Abstract: The Great Global Contagion and Recession was
largely the result of a sustained global savings glut combined with
excessive monetary accommodation by the Federal Reserve and other
central banks. These two complementary and reinforcing forces
artificially depressed the price of risk globally, leading to the
widespread mis-pricing of assets and misallocation of investment.
These effects were enhanced by rapid financial innovation and
breathtaking arrogance of leading financial market participants in
believing that they understood these innovations. It was also
facilitated by a succession of policy failings, most importantly
the failure of the United States and Europe to modernize their
financial regulatory structures to keep pace with developments in
financial markets.
The Great Global Recession began in the United States in
December 2007 and will likely continue well into 2010 in many parts
of the world. The global contagion began in March 2008 with the
collapse of the investment house Bear Stearns. Citizens, analysts,
and policymakers are appropriately anxious to understand how this
disaster came about and what can be done to prevent a
repetition.
At the outset of the recession, various theories were proposed
to explain who or what was at fault, but most have long since
fallen by the wayside as events outgrew the theories. In
particular, theories specific to the U.S. housing sector, housing
finance, and even the United States in general fail to explain the
global financial contagion and global recession. The global nature
of the financial contagion and recession strongly suggests that the
essential cause or causes must be global, rather than
country-specific.
In coming years a consensus will unfold as to the causes and
contributing factors of this global contagion and recession.
However, two theories already stand out, one centered on monetary
policy and the other centered on an exceptional, sustained surge in
global savings. Neither explanation precludes the other from
playing a major role. On the contrary, the theories describe
complementary, mutually reinforcing economic forces.
Understanding the causes of the Great Global Contagion and
Recession is not merely a matter of history. It is also important
for interpreting events and anticipating problems in the near term
as economies around the world struggle to regain vitality. Clearly
identifying the true causes and discarding the false ones is also
important as policymakers attempt to create new protections against
a repetition. In this vein, discarding false theories regarding
causal forces that could give rise to unnecessary and economically
harmful policies is as important as implementing new policies to
address true causes.
Possible Causes and Theories
Financial contagion arises when profound upheaval in credit
markets spreads quickly from one nation to another. A global
recession occurs when major national economies contract
simultaneously. Although both are highly and harmfully interactive,
examining them as separate processes is nevertheless useful because
their internal dynamics are so different.
Financial markets are essentially support systems for the
broader economy. When financial markets substantially break down,
the broader economy necessarily follows suit while the reverse need
not be the case. In addition, the processes and the distress in
financial markets often occur at lightning speed, such as the near
overnight collapse of the investment house Bear Stearns compared to
the snail's pace collapse of General Motors. The healing processes
of financial markets are likewise fundamentally different than
those in the broader economy.
In coming years a consensus will unfold on the essential cause
or causes, the contributing forces, and the incidental factors
surrounding this global contagion and recession. Much remains to be
revealed and additional significant developments may be in the
offing, yet two central and superficially competing theories
clearly stand out, one centered on monetary policy and the other
centered on an exceptional, sustained surge in global savings.
According to the first theory, the Federal Reserve and certain
other major central banks around the world sowed the seeds of the
financial bubble at the heart of the contagion and recession.
Specifically, the theory argues that the Federal Reserve and other
central banks pursued overly accommodative monetary policy over an
extended period following the recession of 2000-2001 and the
initial slow recovery. Monetary policy thus created credit market
conditions producing various real estate and related-asset price
bubbles. This explanation for the financial bubble has been
advanced most forcefully by John Taylor.[1]
The second explanation is that a global glut of excess savings
drove down the price of risk in asset markets worldwide, leading to
a highly distorted pattern of investment and pricing of assets. Ben
Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve Board Governor, appears to have
been the first to give clear expression to the global savings glut
as an economic factor, although many others have observed its
existence and have tabbed it as the source of the asset price
bubbles.[2]
Two initial observations about these explanations are in order.
First, both explanations point to fundamental, powerful, distorting
elements in global credit markets. Both explanations point to
forces that drove interest rates downward, effectively depressing
the price of risk, which created distortions in credit markets and
then in the broader economy. The monetary explanation--"the Fed did
it"-- is that the distortion arose from excessive monetary
accommodation. The global savings glut explanation is that the
distortion derived from the "real" or nonmonetary side of the
credit markets--the processes of saving, intermediation, and
investment.
Second, both theories have merit in that they describe major
forces that led to asset price bubbles and distorted investment
patterns. Neither explanation precludes the other explanation from
playing a major role. On the contrary, the theories describe
complementary, mutually reinforcing economic forces.
The Global Recession
The first inkling of a pending recession was felt early in 2005.
After four years of extraordinary home building and home price
appreciation, the real estate market slowed and then began to
implode. At the same time, oil prices shot up from an average of
$41 per barrel in 2004 to a peak of $147 per barrel in July 2008.
The rise in oil prices meant a sharp decline in the U.S. in terms
of trade, a heightened risk of broader inflation, and a shock to
the expected cost structures of a wide swath of industries from
trucking to petrochemicals. More immediately, the higher oil prices
caused a collapse in the demand for the low-mileage cars, trucks,
and SUVs on which domestic automobile manufacturers had long
depended for sales volume and profits.
