As the United States and India seek to build a stronger
partnership and take full advantage of the diplomatic opening
created by the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, one of the areas with
the greatest potential benefit to both sides is
counterterrorism cooperation. The multiple terrorist attacks
in Mumbai between November 26 and November 29, 2008, that killed
about 170 people, including six Americans, have highlighted the
urgent need for these two countries to work together more
closely to counter regional and global terrorist threats.
Despite general convergence of American and Indian views on the
need to contain terrorism, the two countries have failed in the
past to work together as closely as they could to minimize
terrorist threats, largely because of differing geostrategic
perceptions, Indian reluctance to deepen the intelligence
relationship, and U.S. bureaucratic resistance to elevating
counterterrorism cooperation beyond a certain level. New Delhi and
Washington both stand to gain considerably from improving
counterterrorism cooperation and therefore should seek to overcome
their trust deficit. Indian suspicions revolve mainly around
the issue of Kashmir and U.S. policy toward Pakistan, which has
provided training, financing and military and logistical support to
militants fighting in Kashmir. Washington, for its part, remains
concerned about Indian ties to Iran, despite Iranian sponsorship of
international terrorism and pursuit of a nuclear weapons
Terrorism Trends in India
India is one of the most terrorism-afflicted countries in
the world. The U.S. State Department's 2007 Country Report on
Terrorism, released in April 2008, states that terrorists,
separatists, and extremists killed more than 2,300 people in
India in 2007. As one of the world's most ethnically,
linguistically, and religiously diverse countries, India has
dealt with numerous separatist and insurgent movements over the
past 30 years, including a Sikh uprising in the state of Punjab in
the 1980s, a Muslim separatist movement in the state of Jammu
and Kashmir from 1989 to the present, and various ethnic
separatist movements in the northeastern states. Another challenge
facing the Indian government is a leftist extremist movement
(Maoist and Naxalite) that is spreading in the rural areas of
eastern and central India.
The late November attacks in Mumbai follow the 1993 bombings of
the Mumbai stock exchange, which killed more than 250, and the July
2006 attacks on Mumbai commuter trains and railway stations that
left 180 dead. These most recent attacks differed from previous
assaults in that they lasted over a period of three days, with the
attackers holing up inside hotels and a Jewish center where
they fought Indian commandos to the death with assault rifles and
grenades. Indian authorities say that one of the surviving November
attackers is a member of a Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
(LET). The LET was listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) by the U.S. State Department in 2001 following its
involvement in an attack on the Indian parliament that led to a
six-month Indo-Pakistani military standoff.
Although Islamabad officially banned it in 2002, the LET
continues to operate in Pakistan unimpeded. Its leaders move about
the country freely, raising funds and recruiting young
Pakistani men for jihad. Its headquarters are located in a
town outside of Lahore, and the group played a major role in
providing humanitarian assistance to victims of the 2005 Pakistan
Definitions of Terrorism and
There is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, adopted on October
8, 2004, defines terrorism as:
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons,
intimidate a population or compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any
The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) describes
terrorism as "premeditated; perpetrated by a sub-national or
clandestine agent; politically motivated, potentially including
religious, philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations;
violent; and perpetrated against a noncombatant target."
The U.S. Department of Defense defines insurgency as "an
organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through use of subversion and armed conflict."
Bahukutumbi Raman, a prominent Indian terrorism analyst and
former official in India's external intelligence service, the
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), described the differences between
insurgents and terrorists as follows:
Insurgents seek territorial control and try to establish the
paraphernalia of a State such as an Army with professional ranks,
an administrative set-up in the territory controlled by them, etc.
They fight like a conventional army in classical set-piece
formation as well as like a guerilla army....
Terrorists, on the other hand, avoid territorial control and the
paraphernalia of a State. They use unconventional methods of
struggle. The avoidance of territorial control and State
paraphernalia enables them to spread death and destruction with a
small cadre strength organized into penetration-proof cells....
Although focused primarily on waging jihad in Kashmir, the LET
has married its objectives with al-Qaeda's virulent pan-Islamic,
anti-West agenda and signed Osama bin Laden's 1998 edict calling
for attacks on Americans and Israelis. The LET has included in its
objectives the institution of Islamic rule over all parts of India.
Under pressure from the U.S., Pakistan over the weekend raided an
LET camp in Pakistani Kashmir and detained several of the group's
There is increasing concern in India about the threat posed by
homegrown Islamist extremists who are linking domestic grievances
to pan-Islamic agendas. Since May, India has suffered at least
eight major attacks inside the country with a death toll of more
than 400. A group identifying itself as the Indian Mujahideen (IM)
has claimed responsibility for some of the most recent
attacks, usually through e-mail messages sent just before or after
Indian terrorism experts have not yet determined whether IM is a
single organization or a united front of several autonomous
groups. The IM claimed credit for the May 13, 2008,
bomb blasts that exploded at crowded markets in the city of Jaipur
and for similar attacks in Ahmedabad in July, in New Delhi in
September, and in the cities of Varnasi, Faizabad, and Lucknow
in the state of Uttar Pradesh on November 23, 2007. A group
identifying itself as ISF-IM claimed responsibility for the
October 30, 2008, serial blasts in Assam in northeast India
that left 75 dead. Local police believe the initials may stand for
Indian Security Force-Indian Mujahideen.
Another group that has often been associated with the recent
attacks is the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). SIMI
was formed in April 1977 at the Aligarh University in Uttar Pradesh
with a mission to revive Islam in India and transform the
country into an Islamic state. It built its organization
from networks of the Jamaat-e-Islami's student wing. One year after
the destruction of the Babri Mosque by Hindu zealots in December
1992, SIMI-linked operatives carried out terrorist strikes across
India. In a 1996 statement, a SIMI leader declared that since
democracy and secularism had failed to protect Muslims in India,
the sole option was to struggle for the Caliphate. After 9/11, SIMI
members held demonstrations in support of Osama bin Laden,
prompting the Indian government to ban the organization.
Analysts believe that SIMI may have about 400 full-time activists
and 20,000 regular members and that its operatives cooperate with
the LET and the Harakat ul-Jihad Islami (HUJ/I), based in both
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
What has been most surprising to the Indian authorities and
public is that many of the individuals arrested for
involvement in the recent attacks are young men (under the age of
35) with good educations and lucrative, prestigious
occupations, such as Web designers, doctors, and engineers. The
IM's top leader, Mohammed Subhan Qureshi, is a highly trained
computer specialist. The Indian authorities have found that these
men are often motivated through the Internet or through terrorist
groups based in Pakistan.
The new homegrown terrorists are apparently inspired by
al-Qaeda's jihadi ideology and by local grievances. The groups
formed to carry out the attacks are loose conglomerations, and it
is still unclear whether there is an overarching commanding
element directing the different cells. Raman says that there has
been a "mushroom-like growth of jihadi terrorist organizations
throughout India-- self-radicalized, self-motivated, motivated by
local grievances but having invisible connectivity with a single
source orchestrating them."
The increasing number of terrorist incidents in the country is
forcing India to re-examine the government's approach to
terrorism prevention. Following strong public criticism of the
government's handling of the Mumbai attacks, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh vowed to overhaul India's counterterrorism
The Indian government had also announced new security measures
in September following Prime Minister Singh's admission that there
were gaps in intelligence related to the recent spate of bombings.
The Indian cabinet approved proposals to hire 7,000 additional
policemen in New Delhi; install closed circuit televisions in busy
areas; and create a research wing to investigate terrorist threats
in the country's internal intelligence service, the Intelligence
Bureau (IB). Singh was quoted as saying that the "issue is really
one of examining the efficacy of the totality of the systems and
the mechanisms that we have to deal with terrorist incidents." He
went on to note that "the role of Pakistan-based terrorists
cannot be minimized but the involvement of local elements in recent
blasts adds a new dimension to the terrorist threat."
Indian terrorism analysts have made several suggestions for
improving India's ability to prevent further attacks, such as
increasing police levels and improving their effectiveness and
streamlining the criminal justice system. There are currently 1.2
million police officers in India and 1 million paramilitary
officers, which amounts to about 126 security personnel for every
100,000 people. In Western countries, the number of security
personnel per 100,000 people ranges from 250 to 500.
