May 18, 2009 | WebMemo on Regulation
Revised and updated June 16, 2009
Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ed Markey (D-MA) modified their global warming proposal from the draft version published on March 31. For the most part, the changes focused on the distribution of the allowance revenue--the equivalent of tax revenue.
There was also a slight easing of targeted emissions reductions for 2020, which resulted in a marginally lower economic impact. However, the new distribution of allowances created a less efficient pattern of government expenditures and more than offset the gain from the lower cap for 2020.
The economic impact of the new draft varies from that of the original draft in several major ways:
Though the proposed legislation would have little impact on world temperatures, it is a massive energy tax in disguise that promises job losses, income cuts, and a sharp left turn toward big government.
Ultimately, this bill would result in government-set caps on energy use that damage the economy and hobble growth--the very growth that supports investment and innovation. Analysis of the economic impact of Waxman-Markey projects that by 2035 the bill would:
The bill discloses a basic two-pronged approach to cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The first prong is a set of mandates forcing efficiencies independent of any cost-benefit calculations on the part of industry or consumers. These mandates include a requirement for low-carbon motor fuels and a tenfold increase in the production of electricity from renewable sources.
The second prong is cap and trade. With cap and trade, absolute limits on total emissions of greenhouse gases are established. Before those in a covered sector can emit a greenhouse gas, they need to have the ration coupons (also known as pollution permits or allowances) for each ton emitted. Because the ration coupons will have a value, and therefore a cost, cap and trade becomes a tax on fossil fuels and the energy they generate.
The intent of cap and trade is to impose a cost on CO2 and allow businesses and consumers to adapt as well as they can to this new cost. The mandates of the first parts of Waxman-Markey are counterproductive because they force choices on the economy that might not be the most efficient and inexpensive ways to cut CO2. That said, this paper's analysis looks at only the cost of a simple cap-and-trade approach. Consequently, the economic impact estimates reported here will likely be lower than the economic cost of cap and trade hobbled further by mandates.
To establish a benchmark against which to measure the impact of Waxman-Markey, this paper assumes an economic recovery from the current recession and the subsequent smooth type of economic growth that all major economic forecasts must make. A more rapid economic recovery would make the costs of meeting the CO2 restrictions even greater.
What Is in the Baseline? The baseline energy projections come from IHS Global Insight's latest U.S. Energy Outlook. The highly respected and widely used Global Insight U.S. Macroeconomic model was used to prepare the estimates employed in this paper as well as data from Global Insight's November 2008 long-term model, which makes economic forecasts through 2038. Use of the November 2008 macroeconomic model aligned this paper's economic forecasting with Global Insight's October 2008 energy baseline. The baseline assumptions include:
Though these goals and mandates will be costly to meet (if even they can be met), the costs will occur with or without Waxman-Markey. Therefore, these costs are not counted in this paper's economic impacts of the Waxman-Markey bill.
Addressing Offsets. Waxman-Markey provides emitters with an option to substitute some allowances with certified CO2 reductions by other emitters that are not covered by emissions caps. These offsets can be purchased from domestic or international sources. On the surface, Waxman-Markey's treatment of offsets is generous to the point of eliminating constraints on fossil-fuel CO2 for decades. However, closer examination reveals multiple catches, costs, and impossibilities.
For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that domestic offsets simply do not exist anywhere near the magnitude nominally allowed by Waxman-Markey. Driven, perhaps, by the concern that existing offset programs suffer from fraud, Waxman-Markey includes significant hurdles for those wishing to use offsets. The EPA administrator "may at any time, by rule, remove a project type from the list." Further, the administrator shall establish "policies to assign liability and responsibility for mitigating and fully compensating for reversals." That is, using an offset may leave a firm with an open-ended liability. Finally, offsets require 1.25 tons of CO2 reduction for each ton of offset credit.
This analysis assumes that allowances will increase the effective CO2 caps by 15 percent. Recent prices of offsets for the Kyoto program have been between 10 and 15 euros per ton. Given the exchange rate, discount (the 1.25 ton reduction per ton of credit), and likely increase in demand, the initial price of $20 per ton is conservative. After the first five years, this price increases by the expected rate of inflation.
Carbon Capture and Storage. One hope for those who want to see continued access to U.S. coal reserves is carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. CCS attempts to remove CO2 from the effluent before emission. This captured CO2 would be compressed into liquid form and injected into deep saline aquifers and deep ocean waters or used for enhanced oil recovery.
Serious obstacles to large-scale commercial deployment of CCS have yet to be overcome. CCS requires roughly one-third more energy to generate electricity than processes without CCS. Viable commercial CCS does not yet exist, though the bill does provide funding for three commercial-scale pilot projects. Along with the technological challenges, a massive pipeline system must be created virtually from scratch. But it is the political and environmental obstacles that may prove most daunting. CCS must be proven to be effective in preventing moderate leaks over long periods of time. In addition, community concern with the possibility of catastrophic local release of large quantities of CO2 could provide the ubiquitous not-in-my-backyard opposition that bedevils many waste disposal problems.
