Pyongyang's June 26 delivery of a data declaration regarding its
nuclear weapons programs and the anticipated destruction of the
cooling tower at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor represent commendable
progress toward North Korean denuclearization. Similarly, North
Korea's earlier delivery of approximately 19,000 pages of
Yongbyon's operating records provided a trove of information for
the U.S. Intelligence Community to refine its assessments of
Pyongyang's nuclear weapons inventory. The destruction of the
cooling tower marks a notable step in the disablement of North
Korea's plutonium production capability. All of these steps
represent greater progress than was ever achieved under the 1994
Agreed Framework.
These steps do not, however, constitute complete compliance by
North Korea of its data declaration commitments. North Korea's
refusal to provide full transparency on its nuclear programs raises
serious questions over its commitment to fulfill even more
difficult future requirements. These questions are made all the
more worrisome by the demonstrated willingness of the U.S. to lower
the bar for North Korean compliance and walk away from its
strongest pledges.
On June 26, the Bush Administration vowed to secure a rigorous
verification regime capable of preventing North Korea from
violating yet another international agreement on denuclearization.
The Administration should carefully abide by this pledge and follow
up on progress in the six-party talks with a demand for full North
Korean compliance with all existing commitments. It should also
insist that subsequent joint statements more clearly delineate
North Korean requirements in order to prevent noncompliance through
creative interpretation.
Data Declaration Shortcomings
Though full details of the data declaration are not public,
indications are that North Korea refused to divulge information on
its covert efforts to develop a uranium-based nuclear weapons
program and its nuclear proliferation activities with other
nations. The February 2007 Joint Statement requires Pyongyang to
provide "a complete declaration of all nuclear programs."
At the time, U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill deflected criticism
that the joint statement did not include a specific reference to
the uranium program by asserting that the plural form of "programs"
clearly included both plutonium and uranium programs.
During April 2008 bilateral meetings with North Korea in
Singapore, the Bush Administration tentatively agreed to an unusual
strategy in which the United States rather than Pyongyang would
provide requisite data on North Korea's uranium program and
proliferation activities. Rather than admitting to having violated
previous international agreements, Pyongyang would then merely
"acknowledge" Washington's concerns by not challenging the U.S.
information. Such a strategy is inconsistent with the approach to
other arms control treaties signed by the U.S. Washington also
acquiesced to North Korean demands to postpone disclosing the
number of its nuclear weapons until a later phase of
negotiations.
In October 2007, President Bush stated that North Korea was
required to provide "a full declaration of any proliferation
activities."[1] Secretary of State Rice stated during a
June 18 speech at The Heritage Foundation that "North Korea has
proliferated nuclear technology to Syria."[2] In November 2006, President
Bush vowed that "the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by
North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a
grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea
fully accountable for the consequences of such action."[3]
Removal from Terrorist List Risks Alienating
Japan
Premature removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism risks alienating key ally Japan. The Bush
Administration has justified such a removal by citing Pyongyang's
having fulfilled the narrow statutory requirements of not
committing a terrorist act for six months. Previously, the U.S. had
conditioned the removal on Pyongyang returning to Japan the
remaining members of the Red Army Faction terrorist group who
continue to reside in North Korea.
President Bush had also provided a political commitment to then
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that the U.S. would also
require progress on resolving North Korea's abduction of Japanese
citizens. Dennis Wilder, senior director for Asian Affairs at the
National Security Council, told reporters in April 2007 that "we
aren't going to delink the abductee issue from the state sponsor of
terrorism issue."[4] It is noteworthy that Libya was required to
acknowledge and make restitution for its involvement in the
Lockerbie terrorist act.
Tokyo has long been concerned that the U.S. would forego
demanding progress on the abductee issue in return for progress in
the six-party talks. Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura
conveyed Tokyo's concern that prematurely removing North Korea from
the terrorism list would reduce allied negotiating leverage. North
Korea recently stated that it would reopen the investigations into
the abductions. But Komura stated on June 22 that "we haven't seen
enough progress on the abduction issue."[5]
The Administration must maintain the integrity of the criteria
for determining state sponsors of terrorism. Failure to do so would
undermine the credibility of the process in the eyes of would-be
terrorists worldwide. As Secretary Rice herself has said, "The
non-negotiable demands of human dignity are not bargaining
chips."
Verification Remains Critical
Secretary Rice declared on June 18 that the U.S. would demand
extensive verification of the data declaration, including access to
nuclear facilities and documents. The State Department's June 26
fact sheet proposes a comprehensive verification regime that would
include short-notice access to declared and suspected sites,
sampling of materials, and interviews with North Korean
personnel.
An extensive verification protocol is necessary to ensure that
North Korea fulfills its denuclearization pledge. Pyongyang will
resist intrusive inspections throughout North Korea but the Bush
Administration must insist on nothing less than verification
requirements consistent with previous U.S. arms control treaties.
Though the Administration's pledge for strong verification is
encouraging, past behavior indicates it will be difficult to
maintain U.S. resolve and gain North Korean acceptance on the
issue.
Prospects for Future Progress
North Korean officials have repeatedly indicated their intention
to achieve international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear
state. Such statements are at odds with U.S. public reassurances of
Pyongyang's willingness to fully abide by its denuclearization
pledge. Washington should test Pyongyang's veracity by insisting on
a joint statement that clearly defines North Korean requirements
for complete transparency, including full disclosure of its uranium
weapons program and proliferation activities, a vigorous
verification system, and a timeline for destruction of its nuclear
weapons.
All indications are that the Bush Administration will, at most,
achieve completion of phase two of the six-party talks-disablement
rather than dismantlement of North Korean nuclear facilities at
Yongbyon. However, serious questions remain as to whether North
Korea will fully dismantle its nuclear weapons and programs.
Bruce
Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the
Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.