February 28, 2012 | Backgrounder on National Security and Defense
Abstract: Twenty-two states currently have volunteer state guard units. These units, formally known as state defense forces (SDFs), are today’s state militias. Authorized by the Constitution and built on a strong U.S. militia tradition, today’s SDFs offer a vital, low-cost force multiplier and homeland security resource. In July 2011, Arizona’s Senate Bill 1495 went into effect, authorizing Arizona’s governor to establish an SDF. Historically, state defense forces were often organized as light infantry and military police forces. This model is largely a relic of past security and defense needs. While SDFs are not necessarily required in states with low risk of natural disasters or terror attacks, several states that are at high risk for catastrophes have yet to create a modern state defense force. Such states can no longer afford to place establishment of an SDF on the sidelines. Four national security analysts, including two retired SDF officers, explain how SDFs work, and why they are invaluable to so many states—and to the country.
On July 27, 2011, Arizona’s Senate Bill 1495 (S.B. 1495) went into effect, authorizing Arizona’s governor to establish a state guard unit. These units, formally known as state defense forces (SDFs), are today’s modern state militias. Authorized under the Constitution and by state and federal law, and built on a strong U.S. militia tradition, today’s volunteer state defense forces offer a vital, low-cost force multiplier and homeland security resource.
It now stands with Arizona’s governor to establish the force. If established, Arizona’s state defense force would become the 24th active SDF of the United States (22 in other states, one in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico). Obtaining statutory authorization to stand up the force, however, is only the first step. Arizona’s state leaders must now organize and train their newly authorized SDF and assign to it those missions most critical to the state.
Historically, state defense forces were organized along traditional unit lines, usually as light infantry and military police forces. This model, however, is largely a relic of past homeland security and homeland defense needs. Today’s threats require a different mission. Modern SDFs now serve as auxiliaries to the National Guard units of their states, as well as force multipliers for state homeland security missions in disaster preparation, response, and recovery. This mission portfolio requires a different model than has been seen in the past, one that centers on building professional units capable of contributing substantial value added to the states and augmenting the National Guard’s capabilities.
Once Arizona’s governor formally authorizes the establishment of the state defense force, determining how to design and build the force will be the next challenge. In building a professional SDF, Arizona could learn from the experiences of other SDFs, and, in turn, serve as a model for other states. SDFs are not necessarily required in states with low risk of natural disasters or terror attacks. But several states that are at high risk for catastrophes have yet to create a modern state defense force, despite the SDFs’ role as cost-effective force multipliers and resources, especially when a state’s National Guard units are depleted by combat deployment, peacekeeping, or homeland defense missions. Such states can no longer afford to place the valuable national security asset that an SDF embodies on the sidelines.
State militias have been seen as an essential component of the defense of America since the time of its founding. Building on English and Colonial experience, and reflecting their concerns about maintaining a large standing federal army, the Founding Fathers inscribed their belief that a well-regulated militia was “the ultimate guardian of liberty” within the Constitution, proclaiming among the enumerated powers of Congress the following:
The Congress shall have the power…to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Law of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repeal Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
With this language, the Constitution granted the federal government the power to call forth the militia of the United States, but left the states the freedom to man and train their militias as they saw fit.
Five years after the Constitution was ratified, state militia powers were more fully addressed by the Militia Act of 1792, which provided that the adjutant general (TAG) of each state would command the militia and that state militias would receive no federal funding. By 1820, the Supreme Court would further solidify the powers of the states in commanding militia units. In Houston v. Moore, the Court ruled that states maintained concurrent authority with the President to mobilize the militia in the event of a natural disaster, civil unrest, insurrection, or invasion. This decision helped to set the basis for the modern state-apportioned militia.
Today, 22 states and one territory have a state defense force, with the force strength of these units totaling around 14,000 members in 2005. Authorized by Congress in Title 32 of the U.S. Code, SDFs are entirely under state control—unlike the National Guard, which can serve the state under Title 32 or the federal government under Title 10—both in peacetime and otherwise. (National Guard troops serve both in their state’s militia and concurrently as reserve personnel of the Army or the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps having no National Guard components.) Hence, while the National Guard is a dually appointed force that can be called to federal service under Title 10, or remain a state force under Title 32, SDFs serve solely as Title 32 forces.
