Over the course of the next several months, senior Department of
Defense (DoD) officials will conduct the congressionally-mandated
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This broad examination of
national defense strategy, modernization, and force structure will
establish a defense planning program that will direct how the
Pentagon allocates its significant resources for the next 20 years.
This strategy guides the planning and programming for service
budgets--and, by extension, what the military purchases, including
vehicles, tanks, ships, aircraft, and other essential
equipment.
Since becoming law in 1996, QDRs have been conducted in 1997,
2001, and 2006. The next Quadrennial Defense Review will be the
second review conducted and published since the terrorist attacks
of 9/11. A new Administration and shifting international strategic
and economic dynamics make this review just as important, if not
more relevant, than previous reviews. It is, therefore, vital that
a comprehensive validation of its findings and an independent
assessment of U.S. defense policy be conducted through the
establishment of a National Defense Panel (NDP) as was first
mandated by Congress in the 1996 QDR legislation.[1] Congress should
establish and fund this senior panel in the forthcoming defense
authorization bill to be signed into law later this year.
Independent Panel Needed to "Stress
Test" the Pentagon Assessment
Title 10, Section 118 of the U.S. Code requires the Secretary of
Defense to conduct the QDR. As mandated by law--and because defense
policy is subordinate to foreign policy--the Pentagon's QDR is to
be conducted after the White House issues a National
Security Strategy. Due to the breadth of the impact the QDR stands
to have on defense planning and budgeting, Congress also chose to
insert subsection (f) of section 118, which directs the defense
secretary to "establish a panel to conduct an assessment of the
quadrennial defense review...including the recommendations of the
review, the stated and implied assumptions incorporated in the
review, and the vulnerabilities of the strategy and force structure
underlying the review." The panel is also required by law to
analyze "the trends, asymmetries, and concepts of operations that
characterize the military balance with potential adversaries,
focusing on the strategic approaches of possible opposing
forces."
During the development of the 1997 QDR, an independent National
Defense Panel was convened to study the strategy's findings. The
NDP consisted of eight analysts, including its Chairman Phillip A.
Odeen. In December 1997, the panel released a 94-page report
entitled "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st
Century."[2] The report challenged some of the core
principles underpinning defense strategy at the time, fulfilling
its mandate of complementing the QDR and contributing to a larger
debate on the issues. In the cover letter of the NDP, Chairman
Odeen captured the true intention of the exercise: "We have not
attempted to provide all the answers. Rather, our intention is to
stimulate a wider debate on our defense priorities."[3]
The belief in the importance of the National Defense Panel was
shared by Democrats and Republicans alike. For instance, President
Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, expressed his strong
support for NDP's findings while Senator Dan Coats (R-IN), who
cosponsored the QDR legislation in 1996, also endorsed it, saying
that the purpose of the panel's report was "not based on distrust
or suspicion of the Pentagon, but on the recognition that we need
bold and innovative thinking from a variety of sources in this time
of rapid change."[4]
During the 2001 QDR process, Congress did not mandate a National
Defense Panel, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did
direct his own independent panel, led by Michele Flournoy, to
conduct a defense strategy assessment. The result was a report
entitled "QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security"
that was released by the National Defense University in April 2001.
Unfortunately, the QDR of 2001 was largely overshadowed by the
events of September 11, which heavily influenced the strategy
published just weeks after the attacks. As a result, QDR 2001
inevitably received less public attention than Transforming
Defense did in 1997. Unlike Transforming Defense in
1997, however, QDR 2001 was an edited work that contained a
collection of many views instead of a cohesive, consensus position.
During the 2006 QDR process, no formal defense review panel was
established. Perhaps due in part to the lack of alternate
viewpoints, the most recent QDR was generally shelved upon release
and subsequently ignored by Capitol Hill.
Hedging Against the Status Quo
After the release of the National Defense Panel report in 1997,
Senator Coats argued that the "NDP served two vital functions: as a
hedge against the status quo and an independent validation of
innovative recommendations proposed by the Quadrennial Defense
Review."[5] Ensuring a proper check on the prevailing
strategic views and assumptions within the Pentagon--the same views
that promise to drive the QDR process in the coming year--is a step
Congress must initiate to help verify or reject the Pentagon
strategy findings.
During his initial FY 2010 budget proposal announcement on April
6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates promised to "profoundly
reform how this department does business." The Secretary went on to
announce that he planned to not only reform how the Pentagon
purchases weapons and equipment, but what it purchases as well. In
areas where he believes the U.S. has a qualitative or quantitative
advantage--such as the F-22 fighter, the C-17, or the long-range
bomber program--he chose to propose cuts and program delays now.
Gates then announced that decisions related to how the Pentagon
should shift and mange additional risk will be conducted as part of
the QDR process.
Considering the broad procurement shifts Secretary Gates has
proposed--and his indication of more dramatic weapons systems cuts,
delays, or cancellations next year in the 2011 budget
request--Congress must look beyond the Pentagon leadership for
strategic assessments to stimulate a broader discussion. Given the
number of major defense programs Secretary Gates is seeking to
cut--and the fate of other programs he will leave to the QDR
process to decide--it is absolutely vital that Congress establish
an independent National Defense Panel to draw its own assessments
and offer its own separate conclusions on the U.S. defense
posture.
Thus far, the Secretary has made several subtle moves in an
apparent attempt to control the budget review process and limit
public discussion, debate, and, most important, dissent. In
February, Gates asked anyone involved in the FY 2010 budget to sign
ongoing nondisclosure agreements. According to DoD spokesman Geoff
Morrell, "The whole process the Secretary wants to keep out of the
limelight. He wants to keep it secret, because ultimately it needs
to be judged on the whole and not bits and pieces which may leak
out." Asking for the loyalty of everyone involved, including the
service chiefs and combatant commanders, is an unprecedented step,
but not at all inconsistent with the type of loyalty that Gates has
required in the past.
While it may be possible to appreciate Gates' desire to "keep
close hold" on the process while it was underway, Morrell insisted
that when its findings were complete it would be presented "in a
very open and transparent fashion." Upon completion of budget
deliberations, however, the Secretary said that the nondisclosure
agreements would remain in effect permanently. Further, Secretary
Gates has indicated to the service chiefs that they are not to
submit their unfunded requirements lists to Members of Congress who
have asked for them already. When the detailed defense budget is
released later this week, Congress will have to force a truly
transparent public debate.
In keeping with the original intention of the National Defense
Panel, no one individual or group should be able to direct major
future defense planning decisions absent a separate mechanism to
test their analytical assumptions. As in the past, this panel
should consist of a range of defense analysts with opposing views.
It should be written as a complete report that will require the
consensus of the entire group like the original panel in 1997. It
should also be convened during the QDR process and scheduled to be
released after the Quadrennial Defense Review so that it may
address the major findings of this strategy.
Ensuring Transparency in the Defense
Strategy Process
The Obama Administration has reputedly talked about transparency
in government. A congressionally-mandated National Defense Panel
offers a pragmatic vehicle to ensure transparency in the defense
strategy process by creating a hedge against the prevailing
opinions in the Pentagon through an alternative and independent
evaluation.
Mackenzie M. Eaglen is Senior Policy
Analyst for National Security, and Eric Sayers is a National
Security Research Assistant, in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation.