Revised and updated July 7, 2009
The phrase "secret settlement" has a shady ring to it, even
though it denotes nothing more than a contract between two or more
parties that is not released to the public--just like nearly all
contracts. But the trial bar understands the value of
branding--witness its leading advocacy group's transformation from
the "American Trial Lawyers Association" to the "American
Association for Justice"--and so has dubbed its proposal to make
public nearly all settlement agreements and evidence in
personal-injury cases the Sunshine in Litigation Act (S. 537, H.R.
1508).
Rather than "restore public accountability in the judicial
system by restricting court secrecy on matters that affect public
health and safety," as proponents claim, the legislation would
force the disclosure of private and confidential information, cause
complex litigation to grind to a halt, and actually make it more
difficult for some personal-injury plaintiffs to obtain favorable
settlements. The real beneficiary of the bill is neither the public
nor tort victims, but the trial bar, which would have an easier
time harassing companies with strike suits, fishing for evidence to
use in unrelated cases, and filing "follow-on" lawsuits en masse.
Sunshine is a proper disinfectant for public institutions, but it
is not appropriate for all private matters.
The Sunshine in Litigation Act (SLA) is designed to overturn the
presumption that parties to civil litigation should be free to
decide among themselves whether and how information obtained during
a civil lawsuit may be disclosed--as they would continue to be free
to do in contracts struck up to the moment a lawsuit is filed. The
legislation, devised and long championed by the trial lawyer bar,[1]
contains three components. First, it would prevent federal courts
from entering non-disclosure protective orders during discovery
without reviewing reams of evidence and making specific findings of
fact about the privacy interest in preventing public disclosure and
the information's relevancy to public health or safety. It would
also ban parties to a case from reaching such non-disclosure
agreements among themselves, without the court's involvement,
forcing the disclosure of personal and private information against
the wishes of the involved parties. Second, it would deny courts
the ability to enforce orders among parties that prevent the
disclosure of information obtained during a case to a federal or
state agency. And third, it would deny courts the ability to
enforce confidentiality agreements in settlements without, again,
poring over evidence and making specific findings about those
disclosures. Each of these provisions stands to dramatically change
the face of civil litigation by further increasing the cost and
delay of going to court and stretching judicial resources.
Protective Orders
In the federal court system, protective orders are governed by
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule allows
parties to seek, and judges to grant, orders that forbid the
disclosure of evidence obtained in discovery when disclosure would
cause a party "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense." Protective orders restricting such disclosure
are rarely contested, because parties usually agree on the contours
of the discovery process and are able to negotiate the terms of
their agreements themselves. When a party objects to a proposed
restriction, however, the court must consider and weigh the
asserted need for the order and its requested scope. The court may
then decide whether to grant the order at all and, if so, how
broadly it should apply--to all evidence or just some.
Civil suits are, generally, disputes between private parties
that, outside of court, would present no basis to root around in
one another's private files and disclose the findings to the world.
For most litigants, bringing a private dispute into court does not
alter this presumption of privacy and non-disclosure. As one
treatise of federal procedural law explains, "Discovery is
essentially a private affair."[2]
Protective orders and agreements to keep evidence confidential
are essential tools of litigation due to the nature of the
discovery process. The scope of discovery is "extremely broad,"
allowing information to be obtained "regarding nearly any
matter...that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action, whether or not the information sought will be admissible at
trial, just so long as it is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."[3] This is an extremely
inclusive standard, because "relevance is interpreted very
broadly."[4] In a product liability lawsuit, for
example, a plaintiff may be able to request and obtain detailed
information about a corporate manufacturer's internal meetings and
deliberations, design processes, personnel practices, finances,
etc. Parties may challenge specific discovery inquiries, but doing
so is expensive and time-consuming, as is carefully vetting every
single document, out of tens of thousands or more handed over, for
its relevance. Protective orders and analogous agreements thus
serve to "facilitate the discovery process (thereby reducing the
expense of litigation)."[5] Their necessity and uncontroversial nature
is underscored by the observation of one judge who stated that he
was "unaware of any case in the past half-dozen years of even a
modicum of complexity where an umbrella protective order...has not
been agreed to by the parties and approved by the court."[6]
It should be noted that protective orders--especially broad
ones--are not absolute. A party may still challenge the
confidentiality of certain documents, and then the opposing party
bears the burden of proving that the documents qualify for
continued protection.[7] In this process, judges routinely balance
the parties' interests with those of the public.[8] Protective orders
and agreements, then, just establish default rules that may be
overridden when appropriate.
The Supreme Court has recognized the great importance of
protective orders in civil litigation. In a unanimous opinion, the
Court explained that because the rules governing pre-trial
discovery "do not differentiate between information that is private
or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach...the
Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both
litigants and third parties" and have "a significant potential for
abuse"[9] Privacy, it concluded, had long been the
norm; fruits of pre-trial discovery, it explained, "are not public
components of a civil trial" and "were not open to the public at
common law."[10] Thus it held that protective orders
prohibiting public disclosure of information obtained in discovery
stood up to even First Amendment challenge.[11] And going a step
further, the Court implied that denial of such protective orders
may even violate constitutional rights in cases where "privacy
interests" are implicated.[12]
Without enforceable protective orders and agreements, the
discovery process--already expensive, slow, and burdensome--would
grind to a halt as more time-consuming and onerous efforts would be
taken to prevent sensitive information from being released in
discovery, and if so, from being subject to disclosure. Weakening
this aspect of civil litigation is incompatible with the primary
goal of securing the "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."[13]
"Secret" Settlements
Settlement is the conclusion of the overwhelming majority of
lawsuits filed.[14] If the purpose of the civil justice
system is to lead to a determination of every action, then
settlement is usually the least expensive, most amicable means
toward reaching that goal. The Federal Rules of Evidence, as well
as other rules of court, are carefully crafted to encourage
settlement of claims throughout the litigation process.[15] As
discovery progresses, the parties are likely to have a better
understanding of the factual basis of the case and the merits of
the other side's contentions, and so a better idea of what the case
is "worth." If the parties can reach an agreement on that point,
then avoiding trial by means of settlement greatly reduces expense,
delay, uncertainty, and frustration.
In most civil actions, settlements require no approval by the
court. The plaintiff simply dismisses the action after reaching a
deal, memorialized in a contract, with the defendant. This applies
to sealed settlements, as well. Until a party seeks to enforce a
settlement agreement, usually following an alleged breach of it,
there is no requirement that it be filed with a court. This is the
norm for nearly all contracts struck between private parties.
Settlements agreements, in general, are brief and fairly uniform
in their contents. A typical agreement usually contains four
elements: "(1) a denial of liability, (2) a release of liability,
(3) the amount of settlement, and (4) a requirement of
confidentiality."[16] This last element serves much the same
purpose as a protective order during discovery that restricts a
party from disclosing certain information.
Sealed agreements--so-called secret settlements-- are actually
rare in civil litigation. The Federal Judicial Center, a government
agency that performs research for the federal courts, has conducted
the only in-depth statistical analysis on the prevalence and use of
sealed settlement agreements in federal civil litigation. Analyzing
thousands of cases and tens of thousand of docket sheets, FJC
researchers found that one in 227 civil filings (0.44 percent)
result in sealed settlement agreements.[17] If anything, this estimate
is high because the study's sample included two unusual clusters of
cases resulting in sealed settlements: 144 product liability cases
arising from a 1998 airplane crash and 31 cases arising from a 1996
crash.[18] Among all the cases resulting in sealed
settlements, the initial complaint was sealed only 3 percent of the
time, meaning that, in all but a very few cases (about 3 percent of
0.44 percent of cases), any allegations of wrongdoing remain a part
of the public record.[19]
The study also examined the types of cases that result in sealed
settlements. Less than a third of sealed settlements were in
personal-injury cases. More significantly, less than one percent of
personal-injury cases filed resulted in sealed settlements. Labor
law, intellectual property, and civil rights cases accounted for
significant numbers of sealed agreements--though, again, only a
very small proportion of the cases filed in these areas actually
result in sealed agreements.[20]
Expense, Delay, and Confusion
The most immediate collateral damage of removing the presumption
of confidentiality in civil proceedings where the parties have
agreed to it would be on judicial economy. The text of the SLA
would prevent umbrella confidentiality agreements in almost all
cases, whether or not there is even a conceivable relation to
public health or safety, and require the parties to request narrow
orders for each matter they might wish to keep confidential. That
the parties may agree that confidentiality is appropriate and even
beneficial to both at the early discovery phase of litigation would
be of no moment. The direct result would be a plethora of motions
for protective orders, requiring filings and perhaps briefs for
each and judicial review and determination.
As District Judge Mark Kravitz, who chairs the Judicial
Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, has explained, this
would impose "intolerable burdens on the federal civil justice
system."[21] Specifically, the SLA would require
judges "to examine all documents and information that may be
produced in discovery to try to determine in advance whether any of
it is relevant to protecting public health or safety."[22]
This would not even be possible in many cases; federal cases
requiring intensive discovery regularly produce millions of pages
of discoverable information. Few judges would be in a position to
recognize a "smoking gun" amidst so much evidence, especially at
the outset of a case, before the court has begun to understand the
issues at play. Significant delays in the production of evidence
would be inevitable-- that is, plaintiffs would have to wait months
or years to examine evidence central to their cases. This process
would also affect other cases before the court. As Judge Kravitz
observed, "[T]o the extent to which I spend my time looking through
truckloads of documents or electronic discovery, then other
deserving litigants and critical issues are not going to get my
attention."[23]
Also inevitable would be a rise in the number of challenges
during discovery. Discovery is, as described above, very liberal,
and parties are willing to hew to the spirit of this liberality
when they know that their sensitive materials can be protected from
public disclosure. When that protection is uncertain or denied,
parties will oppose more requests for document production, for fear
that sensitive materials may be made public, and delay production
as they carefully vet every document for information that may be
lawfully withheld from the other party. Courts would be forced to
do what they now dread: routinely make decisions and impose orders
regarding minute details during the discovery process.
Further complicating matters, the legislation provides no
specific standards that courts could use to determine whether to
grant an order for nondisclosure. The potential bar on such orders
would apply to all "information which is relevant to the protection
of public health or safety," and the balancing test weighs "public
interest" against a party's "specific and substantial interest" in
confidentiality (in one provision) and "privacy interest" (in
another). (This inconsistency of terms is, at least, a drafting
error, and it may be an attempt to further narrow the grounds for
confidentiality agreements.) These terms and concepts are extremely
vague. The bill provides no guidance to a court that must decide
whether a particular piece of evidence--say, a report from a
manufacturer's internal investigation of a production system
incorporating its trade secrets that a single plaintiff asserts is
"relevant" to public health or safety-- actually meets that
ambiguous definition. Although the manufacturer in this case may
contest the plaintiff's theories of defect and injury causation,
the plaintiff's mere assertion in its complaint would be enough to
force the manufacturer to make its case to the court and force the
court to rule on what will, necessarily, be a bare factual
record.
Indeed, the legislation contains no mention of any specific
reasons, even those long recognized in the use of protective
orders, that litigants might wish to keep certain pieces of
evidence confidential. These include information revealed in
settlement negotiations, trade secrets, and Controlled Unclassified
Information (CUI) concerning national security. The legislation
also makes no mention of information that is subject to a
privilege--such as the attorney-client, law enforcement,
deliberative process, doctor-patient, and spousal privileges-- but
may be incidentally revealed in discovery (a happenstance often
preemptively addressed today by mutual agreement of the
parties).
In short, as the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the
American Bar Association have concluded, this legislation "would
make discovery more expensive, more burdensome, and more
time-consuming, and would threaten important privacy interests."[24]
Bad for Plaintiffs
Proponents of the SLA portray it as a measure to aid plaintiffs
pushed into signing confidentiality agreements by powerful
defendants, but the legislation would actually make plaintiffs
worse off. The greatest risk is that plaintiffs would be denied the
opportunity to strike a quick settlement of meritorious claims--an
important thing for plaintiffs who have been injured or are out of
work. The inability to protect confidentiality would make
settlements less attractive to defendants, giving them a greater
incentive to litigate claims rather than settle. Particularly when
defendants have greater resources than plaintiffs (such as when an
individual sues a corporation), this would put the plaintiff at a
disadvantage as litigation drags on and expenses mount.[25]
Similarly, forbidding confidentiality agreements would limit
plaintiffs' bargaining positions and reduce the value of
settlements to plaintiffs. Agreements between parties (whether
contracts, settlements, or even informal ongoing relationships) are
polycentric--that is, the terms of the agreement do not stand alone
but are interrelated. It is usually not possible to alter one term
of an agreement without others being affected. For example,
increasing the duration of a product warranty may raise the price
of the product and also prompt the manufacturer to supply a hardier
product. Similarly, altering one term of a settlement agreement
will affect others. Today, nearly all parties to litigation are
free to choose whether to accept or reject other parties' requests
for confidentiality and may weigh the costs of doing so against the
advantageous terms that may accompany confidentiality. But if a
party is forbidden from offering confidentiality as part of a
settlement agreement, it will receive less favorable terms
elsewhere in the agreement, such as a lower cash award. The
decision whether or not to make this tradeoff would be out of the
plaintiff's hands.
Further, some plaintiffs would be reluctant to sue at all for
fear that evidence obtained from them in discovery may be disclosed
to the public against their wishes. This is particularly a risk in
personal-injury actions, where the plaintiff "is often asked to
expose his or her private life to intense scrutiny"[26]
and this scrutiny may result in evidence that is relevant to public
health. Women, in particular, are likely to face this consequence
due to their reproductive role. For example, a woman claiming that
an intrauterine contraceptive device caused her infertility may
have to disclose her sexual history, which may be a causative
factor in infertility, in the same way that smoking greatly
increases the risk of cancer among those who have been exposed to
asbestos. The SLA would create a presumption in favor of disclosure
of this very personal information. In other cases, plaintiffs may
wish to avoid publicity altogether. A strong presumption against
confidentiality and the sealing of court records, even by mutual
consent of the parties, could cause such plaintiffs to seek shelter
from the sunshine of public disclosure and thus from the
courtroom.
Finally, the SLA would create the real risk that courts may turn
their back on the innovation of liberal discovery practices by
limiting discovery in ways that would not be covered by the law. As
Harvard Law School's Arthur Miller explains, "If courts could deny
or restrict discovery more easily than they could issue protective
orders, judges might choose to do the former on the assumption that
denying discovery will curb abuse and prevented protracted pretrial
litigation." This, he explains, would be antithetical to the
purposes of discovery because it "would subordinate one litigant's
interest in preparing her case to a hypothetical subsequent
litigant's interest in ready access to the discovery material in
the original case."[27] In this way, the legislation is directly
opposed to plaintiffs' interests.
Infringement of Constitutional
Rights
While the SLA is almost certainly constitutional, it could, and
likely would, be employed in ways that violate litigants'
fundamental rights. First, as the Supreme Court observed in
Seattle Times, discovery and disclosure "may seriously
implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties," and
these interests may be so substantial as to give rise to a
constitutional violation.[28] Though the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
on privacy rights is controversial and, in the main, unsupported by
persuasive textual or historical authority, it is the law of the
land and certainly applicable to judicial proceedings, which may
concern matters well within the bounds of personal autonomy
protected by courts under constitutional privacy doctrines.
Second is the risk that the SLA could infringe on property
rights. Information can be property,[29] and is frequently more
valuable than tangible property. Trade secrets, for example,
encompass a wide variety of businesses' intellectual capital, from
customer lists to proprietary methods of manufacturing to secret
flavoring agents, and exposing most of these secrets to the public
and competitors would destroy their value. Mandated disclosure of
trade secrets could result, then, in the taking of private property
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.[30] This is no hypothetical
fear but a reality in modern business practice, where companies go
to great lengths to prevent computer intrusions by competitors,
industrial espionage, and improper disclosures by employees.
A Boon to Trial Lawyers
While the SLA would disadvantage many plaintiffs, it would help
the trial attorneys representing them in three important ways.
First, limiting protective orders and agreements--and essentially
banning "umbrella" protective orders--would make "fishing
expeditions" far more lucrative. Getting into court in the United
States is easy; a plaintiff need merely file a complaint sufficient
to put a defendant on notice of the allegations against him. With
that single filing, perhaps just a few pages long, and a small fee,
an attorney is entitled to discovery. As described above, discovery
is extremely liberal and can be easily abused to dredge for facts
to support flimsy allegations or to conduct broad sweeps for
information which might be useful in some future case. Protective
orders and the good discretion of trial judges serve today to limit
this kind of litigation abuse, but bars on protective orders would
make it much harder for courts to prevent fishing expeditions
intended to find needle-in-a-haystack wrongdoing.
Second, failing that, a trial attorney may use discovery to
harass and coerce the defendant into an easy settlement. This
threat would be greatly amplified without enforceable protective
orders and agreements, leading more corporate defendants to settle
early, before discovery, for relatively small sums. While such
"strike suits" can be lucrative for lawyers, who may bring them by
the dozen and gain a modest fee for each, they benefit plaintiffs
little--each receives just the residue of his suit's small
settlement after lawyers' fees have been extracted.