This status gives SDFs two important advantages. First, SDFs are continually resident within their respective states and can be called up quickly and easily in times of need. Also, SDFs are exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits troops in federal service under Title 10 from engaging in domestic law enforcement activities. While the Posse Comitatus Act has never proved to be a major obstacle to deploying federal forces for domestic emergency response, and does not apply to the Army National Guard or Air National Guard while serving solely in state status under Title 32, SDFs may enforce civilian criminal law uninhibited by legal obstacles, if given that power under state law.
Typically, SDFs are under the control of the state’s governor, in his or her role as militia commander in chief; operational control and the chain-of-command typically run from the state’s adjutant general, through the state’s military department, to the commanding general of the SDF. That is, the adjutant general, who is the state’s senior military commander and typically a member of the governor’s cabinet, commands the SDF on behalf of the governor. As the commander of the State Military Department, TAG is responsible for all training, equipment allocation, and decisions regarding the SDF’s strength, activity, and mission. The adjutant general is also the commander of the state’s National Guard and often directs state emergency response. Through TAG and the state’s joint staff, the SDF can easily coordinate with other key components of the state emergency response.
In recent years, SDFs have proved their value as vital force providers to homeland security and emergency responses. After 9/11, for instance, the New York State Guard, the New York Naval Militia, and the New Jersey Naval Militia were activated to assist in response, recovery, and critical infrastructure security. An estimated 2,274 SDF personnel participated in recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina. SDF personnel were activated in at least eight states, including Texas, Maryland, Virginia, and Tennessee. They assisted directly with recovery efforts or stayed in their states to fill the roles of the state National Guard units that were deployed to assist in the recovery. SDFs have also offered critical infrastructure protection. In Operation Noble Eagle, a homeland defense and civil support operation after 9/11, the Alaskan SDF helped protect the Alaska oil pipeline.
In May 2007, Arizona’s state legislature passed S.B. 1132. The bill sought to create a “homeland security force” such that “after consideration of federal deployment of the national guard, if the governor determines that an emergency exists or that it is necessary to protect lives or property.” While not outwardly stated, this “homeland security force” was widely accepted to mean an Arizona SDF. Passed in the Arizona Senate by a vote of 18 to 11, and in the House of Representatives by 34 to 21, the creation of this special volunteer homeland security force received clear support from the Arizona legislature and public. S.B. 1132, however, never became law, as it was vetoed by then-Governor Janet Napolitano.
In 2011, the Arizona legislature tried again, proposing and passing S.B. 1495. The bill, sponsored by Arizona Senator Sylvia Allen (R–Fifth District) and Representative Jack Harper (R–Fourth District), was signed by Governor Jan Brewer on April 28, 2011, and became law 90 days later. With the passage of this legislation, broader in scope of authorization than its failed predecessor, Arizona’s governor is now authorized to stand up a unit of the Arizona state guard, a state defense force, “if the national guard of Arizona or a major portion thereof is called into active federal service…or for any other reason the governor considers to be necessary...for the safety and protection of the lives and property of the state.” In the case of border states, border security might very well be one of those reasons. As long as any SDF border-security contingents respect the three main tenants of volunteer activity—liability, accountability, and sustainability—states should be allowed to decide which missions their SDFs will fulfill.
Taking advantage of this newly granted statutory authority and creating an SDF in Arizona would add significant value to the state, particularly in terms of disaster preparedness. In 2010 alone, Arizona experienced six major natural disasters, ranging from severe storms and flooding to wildfires and winter storms. In 2011, Arizona had the largest wildfire in state history as three major blazes burned simultaneously. The Wallow Fire alone scorched an estimated 835 square miles, forced the evacuation of roughly 10,000 people, and destroyed 32 homes.