Despite these weaknesses, the U.S. economy remained surprisingly
strong, growing about 2.9 percent in 2005 and 2006, finally
succumbing to recession in December 2007.[3] The recession initially was
so mild that total economic output was unchanged after 12 months.
However, as the overall economy muddled through 2008, tremendous
contractionary forces built up below the surface with the epicenter
in home financing. The onset of declining home sales and prices
exposed a series of dangerous weaknesses in home financing
involving loans fraudulently obtained by borrowers, shoddy lending
practices, and the simple, powerful, widely held, yet errant
assumption at the heart of the housing finance complex that housing
prices would rise indefinitely.[4]
The unraveling of financial markets revealed other serious
errors by market participants. Throughout the early part of this
decade, financial market observers universally marveled at the
efficiency of financial markets in spreading diverse risks over
multitudes of participants through a process called securitization
and related feats of financial engineering. Spreading risk reduced
the apparent level of risk in traditionally risky investments. It
also led participants to the false belief that financial wizardry
had conquered the demon of great systemic risk, an arrogance that
played a central, causal role in the ultimate financial
debacle.
At the same time, major financial firms engaged intensively in
irresponsible practices involving poorly understood financial
innovations, often to circumvent antiquated government regulations.
These firms assumed dangerous debt-to-equity ratios that risked
their very survival. Credit rating agencies, key guardians of the
overall system through their analysis of risk, proved incompetent
and sorely conflicted.[5]
When the U.S. housing sector collapsed, it brought down the
grand structures of financial engineering with it. Sources of
strength and diversification suddenly became weaknesses and
dangers. Errors great and small were exposed in the harsh light of
corrected assumptions and multiplying losses. As the distress
spread from specific financial instruments to credit markets to
firms, the entire system of credit allocation began to unravel.
What began as a U.S. housing problem became a housing finance
problem, which became a general problem in the financial markets
and finally became a problem for every aspect of the U.S.
economy.
In the early months of the U.S. housing and financial markets
collapse, much of the rest of the world heaped schadenfreude on
what they called the Anglo-Saxon economic model of free markets,
entrepreneurship, and relatively light regulation. French and
German fingers, in particular, wagged reprovingly at the
irresponsible Americans and their relatively light regulations and
their heavy reliance on debt, touting instead Europe's heavy
reliance on supervision and what proved to be an even heavier
reliance on debt.
However, events continued to unfold, relentlessly demonstrating
the power of financial distress to reveal mistakes without regard
to national borders. While many countries avoided the excesses of
the U.S. housing market, few avoided the broader excesses within
their financial markets. It quickly became apparent that European
financial firms had widely engaged in much the same irresponsible,
ill-advised practices as their American counterparts despite the
Europeans' heavy-handed regulatory approach. For every Bear
Stearns, AIG, or Citigroup that ran aground, a French BNP Paribas,
German Hypo Real Estate, or Belgian Fortis was bailed out by its
government. Much of the European finger wagging quickly
subsided.
In 2009, two more trouble spots emerged from past practices.
Commercial real estate in the United States went through its own
boom and bust cycle. In Europe, an explosion of lending to emerging
Eastern Europe housing markets created yet another housing bubble,
which popped, creating tremendous problems both for those countries
and for the banks that bankrolled the bubble, especially Austrian
and German banks. The full effects of these mistakes will be
revealed in the fullness of time.
The mild U.S. recession that began toward the end of 2007
evolved into a global financial contagion in 2008 and a deep global
recession toward the second half of 2008. In the spring of 2009,
financial markets began to show signs of stabilizing and resuming
normal operations. By summer, U.S. banks that had received special
funding from the U.S. Treasury began to repay their loans. The
actions of central banks around the world, especially the Federal
Reserve throughout this period, played major roles through bold, if
disconcerting, innovations to protect the functioning of credit
markets.
Although occasionally helpful, the federal government's actions
during the waning months of the Bush Administration and early
months of the Obama Administration were on balance likely harmful
in sustaining credit markets through these times.[6] The Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) advanced by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M.
Paulson certainly proved troubling to the markets. Efforts to
reform mark-to-market accounting were slow in coming and probably
inadequate. Persistent reactive posturing on financial market
reforms by Congress, the Bush and Obama Administrations, and
international voices bathed the financial markets in new and
debilitating uncertainties.
Contributing and Incidental
Factors
As the recession initially unfolded and accelerated, many
culprits were offered up as causes. Yet these early suspects were
at most incidental to the recession's causes.
The Community Reinvestment Act. The first tremors in the
subprime housing market drew immediate attention to the role of the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Enacted in 1977 and substantially
revised in 1995, the CRA sought to increase home ownership by
encouraging banks to make loans to individuals with minimal or poor
credit histories and who posed a relatively high risk of
foreclosure.
While the CRA certainly encouraged behaviors consistent with the
broader ills in the housing sector, the Federal Reserve Board
staff's research of 2006 mortgage originations strongly suggests
that the CRA was likely only a minor or incidental factor.[7] As
Federal Reserve Governor Elizabeth Duke stated in February 2009,
"only 6 percent of higher-priced loans were made by CRA-covered
lenders to borrowers and neighborhoods targeted by CRA."[8]
The Federal Reserve study found that mortgage brokers and others
not subject to CRA were just as active as the banks subject to the
CRA in making inappropriate loans to dubious borrowers: 20 percent
of such mortgages were made by lenders not covered by the CRA,
while 60 percent of high-priced mortgages went to middle-income and
upper-income borrowers. Moreover, as soon became apparent, the
subprime market was simply the first housing or financial market in
which bad practices were discovered to be widespread.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Congress created Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac specifically to lower the costs of home borrowing
by encouraging the development of the securitized mortgage market.
