that national security interests are protected during the defense procurement process.
If the EU Commission suspects an EU member of failing to demonstrate why a particular public tender on a piece of military equipment would pose a risk for its security interest, the country in question can be brought before the European Court of Justice. Clearly, it should be up to the individual states, not the EU Commission or the court, to determine the defense needs of their own armed forces.
In 2008, the Czech Republic directly awarded a public supply contract worth €132 million (about $139 million) for four CASA-295 tactical military transport aircraft without organizing a tendering procedure. The Czech authorities relied on the “essential security interests” exemption of Article 346, since these planes were ultimately destined for Afghanistan to support Czech troops there serving in the NATO-led operation. After threatening to bring the matter before the European Court of Justice, the commission finally relented and dropped the case in November 2011.
As Clara Marina O’Donnell of the London-based Centre for European Reform noted:
By adopting the initiatives, member-states would be accepting the Commission’s oversight in an area they have hitherto jealousy guarded. Defence ministries would no longer have the final say in their defence procurement.
Proponents of EU defense integration argue that military capabilities developed under the auspices of the CSDP will always be made available to NATO. For example, an EU Battlegroup could also be on call for NATO operations if, and when, NATO was ever to request the use of it. This may sound good in theory but is unlikely to work in practice.
This is due to the institutional workings of the EU and the composition of its membership. Any time that EU military assets are used, unanimous agreement by all EU members is required. Six veto-wielding EU members are not members of NATO. Of these six countries, five are established neutral countries: Ireland, Austria, Malta, Sweden, and Finland. The other, Cyprus, is politically hostile toward NATO member Turkey and has a track record of blocking NATO-EU cooperation in the past.
The most recent example of EU duplication of NATO capabilities is the push for the creation of a permanent EU operational headquarters (OHQ). An EU OHQ is a needless and expensive proposal that is more about planting the EU flag than it is about increasing Europe’s military capability. The EU already has access to the full range of NATO’s military headquarters at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) under the Berlin-Plus arrangement. Furthermore, the EU has access to five national headquarters for use for EU-led military missions.
The estimated cost of establishing an EU military operational headquarters is tens of millions of dollars. At a time when NATO is decreasing the number of its regional headquarters to save money, it hardly makes sense for the EU to be increasing its own numbers. Although a number of EU countries have called for the creation of the OHQ, the British have so far been successful in blocking it. British Foreign Secretary William Hague told reporters in July 2011 that
I have made very clear that the United Kingdom will not agree to such a permanent OHQ. We will not agree to it now, we will not agree to it in the future. That is a red line for us. We are opposed to this idea because we think it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from NATO planning.
The CSDP is also discriminatory against non-EU NATO members. Perhaps the best example is with Turkey. Although Turkey can be a challenging partner for the U.S. and NATO, it is a valuable partner nevertheless.
Turkey played a key role in NATO during the Cold War by being one of two NATO members that bordered the Soviet Union. Turkey’s military contribution to international security operations sets it apart from many of the nations of Western Europe. The Turks have deployed thousands of troops to Afghanistan. In addition, they have commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) twice since 2002. The Turks have also contributed to a number of peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, and participated in the American-led Combined Task Force-151 in the Gulf of Aden to help combat piracy and terrorism in the region.
The source of this discriminatory attitude towards Turkey is the dispute between Cyprus and Turkey. In addition, many in the EU no longer want to give Turkey what it was promised in the late 1980s: eventual EU membership. This has created an atmosphere of animosity and distrust between the EU and Turkey. These two points combined have caused serious problems for NATO and EU relations:
Cyprus’s unwillingness to cooperate with Turkey has been blamed for putting lives at risk in places like Afghanistan. In 2011, a report published by the House of Lords on the EU’s police training mission in Afghanistan stated:
We still believe that the lack of a formal cooperation agreement between the NATO forces in Afghanistan and EUPOL on the security of EUPOL personnel has increased the risk to the lives of EUPOL personnel, including British citizens. This is unacceptable.… Only the Taliban benefit from the lack of such an agreement.