While the first tier of response to natural disasters is typically composed of state and local fire and police first responders, many of them volunteers, these resources and capabilities may quickly become stressed in the event of large-scale, catastrophic disasters. In such cases, National Guard troops may be expected to be called out for Title 32 service to aid response and recovery efforts. However, National Guard troops may be unavailable to respond in sufficient numbers, due to the Guard’s increasing commitments to active duty deployments. Additionally, because the Guard is typically organized along the needs of combat, sufficient expertise in particular fields (such as medical expertise and engineering) may not be available in its ranks to satisfy emergency requirements. Likewise, while direct federal support may be appropriate in the event of catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, federal assistance can take up to 72 hours to mobilize and arrive at the scene of the disaster. SDFs, on the other hand, can be mobilized quickly to respond to disasters in their own states. SDFs are also likely to have significant “local knowledge”—intimate familiarity with the area and resources at hand—making SDFs vital for effective disaster response.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, at least eight states activated their SDFs to aid in the recovery efforts and to fill in for National Guard members deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi. State defense force personnel were involved in the operation and management of shelters, distribution centers, and warehouses; housing and transportation of victims; unarmed police assistance; and religious services. There was even an unprecedented swearing-in of over 100 emergency medical personnel on an Air Guard base tarmac to allow them to practice in the disaster areas, as allowed by multi-state Emergency Management Assistance Compacts.
As another example, when flooding from Hurricane Alex in 2010 forced 850 south Texas residents to evacuate their homes, more than 750 Texas SDF members were mobilized to staff shelters. An Arizona SDF could aid its state in disaster response in much the same way, quickly supplying boots on the ground to aid victims and help begin local recovery work.
Arizona could further benefit from an SDF after a terrorist attack. While none of the 43 publicly known thwarted terrorist plots against the U.S. since 9/11 has been aimed at Arizona, Phoenix has consistently been rated by the federal government as an urban area with one of the highest risks of a terror attack. This rating stems from the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program, which is intended to provide funding to high-risk, high-density urban areas in order to help them build the capacity “to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.” Phoenix has received a UASI grant every year since the program began in 2003, even after the program was scaled back from 63 to 31 cities in 2011.
Today’s modern militia, the state defense force, has a long history in the United States, although its scope and design have changed over time, as the threats to the United States and each state have evolved. Throughout World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War, the modern state defense force was organized to serve in traditional military roles, such as light infantry or military police. The initial SDF mission was largely to support the National Guard by protecting armories whenever the assigned state National Guard unit was not in attendance (when the Guard was mobilized en masse, as happened in World Wars I and II), to perform burial honors, to support local events as Color Guards in parades, to provide ushers and parking monitors for local events, and, when available, to provide first aid at local events. These were tasks, albeit of value, that obviously required minimal training and qualifications.
With the Cold War over, the nation and the states face different threats. Rather than preparing to fight Communism, the United States is now faced with an entirely different threat, that of radical Islamists who use terror as a weapon. This threat, coupled with the ever-present risk of natural disasters, has created an increased need among the states to strengthen and augment their homeland security capabilities. With the recent high mobilization rates among the nation’s National Guard forces, both as units and as individuals, due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, forward-thinking governors and TAGs have begun looking to their SDFs as force multipliers, providing key elements of all-hazards homeland security for their states.
Force Design. Meeting this redefined mission set has required a new model. This model should rest on creating professional units within an SDF, units which add to existing capabilities and create a force that adds greater value to the TAG, National Guard, and state as a whole. Likewise, force design largely depends on the type and level of the missions and the extent to which the TAG is willing to integrate the SDF with the National Guard. In implementing force design, states should consider the risks posed by the following threat scenarios:
Typically, a modern SDF is organized as a brigade, with a brigadier general in command, structured as follows:
Under the chief of staff are up to nine specialized staff functions providing organizational or operational input, bearing the letter and number designations commonly used for general staff elements of Army units:
In the modern SDF, attention must be paid to the special professional components that will best meet the needs of the state. There are no field manuals or other set publications that describe “best practices” for an SDF. Nonetheless, interchanges among SDF personnel do occur, and an analysis of existing literature illustrates some specific “professional components” that form part of vibrant SDFs throughout the United States. These include:
Recruitment. Of course, force structure means nothing without the effective recruitment of members. Typically, SDF recruiting is a collection of approaches put together by the G1 staff element responsible for personnel matters, based on input from its own staff and others on the general staff. Any recruiting plan becomes unique to the SDF unit itself. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that the key to building a strong professional force is to recruit a “key” person as its commander. This person may be a leader in his or her professional field and in the community, such as a prominent physician, a judge or well-known lawyer, or a leading cleric or engineer. These people are connected with the network needed to effectively communicate the SDF story to their peers and have access to the channels and language essential to reach out broadly to potential recruits.