The Indian government may also decide to take a page from the
British book by focusing more on improving relations between the
local police and Muslim communities to prevent further
radicalization of youth.
Many observers have raised the issue of lack of coordination
among the various Indian investigative and intelligence
organizations operating across the country as a major impediment to
improving terrorism prevention. They note a reluctance, even
refusal, to share information among the intelligence and security
agencies. One renowned Indian terrorism
analyst has cited the Indian government's failure to develop a
national database on crime and terrorism despite a mandate to do so
in 2001 as an indicator of government inaction to rectify
shortcomings in the system.
Several Indian government organizations currently conduct
intelligence activities related to countering terrorism:
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) handles domestic intelligence
operations and reports to the Home Ministry, which oversees all
national police, paramilitaries, and domestic intelligence
The IB oversees an interagency counterterrorism center similar
to the CIA's National Counterterrorism Center that analyzes
intelligence flowing in from different organizations and
coordinates follow-up actions. Observers say that its work is
inhibited by lack of staffing and resources.
The Research and Analysis Wing handles external
intelligence and reports to India's national security adviser. The
National Technical Research Organization, which focuses on
collecting technical intelligence, is part of RAW.
Paramilitary organizations like the Central Reserve Police Force
and Border Security Forces maintain their own intelligence wings to
deal with counterinsurgency efforts in Jammu and Kashmir and
elsewhere. The Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI)
also has a network of field offices and posts in border areas that
collect intelligence on terrorist activities. India
created a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2002 to
increase coordination of the various intelligence activities
of the different military services.
The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is responsible for a
variety of criminal and national security investigative matters.
The CBI's powers and functions are limited to specific crimes based
on the Delhi Special Police Establishment Actof 1946, and the
organization is prohibited from initiating investigations until it
is given consent from the state government.
Another controversial issue has been whether to revive more
stringent anti-terrorism legislation. The political opposition, the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has criticized India's government,
led by the Congress Party, for its 2004 decision to repeal the
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). POTA, passed in 2002, expanded
the government's powers to combat terrorism through measures like
the ability to keep suspected terrorists in custody indefinitely
without bringing them to trial. Leaders of the Congress Party
argued that the legislation was misused to settle political
scores and to harass Muslims.
Indian terrorism experts and government officials
increasingly acknowledge that alienation among Indian Muslim
communities is contributing to the problem of homegrown terrorism.
(Virtually all reports about the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai
indicated that they were not generated in the Indian Muslim
community.) They have further noted that increased prosperity in
the country has not necessarily led to increased integration among
various religious communities. Indian Finance Minister Palaniappan
Chidambaram recently said that "the divide between Hindus and
Muslims is taking new and dangerous forms" and noted a growing
sense of alienation among India's Muslims.
Perpetrators of some of the recent terrorist attacks were
apparently motivated by speeches that focused on perceived wrongs
against the Muslim community in India, such as the demolition of
the Babri Mosque by Hindu zealots in 1992 and communal riots
in Gujarat in 2002 that led to the killing of at least 1,000
Muslims. Muslims account for nearly 150 million of
India's 1.1 billion people. While a minority in India, the Muslim
community is the world's third largest, after those in Indonesia
To explore the level of disaffection in the Muslim community and
seek ways to address the issue, Prime Minister Singh established a
high-level committee in 2005 to prepare a report on the
social, economic, and educational status of Muslims in India.
The report, named the Sachar Committee Report after the chairman of
the Committee, Justice Rajindar Sachar, was released in
November 2006. It found that India's Muslims lag behind the rest of
the Indian population in literacy, employment rates, and income and
that there has been a general decline in the socioeconomic
conditions of Muslims in India. The report offered recommendations
to ensure equity and equality of opportunity for Muslims,
especially in employment and education. One of the follow-up
actions the government has initiated includes establishment of the
National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation (NMDFC) by
Finance Minister Chidambaram. There have been numerous complaints
that the government is moving too slowly in following up on
the report's other proposals, however.