While the origins of Europe’s current economic woes can be traced back to the introduction of the single currency, the source of the EU’s recent political troubles originates from the 2004 Constitutional Treaty and the subsequent 2009 Lisbon Treaty.
In 2004, a Constitutional Treaty was drafted and proposed for all the EU member states to ratify. However, the citizens of France and the Netherlands rejected its ratification in popular referenda. Soon after the rejection, the EU called for a “period of reflection” and established a “group of wisemen” to determine what went wrong and what should be done in terms of another treaty in the future. This resulted in the Lisbon Treaty which was eventually ratified in 2009, but not without controversy.
According to analysis by the London think tank Open Europe, 96 percent of the text was the same as the Constitutional Treaty. In fact, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former French President and the author of the Constitutional Treaty, famously said about the Lisbon Treaty that “[a]ll the earlier proposals will be in the new text, but will be hidden or disguised in some way.”
Even though the two treaties are virtually the same, the only country that put the Lisbon Treaty to a popular referendum was Ireland—because it was compelled to do so by Irish law. In particular, there was a concern that the defense provisions in the Lisbon Treaty would violate Ireland’s well-established neutrality. In June 2008, the Irish people rejected the treaty. Immediately, EU elites called for another “period of reflection,” held another Irish referendum on October 2009, and the treaty finally passed. Far from being a major “milestone in our world’s history,” as described by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Lisbon Treaty laid the foundations for much of the public disdain seen today across Europe.
Not only did the Lisbon Treaty transfer more power and control from the member states to Brussels than any other treaty before, it also contained a number of defense provisions that threaten to undermine NATO. The U.S. should keep a close eye on the development of these provisions on the Lisbon Treaty:
The authors of the Lisbon Treaty believed that creating an exclusive group inside the EU of countries cooperating on defense will entice others to improve their military capabilities. To date, PESCO has not been implemented because the EU member states cannot agree on what the specific goals of PESCO should be and what criteria should first be met before an EU member state joins.
The fact that PESCO has not been implemented is a good thing from an American and NATO standpoint. Paradoxically, far from encouraging European countries to invest more in defense, PESCO will likely do the exact opposite. With an inner core providing the majority of military requirements in the CSDP, small EU members (many of which are also members of NATO) will have little incentive to spend more on defense. The burden of PESCO will largely be left to France and the U.K.—two countries that already have real military capability.
A mutual defense commitment in the Lisbon Treaty is meaningless because the CSDP lacks the military capability as well as the political will to act against armed aggression without NATO’s support. Consequently, this will give EU members a false sense of security and undeservingly places the CSDP at the same level of importance as NATO in terms of European defense.
In a poor attempt to both justify the agency’s existence and give the treaty legitimacy, drafters included the establishment of the EDA as part of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009—a full five years after the agency had already been established. Even William Hague, who now serves as Britain’s Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons in 2009 during the Lisbon Treaty debate that the EDA was established “on a shaky legal basis.”
There are no examples of the EDA delivering substantial military capability to the battlefield, and only a handful of examples of the EDA delivering low-level and modest military capability. The EDA’s two greatest achievements have been the creation of a counter–improvised explosive device (C-IED) laboratory that has been deployed to Afghanistan, and the training of helicopter crews some of whom have also deployed to Afghanistan. Even both of these endeavors have offered little in practice.
The C-IED Theater Exploitation Laboratory, designed to counter the IED threat, is a very modest project that took five years to finally get into Afghanistan. It is located in Kabul, its impact has been limited, and the EDA’s own website describes the laboratory as “a number of standard ISO containers jammed with equipment.”
The EU’s Helicopter Training Program is designed to get European helicopter crews to a standard that allows them to deploy to Afghanistan. Between 2009 and 2011, the dates for which the EDA provides information, the EDA’s Helicopter Training Program has trained 152 helicopter crews—only 76 of which have been subsequently deployed to Afghanistan. Considering the thousands of helicopter crews that have deployed to Afghanistan, the EDA’s contribution has been largely insignificant. Furthermore, due to national restrictions on where forces can deploy it is unlikely that many of the crews will ever be deployed to the dangerous eastern or southern parts of Afghanistan.
There is no reason why either program could not be carried out by NATO, and the impact of these two examples is often overstated. Both examples should be taken for what they are: a minor contribution to Europe’s defense capabilities—not the indication of an emerging defense power. The EDA’s real accomplishment is to give the EU Commission a toehold in EU defense policy since the High Representative (who also serves as the First Vice President in the Commission) is the Head of the Agency.
EU defense policy is heading, albeit slowly, in one direction: full integration resulting in a common defense policy. For many, the ultimate goal is the creation of an EU Army under some sort of supranational control, either in full or in part. Although the EU is not yet close to achieving this goal, it is clear that many across Europe would like to see this happen.
When opponents of EU defense integration cite the creation of an EU Army as a serious long-term concern, they are accused of scaremongering. However, over recent years—and certainly since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, there has been a list of senior European officials calling for the creation of an EU Army.
An EU Army under partial or complete control of any supranational institution of the EU would be bad for Americans and Europeans alike. First and foremost, unelected, unaccountable, or supranational bureaucrats in Brussels should not decide when troops are placed into harm’s way. There is something fundamentally morally wrong with the idea that those who do not have to answer to the public can send young men and women into war. While this may not be the case yet, it is certainly the goal for many.
Second, an EU Army would be expensive and resource-intensive to form, equip, and maintain. In an era of declining defense spending across Europe this would come at the expense of national armies that could be used in NATO operations. Finally, it would not be in the security interest of the U.S. to have the bulk of Europe’s fighting force under the control of the EU—which, in many cases, no longer shares America’s view of the world.
There are many examples of senior European officials calling for the creation of an EU Army. German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle has stated that Berlin supports the long-term goal of creating a European army. Speaking at the 2012 Munich Security Conference, an annual gathering for high-level discussions on security and defense, Westerwelle said that the EU’s new institutional rules regarding defense policy in the Lisbon Treaty are “not the end but, rather, the beginning for common security and defence policy.” He went on to say that “[t]he long-term goal is the establishment of a European army under full parliamentary control,” noting that the German government “wants to advance along this path.”
Westerwelle’s remarks were not groundbreaking. In fact, they were simply a continuation of a long-held German view that creating an EU Army is the ultimate objective. Chancellor Angela Merkel said in 2007 that “Within the EU itself, we will have to move closer to establishing a common European army.” That same year then-foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told a security conference in Berlin that he was in favor of a “European armed force” and that “the end result of a consolidation of military capacities must be a European army.” Former defense minister Peter Struck told the same conference: “There will still be opposition to the idea of a European army as there once was against the single currency, the euro. But single states are no longer able to handle the threats of today.”
In a 2009 interview with the London-based Times newspaper, the Italian foreign minister, Franco Frattini, said that it is a “necessary objective to have a European army.” He elaborated:
Every country duplicates its forces, each of us puts armored cars, men, tanks, planes, into Afghanistan. If there were a European army, Italy could send planes, France could send tanks, Britain could send armored cars, and in this way we would optimize the use of our resources. Perhaps we won’t get there immediately, but that is the idea of a European army.
The European Parliament has also called for the creation of what amounts to an EU Army. In 2008, a report published by the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee stated that the committee “proposes to place Eurocorps as a standing force under EU command and invites all Member States to contribute to it.” A 2009 report by the Foreign Affairs Committee stated: “A common defence policy in Europe requires an integrated European Armed Force which consequently needs to be equipped with common weapon systems so as to guarantee commonality and interoperability.”
Support for an EU Army was most recently demonstrated in September 2012 in a communiqué agreed by Germany, France, and nine other EU members calling for a drastic rethinking of the future of the EU—especially in the fields of foreign affairs and defense. In this document 11 foreign ministers called for an EU defense policy that “could eventually involve a European Army.”
The acceleration of EU defense integration encouraged by the Lisbon Treaty should be worrying for U.S. policymakers and leaders, especially in the Department of Defense. The EU has done nothing to increase European defense spending, it has diverted effort and resources from improving NATO, and the structure and membership of the alliance prohibits EU–NATO cooperation.