Congress also pushed these government-sponsored entities (GSEs) to
expand lending to low-quality borrowers and thereby raise the
homeownership rate in America. The key to their financial success,
aside from their support in Congress, was an implicit guarantee
that the federal government would not let the institutions go
bankrupt. This implicit guarantee eliminated a source of risk to
GSE bondholders, thus reducing the interest rate markets charged on
GSE debt.
The GSEs played roles far greater than only being market makers.
They were also for-profit firms, borrowing funds from capital
markets at artificially low rates due to the implicit federal
guarantee and buying much higher-yielding mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities to hold as their own investments.[9]
The significant systemic risk posed by the two GSEs was widely
acknowledged. Their operations involved complex assessments of and
exposure to risks against which they could not adequately protect
themselves. The management of the GSEs insisted in public
statements that they were well aware of the risks and had taken all
prudent and necessary steps to protect their institutions, but
events decisively proved otherwise.
In addition to fundamental miscalculations about the risks to
and posed by the GSEs, their management engaged in scandalous
accounting practices, including manipulation of earnings to reach
earnings targets to maximize bonuses to company executives. For
example, Franklin Raines, former Fannie Mae chief executive officer
and former budget director under President Bill Clinton, was forced
to pay a $24.7 million fine and give up $15.6 million in stock
options for his role in the scandal.[10]
The management's assertions about the GSEs' soundness were
repeated and reinforced by their patrons in the U.S. Congress. In
response to Bush Administration proposals to begin reining in the
GSEs, Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), then Ranking Member of
the House Financial Services Committee, said: "These two
entities--Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac--are not facing any kind of
financial crisis," and "[t]he more people exaggerate these
problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less
we will see in terms of affordable housing."[11]
Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) joined in his House
counterpart's effusive support for the soon-to-be defunct GSEs. On
July 13, 2008, Senator Dodd said on national television, "To
suggest somehow that [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] are in trouble is
simply not accurate."[12] Less than two months later the federal
government had placed both institutions into receivership, and the
Treasury Department had committed up to $400 billion to ensure
their ongoing solvency.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac played leading roles in the markets
at the center of the housing storm. While the costs to the
taxpayers are inexcusable and those responsible in and out of
Congress should be held accountable, the two GSEs played at most
secondary roles in the global financial contagion. The GSE market
shares declined dramatically in the middle years of the decade,
evidence that private firms were overcoming the GSEs' funding
advantage with their own strengths.
If the GSEs' implicit guarantee had been phased out at the turn
of the century as many advised, the GSEs would have likely faded
from the market and private companies would have handled the entire
portfolio of business. The rage of securitization that swept so
many credit markets would have continued in housing, and the
withering GSEs would have has little or no effect on the financial
contagion. However, phasing out the implicit guarantee would have
saved the taxpayers tens of billions of dollars in bailout
costs.
Tax Cuts. The tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 included
significant reductions in income tax rates, a reduction in the
capital gains tax rate, a very significant reduction in the
dividend tax rate, a temporary phaseout of the death tax, and other
elements. Together, these tax cuts ranged between 0.7 percent of
GDP in 2001 to a peak of 2.7 percent in 2004, and averaged 1.6
percent of GDP between 2002 and 2008.[13] Over this period, the
budget ranged from a surplus of 1.3 percent of GDP in 2001 to a
deficit of 3.6 percent in 2004, posting an average deficit of 2
percent of GDP. In contrast, the budget deficit in 2009 came in at
9.9 percent of GDP--almost three times the largest deficit of the
Bush Administration.
Some have asserted that the tax cuts played a major role in the
housing bubble and financial contagion, but these assertions defy
all logic. For example, nothing in the tax cuts specifically
related to housing. While the tax relief, especially the reductions
in tax rates, strengthened the economy by reducing the tax-based
distortions to economic decision making, at no time did the
unemployment rate drop so far as to suggest the overall economy was
overheating. Nor can the tax cuts' contributions to the budget
deficit be blamed for the housing bubble, financial contagion, or
recession. If anything, to the extent tax relief resulted in a
higher budget deficit, it would have restrained the housing bubble
by exerting upward pressure on mortgage rates.
Other commentators have suggested that the recession evidences
the failure of the tax cut policy to strengthen the economy. This,
too, is a politically based assertion devoid of economic reasoning.
Appropriately designed tax relief focused on improving economic
incentives can and did stimulate the economy. If maintained, it
will improve performance in the long run. However, tax relief
cannot inoculate an economy against every economic shock. To
suggest the contrary is to suggest that a proper diet is pointless
if it fails to ward off all disease.
