As the economy slips into one of its worst recessions in several
decades, many in Congress have been arguing the need for more
government spending to create new jobs to offset those lost and to
jumpstart the economy. President Obama supports that effort, as do
many in the media, academia, and business.
But despite the clamor for bold federal jobs programs, the
evidence from past such efforts--here and abroad--suggest that
little may come of it. Indeed, the growing nostalgia for a reprise
of the New Deal programs of the 1930s fails to note that the Great
Depression lasted more than a decade. What ended it was the
rearmament and mobilization for war against Germany and Japan, not
the unprecedented expansion of federal jobs programs.
As the federal stimulus legislation winds its way through the
Senate, much of its focus is on "infrastructure." Recognizing that
parts of America's infrastructure--notably roads--suffer from
neglect, many urge their upgrade, thereby gaining a double benefit
of short-term jobs and long-term mobility.
The Limits of Infrastructure Job
Creation
The benefits of these infrastructure proposals appear
intuitively plausible, but a review of past such efforts reveals
that the promise exceeds performance. Problems arise in large part
because of three limitations: (1) the difficulty in getting such
large, complicated projects up and running in a short period of
time; (2) the tendency of many states to substitute federal for
dedicated state money; and (3) the shortage of skilled labor needed
to build them.
Both Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt implemented ambitious
infrastructure programs in the aftermath of the stock market crash
of late 1929, but nine years later the unemployment rate in the
United States was still over 17 percent.[1] Following its stock market
crash in the early 1990s, the Japanese government attempted to
revive its economy through several infrastructure spending
initiatives. None succeeded. Instead the Japanese economy has
suffered from pervasive stagnation over the past decade and a half,
and economic growth averaged only 0.6 percent per year since the
early 1990s.[2]
More recently, numerous studies of post-World War II
infrastructure spending stimulus schemes have concluded that the
benefits of such programs are modest at best and largely
ineffective, despite the vast financial resources applied to
them.[3]
While there has been considerable debate in Congress about the
start-up delays common to infrastructure spending, there has been
little mention of the obstacles posed by the shortage of skilled,
heavy construction labor in the United States, where much of the
American population manages to avoid the kind of outdoor, physical
labor common to construction work. Consequently, a significant
portion of construction workers are recent immigrants, mostly from
Latin America. Increased infrastructure spending may lead to
increased immigration, thereby leaving the existing domestic pool
of unemployed workers unchanged.
What Sort of Jobs Should Be
Created?
This obsessive focus on infrastructure jobs has led to the
neglect of employment-generating opportunities in other important
sectors of the U.S. economy also hammered by the recession,
specifically the financial services sector, where substantial job
losses have occurred among well-educated professionals with
specialized skills. It is highly unlikely that any of these
unemployed investment bankers, mortgage brokers, actuaries and bond
counsel, and other skilled workers who make the financial system
work would instead bang rivets into West Virginia bridges or hang
drywall in Chicago schools. Indeed, even if these pale and doughy
office people wanted the work, it is unlikely that a construction
foreman would hire them if skilled construction workers could be
obtained elsewhere.
So rather than risk scarce resources on uncertain infrastructure
jobs, why not focus on other important segments of America's
economy where a successful revival would yield big benefits in
income growth and enhanced global competitiveness--notably in the
financial service sector, which to date has experienced the brunt
of the damage caused by the financial crisis and recession? Indeed,
if the nation really does want to recharge the economy and generate
sustained prosperity, these many unemployed financial services
workers should be encouraged to stay within their skill set and
redeploy their valuable talents to help revive and sustain
America's financial industry and economy.
America's rising incomes and prosperity are the result of the
incessant reshuffling of U.S. resources--labor and capital--from
low-valued manufacturing to high-valued technology and services, of
which finance has been among the most lucrative. In the process,
the U.S. became a world leader at providing sophisticated financial
services to global investors, allowing the American people the
luxury of exchanging paper IOUs for valuable resources and products
mined and made by others.
Many across the globe now think that the role of financial
leadership is up for grabs, and America will have to fight to keep
it. Turning loan officers and credit analysts into trim carpenters
and backhoe operators will not win that fight, but getting them
back in the business they are trained to perform will.
Focus on the Future
So what does all this mean for jobs and stimulus? For starters,
the focus on the restoration of solvency in American financial
markets must look beyond the pressing needs of the moment--and the
policy mistakes of the recent past[4]--to ensure that steps taken
today also serve the long-term interests of the nation. Otherwise
America risks losing its commanding global market share of the
profitable financial services business. As financial markets
stabilize, future actions should not undermine opportunity by
ignoring the abundant human financial services talent that helped
generate a good bit of the nation's recent prosperity.
Ronald D. Utt, Ph.D., is
Herbert and Joyce Morgan Senior Research Fellow in the Thomas A.
Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation
[1]Amity Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New
History of the Great Depression (New York: Harper Perennial,
2007), p. 352.