U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “The Employment Situation—January 2013,” February 1, 2013, p. 14, Table A-1, and p. 26, Table A-12,http://www.bls.gov/news.re lease/pdf/empsit.pdf(accessed February 7, 2013).
 Throughout this paper both programs are collectively referred to as federally extended benefits even though EB and EUC are technically separate programs. The overwhelming majority of workers receiving federal benefits are in the EUC program.
 This rate applies to states with unemployment rates above 9 percent. In most other states, the maximum benefit duration is 63 weeks.
 U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance: Exhaustion Rate, compiled by Haver Analytics.
 U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, “Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Report,” February 7, 2013, http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/press/2013/020213.asp (accessed February 7, 2013).
 See Stuart M. Butler, “Can the American Dream Be Saved?” National Affairs, No. 14 (Winter 2013), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/can-the-american-dream-be-saved (accessed February 7, 2013).
 Jacob Mincer, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974), http://www.nber.org/books/minc74-1 (accessed February 7, 2013).
 This is one of the causes of the male–female wage gap: Women are more likely than men to exit and re-enter the workforce for family reasons. Because they have less experience than their peers (both male and female) who remained in the workforce, they make less when they resume working. For example, see Audrey Light and Manuelita Ureta, “Early-Career Work Experience and Gender Wage Differentials,” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 121–154.
 Workers who spend more time unemployed earn less and have more difficulty finding jobs than workers who remained employed. Two competing theories explain this finding: stigma effects and skill depreciation. The stigma hypothesis states that prolonged unemployment sends a signal to employers that an employee is of low quality, and employers respond accordingly. The skill depreciation hypothesis states that as workers remain out of the labor market, their skills may deteriorate. Evidence supports both theories. For evidence of skill depreciation, see Edin Per-Anders and Magnus Gustavsson, “Time Out of Work and Skill Depreciation,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (January 2008), pp. 163–180, and Christopher Pissarides, “Loss of Skill During Unemployment and the Persistence of Employment Shocks,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 4 (November 1992), pp. 1371–1391. For evidence of stigma effects and against skill depreciation, see Kory Kroft, Fabian Lange, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, “Duration Dependence and Labor Market Conditions: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment,” National Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 18387, September 2012. Both factors probably contribute to some extent the observed drop in wages for unemployed workers.
 Mary Gregory and Robert Jukes, “Unemployment and Subsequent Earnings: Estimating Scarring Among British Men 1984–94,” Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 475 (November 2001), pp. 607–625, and Arulampalam Wiji, “Is Unemployment Really Scarring? Effects of Unemployment Experiences on Wages,” Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 475 (November 2001), pp. 585–606.
 Bhashkar Mazumder, “How Did Unemployment Insurance Extensions Affect the Unemployment Rate in 2008–10,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Chicago Fed Letter No. 285, April 2011, http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2011/cflapril2011_285.pdf (accessed February 8, 2013); Jesse Rothstein, “Unemployment Insurance and Job Search in the Great Recession,” National Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 17534, October 2011; and Rob Valletta and Katherine Kuang, “Extended Unemployment and UI Benefits,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter No. 2010–12, April 19, 2010, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2010/el2010-12.html (accessed February 8, 2013).
 Mark Zandi, testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, February 7, 2012, https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2012-02-07-JEC-Payroll-Tax.pdf (accessed February 8, 2013).
 Under the pre-stimulus UI rules approximately 1 million Americans would earn as much or more on unemployment benefits as they would from taking a job that paid as much as their previous one. Under the stimulus rules that made UI benefits more generous that figure increased to 3 million Americans facing effective 100 percent marginal tax rates on taking a new job. Casey B. Mulligan, “The ARRA: Some Unpleasant Welfare Arithmetic,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 18591, Table 4, December 2012, http://www.nber.org/papers/w18591 (accessed February 12, 2013).
 For a more detailed overview, see Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund, “Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research,” Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 357–386.
 Dan Black et al., “Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective Than the Services Themselves? Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (September 2003), pp. 1313–1327.
 Terry Johnson and Daniel Klepinger, “Experimental Evidence on Unemployment Insurance Work-Search Policies,” The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 695–717.
 Daniel H. Klepinger et al., “Evaluation of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Work Search Demonstration,” Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, November 1997, http://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/98-2 (accessed February 8, 2013).
