Brazil and Thailand are the latest to join the list of countries
that have filed disputes against the U.S. within the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in response to America's practice of "zeroing"
in anti-dumping investigations. Even though the WTO has ruled that
zeroing--the tactic of zeroing out dumping calculations when a
producer in another country charges a higher price in the U.S.
market than in its home market or above its production costs--is
not compliant with international trade rules, America refuses to
change its dumping methodology. America's refusal to comply with
WTO rulings and eliminate this unfair trade practice erodes U.S.
credibility and influence in multilateral trade negotiations and
leaves America open to retaliation from affected trade partners.
With the new year should come a new commitment to cleaning up U.S.
dumping practices.
Anti-Dumping, Zeroing, and the WTO
Historically, the U.S. has aggressively applied anti-dumping and
countervailing duties, or trade remedy laws, against foreign firms
and countries that engage in allegedly unfair trade practices.
Anti-dumping duties may be imposed on imports sold in the U.S.
market at a price lower than in the producer's home market or below
the foreign firm's cost of production. Countervailing duties may
also be imposed on imported products receiving government
subsidies. In both cases, the key factor is that the import causes
material injury to the competing domestic industry.
While trade remedies afford a layer of protection for firms
facing stiff foreign competition and allow the government some
additional revenue, households and businesses have to pay higher
prices for those imports. Moreover, consumers may not be able to
purchase the imports at all if duties are high enough to prohibit
trade. This tax on America's households and import-consuming firms
reduces economic activity and lowers living standards. Furthermore,
the incentives to efficiently use resources and find innovative
ways to produce diminish as competition is reduced by the trade
barriers.
In general, members of the WTO are required to bind their
tariffs and not discriminate between trading partners by charging
different tariffs. However, Article 6 of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in conjunction with the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement, allows countries to retaliate against dumping by
assessing additional duties on dumped products from specific
countries if the dumping is causing material damage to the
importing country's respective industry. Countries investigating
alleged incidents of dumping must evaluate all relevant economic
factors affecting the industry in question. If a determination is
made that injurious dumping is occurring, then the exporting
company has the option to raise its price to an agreed level in
order to avoid an anti-dumping import duty. Anti-dumping measures
must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless
subsequent investigations show that ending the measure would lead
to injury.
"Zeroing" is used by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) in
its calculation of dumping margins. The DOC first determines a
product's "normal value," which can be based on the product's price
in the exporter's home market, the price charged by the exporter in
another country, or on the exporter's production costs. The DOC
then compares the normal price of the good to the price charged in
the U.S. for each sale and calculates the dumping margin--the
average of the differences between the two prices. When the normal
value of the good is more than the price charged in the U.S., the
difference contributes to the dumping margin. However, when the
normal value is less than the price charged in the U.S., the DOC
assigns a zero value to the transaction rather than deduct the
difference from the final dumping margin. This practice of
"zeroing" artificially inflates dumping margins, increasing both
the likelihood that the DOC will find injury and the value of
punitive duties that can be assessed on "dumped" products.[1]
In cases brought against the U.S. by the EU, Japan, Canada,
Ecuador, and others, the WTO has ruled that zeroing is contrary to
anti-dumping rules because it distorts the prices of certain export
transactions by not considering all comparisons of normal value and
export price. By disregarding certain comparison results, the
United States has acted inconsistently with the "fair comparison"
requirement set out in Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement on
Anti-Dumping.
The U.S. refuses to accept WTO recommendations that America's
anti-dumping methodology be brought into compliance with
international trade rules. The longer America defies or ignores
these recommendations, the more likely complainants will be allowed
to impose retaliatory duties or other punitive measures against
U.S. products. The U.S. insists that the law is being
misinterpreted and plans to use the WTO Doha Round of multilateral
trade negotiations to permit zeroing in WTO rules. Fortunately, for
the cause of free and fair trade, the effort has met with strong
opposition.
The U.S. Should Practice What It
Preaches
When the WTO finds in favor of a U.S. position in a trade
dispute, all is fair and good. Yet when it rules against the
U.S.--as it has time and time again when considering America's
practice of zeroing--Congress cries foul, insisting that the WTO
has overstepped its bounds and is violating U.S. sovereignty.
America is as assiduous in rooting out the unfair trade practices
of the world and demanding their elimination as it is protecting
its own.
It is time to end the hypocrisy. America's use of zeroing has
been found in violation of WTO trade remedy rules and imposes
costly distortions on the U.S. economy. At the same time, America's
refusal to comply with WTO rulings to eliminate the unfair trade
practice erodes the United States' credibility as a champion of
free and fair trade and weakens America's influence in multilateral
trade negotiations. It is time for America to live up to the same
high standards it demands from the rest of the world and end the
practice of zeroing in anti-dumping investigations.
Daniella Markheim is
Jay Van Andel Senior Trade Policy Analyst in the Center for
International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation.
[1]
Recent research confirms that zeroing can add 3-4 percent to the
average U.S. anti-dumping duty, an amount that costs U.S. consumers
approximately $150 million per year on existing U.S. anti-dumping
orders. William W. Nye, "The Implications of 'Zeroing' on
Enforcement of U.S. Antidumping Law," Social Science Research
Network, August 2008, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263423
(December 19, 2008).