Muslim Clerics Take Action
In a gesture that could have long-term ramifications in
slowing recruitment for terrorism, the influential Islamic seminary
Darul Uloom Deoband--seat of the Sunni Islamic revivalist Deobandi
movement--in India issued a fatwa against terrorism in May of this
year. Although it did not receive much attention from the Western
media, several Indian analysts view the fatwa as a significant
first step in breaking the terrorist recruitment cycle. They
acknowledge, however, that the fatwa is unlikely to have an
immediate impact in terms of stemming attacks.
The fatwa stated that "Islam is a religion of peace and
security. In its eyes, on any part over the surface of the earth
spreading mischief, rioting, breach of peace, bloodshed, killing of
innocent persons and plundering are the most inhuman crimes." The
fatwa goes on to say that the purpose of Islam is "to wipe out all
kinds of terrorism and spread the message of global peace....
[T]errorism is the gravest crime as held by the Koran and Islam. We
are not prepared to tolerate terrorism in any form and we are ready
to cooperate with all responsible people."
Located in the town of Deoband in the Indian state of Uttar
Pradesh, the Darul Uloom ("house of knowledge") school advocates an
austere version of Islam but has distanced itself from religious
militancy. It is one of the most important Islamic schools in the
world but has become notorious in recent years because many of the
Pakistan-based extremist groups as well as the Taliban claim to be
Deobandi adherents. Scholars of Islam have pointed out that there
is a significant divide between Deobandi scholars and clerics and
militant groups like the Taliban. Observers say the Taliban
has oversimplified the original Deobandi teachings and note that
Deobandis living in India support the secular government,
while many of the Pakistan-based groups support a violent
anti-state Islamist agenda.
Building U.S.-Indian Counterterrorism
U.S.-Indian counterterrorism cooperation has expanded
considerably in recent years, particularly since 9/11. The U.S. and
India had already launched a formal Counterterrorism Joint Working
Group (CTJWG) in 2000 that meets one or two times a year, although
the two countries cooperated informally before 2000. India's
success in combating Sikh terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s
stemmed in part from intelligence shared by the U.S. and other
countries as well as a U.S. law signed in 1996 that barred
fundraising in the U.S. by the Indian Sikh separatist groups Babbar
Khalsa and Khalistani Liberation Front.
Through the CTJWG mechanism, India and the U.S. have exchanged
information, training material, and methods related to interrupting
terrorist financial networks, institutional and law
enforcement steps to strengthen homeland security, border
management and surveillance techniques, aviation
security, and disaster management in the event of a terrorist
incident involving weapons of mass destruction. The two sides
also launched a Joint Initiative on Cyberterrorism in 2001, held
joint counterterrorism exercises, and discussed
counterterrorism equipment issues within the Defense
Policy Working Group.
Despite this wide-ranging anti-terrorism cooperation, a
lingering trust deficit pervades the relationship and prevents
deeper cooperation on specific regional threats. In the past, India
has been frustrated by what it views as inconsistencies and
backsliding in U.S. public statements concerning the
Pakistan-based terrorist threat to India. Indian officials also
believe the U.S. has withheld information on terrorist
operatives suspected of having ties to Kashmiri militants.
Indian analysts believe the U.S. has been reluctant to assist the
Indian government in investigations related to terrorism in
Jammu and Kashmir to spare embarrassment to Pakistan, which has
assisted Kashmiri militant groups, many of which are also connected
The convergence of U.S. and Indian interests in Afghanistan
could help to build confidence between Washington and New Delhi in
terms of intelligence sharing, since both U.S. forces and Indian
interests have been targeted by the same terrorists. Though
the U.S. will have to take Pakistani geostrategic interests into
account as it seeks to bring security and stability to Afghanistan,
Washington will not tolerate use of terrorist proxies by
Islamabad and will not hesitate to alert other countries about
terrorist threats, including those linked to Pakistan.
India has developed a significant political presence and
substantial assistance programs inside Afghanistan, which have
fueled concern within the Pakistani security establishment that it
is losing influence in the region and is being encircled by hostile
regimes in both New Delhi and Kabul. Credible U.S. media
reports have linked Pakistani intelligence to the bombing of
India's embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008. Indian media reports
reveal that the U.S. possessed intelligence information related to
the attack that it shared with the Indian government weeks before
it occurred. U.S.-Indian intelligence sharing and
cooperation could not prevent this dastardly attack, but there
may be future opportunities for the U.S. and India to assist each
other in preventing Taliban and al-Qaeda attacks against both
coalition forces and Indian interests in the country.
Clandestine U.S. attempts to penetrate Indian intelligence
agencies have also dampened U.S.- Indian intelligence ties. The
defection of a senior Indian intelligence official to the U.S. in
2004 and revelations of unauthorized meetings between a senior
Indian intelligence official and an American intelligence official
in New Delhi in 1997 have raised red flags in India about U.S.
intentions regarding increased U.S.-Indian intelligence exchanges
and concern that the U.S. will exploit these links for its own
purposes. Directly following news of the 2004
scandal, one Indian newspaper hinted that the incident risked
damaging the "post-11 September 2001 strategic alliance with the
U.S. and an earlier one with Israel" and would likely result in
"New Delhi placing limitations on intelligence sharing with both
the U.S. and Israel."
Another irritant in U.S.-Indian relations that could potentially
affect counterterrorism cooperation is Iran. U.S. concern
about Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and its
support for terrorism drives Washington's policy toward
Tehran. India, on the other hand, has a multifaceted
relationship with Iran that is characterized by long-standing
regional, historical, and cultural ties. India opposes Iran's
pursuit of a nuclear weapons program and voted against Iran on
that issue at International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
meetings in September 2005 and again in February 2006. New Delhi,
however, views its ties to Tehran through its own regional context
and believes that it must maintain cordial ties with Iran to
prevent Islamabad and Tehran from drawing closer.
India worked closely with Iran (and Russia) to support the
Afghan Northern Alliance forces against the Pakistan-supported
Taliban during the late 1990s and has held regular military
exchanges with Iran, although it has not made any significant
military transfers to the country. India also views Iran as a
potential source for its growing energy needs and currently ships
goods to Afghanistan through the Iranian port at Chabahar, since
Pakistan does not allow Indian goods destined for Afghanistan to
transit its territory. In recent years, during negotiations over
the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, New Delhi pulled back from major
energy projects with Tehran, such as the $7.5 billion
Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline project. India will be watching
the incoming Obama Administration's policies on Iran closely
to determine whether there will be increased U.S. flexibility
toward Iran, particularly regarding the situation in
What Needs to Be Done
The best course for the United States to follow in order to
minimize regional and global terrorist threats to both U.S. and
Indian interests would be to:
- Increase intelligence sharing through established U.S.
procedures for intelligence-liaison relationships. There are
opportunities for the U.S. and India to increase their cooperation
for mutual benefit against terrorist threats. Since 90 percent of
counterterrorism concerns intelligence, Washington and New
Delhi should focus on breaking down barriers to sharing
Specifically, the U.S. should follow formal guidelines with regard
to intelligence cooperation with Indian authorities much as it
does with intelligence-liaison relationships with other key allies.
Given the recent dust-ups in the U.S.- Indian intelligence
relationship, Washington will need to be particularly careful to
follow established intelligence-sharing procedures.
Washington should also take care to avoid public
misunderstandings like the one that occurred in 2004 when U.S.
Ambassador to India David Mulford offered FBI assistance directly
to the state of Assam's chief minister following a series of bomb
blasts there instead of working through the central government. The
Indians felt that the U.S. acted inappropriately by going directly
to the state government on an intelligence matter.
- Increase official diplomatic and non-governmental
exchanges on improving counterterrorism cooperation. The
level and frequency of the U.S.-Indian Counterterrorism Joint
Working Group (CTJWG) meetings should be raised. These meetings
should include talks on ways to organize and streamline operations
of various intelligence-gathering and investigative
institutions as well as a free exchange of ideas on how to
address the ideological foundations of terrorism.
India's experience in addressing new terrorism threats that
involve both homegrown and international elements should be a
focal point of these discussions. The CTJWG talks should also
incorporate private-sector entities and think tanks dealing with
counterterrorism to bring in new ideas on the latest
counterterrorism technology and research.