 Congressional Budget Office, “H.R. 8, American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012,” January 1, 2013, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43829 (accessed February 8, 2013).
 Alan Krueger and Andreas Mueller, “Job Search and Unemployment Insurance: New Evidence from Time Use Data,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94, Nos. 3–4 (April 2010), pp. 298–307.
 Mark Aguiar, Erik Hurst, and Loukas Karabarbounis, “Time Use During Recessions,” National Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 17259, July 2011.
 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Multiple Employment and Training Programs: Providing Information on Allocating Services and Consolidating Administrative Structures Could Promote Efficiencies,” GAO–11–92, January 2011, p. 7, Figure 2, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1192.pdf (accessed February 8, 2013).
 David B. Muhlhausen, “Do Job Training Programs Work? A Review Article,” Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 299–321.
 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Multiple Employment and Training Programs,” pp. 10–12.
 Peter Z. Schochet, John Burghardt, and Sheena McConnell, “Does Job Corps Work? Impact Findings from the National Job Corps Study,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 98, No. 5 (December 2008), pp. 1864–1886, and U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Inspector General, “Job Corps Needs to Improve Reliability of Performance Metrics and Results,” September 30, 2011, http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2011/26-11-004-03-370.pdf (accessed February 8, 2013).
 Lars Calmfors, Anders Forslund, and Maria Hemström, “Does Active Labour Market Policy Work? Lessons from the Swedish Experiences,” Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 61–124; David Card, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber, “Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta-Analysis,” Economic Journal, Vol. 120 (November 2010), pp. 452–477; and John Martin and David Grubb, “What Works and for Whom: A Review of OECD Countries’ Experiences with Active Labour Market Policies,” Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 9–56.
 Some correspondence learning courses existed before the Internet, but they were relatively uncommon.
 See University of Phoenix, http://www.phoenix.edu (accessed February 11, 2013).
 See Western Governors University, http://www.wgu.edu/ (accessed February 11, 2013).
 See Udacity, https://www.udacity.com/ (accessed February 11, 2013).
 Ki Mae Heussner, “Udacity Nabs Another $15M to Bring More Interactivity to Online Education,” GigaOM, October 25, 2012, http://gigaom.com/2012/10/25/udacity-nabs-another-15m-to-bring-more-interactivity-to-online-education/ (accessed February 8, 2013).
 See StraighterLine, http://www.straighterline.com/ (accessed February 11, 2013).
 See edX, https://www.edx.org/ (accessed February 11, 2013).
 See Coursera, https://www.coursera.org/ (accessed February 11, 2013).
 See Khan Academy, https://www.khanacademy.org/ (accessed February 11, 2013).
 Remaining costs include the costs of paying for testing centers to administer proctored exams, grading exams, and paying for mentors to guide students through their course of study.
 Enrolling in other federal job training programs would count toward meeting this requirement, but workers would not be forced to enlist in these programs, and the government would not appropriate additional funds for them.
 Not all job skills, such as the skills used in many manufacturing or construction jobs, are amenable to online education. Even so, workers will end up at least as well off with online studies expanding their knowledge base as without them.
 Economists debate how much of the role of education in raising earnings and reducing unemployment is causal. Some economists believe in the human capital model, which holds that education makes workers more productive, so they earn more. Others advocate the signaling model, which holds that education itself does little to make workers more productive, but it signals to employers about employee quality. Under this theory those with more education are on average more productive and more motivated—and thus earn more—than those with less education. These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and good evidence supports both. While some of the education’s apparent value probably comes from its signaling role, it also does convey valuable skills.
 U.S. Census Bureau, “Computer and Internet Use in the United States: 2010,” Table 1A, July 2012.
 Stephanie Riegg Cellini and Claudia Goldin, “Does Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New Evidence on For-Profit Colleges,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 17827, February 2012.
 Lindsey M. Burke and Stuart M. Butler, “Accreditation: Removing the Barrier to Higher Education Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2728, September 21, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/accreditation-removing-the-barrier-to-higher-education-reform.
 Eileen Poe-Yamagata et al., “Impact of the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) Initiative,” IMPAQ International, June 2011, http://wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullText_Documents/ETAOP_2012_08_Impact_of_the_REA_Initiative.pdf (accessed February 8, 2013).