Deregulation. Events in financial markets and within
major financial firms indicate a clear failure of U.S. and foreign
regulatory approaches to financial services. In the United States,
this occurred largely because a succession of Congresses and
Administrations failed to reform the regulatory framework to keep
pace with changes in the financial markets. The issue is more a
question of antiquated regulation than one of too much or too
little regulation. While the Bush Administration repeatedly
proposed modest regulatory reforms at the edges of the financial
system, such as a proposal rebuffed repeatedly by Congress to
strengthen the federal oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
Bush Administration otherwise did little to regulate or deregulate
financial markets prior to 2007.
In 2007, Treasury Secretary Paulson launched a major effort
examining the nation's federal financial regulatory structure and
issued Treasury's blueprint report in March 2008.[14] While the report
was well received as a thoughtful examination of a pressing
long-term problem, Congress expressed no interest in moving quickly
to address the issues. In any case, the seeds of the current crisis
had long since been sown.
The assertion is often made that the Bush Administration's
deregulatory policies caused or at least significantly contributed
to the financial meltdown and recession. The most obvious fault
with these assertions is that, regrettably, the Bush Administration
achieved no notable deregulation of financial markets.[15]
The only meaningful deregulation in the United States in the
modern era was bipartisan legislation signed by President Clinton.
Among its many reforms, the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999 eliminated many artificial barriers between financial firms
engaged in commercial banking, investment banking, and
insurance.
The 1999 reforms strengthened the financial system by allowing
financial firms to operate more rationally according to market
pressures. The great weakness is that Congress failed to modernize
the financial regulatory apparatus in parallel to developments in
the marketplace. Instead, Congress relied on slow-footed national
financial regulators using legal authorities developed decades
earlier to monitor rapidly evolving, highly nimble, and
intrinsically international financial firms and markets.
The Bush Administration can be fairly accused of failing to
recognize the building systemic threats, but this charge can be
leveled against nearly everyone in the financial markets, both
parties in Congress, and financial regulatory authorities
worldwide. Before they were compelled to bail out their own firms,
French President Sarkozy and other European leaders explicitly
blamed the "light touch" regulatory approach of the United States
and the United Kingdom. As events subsequently and painfully
demonstrated in the collapse and bailout of numerous major
financial institutions across continental Europe, the heavier, more
intrusive continental European approach proved every bit as
susceptible to systemic failures. An outdated heavy-handed
regulatory approach is at least as inadequate and ultimately more
harmful to the broader economy as an outdated light-touch
regulatory approach.
Global Financial Contagion and Global
Recession
The severe distress in U.S. financial markets was felt in like
measure in Europe, beginning with troubles at the French bank BNP
Paribas in August 2007. A run on the British bank Northern Rock in
September led to its nationalization in February 2008, and problems
at the Benelux banking and insurance giant Fortis resulted in its
partial nationalization and breakup in late September and October.
Many other financial firms in Ireland, Iceland, Germany,
Switzerland, and elsewhere suffered enormous losses, forcing
governments to take extraordinary measures to prevent a general
systemic collapse of European and global credit markets.[16]
The scope and surprising rapidity of the collapse as it spread from
country to country qualify these events as a global contagion.[17]
The special attention given to financial crises generally and
contagion specifically is due to the speed at which major events
can occur and the very special role that credit markets play in
sustaining and advancing the balance of the economy.
As the financial contagion unfolded, even nations largely
unaffected by the distress in global credit markets saw their
economies turn downward. In particular, the combination of the deep
U.S. recession and the difficulties of obtaining trade financing
caused the volume of international trade to plummet, hitting China,
Japan, Germany, and other countries that have exports-based models
especially hard.[18]
The global nature of the financial contagion and recession
strongly suggests that the essential cause or causes must be
global, rather than country-specific. Of course, the policies
within each country may alter the extent and breadth of the
downturn, but the critical underlying causes must almost certainly
be global to have such broad reach. The two leading candidates are
monetary policy and an extraordinary surge of global savings.
"The Fed Did It." Monetary policy can lead to asset price
bubbles if central banks print too much currency and artificially
depress short-term interest rates, leading to excessive speculation
and "hot money." At the same time, if market participants
temporarily misjudge economic fundamentals or if they remain
confident the central bank will act as necessary to prevent a surge
of inflation, then inflation expectations may remain low and
well-anchored despite the surge in money creation. Under these
circumstances, a decline in short-term interest rates due to a
loose money policy will likely spread to longer-term interest
rates, spreading the effects of the policy to a wider array of
asset prices and economic processes.
The Federal Reserve loosened monetary policy significantly with
the onset of the 2000-2001 recession and the subsequent slow
recovery. Three consecutive quarters of inflation below 1 percent[19]
had raised the specter of a painful deflation, prompting the
Federal Reserve to act decisively by reducing the federal funds
rate, the Federal Reserve's primary policy instrument, eventually
to 1 percent--a rate not seen since 1962.[20]
As John Taylor forcefully argues, in hindsight the Federal
Reserve appears to have pursued an overly accommodative monetary
policy from late 2001 to late 2005 or early 2006, pushing the
federal funds rate too low and keeping the rate too low for an
extended period.
The Federal Reserve's stimulative excesses during this period
are neatly demonstrated by a comparison of the actual federal funds
rate with the rate suggested by a counterfactual based on an
application of the "Taylor rule." The Taylor rule prescribes how
the Federal Reserve should set the federal funds rate to maintain
inflation around a target rate given the amount of slack in the
overall economy.[21] In short, the Taylor rule says that if
inflation is above the target rate, then the Federal Reserve should
increase the funds rate by a prescribed amount. If there is slack
in the economy, the rule describes the extent to which the funds
rate should be lowered. In one form or another, the Taylor rule
plays a prominent role in much modern research into the conduct of
monetary policy.

The parameter specifications suggested by Taylor--particularly a
target inflation rate of 2 percent--indicate that the Federal
Reserve was significantly overly accommodative for almost four
years from 2002 to 2006. This constitutes a substantial, prolonged
error in monetary policy and strongly supports the argument that
monetary policy at least contributed to the asset price bubble.[22]
An application of the Taylor rule tells two additional,
interesting stories as shown in Chart 2, which shows the
prescription for the federal funds rate throughout the period. The
first story is that the Federal Reserve should have reduced, not
increased, the funds rate early in 2000. This suggests the Federal
Reserve was overly restrictive throughout 2000 and into 2001,
causing or at least contributing significantly to the recession
that began in late 2001. In hindsight and to its credit, the Taylor
rule would have been a notably better guide to policy than whatever
approach Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan was using at
the time.

The second story is that the Taylor rule suggests that the
Federal Reserve should have raised the funds rate earlier and
continued raising the funds rate throughout 2004 and 2005,
ultimately reaching about 7 percent by the end of 2005. Thus,
according to the rule the Federal Reserve was overly stimulative in
the formative years of the bubble and remained much too stimulative
long after the bubble began to deflate. Fortunately, the Federal
Reserve did not raise rates after 2005 as the Taylor rule
prescribes or the current economic calamity would have been
significantly worse.
Applying the simple rule throughout the period contrasts with
the counterfactual presentation that Taylor uses in which the
federal funds rate levels off at 5.25 percent--the top rate the
Federal Reserve achieves. A justification for freezing the funds
rate at 5.25 percent in the counterfactual is that the economy
would have performed notably differently in 2005 and beyond if the
Federal Reserve had followed the Taylor rule prescription for the
funds rate from 2002 to 2004. For example, a larger output gap
would likely have persisted. Similarly, if the funds rate had been
higher in the earlier period, the rise in inflation from 2005
through 2007 might have been avoided. For both reasons, raising the
funds rate earlier might have rendered a subsequent increase above
5.25 percent unnecessary.[23]
Another consideration is that the conclusion of excessive
monetary accommodation based on the Taylor rule depends
significantly, although not entirely, on the parameters specified
in the rule. From 2001 through 2003, the financial markets and the
Federal Reserve were deeply concerned about the possibility of
deflation. One could represent this concern as a preference for a
temporarily higher target inflation rate. For example, one could
suppose the Federal Reserve's target inflation rate was perhaps 2.5
percent for this period, returning to 2 percent early in 2005 after
the threat of deflation had passed. This alternative Taylor rule
specification significantly shifts the counterfactual prescription
for the federal funds rate as shown in Chart 3.

Importantly, the alternative Taylor rule specification would
have the Federal Reserve lower the funds rate to 1 percent, rather
than only to 1.75 percent, thus eliminating a common criticism that
the Federal Reserve had lowered interest rates too far. In
addition, under the alternative specification the funds rate would
reach 1 percent early in 2002--about a year and a half sooner than
actually occurred. The alternative Taylor rule thus suggests the
Federal Reserve was too restrictive following the recession, hit
the mark on the funds rate too late, and consistently was late
again in raising rates.
Even granting the issues noted regarding the Taylor rule
prescription relative to actual policy in this period, U.S.
monetary policy seems to have been materially overly accommodative
and to have contributed significantly to the bubble and subsequent
contagion. Yet was Fed policy sufficiently overly accommodative to
be the chief villain? Two factors challenge the theory that the
Federal Reserve was the chief villain.
First, the Federal Reserve is the central bank of the
United States, not the world. Yet the distortions to asset prices
and credit allocations were global. For all its influence on world
affairs, the Federal Reserve is not powerful enough to do so much
damage on its own. Other major central banks, such as the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of London, must pursue similar,
overly expansive policies, either independently or following the
Federal Reserve's lead. A March 2008 study from the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) looked into this
question.[24]
According to the OECD study, the ECB was overly stimulative in
the 2002-2005 period when measuring the short-term interest rate
against the Taylor rule prescription, but much less so than that of
the Federal Reserve. Canada was also overly stimulative, but the
central banks of England, Japan, Australia, and Switzerland were
not. The authors conclude:
Monetary policy [in the OECD area] was accommodating over the
period 2002- 2005, and in combination with rapid financial market
innovation, would seem in retrospect to have been among the factors
behind the run-up in asset prices and financial imbalances.[25]
In short, the authors conclude that some broad, excessive
monetary accommodation was present and that it was "among the
factors" that created the conditions for the global financial
contagion. This agrees with the thesis that monetary policy was a
contributing factor, but does not argue that monetary policy was
the essential causal factor.
Second, when the monetary authority lowers short-term
interest rates, longer duration interest rates typically follow
suit, at least until expectations of higher inflation arise.
