On February 27, the Obama Administration announced that it would
not participate in the upcoming Durban Review Conference on racism
due to the extremely biased content of the draft "outcome
document." In a welcome recognition of the limitations of
multilateral engagement, the Administration specifically noted that
it "will not engage in further negotiations on this text, nor will
we participate in a conference based on this text. A conference
based on this text would be a missed opportunity to speak clearly
about the persistent problem of racism."[1] The decision confirms the
Bush Administration's conclusion that the Durban Review Conference,
otherwise known as Durban II, would not be a constructive
discussion on racism and that U.S. participation would not benefit
the U.S. or victims of racism around the world.
The Durban II Disappointment
Durban II is the follow-up to the 2001 United Nations World
Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance. The 2001 conference, held in Durban, South
Africa, was hijacked by nations and non-governmental organizations
that used it criticize Israel and the United States. After
unsuccessfully trying to counter those efforts, the U.S. delegation
walked out of the 2001 conference.[2]
To the disappointment of many, Durban II followed in the
footsteps of the 2001 conference. In some respects, such repetition
was inevitable. For instance, the stated purpose of Durban II is to
further the implementation of the 2001 Durban Declaration. Since
the 2001 Durban Declaration contains positions and provisions with
which the U.S. strongly disagrees, it follows that Durban II likely
will expand on an outcome that is incompatible with American
interests.
However, the Durban II process itself has compounded the
problems, beginning with the decision of the U.N. Human Rights
Council to act as the preparatory committee for Durban II. This
decision was a strong warning sign considering the council's
decidedly biased record against Israel.[3] The council then proceeded to
elect Libya as chair of the Bureau of the Preparatory Committee,
which sets the agenda and objectives for the review conference.
Among the 19 vice-chairs are Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and
South Africa, none of which has distinguished itself as a champion
of equality or human rights during its tenure on the council.
Libya and Iran are particularly ill-suited to overseeing
preparations for Durban II. Both countries are members and strong
supporters of the 57-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference,
which has historically been hostile to Israel. Libya is also a
member of the League of Arab States, whose Arab Charter on Human
Rights calls for the elimination of "Zionism," and Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has infamously stated that Israel
"must be wiped off the map" and that "Zionists are the true
manifestation of Satan."[4]
Unsurprisingly, the draft outcome document for the Durban Review
Conference contains several objectionable references to Israel. For
example, the draft text:
Expresses deep concern at the plight of Palestinian refugees and
other inhabitants of the Arab occupied territories as well as
displaced persons who were forced to leave their homes because of
war and racial policies of the occupying power and who are
prevented from returning to their homes and properties because of a
racially based law of return.[5]
In addition to such biased treatment of Israel, the draft
outcome document contains numerous troubling statements supporting
efforts to constrain freedom of speech and expression in order to
prevent the so-called "defamation of religions." For example, the
draft text claims
… that a most disturbing phenomenon is the intellectual
and ideological validation of Islamophobia. … [W]hen it is
expressed in the form of defamation of religions, it takes cover
behind the freedom of expression … [A]ssociation of
terrorism and violence with Islam or any other religion, including
through publication of offensive caricatures and making of hate
documentaries, would purposely complicate our common endeavours to
address several contemporary issues, including the fight against
terrorism and the occupation of foreign territories and peoples.[6]
The draft text clearly indicates what would be banned if laws
restricting the "defamation of religions" were adopted: The
"publication of offensive caricatures" is a reference to the
publication of a series of rather innocuous cartoons by the Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005, while "hate
documentaries" refers to Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh's 2004 film
Submission as well as Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders's
film Fitna. Van Gogh's film resulted in his brutal murder by
a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim, while the death threats made in response
to Fitna have forced Wilders to hire 24-hour bodyguards.
The proponents of "defamation of religions" laws desire to
restrict such speech in the U.S. and the rest of the world.
Controversial cartoons and films, however repugnant to adherents of
a particular religion, are protected speech under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.[7] The authors of the draft
outcome document, however, seemingly found a solution for such
constitutional barriers, since the document "[c]alls on States to
develop, and where appropriate to incorporate, permissible
limitations on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression
into national legislation."[8]
The Right Decision
Based on the predictable trajectory of the Durban Review
Conference, as well as the subsequent actions of the Preparatory
Committee, the Bush Administration decided to vote against
proposals for a follow-up to the Durban conference, to forgo
participation in the preparatory meetings, to vote against the U.N.
budget that included funding for Durban II, and to withhold the
U.S. portion of the expected costs for Durban II as well as that
portion of its U.N. regular budget assessment that would fund the
U.N. Human Rights Council.[9]
Although the Bush Administration chose not to participate in the
Durban II preparatory meetings, the final decision on whether to
attend the actual conference in April 2009 fell to the next
Administration. Consequently, the Bush Administration could not and
did not definitively announce a U.S. boycott. It did, however,
strongly support the decisions of Canada and Israel to boycott
Durban II.
Faced with the question of whether to continue the Bush
Administration's policy or participate in Durban II, the Obama
Administration sent a delegation to February's negotiations on the
outcome document. It announced that, pending progress on addressing
problems with the text, the U.S. would consider attending the
Durban Review Conference in April 2009. According to the State
Department:
This will be the first opportunity the Administration has had to
engage in the negotiations for the Durban Review, and-in line with
our commitment to diplomacy-the U.S. has decided to send a
delegation to engage in the negotiations on the text of the
conference document. The intent of our participation is to work to
try to change the direction in which the Review Conference is
heading. We hope to work with other countries that want the
Conference to responsibly and productively address racism around
the world.[10]
After participating in the February meetings, however, the Obama
Administration concluded that
the document being negotiated has gone from bad to worse, and
the current text of the draft outcome document is not salvageable.
As a result, the United States will not engage in further
negotiations on this text, nor will we participate in a conference
based on this text. A conference based on this text would be a
missed opportunity to speak clearly about the persistent problem of
racism.[11]
The Administration left open the distant possibility of
participating in the April conference if the outcome document was
"shortened and [did] not reaffirm in toto the flawed 2001
Durban Declaration and Program of Action" (DDPA) and that it not
"single out any one country or conflict, nor embrace the troubling
concept of 'defamation of religion'" and "not go further than the
DDPA on the issue of reparations for slavery."[12] However,
considering the nations represented on the Bureau of the
Preparatory Committee and the support these provisions have among a
number of U.N. member states, it is highly unlikely that the text
will be changed in such a drastic fashion.
Now that it has made the difficult philosophical decision to
boycott the multilateral Durban II meetings, the Obama
Administration should follow through and similarly announce its
decision to withhold the proportional U.S. share of any costs
associated with the Durban II conference. The Administration should
also urge its allies in Australia, the European Union, Japan, and
elsewhere in the world that their collective presence at the Durban
II grants the conference an undeserved legitimacy.
A Valuable Lesson
The Obama Administration now recognizes that attending the
Durban II conference is a fool's errand.
Hopefully, this will serve as a valuable lesson that criticism
of the previous Administration's alleged lack of commitment to
multilateral negotiations was often off target. Multilateralism is
only a means to an end, and participation in multilateral
negotiations is no guarantee of beneficent outcomes. On the
contrary, sometimes U.S. participation only lends credibility to a
process that deserves none. This is a lesson that applies in the
case of Durban II but should also lead the Obama Administration to
reconsider its decision to participate as an observer in the U.N.
Human Rights Council, which oversaw the Durban II debacle.
Brett D. Schaefer is Jay
Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs, and Steven Groves is Bernard
and Barbara Lomas Fellow, in the Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation.