In the next couple of weeks, the Obama Administration will be
engaged in high-level diplomacy with America's treaty allies and
friends in Southeast Asia.
Secretary Clinton will be in Bangkok tomorrow to meet with
Thailand's leadership, including Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva
and Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya. She will then go on to attend
the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference and ASEAN Regional Forum. In
the week following Secretary Clinton's trip, the President of the
Philippines Gloria Macapagal Arroyo will meet with President Obama
at the White House.
It is well worth the minor investment in time, attention, and
transpacific travel to remind America's friends and allies--as well
as its rivals--that the United States is in Asia to stay.
The Obama Administration clearly recognizes the importance of
this message. Yet, even as it reaps rewards for "showing up," the
Administration has arrived at a point where it must turn to
substance. Now seven months into its first term, the Obama
Administration's key policy people, including an Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, are in
place. Engagement is not an end in itself. The Administration must
now begin to make some of the tough policy choices.
Trade and Investment
First and foremost, ASEAN and the ASEAN countries are concerned
with trade and investment. They have entered into more than 20
trading arrangements, including the ASEAN Free Trade Area, an
ASEAN-China free trade agreement (FTA), and agreements with Japan,
South Korea, and India. Granted, none of these approaches the "gold
standard" of U.S. FTAs, but in sum, ASEAN's agreements constitute a
formal economic integration that America is largely watching from
the sidelines.
The United States has a single trade agreement with an ASEAN
country--a lucrative agreement with Singapore. Agreements with
Thailand and Malaysia have been left on the table. During the Bush
Administration, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) was often working against political and
economic developments in the region--although the Thais and the
Malaysians certainly deserve a fair share of the blame for the
failure to conclude agreements. The USTR was also working against
political winds in Washington; for instance, the failure to renew
trade promotion authority in 2007. But the situation is much worse
today.
The Obama Administration's trade policy is a mystery. "Buy
America" provisions in the 2009 stimulus package provide a fig-leaf
to countries looking for excuses to protect local industries from
globalization. And stiffing South Korea on its FTA, after Seoul
bent over backward last year to accommodate adjustments demanded
from the U.S. Congress, has left an impression in the region. At
some point very soon, the Administration must put a coherent free
trade policy in Secretary Clinton's ASEAN bag. They could start by
reviving U.S.-Thai talks and bringing to conclusion U.S.-Malaysia
negotiations.
Burma Policy
Neither the ASEAN nor the U.S. can move forward from the
continuing impasse in Burma. The problem of Burma's dogged and
brutal authoritarianism encapsulates a fundamental issue: whether
ASEAN can find a rule-based "new ASEAN way" that, among other
things, upholds its charter's commitment to democracy, rule of law,
and fundamental freedoms. How ASEAN responds to the situation in
Burma will determine its external orientation. (The ASEAN meetings
in Phuket this week are already off to a poor start with the
adoption of terms of reference for its new human rights commission
that empower it only to promote the concept of human rights, not to
monitor or investigate abuses, let alone punish them. The idea that
this can evolve into something with more teeth--when the same
members are there to block it--is a pipedream.)
Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD)
tower over Burmese politics. Their landside victory in Burma's 1990
parliamentary election--later annulled by the junta - gives them
enormous moral force. The junta believes it has supplanted that
1990 election with its referendum last year on a draft
constitution. They promise to organize a new national election next
year. U.S. policy should press for a 2010 election that, if it is
truly free and fair, will validate the 1990 verdict. In order to
ensure free and fair elections, the junta must:
- Release all political prisoners, including the leaders of the
NLD and Suu Kyi herself;
- Amend the constitution to reduce the role of the military and
permit full democratic participation; and
- Allow for international supervision of the election.
Any election that does not permit Suu Kyi's participation does
not pass the test.
Between now and the new elections there should be no major
changes in U.S. policy. It should maintain pressure on the regime
and continue to encourage others to do the same. At this point in
time, high-level contact and/or normalization of diplomatic
relations would demoralize the opposition by taking away the small
amount of leverage that sanctions give them.
Regarding humanitarian assistance, the question has always been:
How much can be channeled through third party NGOs before it starts
spilling over the sides in significant quantities to the
government? This is still the crux of the matter. If there is more
the U.S. can do to help with HIV /AIDs and other issues, it should,
but it should not change the measure by which it allocates
assistance.
This is the Burma policy the U.S. should bring to Bangkok, the
ASEAN meetings, and President Arroyo. If the junta fails to meet
the requirements, the U.S. has yet another example of the junta's
bad faith and further justification why "maximum pressure"--the
policy pursued by the Bush Administration and largely enshrined in
U.S. law--is the only answer to the oppression in Burma and the
black eye it has given ASEAN.
Support for Democracy
Thailand and the Philippines are democracies whose people have
the freedom to change their governments through the ballot box.
While these democracies are imperfect and developing, they are
democracies nonetheless. Indeed, try telling President Arroyo the
Philippines is not a democracy. She is savagedin the press
on a daily basis, and every year she is put through the paces of an
impeachment vote. Or tell Prime Minister Abhisit of Thailand--who
weeks ago endured a protest of 30,000 supporters of a former prime
minister who has called openly for "revolution"--his nation is not
a democracy.
Several factors tie the United States more closely to the
Philippines than any other country in Southeast Asia: a long,
shared history of struggle, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, current
cooperation against terrorists in Mindanao, and even extensive
family connections. President Arroyo's meeting at the White House
will be an opportunity for President Obama to reaffirm these ties.
He should also be clear, however, that his respect for President
Arroyo is grounded in the constitutional order of the Philippines
and the office she holds.
The Filipino public is obsessed with the possibility that
President Arroyo will attempt to hang on to office despite
elections for her successor in May next year. Indeed, many are
looking to the example of Honduras to deduce the likely American
response. Much of the speculation in Manila is unsubstantiated and
politically motivated. But President Obama must be acutely aware of
the circumstances. Anything he says that can be interpreted as
support for an unconstitutional extension of President Arroyo's
term or a change in the constitution to otherwise allow for her
continued leadership will have a destabilizing impact on the
Philippines.
Playing the Asia Game
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit this week targets two
of the most important places she did not have time to visit in
February--India and Thailand. President Obama fills another of
those boxes by meeting with President Arroyo here at home. These
visits and the leaders that President Obama receives at the White
House are symbolically very important. Stabilizing the American
commitment to ASEAN is also key. The Administration deserves credit
for understanding this fact, but the symbolism of its commitment
will soon be exhausted. It is time to address the difficult
issues.
Walter
Lohman is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.