Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) is a clear
winner in his country's April 9 parliamentary (DPR) elections.
Indications are that SBY's Democrat Party has increased its 7.5
percent support from the 2004 DPR elections to approximately 20
percent. Whether his party clears the legal 20 percent threshold of
seats required to name its own presidential candidate does not
practically matter: Either way, SBY will need to form a governing
coalition. The most important part of the coalition will be his
choice of a vice presidential running mate.
The Islamist Failure
The other major outcome of the election is the considerable
setback dealt to the Indonesian Islamist parties. PKS, the
ideology's standard bearer, failed to improve substantially from
its 2004 share. Throughout the last year, PKS held firmly to a goal
of garnering 20 percent of the vote. That was probably never in the
cards. But they outwitted themselves on the 15 percent they might
have reasonably hoped for. To expand their base, PKS sought to
appeal to Indonesian nationalism and downplay their Islamism. They
portrayed themselves as members of the political elite, ingratiated
themselves with SBY at every opportunity, and floated coalition
balloons with each of the mainstream parties.
The PKS campaign failed. If Indonesians voted out of a sense of
nationalism, they went with more trusted sources: a president who
has largely led the country in the right direction and older
parties with which voters are more comfortable.
At the same time, PKS failed to pick up defections from the
other Islamist parties. Two of these parties went below the 2.5
percent threshold for representation in parliament. And the fourth,
the PPP of the Suharto era, continued its long decline, presently
hovering around 5 percent of yesterday's vote total. It is unclear
where all these voters went-although given its poor performance, it
seems certain that they did not go to PKS. Maybe they were as
confused by PKS's appeals to non-sectarian nationalism as everyone
else. Polling before the election also indicated the possibility of
migration from the Pancasila-based Muslim parties-PKB and PAN-to
PKS. This also does not appear to have happened.
No political victories are permanent. In 1999, PKS itself failed
to make the threshold necessary to contest the 2004 elections. It
changed its name to qualify and emerged in 2004 with 45 seats and
three cabinet posts. They turned the name change to their
advantage, using it to obscure their previously more explicit
ideological agenda. They have been running from those roots ever
since to good, steady effect-until now. Their loss will exacerbate
infighting and likely lead them to rely more on their missionary
political work, which continues apace whatever this week's national
election results.
Unfortunately, however, there is one other possibility that
could save PKS from its defeat and pending turmoil.
Vice Presidential Lottery
The Indonesian electorate's attention now turns to the
nominating process for president. Only nine of the 38 parties
contesting the parliamentary elections qualified for
representation, and only a handful of them will field presidential
candidates. The system will force them into multiparty coalitions,
each representing at least 20 percent of the seats in the DPR. Even
if SBY's Democrat Party ends up with the 20 percent of seats
necessary to nominate him without a coalition, he will still
require a coalition of supporting parties to compete effectively in
July.
SBY would seem to be in the driver's seat for the coming
presidential election. His party finished far ahead of the others,
virtually tripling its 2004 total, and the big parties-Megawati's
PDI-P and Golkar-lost votes. But the situation is complicated. If
PDI-P and Golkar-the second and third place finishers-manage to
come together, SBY would be left with few choices for a vice
presidential partner. He could preempt that possibility by
resurrecting his partnership with Golkar, either by patching up
political affairs with his current vice president or running with
another Golkar candidate (the sultan of Yogyakarta, for example).
He could reach out to PKB and PAN, but given their declining
fortunes, that is unlikely.
The other real prospect for vice president is Hidayat Nur Wahid,
the former president of PKS and the speaker of the joint assembly
and holder of three degrees from University of Medina in Saudi
Arabia. Eight percent may be far below what PKS had hoped for, but
it did hold its own, and it has strong organizational capacity.
Securing a spot a heartbeat away from the presidency would more
than salvage their poor performance in the parliamentary
elections.
The Future of U.S.-Indonesia
Relations
SBY has clearly done some things of mutual importance to
Indonesia and the United States. On his watch, Indonesia has
prosecuted the war on terrorism quite effectively: Indonesia is now
going on its fourth year without a major terrorist attack. Under
SBY's leadership, Indonesia is reasserting itself in East Asian
politics, and speaking aloud about the importance of values in its
foreign policy. On this basis-and on the basis of the positive
political model Indonesia serves for other predominantly Muslim
countries-the Obama Administration is rightly committed to taking
the U.S.-Indonesia relationship to a whole new level of
partnership.
On the negative side, SBY has sent mixed signals about an
Islamist agenda diametrically opposed to both Indonesian tradition
and American interest in liberal democratic governance. The most
recent example is the remarkable commission he offered Shari'a
financing at the World Islamic Economic Forum this past March:
"Islamic bankers should therefore do some missionary work in the
Western world to promote the concept of Shari'a banking, for which
many in the West are more than ready now." While Shari'a financing
is a complex subject for another paper, suffice it to say that most
Indonesians in the market are indifferent to it, and those inclined
to examine their options would find more than enough authoritative
religious opinion approving of interest-based banking services.
Plus, Shari'a financing constitutes a bare 3 percent of the
Indonesian market.
No one accuses SBY of being an Islamist. And the DPR election
results are evidence that he is a good political tactician. But
from the perspective of U.S.-Indonesia relations, his political
maneuvering may ultimately bring him into the cross fire of
American politics. Careless statements extolling as a role model
Indonesia's most influential Islamist[1] and calls for Islamist
missions to the West could have the effect of choking off the
tremendous potential in U.S.-Indonesian relations.
A Telling Choice
SBY's election victory should give him the confidence he needs
to develop and assert his own vision for Indonesia. With his choice
of a vice presidential candidate, he will tell the world something
about that vision. There are many factors to consider in his
choice-political calculations top among them-but if SBY cares about
establishing a deeper, mutually beneficial relationship with the
United States, he will consider the way his choice will be received
outside Indonesia. Throwing PKS a lifeline by giving them the vice
presidency will effectively kill any effort to take the
U.S.-Indonesia relationship to the next level.
Walter Lohman is Director
of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.