However, NATO has its shortcomings, too. The U.S. needs to work on improving NATO by making it relevant to Europe’s defense for the 21st century. In order to remain effective as a security alliance, NATO must maintain credibility. Currently, NATO’s credibility is being undermined by the perception that it is not achieving its objectives in Afghanistan and that it barely did so in Libya. Refocusing NATO’s mission for the 21st century may include abandoning its focus on expeditionary warfare. The alliance should focus more on areas where Europe actually faces direct security threats, such as nuclear proliferation, cyber attacks, and the emerging threats of ballistic missiles.
If NATO, the world’s premier security alliance for the past 64 years, cannot encourage European countries to invest more in defense, why should anyone believe that the EU can do so? In order to ensure that the CSDP does not undermine NATO, the U.S. should:
American support for deeper EU defense integration will not only be a disappointment for those who believe it will lead to greater military capability; it will prove to be dangerous to the NATO alliance. As the EU develops a more integrated defense capability, America’s influence in European defense matters that it currently has through NATO will be reduced.
It takes real spending, and not words in a treaty, to achieve real military capability. Until America’s European allies realize this they will continue to hide behind the bureaucracy of the EU with the comfort of America’s security guarantee. European capitals must focus their energy and resources on fixing NATO before creating more institutions and signing up for more military commitments within the EU. This is the only way the U.S. will see greater burden sharing. Any increase in European military capability must take place under the NATO umbrella.
Far from increasing their military capability, European militaries’ size and budgets have shrunk at a time when the global security situation has become more perilous and uncertain. Most European countries have not met their NATO commitment for defense spending since the days of the Cold War, so it is unlikely that CSDP would spark European countries to spend more on defense. Many leaders in Europe say that the first duty of government is the defense of the realm, but few implement this view in practice. Spending is about setting national priorities, and Europeans have become complacent about their own defense capabilities—and U.S. policymakers need to stop believing that the EU can change this complacency.—Luke Coffey is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
 Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, “NATO Runs Short on Some Munitions in Libya,” The Washington Post, April 15, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-04-15/world/35231577_1_nato-officials-cluster-bombs-munitions-in-civilian-areas (accessed April 3, 2013).
 For example, France, at the time NATO’s fourth-largest troop contributor, withdrew its forces in 2012, well before the NATO-agreed date of 2015.
 For example in November 2012, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain issued a call for greater EU defense integration which stated: “We are convinced that the EU must set up, within a framework yet-to-be-defined, true civilian–military structures to plan and conduct missions and operations.” Foreign ministers meeting, joint communiqué on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Paris, November 15, 2012, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/121114_Outcome_proposal_Final.pdf (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden. A brief explanation regarding their neutral statuses can be found in “In Focus: Neutral European Countries: Austria, Switzerland [not an EU member], Sweden, Finland, Ireland,” Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/national-security/neutral-status/neutral-countries/ (accessed April 10, 2013), and Alex Sceberras Trigona, “30th Anniversary of Neutral Malta,” Times of Malta, September 15, 2010, http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20100915/local/30th-anniversary-of-neutral-malta.326944 (accessed April 10, 2013).
 The expression “ever closer union” is found in the first sentence of the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the European Union: “Determined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.” Today the phrase is used to describe the continuous process of integrating Europe to the level of a single United States of Europe.
 In 1961, the OEEC developed into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Today, the OECD has 34 members, including the United States.
 James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1998), p. 324.
 Armağan Emre Çakir, “Applying Contingency Theory to International Organizations: The Case of European Integration,” Journal of International Organizations Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 2012), p. 14.
 France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
 Franco–British Summit, “Joint Declaration on European Defense,” Saint-Malo, France, December 4, 1998, http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Madeleine K. Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure Nato’s Future,” Financial Times, December 7, 1998, p. 22.
 Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld Speaks on Missile Defense, Cooperation,” American Forces Press Service, February 5, 2001, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=45734 (accessed April, 4, 2013).
 News release, “Remarks by President Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall,” The White House, April 3, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-strasbourg-town-hall (accessed April 4, 2013).
 News release, “Strasbourg/ Kehl Summit Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4, 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed April 4, 2013). Incidentally, this same wording was also included in the 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration.