An SDF recruiting plan is typically aimed at:
Age and physical health requirements for joining an SDF differ from those required for federal service, whether active duty or not. Strict active-duty standards are not necessary, as SDF members are not expected to be able to perform the full range of military duties in a combat environment. Appropriate weight and grooming standards are typically set by regulation, while state law may establish age requirements in the SDF-enabling legislation. When setting age and physical health requirements, it is important to take into account that SDFs are composed largely of retired military personnel and other seasoned professionals who tend to be older than deployable National Guard troops, and, hence, cannot be expected to meet the same physical (today, essentially “active duty”) standards. Nonetheless, their years of professional and military experience can be absolutely invaluable and must not be discounted. “In many cases it is not uncommon in a group of four or five SDF officers to find 100 plus years of military experience.” Thus, allowances are typically made to customary military standards of weight and fitness, but members who wish to wear military uniforms are customarily required to meet physical and grooming standards that assure their military appearance in uniform. Some SDFs (such as Maryland’s) may allow members who do not conform to their military uniform-wearing criteria to wear a “non-military uniform,” such as khaki slacks and a logo polo shirt, or logo “scrubs” for medical personnel.
Background Screening. Due to the nature of the state defense force in terms of its representation of the governor and TAG (and the fact that members of some SDFs may be armed while on duty) it is usually required that, at a minimum, a criminal background check be performed prior to induction. Thus, states should consider a requirement that both federal and local criminal record checks be conducted, as well as a local background check in the localities surrounding the individual’s home and work locations. It is essential to obtain the recruit’s consent to this screening beforehand.
Finance. The SDF is a volunteer military organization. There is no general requirement for a budget to cover such costs as salaries, facilities, equipment, training, travel, and general and administrative expenses. Each state legislature determines precisely what will be covered, at what cost, and for how long. For example, some SDFs:
While states are not required to budget for SDFs, there are ways in which SDFs can obtain support funds or equipment:
Training. The backbone of any professional military force is training, both general military training and job-specific training. A well-run SDF is no exception. Therefore, there must be an established schedule of training for all personnel who want to be active members of their assigned units. Each member should undergo basic SDF coaching before starting duty. This will include general education in military customs and courtesies, as well as in SDF roles and responsibilities. Specialized professional directorates, such as chaplaincy, JAG, and medical regiment, have memberships that are already accustomed to continuing professional education, and they should be required to participate in continuing professional education unique to SDFs, as well. It is also vital that all SDF personnel be trained in the National Incident Management System’s (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) for command and control of emergency situations, which is readily available through FEMA or a state’s emergency management agency. This will allow SDF personnel to fit seamlessly into a larger strategy for handling a domestic emergency.
Enhancing the Strength of the Nation’s SDFs
Despite the tremendous advances in the role and stature of SDFs in recent years, forward thinking shows that more can be done to solidify and strengthen SDFs. Suggested future actions for states and Congress include:
Arizona: The Chance to Be an Example
With the passage of S.B. 1495, Arizona stands ready to authorize and establish a state defense force unit. Once authorized, Arizona’s state leaders will be faced with determining how best to organize and train their newly authorized SDF. By building on best practices throughout the nation and seeking to establish a force focused on creating professional units, Arizona can establish a state defense force that meets the needs of its population—and serves as an example and an inspiration to states across the country.
—Jessica Zuckerman is a Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Colonel Martin Hershkowitz is Chairman of the Board of Directors and Executive Vice President of the Citizen Soldier Treatment Center, Inc., chief editor at the SDF Publication Center, Associate Director of Military Programs (Special Projects) for the Aleph Institute, and Executive Consultant for Hershkowitz Associates. He is retired from the Maryland Defense Force (MDDF), where he served as Special Advisor to the Commanding General, and to the commander of the 10th Medical Regiment. Brigadier General Frederic N. Smalkin currently serves as a Special Advisor to the MDDF Commanding General, a position he previously held himself. He is a retired chief judge of the U.S. District Court for Maryland, a faculty member at the University of Baltimore School of Law and at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, and a member of the American Law Institute. He has also served as chairman of the Maryland State Emergency Management Commission. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation.
State of Arizona, Senate, “Arizona State Guard; Establishment,” S.B. 1495, 2011, at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/sb1495p.pdf(February 7, 2012).
32 U.S. Code § 109, “National Guard, Maintenance of Other Troops,” August 11, 1955, as amended. Congressional statutory approval of state defense forces is mandated by U.S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 10, cl. 3.
Col. Martin Hershkowitz (Ret.), Col. Robert Paterson (Ret.), and Maj. Gen. James McCoskey (Ret.), “A Proposed Structure for Today’s State Defense Force,” State Defense Force Monograph Series, Fall 2009, at http://www.sdfpubcntr.net/MissionSDFColdwarV42009.pdf(September 22, 2011).
U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 8.
Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636–2000 (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2003), p. 68, at http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/douciv.html(February 7, 2012).
 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820).
U.S. Department of Defense, “Homeland Defense Forces for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Missions,” No. 3898, November 2005, at http://www.gasdf.net/documents/DoDReportonSDFNov.20051.pdf(February 7, 2012).
10 U.S. Code § 13.
32 U.S. Code § 109; and 10 U.S. Code § 13.
18 U.S. Code, § 1385, Posse Comitatus Act; and J. R. Brinkerhoff, “Understanding the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act,” State Defense Force Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 2007), at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494995&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (February 7, 2012).
James Jay Carafano, “Assessing Plans to Deploy U.S. Military on the Homeland Security Front,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2156, December 5, 2008, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/12/Assessing-Plans-to-Deploy-US-Military-on-the-Homeland-Security-Front.
James Jay Carafano, “Critics of the Hurricane Response Miss the Mark in Focusing on Posse Comitatus,” Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 983, October 3, 2005, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/critics-of-the-hurricane-response-miss-the-mark-in-focusing-on-posse-comitatus.
Col. H. Wayne Nelson, Col. Robert Barish, Brigadier Gen. Frederic Smalkin, Lt. Col. James Doyle, and Col. Martin Hershkowitz, “Developing Vibrant State Defense Forces: A Successful Medical and Health Service Model,” State Defense Force Monograph Series, Winter 2006, at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA494466(February 7, 2012).
Arthur N. Tulak, Robert W. Kraft, and Don Silbaugh, “State Defense Forces and Homeland Security,” Parameters, Vol. 33 (Winter 2003–2004), pp. 132–146, at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/03winter/tulak.htm(February 7, 2012).
W. E. Girardet, “The New Jersey Naval Militia,” State Defense Force Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2007), and ibid.
Col. James L. Greenstone, “The Texas Medical Rangers in the Military Response of the Uniformed Medical Reserve Corps to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita 2005: The New and Tested Role of the Medical Reserve Corps in the United States,” State Defense Force Monograph Series, Winter 2006, at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA494466 (February 7, 2012), and Lt. Col. Richard Colgan, Maj. Kisha Davis, and Col. Robert A. Barish, “Operation Lifeline: Health Care Professionals from Maryland Respond to Hurricane Katrina,” State Defense Force Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2006), at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496627(February 10, 2012).
Col. Martin Hershkowitz (Ret.), “Summary of Available State Defense Force After Action Reports from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Deployments,” State Defense Force Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2006), at http://www.23bn-vdf.com/s3/AARs%20of%20SDFs%20in%20Katrina.pdf(February 7, 2012).
Tulak, Kraft, and Silbaugh, “State Defense Forces and Homeland Security.”
Homeland Security Force, S.B. 1132.
Establishing Arizona State Guard, S.B. 1495.
FEMA, “Arizona Disaster History: 2010,” at http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters_state.fema?id=4(February 7, 2012).
