On July 30, Turkey's Constitutional Court averted a potentially
explosive political crisis when its judges rejected an attempt by
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, the chief prosecutor for the
Court, to ban the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The
ban would have prohibited 71 senior members of the AKP from
participating in politics for five years and would have effectively
brought down the government. AKP's leader, Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, and Turkey's President, Abdullah Gül, were
among the AKP members facing expulsion from political life. The
ban, if enacted, would have also negated the will of 47 percent of
Turkish voters who supported the party and dashed the country's
hopes of entering the European Union (EU).
Presently, Washington is facing several difficult choices with
respect to its friend Turkey. On the one hand, the U.S. supports
democracy worldwide, particularly in the Middle East. A ban on AKP
would be a setback to U.S. policies designed to foster Middle
Eastern democracy. Yet prolonged rule by AKP may transform a U.S.
ally into a hostile Islamic republic.
In addition to applauding the Constitutional Court's balanced
decision which upholds the rule of law, the U.S. should:
- Continue to encourage Turkey's Western orientation, economic
reform, civil rights, and aspirations to join Europe;
- Emphasize its desire to maintain robust bilateral relations
with Turkey, particularly emphasizing cooperation on security
matters;
- Continue the dialogue with Turkey on fighting terrorism, on
Iraq, on the Iranian challenge, on Afghanistan, and with regards to
a resurgent Russia; and
- Expand energy and trade cooperation with Ankara.
A Slap on the Wrist
Of the Constitutional Court's eleven judges, six voted to ban
the AKP and its leadership, but seven votes were required to pass
the ban. The prosecution accused the AKP of effectively introducing
religion into politics and public life, with the intention of
leading secular Turkey down a path toward Shari'a law. The
government-proposed constitutional amendment on allowing the
religiously mandated headdresses (hijabs) in universities,
as well the AKP-controlled Parliament's Islamist political agenda,
were perceived by many as a threat to the secular foundations of
the Turkish Republic, established by Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk.
AKP opponents indicated that the party has also attempted to
allow Islamic seminary graduates to enter universities, something
that is presently forbidden. Such a development would allow the
party to create a professionally educated cadre of bureaucrats. AKP
has already taken over the police and is expanding its influence
into the military and secret services, which were, until now, the
pillars of Turkish secularism.
Rather than banning AKP, the Constitutional Court decided
instead to give the party a slap on the wrist, cutting half of the
party's state funding for this year-approximately $15 million-and
issuing a verbal warning. The Turkish Constitutional Court's
moderate ruling, which avoided a serious national crisis, was
clearly influenced by interethnic and social tensions exacerbated
by anticipation over the impending decision.
For example, bombings in Istanbul on the Sunday prior to the
ruling-blamed on the Kurdistan Workers Party-killed 17 people and
may have prompted a milder decision. Indeed, Haşim
Kılıç, Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court,
may have implicitly recognized this fact when he said, "We can see
that there is tension in society. … We must do all we can
for … people to be able to live together whatever ideas or
beliefs they hold."
The AKP's Hidden Agenda?
The political crisis that has been resolved-at least for now-by
the Constitutional Court's measured decision is just the tip of the
iceberg. It would be an easy task for the Court if the prosecution
had presented clear evidence of an AKP conspiracy to seize power,
ties with foreign governments, or assassination plots. The case
against AKP, however, is more complicated.
On the one hand, Turkey's secular elites are concerned by AKP's
agenda of creeping Islamization. They allege that AKP is promoting
an agenda that is close to the secretive Muslim Brotherhood Sunni
fundamentalism as opposed to the traditional Ottoman tolerant Sufi
approach.
Alternatively, the AKP and supporters of democracy are worried
about what steps Turkey's elite, including the top-level
bureaucracy and the military-the guardians of Atatürk's
secular revolution-may take to prevent the realization of an
Islamist agenda. One does not have to look further than 1997-when
the Turkish military took decisive action to guard secularism-to
understand the potential consequences of AKP's continued commitment
to Islamization.