Third, the legislation would make it easier for trial lawyers to
bring "follow-on" litigation. While this is not necessarily a bad
thing in itself, it does create a conflict of interest for trial
lawyers: They will have a larger incentive to treat each case as
part of a larger litigation strategy rather than an opportunity to
reach the best result for their client. For example, a client may
wish to settle early in litigation, but her lawyer may wish to push
on through discovery to see if he finds anything that will be
useful in subsequent cases. In other cases, a lawyer who is
prepared for "follow-on" cases may be less than zealous in seeking
an award for a plaintiff who has been injured more greatly than
other plaintiffs in this type of litigation.
Conclusion
The Sunshine in Litigation Act is unnecessary. A wide variety of
expert agencies already investigate threats to public health and
safety and mandate the public disclosure of relevant materials.
These experienced agencies are better placed than courts to
determine whether the public has a legitimate interest in otherwise
private information and have a wide variety of tools at their
disposal, from administrative enforcement to criminal prosecution,
to ensure that businesses do not escape their obligations to be
forthcoming. Because these agencies can make determinations with
greater accuracy and precision than the courts, they are also less
likely to mandate the disclosure of information in which the public
has no legitimate interest. Narrow, relevant disclosures avoid
confusing the public with misleading reports and burdening
businesses and individuals with violation of their privacy and
other rights.
The tort-lawyer lobby has been pushing this legislation for 15
years, taking advantage of every opportunity to point out cases
implicating public health and safety in which confidentiality
agreements were employed. The record, however, is sparse of federal
cases in which such agreements have kept valuable information from
the public. Much more common, though, and well documented is
harassing and vexatious litigation that saps American
competitiveness and winds up costing businesses millions in legal
fees.
Confidentiality plays a vital role in civil litigation and is
usually the result of deals freely made between parties to a
lawsuit. This is because confidentiality benefits plaintiffs and
defendants alike, reducing the cost and delay of litigation and
easing the settlement process. Where confidentiality is not
appropriate, parties today have the power to block or contest it.
Lawsuits are, in most cases, private disagreements between private
parties. Asking a court to adjudicate a dispute should not rob
parties of their right to keep private matters private.
Andrew M.
Grossman is Senior Legal Policy Analyst in the Center for Legal
and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
[1]Richard Marcus, The Discovery
Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457, 464-45
(1991).
[2]Charles Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Law of
Federal Courts § 83 (6th ed. 2002).
[5]Christopher Mueller & Laird Kirkpatrick,
Evidence § 5.28 (3rd ed. 2003).
[6]Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D.Pa.1981) .
[7]See, e.g., Paul Barrett, Protective
Orders Come Under Attack, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1988, p.
27.
[8]
See, e.g., Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 399 F.3d
391, 402 (1st Cir. 2005); Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d
133, 141 (2nd Cir. 2004); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d
772, 787 (3rd Cir. 1994); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d
249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); Chin v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 2000 WL
960515 (5th Cir. 2000); National Polymer Products, Inc. v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424-25 (6th Cir. 1981); Citizens
First Nat. Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943,
945 (7th Cir. 1999); Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 580
F.Supp 913, 916 (D.C. Iowa 1983); Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d
1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); Rohrbough v. Harris, 549 F.3d 1313,
1316 (10th Cir. 2008); Romero v. Drummond, 480 F.3d 1234, 1246
(11th Cir. 2007).
[9]Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 29, 33
(1984).
[14]Kevin McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement:
The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers,
37 UCLA L. Rev. 833, 838.
[15]SeeFed. R. Evid. 408.
[21]Hearing on the Sunshine in Litigation Act,
H.R. 1508, Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Judge Mark Kravitz, Judge, United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/hear_090604_1.html.
[24]Letter from Thomas Susman, Director,
Governmental Affairs, American Bar Association, to John Conyers,
Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary (April 13,
2009).
[25]Though plaintiffs represented on a
contingent-free basis may not feel the burden of legal expenses so
acutely, they may have an even greater need for a quick settlement
than other defendants.
[26]Arthur Miller, Confidentiality, Protective
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427,
464 (1991).
[28]Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35.
[29]Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1003-04 (1984).
[30]That the disclosure would constitute a taking
is apparent by its public character--that is, to advance the
"public interest"-- and by the actor compelling it, a federal
judge, pursuant to an act of Congress.