 From 1992 to 2009, the Pillar System was used by the EU to determine which policy competencies were intergovernmental and which were supranational. First Pillar: European Communities (supranational); Second Pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy (intergovernmental); Third Pillar: Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (intergovernmental).
 European Council Meeting, “Helsinki Headline Goal,” Helsinki, Finland, December 1999, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf (accessed January 27, 2009).
 The “Petersberg tasks” cover humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
 Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos, “EU Battlegroups—Battling Irrelevance?” ISIS Europe Blog, April 7, 2012, http://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2012/07/04/eu-battlegroups-battling-irrelevance/ (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Nick Whitney, “Re-Energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy,” European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Paper, July 2008, p. 20, http://ecfr.3cdn.net/678773462b7b6f9893_djm6vu499.pdf (accessed April 3, 2013).
 Calculation based on official NATO figures. For 1998: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Defence expenditures of NATO countries,” http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_1998_12/20100826_p98-147.pdf (accessed April 4, 2013). For 2011: News release, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 13, 2012, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_04/20120413_PR_CP_2012_047_rev1.pdf (accessed April 4, 2013).
 News release, “Military Balance 2012,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 7, 2012, http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2012-ebe1/march-1290/military-balance-2012-press-statement-b956 (accessed May 22, 2013).
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “International Security Assistance Force, Ireland Troop Numbers & Contributions,” http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/ireland/index.php (accessed April 4, 2013).
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “International Security Assistance Force, Austria Troop Numbers & Contributions,” http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/austria/index.php (accessed April 4, 2013).
 David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, “NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan,” presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2009, p. 9, http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20at%20War.pdf (accessed April 3, 2013).
 Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO),” speech delivered in Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581 (accessed April 3, 2013).
 News release, “Council Decides on EU Military Operation in Support of Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Libya,” Council of the European Union, April 1, 2011, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110404_2_en.htm (accessed April 3, 2013).
 Ana Gomes, “Was Eufor Libya an April Fool’s Joke?” EU Observer, July 13, 2011, http://euobserver.com/opinion/32624 (accessed April 4, 2013).
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Command Operations, “NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A),” 2012, http://www.aco.nato.int/page272701224.aspx (accessed April 4, 2013).
 The EU Commission is the executive branch of the European Union and is perhaps the most undemocratic decision-making body inside the EU. Every five years each EU member appoints a commissioner—not its commissioner. Once a commissioner is appointed, he cuts all ties to his home country and is not answerable to his elected leaders or the voters. The oath of office for a commissioner requires swearing that he will work in the interest of the union and pledges neither to “seek nor to take instructions from any Government….” Furthermore, the commissioner cannot be recalled and replaced when there is a change of government in his home country.
 Elena Bratanova, “Legal Limits of National Defence Privilege in the European Union,” research paper, International Center for Conversion, April 2004, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=16643 (accessed April 4, 2013).
 The current High Representative, Catherine Ashton, is not without controversy. Until she was appointed to the role, she had never been elected to any office in her life and she had no foreign policy experience. Her only experience with defense and security issues was as Treasurer for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the 1980s. Hardly a background that is sympathetic to America’s or NATO’s view of the world.
 Article 27(4). Before the Lisbon Treaty, the only way for the commission to propose an EU military mission was for all 27 members of the commission to agree. Under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, only one member of the commission, the first vice president—who is also the High Representative—will have the power to do so.
 “Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC,” August 20, 2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:216:0076:0136:en:PDF (accessed April 3, 2013).
 Formally known as Article 296 of the 2003 Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC). Consolidated version (Nice).
 News release, “Public Procurement: Commission Closes Infringement Case Against the Czech Republic,” European Union, December 13, 2006, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-1785_en.htm (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Clara Marina O’Donnell, “The EU takes on Defence Procurement,” Centre for European Reform, November 28, 2008, http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2008/11/eu-takes-on-defence-procurement.html (accessed April 4, 2013).
 The Berlin-Plus arrangement agreed in 2002 allows the EU to have access to NATO resources and capabilities should all NATO members agree. It also guarantees NATO’s right of first refusal for all military missions pertaining to Europe. It has been used only twice: for the EU’s Operation Concordia (Macedonia), and for the EU’s Operation Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina).