It is worth noting that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
a majority of the leaders of the AKP once belonged to the Islamist
Refah (Welfare) Party, which the military removed together with its
leader, Prime Minister Necmettin
Erbakan. Thus, an important question remains: Does the
hijab constitutional amendment, along with various other
measures undertaken by AKP constitute a "secret agenda" designed to
incrementally move secular Turkey toward the twilight zone of
Shari'a law?
Despite such concerns, Erdogan's party is enjoying broad popular
support, while secular parties remain moribund. AKP came to power
in 2002 and won the 2007 parliamentary elections with 47 percent of
the vote, receiving 341 seats in the 550-member legislature. AKP's
electoral success has been the result of Erdogan's great political
skill and subsequent popularity with the low middle classes and
migrants from the Anatolian (hinternland) who moved to the big
cities. Pro-EU and liberal market policies have also helped AKP
capture support among Turkish entrepreneurs.
Turkish Janus: Facing East or West?
In response to Turkey's cultural and political tensions, the
Prime Minister has proposed a "third path," purportedly aiming to
emphasize Islamic and Turkish traditional values while pursuing a
foreign policy more closely aligned with the Islamic world, Russia
and China, in opposition of the secular elites' traditional
orientation toward U.S. and Europe. Although such a potential
change in geopolitical focus has been heavily criticized by both
Turkish foreign policy analysts and security secular elites,
Erdogan's mixed agenda has won the AKP the support of practicing
Muslims as well as less observant voters. The EU is not shedding
tears over Turkey's cooling toward the U.S. Yet the extent of
domestic opposition to a realignment of Turkish foreign policy
remains unclear, as many among the secular elites perceive Europe
and the United States as declining world powers.
The successes and abuses of the AKP offers convincing evidence
that under Erdogan, the foundations of Turkish democracy are
becoming shaky. While winning 47 percent of the vote in the
parliamentary election, AKP disenfranchised millions of voters
whose party ballot did not count due to a high-7 percent-electoral
threshold.
There are also serious concerns over what steps the government
is taking to maintain its grip on power. For example, Freedom House
published a press release exposing the AKP's intimidation of
journalists and editors.[1]Additionally, according to some prominent
critics, AKP brass has been engaging in surveillance of prominent
party critics and, in order to ensure favorable coverage, is
orchestrating the change in ownership of several major media
outlets, thus undermining the freedom of the press and the rule of
law within Turkey.[2]
Erdogan has also sued more journalists than any other Turkish
president and has even arrested a senior editor. Outspoken liberal
critics have been pushed to resign. As a result, prominent
supporters of democracy are concerned that the right of dissent and
the principle of government accountability are being eroded and
that Turkey is starting to resemble a police state; critics have
even begun calling Erdogan "the Turkish Putin."[3]
Religious coercion remains even more persuasive than political
repression. For instance, a legislator who is also a member of the
AKP Politburo reportedly said that if Turkish businessmen wanted
government contracts, their wives should wear the hijab
(also known as a turban). Indeed, nearly 60 percent of
Turkish women wear headscarves, which reveal at least some hair.
What is banned is the hijab or Islamic turban, which
completely covers all the hair on a woman. (According to Islamic
doctrine, exposed hair leads to temptation and sin.) Erdogan is
believed to support wearing a hijab-which his wife, as well
as the wife of President Gül, does in public-a behavior that
alienates the secularists.
Clearly, these customs embraced by the AKP, bordering on the
religious coercion tactics, may lead to the inequitable and
preferential granting of government contracts and would amount to
imposition of Islam by the state. More ominously, secular
opposition says that government pressures for women to wear the
hijab could lead to the spread of Iranian-style headscarf
culture-where women are "encouraged" to wear it to win scholarships
or obtain preferential access to jobs and public housing-throughout
Turkey. Such a development would represent a transition to the
hardline practices of other Islamic regimes such as Iran and Saudi
Arabia.
