On November 23, Venezuela's previously fragmented opposition
scored key victories in state and municipal elections. President
Hugo Chávez's march to create a socialized economy and
install a one-party state à la Cuba continues to encounter
resistance from wary voters. This electoral setback is the result
of several everyday problems that have blemished Chávez's
social track record and placed him on the defensive, including:
high inflation, food scarcities, skyrocketing crime, and poor
service delivery. Consequently, the electorate's reluctance to
further embrace Chávez's socialist, one-party vision is
drawing the opposition together.
By winning in key populous states like Zulia and Miranda and
gaining the mayor's office in the capital district of Caracas, the
opposition showed it is able to build electoral strength and that
its message is penetrating deeper into urban areas--Chávez's
traditional stronghold. The opposition also claimed victories in
the states of Carabobo and Táchira. Overall, Venezuela's
democratic opposition will take heart that its efforts to resist
the unchallenged imposition of Chávez's socialist dream
finds resonance with voters and that political pluralism survives
in Venezuela.
At stake during the November 23 elections were a total of 22
governorships, 328 mayoral positions, and hundreds of local
legislative council seats. The elections pitted Chávez's new
United Venezuelan Socialist Party (PSUV) against a handful of
leftist dissidents and remnants of the more centrist and
conservative opposition of Venezuela's late-1990s two-party
system.
Even pro-Chávez analysts credit opposition candidates
with running effective campaigns. These campaigns were tightly
focused on local, everyday issues--issues on which Chávez
was vulnerable--such as the government's inability to deliver on
commitments and address such problems as garbage collection and its
failure to respond to increases in homicides, kidnappings, and
other violent crimes
Opposition Gains Despite Heavy-Handed
Intervention
The campaign, which began months ago, was marked by massive
efforts from Chávez and his supporters to tilt the
elections' outcome. Chávez's strategy focused on polarizing
and radicalizing the elections, making it appear as though he was
"the only candidate in the contest" and that the November 23 vote
was a referendum on "Socialism for the 21st Century." Often the
elections appeared to be more about Chávez and less about
candidates and issues, thereby reinforcing an argument made by
critics like the distinguished Mexican historian Enrique Krauze
that Venezuelan politics are increasingly dominated by a "cult of
personality."
Before the elections, the government barred hundreds of
candidates, including popular figures, for alleged corruption
charges. Chávez's officials worked to deliver visible social
assistance and to reduce the absenteeism that helped pave the way
for the defeat of the constitutional referendum last year.
Chávez warned that states voting against him would not
receive federal funding. He launched threatening direct attacks
against opposition figures such as Manuel Rosales, the outgoing
governor of Zulia and candidate for mayor of Maracaibo. In an
effort to discredit Rosales, government stations aired intercepted
telephone calls placed by Rosales. On November 11, Chávez
warned voters in Carabobo that if they voted for the opposition, he
would unleash an armored brigade to defend the revolution.
Opposition and Chávez Claim
Victories on November 23
The voter turnout set a record for state and municipal
elections, with approximately 11 million voters going to the polls
on Sunday. While there were no major allegations of fraud, many in
the opposition questioned the decision to extend voting hours past
the announced 4 p.m. closure, a move that gave the PSUV more time
to get out stay-at-home supporters.
Overall, Chávez's followers claimed victories in 17 of
the 22 states. Among those eking out a win for the PSUV was
Chávez's older brother Adán, who won a slender
triumph (49.63 percent) in the state of Barinas and will replace
clan patriarch Hugo de los Reyes Chávez. Although
Adán won, it is important to note that opposition candidate
Julio Cesar Reyes campaigned against the nepotistic rule of the
Chávez family and nearly succeeded.
The opposition scored important victories, retaining Zulia and
Nueva Esparta. It also gained Miranda, a populous state, and claims
victories in two other states. In the greater Caracas area,
opposition figure Antonio Ledezma won a surprise victory over the
PSUV candidate Aristóbulo Isturiz, promising to end the
anarchy that has characterized local governance in Venezuela's
capital. In Zulia's capital, Maracaibo, despite Chávez's
allegations and threats, Manuel Rosales won with 60 percent of the
vote.
An Opportunity for the Opposition
It is premature to interpret opposition gains in Venezuela's
elections as sufficiently large to derail Chávez's ambition
to change the constitution and run for a third presidential term in
2012. The PSUV is Venezuela's primary political force and
Chávez vows to "deepen the socialist project." Chávez
can still command approximately 60 percent of the national vote and
enjoys a similarly high approval rating. Moreover, Chávez
exercises predominant control over the National Assembly, the
Supreme Court, the national bureaucracy, and every nationalized
company. He will likely utilize these controls to make life more
difficult for opposition governors and mayors.
Yet 2009 is stacking up as a tough year for Chávez. He
must cope with plunging oil prices, lowered expectations for
economic growth, and hard economic choices as the global economic
recession begins to hit the oil-dependent domestic economy.
Venezuelan crude is cheaper than oil found elsewhere in the world.
Last week it commanded a price of only $41/barrel because it is
more expensive to refine. Add to that the increased costs to
produce oil in Venezuela by the state-owned PDVSA due to corruption
and mismanagement. Consequently, there will be less money with
which Chávez can buy influence and friends in the
future.
As Chavez encounters more difficulties in the coming months and
years, the opposition must continue to develop constructive
alternatives, reenergize efforts to win back support lost to
Chávez's charisma and populist handouts, and further develop
programs for electoral unity and cooperation. As popular opposition
figure Leopolo Lopez commented, "It is now time to begin the
movement from opposition to becoming an alternative" to the
Chávez model of governance. The next major challenge will be
the 2010 legislative elections. Therefore, the following actions
should be taken:
- The Obama Administration must continue to provide vigorous
support for pro-democracy efforts throughout Latin America,
including in Venezuela, as these movements seek constructive and
principled opposition to one-party democracies.
- The Obama Administration needs to reaffirm the central concept
that Latin America's social agenda, democratic governance, human
rights, and free markets are fully compatible with one
another.
- Finally, before sending a new ambassador to Caracas, the Obama
Administration should develop a comprehensive strategy for
responding to the multiple challenges Venezuela poses to regional
security, to the fight against the drug trade, and to the
prevention of international terrorism, as well as to
Chávez's efforts to construct an anti-U.S. coalition with
Iran, Russia, and other antagonistic regimes.
Ray Walser, Ph.D., is
Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.