Contrary to what many politicians and talking heads tell
Americans, a false choice exists between what are often referred to
as hard and soft power. A country's military resources (its hard
power) and the diplomatic tools it uses to persuade others without
resorting to coercion (its soft power) operate most efficiently in
tandem.
As Teddy Roosevelt famously observed, a nation must "speak
softly" with diplomacy while also wielding a "big stick." Just as
no country can be expected to provide security and pursue its
interests solely through the use of military power, no country can
expect to be taken seriously during high-stakes negotiations
without the potential threat of military force to back up its word.
The two approaches are not separate tools but mutually reinforcing
mechanisms.
The Limits of Soft Power
To witness the consequences when policymakers and politicians
believe that hard and soft power are disconnected, one need look no
further than Europe. The Europeans--many of whom believe that the
peace that has broken out on their continent is the model for a
post-sovereign world order--have become convinced that the anarchic
order of the Westphalian system of nation-states can be breached
through the exercise of soft power alone. In their view, bridging
the often hardened differences between states and shaping their
decisions requires only negotiation and common understanding.
Many liberals are now pressing the U.S. government to adopt this
vision, but the futility of this approach can be seen everywhere,
from the failure of negotiations to deter both Iran and North Korea
from their nuclear programs over the past five years--a period in
which their efforts have only matured--to the lackluster response
to Russia's invasion of Georgian territory.
Whether it is states like Iran and North Korea that believe a
nuclear weapons program is central to regime survival, or
human-rights abusers like Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe, or rising
powers like China, which continues to use its military to emphasize
its sovereignty in the South China Sea, diplomacy alone has not
been enough to bring about change in a direction that is favorable
to America's interests.
At times, America and its leaders have also been guilty of this
type of strategic myopia. After applying pressure on North Korea so
diligently in 2006, the Bush Administration relaxed its posture in
early 2007, and North Korea concluded that it was again free to
backslide on its commitments. Two years later, this weak diplomatic
approach, which the Obama Administration continued even after North
Korea's April 5 missile test, has only brought North Korea to
believe that it can get away with more missile tests and nuclear
weapons detonations. And so far, it has.
Backing Carrots with Sticks Works
In the past, when America chose to flex its diplomatic muscle
with the backing of its military might, the results were
clear.
During the Cold War, the foundational document for U.S. strategy
toward the Soviet Union, NSC-68, concluded that military power is
"one of the most important ingredients" of America's national
power. This power gave the U.S. the ability not just to contain
and, if necessary, wage war against the Soviet Union and its
proxies, but also, during tense diplomatic stand-offs like the
Cuban Missile Crisis, to reinforce its political objectives with
robust strength.
This same equation of military-diplomatic power proved effective
in easing tensions during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996,
when President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to
demonstrate America's firm commitment to the Taiwanese democracy.
Similarly, the display of America's military strength against a
defiant Saddam Hussein in 2003 convinced Libyan President Moammar
Qadhafi to abandon his weapons of mass destruction program.
Obama's Risky "Rebalancing" Act
Before he became President , Barack Obama raised the important
connection between our hard and soft power, arguing that America
must "combine military power with strengthened diplomacy" while
also building and forging "stronger alliances around the world so
that we're not carrying the burdens and these challenges by
ourselves."[1] While his statements are correct, his
actions as President have done little to demonstrate actual
commitment to forging a policy that combines America's military
power with its diplomatic authority.
For America to be an effective leader and arbiter of the
international order, it must be willing to invest in a world-class
military by spending no less than 4 percent of the nation's gross
domestic product on defense.[2] Unfortunately, President Obama's FY 2010
proposed defense budget and Secretary Robert Gates's vision for
"rebalancing" the military are drastically disconnected from the
broad range of strategic priorities that a superpower like the
United States must influence and achieve.
Instead of seeking a military force with core capabilities for
the conventional sphere to the unconventional--including a
comprehensive global missile defense system[3]--in order to deter,
hedge against, and if necessary defeat any threat, Secretary Gates
argues that "we have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely
to fight."[4] He is echoing the view of President Obama,
who has argued that we must "reform" the defense budget "so that
we're not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we don't use."[5]
But the conventional Cold War capabilities that this
Administration believes we are unlikely to use are the same
platforms that provide America with both the air dominance and the
blue-water access that is necessary to project power globally and
maintain extended deterrence, not to mention free trade.
The Importance of Sustaining Military Power
The consequences of hard-power atrophy will be a direct
deterioration of America's diplomatic clout. This is already on
display in the western Pacific Ocean, where America's ability to
hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being
called into question by some of our key Asian allies. Recently,
Australia released a defense White Paper that is concerned
primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and
the implications that this decline would have for Australian
security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are
anything but reassuring.
The ability of the United States to reassure friends, deter
competitors, coerce belligerent states, and defeat enemies does not
rest on the strength of our political leaders' commitment to
diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. Only
by retaining a "big stick" can the United States succeed in
advancing its diplomatic priorities. Only by building a
full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends
and allies and count on their future support.
Kim R.
Holmes, Ph.D., is Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy
Studies and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation and
author of Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st
Century (2008).