However, while the Federal Reserve appears to have been overly
accommodative, short-term and long-term interest rates appeared to
disconnect, giving rise to the Greenspan "conundrum." As Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Greenspan explained in his 2005
testimony:
In this environment, long-term interest rates have trended lower
in recent months even as the Federal Reserve has raised the level
of the target federal funds rate by 150 basis points. This
development contrasts with most experience, which suggests that,
other things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are
normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. The simple
mathematics of the yield curve governs the relationship between
short- and long-term interest rates. Ten-year yields, for example,
can be thought of as an average of ten consecutive one-year forward
rates. A rise in the first-year forward rate, which correlates
closely with the federal funds rate, would increase the yield on
ten-year U.S. Treasury notes even if the more-distant forward rates
remain unchanged. Historically, though, even these distant forward
rates have tended to rise in association with monetary policy
tightening.[26]
The Federal Reserve began a rapid, sustained reduction of the
federal funds rate with a 100-basis-point cut in January 2001 from
6.5 percent to 5.5 percent and ended the reductions at 1 percent in
June 2003. Prior to these developments, the 10-year Treasury bond
rate briefly rose above the 5 percent to 6 percent trading range of
the preceding months, but as the funds rate began its descent, the
10-year Treasury bond rate returned to the lower bound of its prior
range, remaining at or above 5 percent until the summer of 2002.
Even then, it only declined by a single percentage point. In total,
over this period the Federal Reserve reduced the funds rate by 5.5
percentage points and then raised it by 4.25 percentage points,
while the 10-year Treasury bond rate fluctuated in a narrow band
between 4 percent and 5 percent.
Greenspan noted the conundrum that long-term bond rates seemed
to have detached from short-term rates. From a monetary policy
perspective this was especially troubling because the Federal
Reserve's inability to move long-term bond rates meant that
monetary policy was relatively ineffective in stimulating (or
dampening) the economy. By extension, if monetary policy was
relatively ineffective in stimulating the economy, then it was
likely less of a factor in building the forces of an asset price
bubble.
The disconnection between monetary policy and asset price
bubbles in this case seems even more pronounced because the assets
at the center of the storm were residential and commercial real
estate-- assets involving very long financing periods. Shorter-term
mortgages were popular in this period, whether five-year adjustable
rate mortgages or sub-prime mortgages with two-year or three-year
teaser rates. Yet even in 2006, long-term, fixed-rate mortgages
accounted for 40 percent of the loan volume by amount.[27]
In conclusion, it appears that:
- The Federal Reserve adopted a materially overly accommodative
monetary policy over an extended period leading up to the financial
markets collapse.
- Certain other central banks followed a similarly overly
accommodative policy to one extent or another, but many did not.
This raises doubts as to whether a sufficient global pattern of
excessive monetary accommodation existed to qualify as the sole,
essential cause of the global asset price bubbles.
- The magnitude of the Federal Reserves' excessive accommodation
does not seem to have been adequate, even given its duration, to
have distorted asset prices to the extent observed, especially
given the Greenspan conundrum.

The Global Savings Glut: Alternative
Cause or Accomplice to the Fed
Frothy asset prices and historically excessive leverage are sure
signs of fundamental distortions in global credit markets. Monetary
policy was at least a major contributing factor to these
distortions, but an alternative explanation is that a steady,
extraordinary surge in global savings from a variety of sources
exceeded what the global economy normally could absorb in new
investment. Analyzing such a surge becomes at first a simple matter
of supply and demand curves in which the supply curve shifts
outward, driving down the price, in this case, interest rates. As
Richard Clarida explained at the time, "excess global saving is
crowding in U.S. investments, driving down U.S. interest rates and
risk premiums."[28]
Throughout the middle of the 2000s, commentators noted that risk
seemed to be systematically underpriced as reflected in unusually
low longer-term interest rates. For example, from 1996 through
2001, interest rates on 10-year AAA corporate bonds averaged 6.6
percent, while the average rate on those securities was just 5.2
percent from 2002 to 2007. Interest rates on AA and A-rated
corporate bonds were similarly oddly low.
This downward shift in the interest rate structure could be
attributed to a decline in inflation expectations, but this seems
unlikely because the average annual rate of inflation rose from 1.8
percent to 2.4 percent during this period.[29] Of course,
current inflation rates are imperfect measures of future inflation
expectations. However, it seems unlikely that the market would have
expected significantly lower future inflation after inflation had
risen. It seems much more likely that some other force was at work,
such as the outward movement of the global savings supply
curve.
In conjunction with the possible excess of global savings,
financial markets underwent a rapid transformation brought on by
rapid innovation in financial practices, especially the
securitization of assets and the spreading of risk. Jean-Claude
Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, expressed this
simply and plainly in January 2009:
Looking back, the main factor that I would identify as
underlying the turmoil is the broad-based under-appreciation of
risk. This under-appreciation of risk has been observed across
financial institutions, across markets and across economies.[30]
President Trichet went on to say:
Against this apparently favourable economic background [in
2006], innovation was rapidly taking place in financial markets.
This was perceived by most observers as a positive development, on
balance, because it enabled a better and wider distribution of
risk. In fact, the diversification of risk appeared to be
beneficial not just for the financial sector's stability, but also
for the real economy, since companies were able to more efficiently
spread the risks they were bearing. This perception is likely to
have encouraged risk-taking not only inside but also outside the
financial sector. However, as the turmoil has since shown, there
was a generalised tendency to overestimate the true degree of risk
spreading and diversification, especially in credit markets.[31]
Financial innovation increased the ability of market
participants to ferret out new investment opportunities, but it
also allowed them to more intensively use the available financial
resources. The raw material of a possible excess of global savings
combined with rapid and poorly understood financial market
innovation could make a dangerous economic mixture.
The Evidence of a Global Savings
Glut
A complication in the global savings glut explanation is that
the glut appears to have had a variety of sources, but particularly
China's trade surpluses, oil exporters' riches, and U.S. corporate
profits.
China's Trade Surpluses. One commonly mentioned
source of the global savings glut is the massive trade surpluses
run by China, which were accompanied by massive accumulations of
foreign currency reserves. From 1999 to early 2009, China's foreign
exchange reserves rose from $155 billion to over $2 trillion.[32]
These reserves, largely denominated in dollars, were then recycled
through global capital markets. (See Chart 5.)

Oil Exporters' Riches. Another important source was the
dramatic increase in oil prices, which provided oil-exporting
countries with windfall earnings of tens of billions of dollars for
which they had no immediate application. They responded by plowing
their new profits into relatively liquid investments through the
global credit markets. From 1995 to 1999, OPEC's net oil revenues
averaged $130 billion annually. From 2001 to 2008, these revenues
averaged $445 billion, for a cumulative total of excess earnings of
about $2.5 trillion--more than matching the rise in China's
reserves.[33]
U.S. Corporate Profits. A third, often-neglected
source of the global savings glut was the run up in U.S. corporate
profits. As often lamented at the time, the recovery that began
toward the end of 2001 was largely a "jobless recovery" until the
economy finally accelerated in the summer of 2003, spurred by the
2003 tax cuts. In this period, the economy grew because businesses
and workers achieved remarkable improvements in labor productivity.
However, the economy was not growing rapidly enough to absorb this
labor productivity growth and add additional workers. Not until the
first quarter of 2005 did employment finally surpass its previous
peak.
Once economic growth is strong enough to begin tightening labor
markets, workers can capture the value of their productivity gains
in higher wages, salaries, and benefits. However, until labor
markets tighten, labor productivity gains mean higher business
profits. From 1995 through 2000, U.S. corporate net cash flow
averaged a healthy $809 billion annually.[34] From 2001 through 2008,
U.S. corporate profits averaged a remarkable $1.2 trillion, a
cumulative increase of almost $2.9 trillion above the previous
norm.
Lesser factors undoubtedly contributed to the global savings
glut. Of course, savings may have been persistently and materially
below normal levels in some areas. The point is that massive and
extraordinary sources of savings were circulated through credit
markets into asset markets. This could have been sufficient to
drive down the price of risk materially, distorting financial
arrangements, stoking speculative fires, and distorting the pattern
of real investment.
The First Modern Global Savings Glut
The recent buildup of oil exporters' riches harkens back to a
strikingly similar episode in the mid 1970s. OPEC raised oil prices
from $3.50 to $10 per barrel in January 1974 to $32.50 by the end
of the decade. These price hikes rocked the global economy, while
the resulting OPEC riches spurred an explosion in what became known
as the Eurodollar markets--credit markets operating in dollars even
though the depositors, financial institutions, and borrowers were
rarely U.S. citizens. While not referred to as such, this was the
first modern global savings glut.
The parallels continue in a striking fashion. As the Eurodollar
market expanded rapidly, much of the lending went to less-developed
countries (LDCs), now typically called emerging market economies,
which needed external financing to grow rapidly. Thus, poor
countries across the globe took on debt and then more debt, and
then even more debt to refinance their previous debt.
Throughout this, lenders consoled themselves with the cleverness
of their financial engineering, the massive upfront fees that they
were earning, and the mantra that countries do not go bankrupt.
Debtor countries always have assets to sell and tax revenues to
collect. Thus, the risk associated with massive lending to poor
countries was believed quite small. This mantra closely parallels
the modern, now equally criticized mantra in the U.S. housing
markets that home prices only rise and the mantra in global capital
markets that risk can be "diversified away."
The Eurodollar debt party ended in August 1982 when Mexico was
unable to service its $80 billion mostly dollar-denominated debt
obligations, which were largely held by U.S. commercial banks. This
signaled the beginning of the LDC debt crisis.1 In total, LDCs owed
some $235 billion (about $465 billion in 2009 dollars). In another
interesting parallel, at the time of the LDC debt crisis, four
Latin American countries owed about $37 billion to the eight
largest U.S. banks, an amount equal to 147 percent of their capital
and reserves.
1.
See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Research and
Statistics, History of the Eighties--Lessons for the
Future, Vol. 1, An Examination of the Banking Crises of
the 1980s and Early 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 1997), pp 191-210, at /static/reportimages/6A50E65C7E7D48EA6754BFE970078B94.pdf
(October 7, 2009).