“Cousins Charged in Ariz. Wildfire Appear in Court,” USA Today, September 19, 2011, at
James Jay Carafano, “Homeland Security in the Next Administration,” Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 1085, April 9, 2008, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Homeland-Security-in-the-Next-Administration.
Hershkowitz, “Summary of Available State Defense Force After Action Reports.”
Capt. Morgan Montalvo, “Authorities Brace for Threat of Renewed Flooding as Hurricane Alex Moves Inland, Texas State Guard Wraps up Hurricane Shelter Duties,” Texas State Guard, July 1, 2010, at http://www.txsg.state.tx.us/news/article.aspx?id=20100701(February 7, 2012).
Nelson et al., “Developing Vibrant State Defense Forces,” and
Col. Martin Hershkowitz and Col. H. Wayne Nelson, “Maryland Defense Force 10th Medical Regiment: Past, Present and Future,” State Defense Force Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 2007), at http://www.sdfpubcntr.net/docs/sdfjvol4.pdf(February 7, 2012).
Sgt. First Class Brenda Benner, “The Texas Medical Rangers and Thousands of Patients,” State Defense Force Monograph Series, Winter 2006, at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA497328 (February 7, 2011), and Col. Robert Morecook, “Medical Brigade Reaches Across Texas Providing Care for Citizens and Guard,” Guidon, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 2011), p. 16, at
http://www.txsg.state.tx.us/guidon/docs/2011AprGuidon.pdf (November 17, 2011).
Lt. Col Richard Colgan, Maj. Kisha Davis, and Col. Robert A. Barish, “Operation Lifeline: Health Care Professionals from Maryland Respond to Hurricane Katrina,” State Defense Force Monograph Series, Winter 2006, at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA496627 (February 7, 2012).
Col. Brian R. Kelm and Col. Martin Hershkowitz, “Maryland Defense Force Establishes an Engineer Capability,” State Defense Force Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 2007), at http://www.sdfpubcntr.net/docs/sdfjvol4.pdf(February 7, 2012), and Col. Martin Hershkowitz and Col. Brian Kelm, “On Planning a Damage Assessment,” State Defense Force Monograph Series, Fall 2009, at http://www.sdfpubcntr.net/docs/MissionSDFColdwarV42009.pdf(February 7, 2012).
Brigadier Gen. Roland L. Candee, “Forward to the Past: The Legal Status of the Militia and How the Militia Fits Into the Total Force,” State Defense Force Monograph Series (forthcoming in 2012).
Robert Miller, “Hurricane Katrina: Communications and Infrastructure Impacts,” State Defense Force Monograph Series, Winter 2006, at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Hurricane%20Katrina%20Communications%20&%20Infrastructure%20Impacts.pdf(February 7, 2012).
Col. Martin Hershkowitz and Chesky Tenenbaum, “The Critical Shortage of Military Chaplains: One Possible Solution,” State Defense Force Monograph Series, Winter 2006, at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA494808(February 7, 2012).
Hershkowitz and Tenenbaum, “The Critical Shortage of Military Chaplains.”
The South Carolina State Guard offered a $3,000 state-tax exemption, provided a guardsman has completed at least 192 hours of service. Texas provides tuition reimbursement for up to 12 credit hours per semester for members of the Texas State Guard and the Texas National Guard. Maryland provides state passes to permit free travel on toll roads and bridges for mission purposes and, starting in 2012, will allow state-income-tax relief of up to $3,500 for MDDF service.
Nelson et al., “Developing Vibrant State Defense Forces.”
 Author conversations with different SDFs.
National Guard Regulation 10–4, “Organization and Functions: National Guard Interaction with State Defense Forces,” November 2, 2011, at http://www.vdf.virginia.gov/images/Regulations/ngr10_4.pdf(February 7, 2012).
32 U.S. Code § 508. Section 508 lists the Boy and Girl Scouts of America, the Young Men’s and Women’s Christian Association, the Police Athletic League, and the Civil Air Patrol, but not the Coast Guard Auxiliary or the State Defense Force, among the organizations authorized to use National Guard facilities and equipment, as well as receive technical training and administrative support.