An Opportunity for Moderation
Turkey's recent crisis has thrown into stark relief some of the
nation's underlying economic, political, and cultural tensions.
Since the March 2008 indictment against the AKP, political crisis
has led to economic uncertainties. The Turkish stock market has
been down 20 percent this year and foreign direct investment has
been only $6 billion, a dramatic decrease from $20 billion in 2007.
Additional instability was fueled by an investigation into the
Ergenekon gang, a secular, shadowy organization led by some former
generals, that has plotted a number of political murders and
attacks as part of its ultimate aim to overthrow the government.[4]
However, the Court's ruling provides the AKP with a second
chance to moderate its ambitious agenda and focus instead on the
country's economic modernization and foreign policy. Such a focus
will be instrumental in improving the image of Turkey and
rebuilding the confidence of allies and investors alike. Such
moderation is also necessary to help put Turkey back on the path
towards EU membership, particularly in light of the current
widespread opposition to such membership in Europe.
What Should the West Do?
Bordering volatile Middle Eastern states such as Iraq and Iran,
Turkey is a crucial U.S. ally and an important geopolitical player.
Located in both Europe and Asia, straddling Mesopotamia, the
Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, Turkey is a party
to the long-standing conflict in Cyprus and has mediated a
difficult, indirect dialogue between Israel and Syria. The United
States has always needed-and will continue to need-good relations
with Ankara in general and with the Turkish military in
particular.
In view of the current easing of political tensions, the U.S.
and Europe should signal that they are interested in further
improving relations with Ankara. Turkey's maturity and independence
as a nation requires as much. However, in the future, Washington
should not remain silent about any potential abuses of power,
especially intimidation of media outlets and opposition parties or
religious coercion. To advance our national interests, the U.S.
should:
- Applaud the Constitutional Court's measured and balanced
decision, which expressed the rule of law and maintained political
stability in the country-at least for now. U.S. support is
important for the Turkish judiciary and signals that Washington is
following the situation with great attention and would oppose
Islamization. Such a statement of support should be issued at the
highest level of the U.S. government or communicated at a White
House or State Department press conference;
- Continue to encourage Turkey's Western orientation, economic
reform, civil rights, and integration with Europe. Continued
progress on acquis communautaire(European common
law)improves the rule of law in Turkey and makes the nation's
economy more compatible and predictable in international trade and
investment; and
- Emphasize U.S.desire to maintain robust bilateral relations
with Turkey, with particular stress on the need for cooperation on
security and defense. Strong bilateral security relations are
particularly important in view of the necessity for cooperation in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the escalating challenge of Iran, and a
resurgent Russia. The U.S. should also expand energy and trade
cooperation. Subsequently, more involvement by Department of
Commerce and Energy will be necessary.
Opposing Creeping Islamization
The Turkish legal system should remain robust to protect the
rule of law in the fight against both Islamization and nefarious
conspiracies targeting the democratic republic. Constitutional
Court remains the last bulwark against anti-constitutional
activities by Islamist parties. The battle between the AKP and
secular forces is both political and religious. It is the battle
for the soul of the country, for its very future. Ultimately, in
order to win over the hearts and minds of the Turkish people,
secular forces need to be better politically organized when
bringing their case to the court of public opinion and to the
ballot box.
Without electoral victories by secularists at the ballot, the
status quo-in which secularists are losing power-may continue.
Prolonged rule by AKP may translate into a creeping long-term
re-Islamization of Turkish society and its political system. The
outcome of such a transformation may be an Islamic republic hostile
to the U.S. and its allies and a Turkish society that would lose
its current vitality, including political and economic gains. The
U.S. is Turkey's friend, and friends do not allow friends to commit
political suicide. Turkey is-and should remain-a key democratic
NATO ally for the United States.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is
Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and
International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The
Heritage Foundation. The author wants to thank Heritage consultant
Dr. Lajos Szaszd and Research Assistant Owen B. Graham for
contributing to this paper.