- Enhance U.S.-Indian cooperation in promoting democracy and
religious pluralism as a way to disrupt recruitment and support for
Islamist-inspired terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan.
India, being a functioning multi-faith, multi-ethnic democracy,
provides a powerful example to Afghan leaders who are struggling to
develop democratic institutions in their own country. The U.S.
should encourage Indian technical assistance to democratic
development in Afghanistan, including in the upcoming 2009
- Expand cooperative efforts on maritime security.
One area in which to increase U.S.-Indian counterterrorism
cooperation lies in maritime coordination. Given the increasing
number of piracy incidents over the past few months, there is
growing concern about the possibility that terrorists,
potentially acting in concert with pirates, will seize supertankers
and blow them up near important ports or at maritime choke points.
India and the U.S. have already expanded maritime cooperation
in Southeast Asia. India and Japan also have initiated
measures in this regard, leaving open opportunities for closer
U.S.- India-Japan trilateral cooperation to address maritime
- Review coordination of cyber security, energy security, and
nuclear nonproliferation efforts to increase both countries'
security against new terrorist threats. With the passage of the
U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, U.S. and Indian officials need to
re-examine opportunities for enhancing joint nuclear terrorism
risk-reduction measures, including further improvement of export
controls andsecurity at civilian nuclear facilities in India. A gun
attack on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore on December
28, 2005, led to an investigation that revealed the Kaigan nuclear
power plant in India to be a critical infrastructure terrorist
There has been some cooperation between India and the U.S. in
enforcing provisions of the Container Security Initiative, but
India has been reluctant to cooperate through the multilateral
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). India has, however,
demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with individual U.S.
efforts to stem nuclear proliferation. It agreed, for example, to a
recent request from the U.S. to deny overflight of Indian territory
to a North Korean aircraft suspected of carrying sophisticated
weapons technology to Iran.
- Avoid high-profile attempts to mediate the Indo-Pakistani
dispute over Kashmir. A recent assertion by President-elect
Barack Obama that the U.S. should try to help resolve the Kashmir
imbroglio so that Pakistan can focus on reining in militancy on its
Afghan border is misguided. Raising the specter of an international
role in the dispute could fuel unrealistic expectations in Pakistan
for a final settlement in its favor and therefore encourage
Islamabad to increase support for al-Qaeda-connected Kashmiri
militants to push an agenda that it believed was now within reach.
Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf initiated the Kargil
incursion into Indian-administered Kashmir in 1999 to raise the
profile of the Kashmir issue and encourage international
- Take a wide view of challenges in the region and focus on
broad-based regional diplomatic efforts. This could include
establishment of a high-profile regional envoy who can play a
productive role in simultaneously easing both Afghan-Pakistani
and Indo-Pakistani tensions by prodding the countries to move
forward with confidence-building measures like the recent opening
of a road between Indian-administered and Pakistani-administered
Kashmir. The Indians would be unreceptive to direct U.S.
mediation on Kashmir, and any such move in this direction
would raise suspicions in New Delhi that Washington is reverting to
policies that view India only through the South Asia lens rather
than as the emerging global power it has become. New Delhi would,
however, likely accept the notion of a senior regional envoy that
took a wider view of the region's challenges and sought to promote
cooperation among Indians, Pakistanis, and Afghans to defuse
tensions and stabilize the region.
Washington and New Delhi will benefit from pooling their
counterterrorism expertise and stepping up joint activities to
address regional and global terrorist threats. As U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in New Delhi on December
3, 2008, "India and the United States have been cooperating...but
we're going to do it in a more intensive and urgent manner."
But to take full advantage of the opportunities to enhance
Indo-U.S. counterterrorism coordination, both sides will have to
work on enhancing trust and confidence in their respective
counterterrorism strategies. The U.S. and India will have to
increase their mutual understanding of the core national security
interests that drive their counterterrorism objectives and
demonstrate that pre-9/11 regional narratives on the issue are no
Lisa Curtis is
Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies
Center at The Heritage Foundation.
Naxalites are revolutionary communists named
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