This paper's analysis of Waxman-Markey assumes that CCS will not be available in significant quantities for the years analyzed.
Renewable Energy Goals. The renewable energy targets already established by current laws will be challenging to meet. This paper assumes no additional renewable energy beyond these significant baseline increases of 36 billion gallons of renewable motor fuels and the existing state-level renewable electricity requirements. The current baseline projects 18.3 gigawatts of increased nuclear power capacity. The history of nuclear construction in the 1960s through the 1980s shows that a much more aggressive nuclear build-out is technologically possible, but political and other factors make the likelihood of a "nuclear renaissance" highly uncertain. Therefore, this study assumes no additional nuclear capacity beyond the baseline increase.
Results of The Heritage Foundation's Analysis
It is no surprise that the economy responds to cap and trade as it would to an energy crisis. The price on carbon emissions forces energy cuts across the economy, since non-carbon energy sources cannot replace fossil fuels quickly enough. Energy prices rise; income and employment drop.
The current recession diminishes near-term projections for aggregate economic activity. As this activity drops, so does energy use. Though a recession is bad news, it has the effect of moving the economy closer to the energy cuts needed to meet the emissions targets. Nevertheless, the income (GDP) losses are nearly $200 billion out of the gate and average over $380 billion per year. As the economy recovers and the caps tighten, the detrimental effect of cap and trade gets more and more severe. In the worst years, GDP losses exceed $700 billion per year.
Waxman-Markey will cause higher energy costs to spread throughout the economy as producers everywhere try to cover their higher production costs by raising their product prices. Consumers will be most directly affected by rising energy bills. Even after adjusting for inflation, gasoline prices will rise 58 percent over the 2035 baseline price. Compared to the baseline, residential natural gas consumers will see their inflation-adjusted price rise by 55 percent. Because of its reliance on coal, the cost of electricity will rise by 90 percent--again after adjusting for inflation and in addition to what the price would have been anyway in 2035.
As President Obama pointed out, cap and trade can work only when energy prices "skyrocket." To force consumer-energy cutbacks, the prices need to rise to painful levels. This paper's analysis shows the results of this strategy. By 2035:
Is It Worth It?
Is all of this economic pain justified by gains against global warming? Waxman-Markey raises energy prices by 55-90 percent. These higher energy prices push unemployment up by 1,145,000 jobs on average, with peaks over 2,479,000. In aggregate, GDP drops by over $9.4 trillion. The next generation will inherit a federal debt pumped up by $28,728 per person. All of these costs accrue in the first 25 years of a 90-year program that, as calculated by climatologists, will lower temperatures by only hundredths of a degree in 2050 and no more than two-tenths of a degree at the end of the century.
The impact of Waxman-Markey on the next generation of families is $1,241 per year in higher energy costs, over $100,000 of additional federal debt (above and beyond the unconscionable increases already scheduled), a weaker economy, and more unemployment. Furthermore, the recently proposed modifications to Waxman-Markey only make these problems worse: By devising a less-efficient pattern of government expenditures, this new draft would more than offset the gains from the proposed slight easing of targeted emissions reductions for 2020.
And all for a change in world temperature that might not be noticeable.
William W. Beach is Director of, David W. Kreutzer, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Energy Economics and Climate Change in, and Karen A. Campbell, Ph.D., is Policy Analyst in Macroeconomics in the Center for Data Analysis, and Ben Lieberman is Senior Policy Analyst in Energy and the Environment in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
IHS Global Insight, U.S. Energy Outlook 2008.
Though this paper employs the model and data developed by Global Insight, the analysis is the authors' and should not be interpreted as representing that of IHS Global Insight.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs,
"EPA Preliminary Analysis of the Waxman-Markey Discussion Draft,"
April 20, 2009, pp. 3, 14, at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs
/WM-Analysis.pdf (May 8, 2009).
discussions about the concerns with the effectiveness of offsets,
see Joseph Romm, "A Good Reason We Shouldn't Love Trees, at Least
Not in This Case," Grist.org, July 2, 2007, at http://www.grist.org/article/the-first
-rule-of-carbon-offsets-no-trees (May 8, 2009); Patrick McCully, "Kyoto's Great Carbon Offset Swindle," RenewableEnergyWorld.com, June 9, 2008, at http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2008/06/kyotos
-great-carbon-offset-swindle-52713 (May 8, 2009); Michael Wara, "Is the Global Carbon Market Working?" Nature, Vol. 445, No. 7128 (February 8, 2007), pp. 595-596, at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v445/n7128
/abs/445595a.html (May 16, 2009).