The U.S.-India civil nuclear deal cleared its toughest
international hurdle this past weekend when the 45-nation Nuclear
Supplier's Group (NSG) developed a consensus on approving civilian
nuclear transfers to India for the first time in over three
decades. The NSG decision marks a significant victory for those who
welcome India's rising global economic and political influence and
the contribution New Delhi will make toward improving stability and
security in Asia in coming years.
Following three years of painstaking U.S.-Indian negotiations
and political opposition in India that almost toppled Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh's Congress-led government, the deal faces
its last hurdle: U.S. congressional approval of a resolution to
operationalize the agreement. Though time is tight-with only three
weeks left until the 110th Congress recesses for
elections-lawmakers should do everything possible to finalize the
deal before the end of the year, since it will solidify ties with a
key Asian nation that shares our democratic values and geopolitical
concerns.
Hard-Won Approval
The NSG vote in favor of India was hard-won as the grouping
makes its decisions on a consensus basis, which allowed some of the
less powerful non-supplier nations (such as Austria, New Zealand,
and Ireland) to raise roadblocks to the deal, even though major NSG
countries such as the U.S., Russia, France, and the U.K. favored
its passage.
The Chinese-buoyed by the unexpected opposition from the smaller
NSG nations-threatened the agreement with last-minute concerns
first signaled last Monday through an article in the Chinese
Communist Party's English language daily. Chinese Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi is in India this week, where he is facing tough
questions from his Indian interlocutors on its role in Vienna and
the unexpected public rebuke of the nuclear deal, despite several
earlier assurances from Chinese leaders that Beijing would not
block consensus. Indian strategic affairs analyst Uday Bhaskar
attributed the maneuvering to longstanding competition between the
two Asian rivals. Bhaskar said, "Clearly, until now China has been
the major power in Asia. … With India entering the NSG, a
new strategic equation has been introduced into Asia and this
clearly has caused disquiet to China."
Overcoming a Tight Congressional Schedule
As part of the process to make the deal operational through a
final congressional vote, the Bush Administration must now submit a
Presidential Determination to the U.S. Congress that includes
details on the following:
- The bilateral 123 agreement reached last year;
- The India-specific safeguards agreement reached with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in August; and
- This past weekend's waiver from the NSG.
Current law requires Congress to consider the nuclear deal
package for 30 continuous legislative days before voting on it. If
no lame duck session is held after the November 4 U.S. elections,
Congress would need to waive the 30-day requirement in order to be
able to vote on the deal before the last day of the congressional
session, now set for September 26. Congressional leaders in both
the House and the Senate would have to push hard for this, since
lawmakers will be busy seeking to wrap up various legislative
matters (mostly domestic) before the end of the two-year
session.
Some Members of Congress, particularly House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-CA), will likely want to hold
additional hearings and/or consultations on the civil nuclear deal
before allowing it to move to a vote. Last year, Berman and ranking
member of the committee Illean Ros-Lehtinen introduced a resolution
calling for the U.S. President to withhold support for any proposed
exemption for India from the NSG guidelines that was not fully
consistent with the Hyde Act and did not incorporate a number of
provisions, including the immediate termination of all nuclear
commerce by the NSG member-states if India detonates a nuclear
device.
Several hearings were held in both the House and Senate in
2005-2006 relating to this question, as well as other aspects of
the deal, and Congress issued hundreds of detailed "questions for
the record" to the Bush Administration to help form the basis of
the Hyde Act, which was passed almost two years ago. Moreover,
senior Administration officials have assured congressional leaders
on several occasions that any civil nuclear trade with India would
be fully consistent with the terms of the Hyde Act.
Undue delay in moving the civil nuclear deal to a final vote in
Congress would likely raise suspicions in India about overall U.S.
intentions toward the deal. The release of a confidential letter of
assurances from the Bush Administration to Berman on the eve of the
NSG deliberations last week provoked a firestorm of Indian
allegations that Washington was seeking to constrain India's
strategic options. The political opposition used the opportunity to
criticize the government for kowtowing to U.S. interests.
Additionally, if the deal lapses into the next U.S. Administration,
it could take several months before it is considered in the new
Congress, which is about the time India heads into its own national
elections, casting more uncertainty over the final fate of the
deal.
Strengthening Global Nonproliferation
The letter that was released to the public last week by Berman
should give confidence to U.S. lawmakers that India understands the
importance of the nuclear testing issue and that any potential
future nuclear detonations would certainly have negative
repercussions on the civil nuclear deal. New Delhi cannot, however,
legally bind itself on this sensitive matter, since it does not
have control over the actions of other nuclear-armed states in its
strategic environment, namely Pakistan and China.
The U.S. has the tools it requires to both remain faithful to
its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations and to bring India
into the nonproliferation mainstream. If this historic nuclear deal
is finalized, it will contribute to strengthening global
nonproliferation by making New Delhi a stakeholder in a system
seeking to adapt itself to the most serious proliferation threats
of the 21st century. There is no good reason to delay this landmark
initiative any longer.
Lisa Curtis is
Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center
at The Heritage Foundation.