Politicians looking for quick fixes to perceived U.S. economic
ills have focused yet again on trade. The China Currency
Manipulation Act of 2008 was introduced in the United States Senate
on April 3 by Senators Jim Bunning (R-KY), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI),
and Evan Bayh (D-IN).[1] Presidential candidates Senator Hillary
Clinton (D-NY) and Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) both endorsed the
legislation while campaigning in Indiana.[2]
Legislative proposals to force revaluation of China's currency,
the renminbi (RMB), pander to special economic interests and
popular prejudice. Contrary to the expressed goals of the sponsors,
such measures are unlikely to stop the loss of manufacturing
employment in the United States, or hurt the Chinese. Their primary
effect would be to spur inflation and hurt American consumers.
An Undervalued Renminbi? A recent event
hosted by the Bretton Woods Forum highlighted what the sponsors
termed "significant injury to the United States in the form of lost
jobs and exports," as a result of the undervaluation of the
renminbi.[3]
Though the conference sponsors assumed that the RMB was
undervalued, the data are not so clear. The Congressional Research
Service's (CRS) report for Congress on this issue,[4] updated this past
January, gives a variety of estimates for the currency's true
value:
- An estimate by the Manufacturer's Alliance that the renminbi
was undervalued by 40 percent in 2003.
- An estimate by the Institute for International Economics that
the renminbi was undervalued by 15 percent-25 percent in 2003.
- An estimate by Goldman-Sachs that the renminbi was undervalued
by 9.5 percent-15 percent in 2003.
- An estimate by Virginie Coudert and Cecile Couharde that the
renminbi was 44 percent-54 percent undervalued in 2003.
The CRS reports that these are "back of the envelope"
calculations, none of them based on theoretically grounded,
econometrically estimated economic models.[5] The CRS notes further that
the first three estimates are based on an equilibrium exchange rate
in which China actually runs a trade deficit rather than its
current surplus. That's a strange assumption for an economy with a
domestic savings rate of around 40 percent. In economics, if you
tilt the assumptions, you can get any answer you want.
The CRS also reports a 2004 analysis by Barry Bosworth in which
he argues that because of the high internal savings rate, which is
more than adequate to finance China's domestic investment, the RMB
may actually be overvalued.
The CRS compares China's current account balance, presumably a
major determinant of equilibrium exchange rates, with those of
other Asian countries, and finds the levels broadly in line. Though
China is running a trade surplus with the United States, it tends
to run deficits with East Asian countries, some of which have
floating exchange rates with the United States. Clearly, factors
other than currency levels are driving China's trade balance.
Though the preponderance of this evidence suggests the RMB is
undervalued compared to the dollar, it is impossible to say by
exactly how much. We don't know what would happen to the exchange
rate in a freely floating environment.
Does an Undervalued Renminbi Hurt U.S.
Manufacturers? The China Currency Manipulation Act
of 2008 accuses China of engaging in "protracted large-scale
intervention in currency markets, thereby subsidizing Chinese-made
products and erecting a formidable nontariff barrier to trade for
United States exports to the People's Republic of China."[6] This
is a novel use of the term "subsidy," which normally refers to
government payments to producers of an item. In this case, the
government of China is purchasing U.S. dollars or U.S. government
securities, so the Chinese government payment is ultimately going
to the U.S. government. To the extent that the renminbi is
undervalued as a result, the benefit goes to U.S. consumers and
businesses, which pay lower prices for Chinese goods imported into
the United States. Chinese manufacturers get less for what they
sell as a result of the process. If there is a subsidy here, the
beneficiaries are U.S. consumers and taxpayers.