Criticisms of the Global Savings Glut
Theory
Few voices appear to contest the general validity of the global
savings glut hypothesis. Many have remarked on its existence,
including Alan Greenspan during his tenure as Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board,[35] and many commentators, such as Paul
Krugman, have identified the savings glut as the primary causal
force leading up to the financial crisis.[36]
One argument against the global savings glut theory was
presented as a chart in the International Monetary Fund's World
Economic Outlook, September 2005. (See Chart 6.) The chart
shows global savings on a steady, downward trend beginning in the
1970s, followed by a modest uptick through 2004. The argument is
that the modest uptick from a downward trend is too minor to
constitute a major force or material savings glut.

However, the operational definition of a global savings glut is
not a high level of savings, but a level of savings that is
persistently higher than the global economy would normally absorb.
The level of global savings had been on a persistent downward
trend, declining to just over $20 trillion in 2001. This is the
condition to which credit markets were accustomed, and if the trend
had continued, global savings would likely have declined another $2
trillion to $18 trillion by 2006 or 2007.
Instead, the level of savings reversed course, increasing
significantly to $21 trillion by 2004 and likely increasing to $23
trillion or more by 2007. Thus, the shift away from the trend meant
perhaps an extra $5 trillion in global savings by 2007, precisely
the pattern of a global savings glut as credit markets were forced
to adjust to significantly higher levels of flowing credit. (See
Chart 7.)

Evil Savings? At least one substantive oddity in the
global savings glut narrative remains. Savings is supposed to be a
good thing. Even a surge in savings leads to investment, which
leads to higher productivity, higher wages, and more wealth. If the
world was suddenly awash in additional savings and it was
productively invested, how does a global savings glut lead to
trouble? The answer is in the presumption that savings finds its
way predominantly into productive investment. If markets
misallocated trillions of dollars in savings for some reason, then
a severe downturn would be inevitable. Such a massive misallocation
of investment is precisely what appears to have occurred.
The Misallocation Multipliers: Foolishness, Innovation, and
Hubris. Financial markets are constantly seeking to innovate,
to find new ways of efficiently connecting lenders to borrowers and
new ways to shift sources of risk from those who face it but do not
want it, to those who are willing to bear more risk to increase
their own profits. Recent years have seen an explosion of financial
innovation including huge increases in the securitization of
mortgages and other types of loans, the repackaging of those
securities into different tranches by perceived levels of risk,
credit-default swaps, and so forth. To some extent, this innovation
may have been in response to the rapid increase in the sources of
market liquidity. Similarly, innovation may have facilitated the
rapid allocation of liquidity.
Rapid innovation combined with the broad application of these
new financial instruments and approaches meant that financial firms
and markets were themselves rapidly evolving in ways that they did
not always fully appreciate. Sometimes knowingly and sometimes with
little understanding of the risks involved, the management of major
financial firms bet the survival of their firms in these new
markets.
When the party ended, many storied financial firms in the U.S.
and Europe were destroyed, including mega-insurer AIG, investment
houses Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and others. Merrill Lynch
was forced into a shotgun marriage with Bank of America, and
Goldman Sachs was forced to become a traditional bank holding
company subject to regular federal supervision.
Underlying all of these transactions, complexities, risks, and
profits was a widespread belief that Wall Street wizards had slain
the systemic risk dragon. They believed that they had found ways to
spread risk so widely that they had made individual sources of risk
almost irrelevant. They had found fantastic new ways to identify
and protect against risk--or profit by it--employing complex
mathematical models and vast oceans of data. They were right for a
long time, and then they were wrong.
Wall Street's financial engineers were not the only participants
engaged in fantasy. Residential real estate markets in the United
States, Spain, the United Kingdom, and other countries were
especially susceptible. Buyers and lenders convinced themselves
that prices could only go up. Even sophisticated credit rating
agencies adopted this assumption in their mathematical models.
Rising prices are a key economic signal for resources to flow. And
flow they did, as much of the global savings glut found employment
in the financing of new homes.
Global excess savings combined with excessive money growth
contributed to an excessive buildup in real estate investment and
prices. However, sustaining the rise to catastrophic levels was the
simple, flawed, fundamental assumption that real estate values
would inevitability rise.
Conclusion
The Great Global Contagion and Recession had many causes, but
two stand out as essential and sufficient. First, the global
savings glut was and is real. It was an essential cause leading to
an artificially depressed price of risk, which led to asset price
bubbles and investment misallocations. Second, excessive monetary
accommodation by the Federal Reserve and some other central banks
around the world powerfully augmented and enhanced the effects of
the global savings glut.
The global savings glut and the excessive monetary accommodation
are not alternative explanations, but rather complementary,
mutually reinforcing forces that distorted global credit markets.
The consequences of these forces were then dramatically enhanced by
the rapid pace of financial innovation during this period. These
consequences were further reinforced by the breathtaking arrogance
of financial market participants and the widespread willingness of
market participants to believe that the usual guides to sound
finance and investment had become old-fashioned.It was also
facilitated by a succession of policy failings, most importantly
the failure of the United States and Europe to modernize their
financial regulatory structures to pace developments in financial
markets.
J. D. Foster, Ph.D., is Norman B. Ture Senior
Fellow in the Economics of Fiscal Policy in the Thomas A. Roe
Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
The author thanks Dr. Michael J. Boskin of Stanford University and
Dr. John B. Taylor of the Hoover Institution and Stanford
University for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors
that remain are the author's responsibility.