 The five national headquarters are: Northwood (U.K.), Mont Valérien (France), Potsdam (Germany), Larissa (Greece), and Rome (Italy). The EU also has access to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) under the Berlin-Plus arrangement.
 “Britain Blocks Proposal for Permanent EU Security HQ,” Reuters, July 18, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/18/eu-britain-defence-idAFLDE76H0RY20110718 (accessed April 3, 2013).
 House of Lords, European Union Committee, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission,” 2011, 8th Report, chapter 3, p. 69, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeucom/87/8706.htm (accessed April 4, 2013).
 “A Guide to the Constitutional Treaty, Second Edition,” Open Europe, p. 5, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/guide.pdf (accessed April 4, 2013).
 “Lisbon Treaty: What They Said,” BBC, September 30, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8282241.stm (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Daniel Finnan, “Why Are the Irish Voting on the Lisbon Treaty Again?” Radio France Internationale English, September 29, 2009, http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/117/article_5262.asp (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Remarks with EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Catherine Ashton After Their Meeting,” remarks delivered at Department of State Treaty Room, Washington, DC, January 21, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135530.htm (accessed April 3, 2013).
 European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community,” Article 27(7), December 13, 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Peter Hain, “Suggestion for amendment of Article: I-40 of Lisbon Treaty,” http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/pdf/30/30_Art%20I%2040%20Hain%20EN.pdf (accessed April 4, 2013).
 On a positive note, the Lisbon Treaty states that the mutual defense clause “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States,” but this is no doubt a line intended to appease the neutral countries in the EU, such as Ireland, Austria, and Sweden, and not to alleviate fears about NATO’s primacy among the more pro-NATO member states.
 “Council Joint Action on the Establishment of the European Defence Agency,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 12, 2004, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:245:0017:0028:EN:PDF (accessed April 3, 2013).
 “William Hague on Europe and Defence,” Conservative Home, February 20, 2008, http://conservativehome.blogs.com/parliament/2008/02/william-hague-o.html (accessed April 4, 2013).
 News release, “Counter IED Lab Saves Lives in Afghanistan,” European Defence Agency, January 7, 2013, http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/news/2013/01/07/counter-ied-lab-saves-lives-in-afghanistan (accessed April 4, 2013).
 European Defence Agency, “Helicopter Initiatives,” August 14, 2012, http://www.eda.europa.eu/projects/projects-search/helicopter-initiatives (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Honor Mahony, “Germany Speaks Out in Favour of European Army,” EU Observer, February 8, 2010, http://euobserver.com/news/29426 (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Kyle James, “The Quiet March Toward a Common European Army,” Deutsche Welle, May 8, 2008, http://www.dw.de/the-quiet-march-toward-a-common-european-army/a-3323736 (accessed May 22, 2013).
 Honor Mahony, “German Foreign Minister Favours EU Army,” EU Observer, May 8, 2008, http://euobserver.com/defence/26107 (accessed April 4, 2013).
 Richard Owen, “Italy’s Foreign Minister Says Post-Lisbon EU Needs a European Army,” The Times (London), November 15, 2009, http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Interviste/2009/11/20091116_postlisbonatimesonline.htm (accessed April 10, 2013).
 “Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP,” European Parliament, May 15, 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=A6-0186/2008 (accessed April 4, 2013). Eurocorps is an intergovernmental military headquarters based in Strasbourg, France. The force was created in May 1992 and five countries participate in Eurocorps as framework nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain. However, the core of Eurocorps is the Franco–German Brigade formed in 1987. Even though the European Parliament voted by a large majority in a non-binding resolution (482 votes in favor, 111 against, and 55 abstentions) to place Eurocorps under the permanent command of the EU, it is not formally part of the EU, and elements of Eurocorps have deployed with NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
 “Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP,” European Parliament, February 19, 2009, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=A6-0032/2009 (accessed May 28, 2013).
 “Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain,” September 17, 2012, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/626338/publicationFile/171838/120918-Abschlussbericht-Zukunftsgruppe.pdf (accessed April 4, 2013).