More well founded is the idea that renminbi undervaluation forms
a non-tariff barrier to trade. If China's currency controls keep
the dollar overvalued, then U.S. goods exported to China carry a
higher price than they should, and may be uncompetitive as a
result. It is important to remember, however, that the value of the
dollar reflects America's trade and investment flows with the
entire world, not just China. U.S. exporters to China are competing
not just with Chinese firms, but with firms from Japan, Europe, and
other Asian countries that import into China. The U.S. dollar has
been in a broad decline against both the euro and the yen, keeping
U.S. goods highly competitive from a pricing point of view. U.S.
exports to China have grown more than 400 percent over the last
decade.[7]
It is true that China's exports to the United States have risen
rapidly over the last decade, too. However, that surge appears to
have come at the expense of other Asian exporters, not U.S.
manufacturers. In 1995, China and Japan together accounted for 23
percent of U.S. imports. In 2005, China and Japan together still
accounted for 23 percent of U.S. imports. What changed was that in
1995, Japan accounted for 73 percent of those combined imports and
China only 27 percent; by 2005, China's share had grown to 64
percent and Japan's had fallen to 36 percent.[8]
Winners and Losers. Assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the renminbi is undervalued compared to the
dollar, the question is whether this is as bad for Americans as
politicians assert. It's true that a U.S. producer of a product
that is in demand in China will normally sell more in China if the
renminbi appreciates against the dollar. Similarly, a U.S. producer
of goods for domestic consumption competing against Chinese imports
will also normally sell more if the renminbi appreciates.
There aren't very many such firms, however. Chinese and
Americans don't generally produce the same things. Indeed, it is
through specialization, not competition, that both countries reap
the benefits of trade. As noted above, Chinese exporters to the
U.S. compete with other Asian economies for market share in the
U.S. American firms compete with Europeans, Japanese, and Asians
for market share in China. Changing the renminbi/dollar exchange
rate will not significantly affect those trade flows.
Changing the exchange rate will, however, affect U.S. producers
who use intermediate goods imported from China in their U.S.
production processes. Renminbi appreciation will increase their
costs of production. U.S. consumers of basic commodities like oil
will also be hurt, as renminbi appreciation will make
dollar-denominated commodities like oil cheaper for the Chinese.
Chinese demand, already rising rapidly, will drive up the dollar
price of such commodities worldwide, forcing American consumers to
pay even more at the pump.
U.S. consumers have the most to lose by congressional efforts to
force revaluation of the renminbi. Chinese goods in the U.S. are
cheap because the renminbi is cheap. Revaluation will weaken the
purchasing power of the American consumers, mostly from the middle
and lower economic strata, who depend on Chinese products to
maintain their standard of life.
It's Not About China. The measures
proposed by some in Congress to pressure the Chinese to inflate the
value of their currency would help some Americans-those few
manufacturers that compete directly with Chinese firms-and hurt
many others, including producers who use Chinese imports in their
U.S. production processes, and American consumers buying Chinese
goods. An inflated renminbi won't punish the Chinese; it will, on
balance, punish Americans.
For the American economy as a whole, the currently undervalued
Chinese currency brings a double benefit. We get both more goods
and services, and more investment capital to help our economy grow
and keep our unemployment rate low.
Politicians like to say that the playing field is not level.
That's true. The playing field, as foreigners are all too aware, is
tilted radically in our favor. Leveling that playing field may
indeed provide benefits for some producers in the U.S., but it will
hurt many more. We are all consumers.
The U.S. occupies a unique and beneficial position in the
international economy. Goods and investment capital are flowing
into America at unprecedented levels. Other countries generally
hope for only one or the other. Many get neither. We get both.
Measures that would change that by manipulating exchange rates to
inflate the renminbi or deflate the dollar are short sighted in the
extreme.
Ambassador Terry
Miller is Director of the Center for International Trade and
Economics at The Heritage Foundation.
[1]
China Currency Manipulation Act of 2008, S. 2813.
[2]
Peter Cohn, "Clinton, Obama Both Throw Weight Behind Chinese
Currency Legislation," May 2, 2008.
[6]
China Currency Manipulation Act of 2008, S.2813, Sec. 2 (3).
[7]
Calculations made with data from the U.S. International Trade
Administration, TradeStats Express, "National Trade Data,"
May 6, 2007, at
[8]
Calculations made with data from the U.S. International Trade
Administration, TradeStats Express, "National Trade Data,"
May 6, 2007, at .