British Prime Minister Gordon Brown will meet with President
George W. Bush in the Oval Office on Thursday, April 17, 2008,
during his second trip to the United States as premier. The talks
are expected to cover a range of issues from the Iranian nuclear
question to international development. During his visit, Brown will
need to work hard to improve the state of U.S.-U.K. relations,
which have deteriorated since his predecessor Tony Blair left
Downing Street last June.
The Anglo-American Special Relationship continues at many levels
behind the scenes, from intelligence cooperation to collaboration
on missile defense. It is, however, beginning to show significant
signs of strain over the handling of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, low levels of British defense spending, and the
broader war against Islamist terrorism.
Gordon Brown has a major credibility problem, and not just in
terms of the U.K. polls that show a personal negative rating of 26
percentage points. It is hard for the Prime Minister to be viewed
as an Atlanticist supporter of the Anglo-American alliance when he
rejects the term "special relationship" and his diplomats are
discouraged from using it. Nor can he be seen as a wholly reliable
military partner when he opposes increasing British defense
spending and refuses to support a robust military role for British
troops in Iraq. Brown is also not helped by a Defense Secretary who
believes that Britain should be negotiating with the Taliban.
When he arrives in Washington this week, the British Prime
Minister must demonstrate a firm commitment to the battle in Iraq,
reject any talk of softening Britain's strategy in Afghanistan, and
show strong leadership in confronting the Iranian nuclear threat.
The alliance has to operate as a two-way street. At present, the
United States is shouldering a disproportionate share of the
burden, and Brown must show that Britain is willing to pull its
weight alongside its closest ally.
Downing Street Drops the "Special
Relationship"
In an extraordinary move, under Gordon Brown, the British
government has dropped the 60-year-old phrase "special
relationship" altogether,[1] and diplomats are strongly encouraged not
to use it. In deference to the European Union, Britain's newly
unveiled National Security Strategy points out that while "the
partnership with the United States is our most important bilateral
relationship," the "EU has a vital role in securing a safer world
both within and beyond the borders of Europe"-giving equal footing
to Britain's relationship with Washington and it relationship with
Brussels.[2] Ironically, while the British Prime
Minister refuses to use the term, his French counterpart Nicolas
Sarkozy had no qualms about using it to refer admiringly to the
Anglo-American alliance when he addressed the House of Commons last
month.
A Divide Over the War on Terrorism
Not only has the Brown government dropped the phrase "special
relationship," but it has also dumped all reference to the "war on
terrorism." The National Security Strategy even states that "while
terrorism represents a threat to all our communities, and an attack
on our way of life, it does not at present amount to a strategic
threat"-an extraordinary statement considering there are at least
2,000 al-Qaeda operatives in the U.K. according to British
intelligence.
In contrast to the U.S. government (and the previous Blair
government), the current British government under Brown does not
believe that the free world is engaged in a global war against
Islamist terrorists and is handling the al-Qaeda threat to British
shores as largely a domestic law-and-order problem. In many ways,
Britain has moved closer to the continental European model under
Brown with a rejection of the U.S. view that the West is engaged in
a long-term war against Islamist extremists who seek the
destruction of our civilization.
This softer approach has gone hand-in-hand with the further
surrender of British sovereignty in Europe. Brown has embraced the
new European Union Reform Treaty, which is almost identical to the
former European Constitution-and, to all intents and purposes, a
blueprint for a European superstate.[3] He has steadfastly refused to
agree to a popular vote on the treaty despite overwhelming public
support for a referendum.
The Decline of British Defense Spending
In addition to adopting a more European approach to the war on
terrorism, Gordon Brown insists on maintaining European levels of
defense spending, which is rapidly undermining Britain's position
as a world power. U.K. expenditure on defense currently stands at
less than 2.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), its lowest
level since the 1930s. This compares with U.S. defense spending at
3.7 percent of GDP. Britain's military is massively overstretched
and underfunded, with huge manpower and equipment shortages, and
faces billion of dollars worth of further cuts over the next few
years.
The decline in British military power is sharply highlighted by
the gutting of the Royal Navy, which has been reduced from 136
ships in 1987 to just 75 today, with a fall in the number of
submarines from 38 to just 13. The crisis is so great that it would
be almost impossible for Britain to mount a major military
operation on the scale of the 1982 Falklands War. As U.K. Shadow
Defense Secretary Liam Fox has commented, "Labour has done what
none of this country's enemies have been able to do: bring the Navy
to its knees."[4]
For the United States, the decline in British military
capability should be a huge cause for concern, both increasing the
burden on America's armed forces and reducing the force projection
of Washington's only large-scale military ally. This was amply
demonstrated in the recent battle for Basra between Iraqi security
forces and the Iranian-backed Mahdi Army led by Moqtada al-Sadr,
where the U.S. Air Force and hundreds of American ground forces
were involved in the Iraqi offensive to retake the city. British
soldiers, meanwhile, were stationed outside of Basra and did not
intervene with the exception of limited logistical and artillery
support.
The non-involvement of British forces was the product of both
dramatically weakened troop strength (down to just 4,100 men from a
height of 45,000) and a lack of political will on the part of the
British government, fearful of the negative impact of troop
casualties on the home front as well as the prospect of having to
take on Iranian-trained and Iranian-funded militias. The lack of
British commitment to the war in southern Iraq will ultimately
force the United States to deploy thousands of soldiers to the
region, picking up the slack left by the British Army and weakening
America's ability to combat al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates
in the Sunni heartlands in central Iraq.
U.S.-U.K. Splits Over Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, the British, with 8,000 troops on the ground,
are far more engaged in military operations and are playing a major
role in fighting the Taliban in Helmand Province. The bravery of
British soldiers there, however, is being undercut by poor
political leadership in London as well as by shortages of
equipment, vehicles, and helicopters. There are also major
differences emerging between London and Washington regarding
long-term strategy in combating the Taliban.
In comments to London's Sunday Telegraph,[5]
British Defense Secretary Des Browne called for negotiations with
elements of both the Taliban and Hezbollah, saying: "What you need
to do in conflict resolution is to bring the people who believe
that the answer to their political ambitions will be achieved
through violence into a frame of mind that they accept [that] their
political ambitions will be delivered by politics." These remarks
can only serve to undermine morale among British forces fighting in
Afghanistan and sharply illustrate the current divide that exists
between the U.S. and the U.K. about critical aspects of the war on
terrorism. They followed the February revelation in the
Financial Times that the Brown government had secret plans
to build training camps in Helmand for former Taliban fighters, a
move strongly condemned by the Karzai government.[6]
Brown Must Shore up the Special
Relationship
From the Second World War to the second Gulf War, the U.S.-U.K.
alliance has been the most successful partnership of modern times,
a far more effective defender of the free world than any
international organization. But there is a real danger that the
Special Relationship will be weakened through a combination of
political indifference, a decline in British defense spending, a
growing unwillingness on the part of Britain to fight a long-term
global war against Islamist terrorism, and the erosion of British
sovereignty within the European Union.
For the partnership to continue, there has to be a wholehearted
commitment on both sides of the Atlantic, and while there is every
sign that Washington is seeking to strengthen the alliance, London
is adopting a laissez-faire approach that is weakening and
undermining it. The stakes are extremely high. If the Special
Relationship were eventually to collapse, not only would the
security and prosperity of both the United States and Great Britain
be significantly reduced, but its demise would embolden the West's
enemies, leaving the world a far more dangerous place.
Nile Gardiner,
Ph.D., is Director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
at The Heritage Foundation.