On December 12, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States released its interim report.[1] The
commission is charged with guiding policy for a strategic posture
for the United States that meets today's security needs. This
guidance will define the future of U.S. strategic nuclear,
strategic conventional, and strategic defense forces.
Currently, there is no consensus in Congress on an appropriate
strategic posture. As an interim report, the commission's tentative
recommendations do not provide such a consensus. However, the
report does describe an alternative policy that would recognize the
essential role of nuclear weapons in providing for U.S. security
while establishing a defense-oriented strategic posture and seeking
the circumstance where comprehensive nuclear disarmament becomes a
real possibility.
The final report is due on April 1, 2009. If the tentative and
general recommendations in the interim report can be translated
into this alternative strategic policy, then a strategic posture
that is broadly supported in Congress should result.
Global Nuclear Disarmament
Individuals both within the commission and outside it fervently
desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons.[2] The commission
recognizes, however, that this goal is "extremely difficult to
attain and would require a fundamental transformation of the world
political order."[3] This means those favoring nuclear
disarmament have recognized that their preferred outcome is not
appropriate under present circumstances and that there is no direct
path to nuclear disarmament at this time. Implicit in this
understanding is that these same individuals will abandon
unilateral steps aimed at atrophying the U.S. nuclear weapons
infrastructure. They will, for example, have to abandon immediate
steps to de-alert U.S. nuclear forces, cease efforts to curtail all
programs for modernizing the nuclear force, put off ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and cease efforts to impose
changes on the declared policy governing the use of U.S. nuclear
weapons.
Strategic Defenses, Conventional
Superiority, and the Prospect of Nuclear Disarmament
The commission's recommendations regarding global nuclear
disarmament are not only qualified; they are conditioned on taking
other steps regarding the broader strategic posture of the U.S.
Included in these are steps to field robust missile defenses and
preserve U.S. conventional superiority. In this context, those who
strongly favor nuclear disarmament should recognize that robust
strategic defensive measures--including ballistic missile
defenses--and conventional superiority can create a circumstance
where nuclear disarmament is appropriate.
In this context, the commission should support a longer-term
approach for strengthening strategic defenses and strategic
conventional forces, along with select steps for nuclear
modernization, that recognizes that neither is provocative under
the right circumstances. This option would use U.S. diplomacy to
convince other states (starting with China and Russia) that a
"protect and defend" strategy will serve their interests as much as
those of the U.S.
Such an effort should encourage the principle of non-aggression
and reducing and ultimately eliminating those strategic weapons
that pose the greatest threat to civilian populations, vital
national institutions, and infrastructure. This policy would start
by focusing on controlling high-yield nuclear weapons that are
mounted on inaccurate delivery systems and offer little or no
defensive value. For its part, the U.S. should produce lower-yield
weapons mounted on highly accurate delivery systems and hold at
risk those weapons that pose a threat of widespread destruction to
itself and its allies. While nothing is certain, the adoption of
fundamentally defensive strategies by these three nations may lead
to a direct path to nuclear disarmament.
Strengthening Strategic Defenses
Regarding strategic defenses specifically, the interim report
states, "Missile defenses appropriate to defend against a rogue
nuclear nation could serve a damage-limiting and stabilizing role
in the US strategic posture, assuming such defenses are perceived
as being effective enough to at least sow doubts in the minds of
potential attackers that such an attack would succeed."[4]
Limiting the strategic defensive posture to missile defenses,
however, is too narrow. Accordingly, the final report should expand
this recommendation to cover the other means of delivering
strategic attacks on the U.S. and its allies.
Further, the commission warns against fielding defenses that
might provoke China and Russia. This point should be qualified in
two ways. First, it must identify an objective standard for what
might provoke China or Russia. Otherwise, any claim of China's or
Russia's provocation would be seen as legitimate. Second, the
commission should describe how the diplomatic and arms control
options toward both China and Russia described earlier will cause
both to see America's defensive measures as not provocative but
stabilizing, reinforcing their security against attack.
An Alternative Vision
If the proponents of nuclear disarmament on the commission honor
the qualifications and conditions described here and convince
Congress to do likewise, then the proponents of fielding robust
strategic defenses should offer an alternative vision for the U.S.
strategic posture. This alternative vision points to a future
circumstance where the U.S. and other states could consider direct
steps to nuclear disarmament. It would represent the indirect path
to global nuclear disarmament. All concerned, however, need to
recognize that the consensus outlined here does not mean an end to
the debate. It will only serve to define the parameters of the
debate from here forward. The fact of the matter is that
substantive differences of opinions regarding the appropriate
strategic posture of the United States will remain.
Baker Spring is F.M. Kirby Research
Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation.
[2] See
George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam
Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," The Wall Street
Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A-15; Shultz, Perry, Kissinger,
and Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," The Wall Street
Journal, January 15, 2008, at http://online.wsj.com/public/article
_print/SB120036422673589947.html (December 18, 2008).
[3]
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States, "Interim Report," p. 9.