The Manager's Amendment to the Mortgage Reform and
Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007 (H.R. 3915) was reported out of
the House Financial Services Committee earlier this month and is
now before the full House for consideration. Originally crafted for
the purpose of addressing the many flaws in the mortgage market
that led to the subprime mortgage turmoil, the current bill would
encourage lenders to limit their lending to only the very best
credit risks. This would put individuals of moderate incomes,
imperfect credit histories, and limited wealth at an even greater
disadvantage, leading to a decline in the homeownership rate, now
at record levels. Among the victims of this mandatory credit
quality cleansing would be members of some ethnic minority groups
whose current homeownership rates are today only slightly better
than the homeownership rate for the nation as a whole in 1890.
Although the causes of the subprime mortgage collapse were as
numerous as the questionable practices devised and allowed by
devious and inattentive borrowers, brokers, lenders, and investors,
the chief cause of the collapse was a significant decline on the
part of many mortgage market participants in the application of
traditional underwriting practices designed to assure that
borrowers had a reasonable prospect of servicing their debt. How
this deterioration in underwriting quality occurred and spread so
far and so fast will be left to the economic historians of the
future, but in many respects, the mortgage market of the past few
years had all the characteristics of the typical speculative bubble
that Charles Mackay so perceptively uncovered in his classic
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.
And as with the bubbles of the past, the market has reacted to the
current turmoil by tightening up credit standards and eliminating
many of the abuses that became all too prevalent in recent
years.
Among the many problems with H.R. 3915 are what some critics
have described as the vague and subjective standards and
requirements in several sections, notably Sections 122, 201, and
202. Section 122, for example, would amend the Truth and
Lending Act by adding a new section 129A, which (among other
changes) would require that mortgage loan originators
with respect to each consumer seeking or inquiring about a
residential mortgage loan, diligently work to present the consumer
with a range of residential mortgage loan products for which the
consumer likely qualifies and which are appropriate to the
consumer's existing circumstances, based on information known by,
or obtained in good faith by, the originator.
The phrase "appropriate to the consumer's existing circumstances"
is problematic. Existing circumstances that may impact a borrower's
repayment prospects include health, marital stability, and
employment prospects, so fulfilling this requirement could require
a massive invasion of a borrower's privacy. Since the bill relies
upon the threat of subsequent litigation to settle the extent to
which lenders fulfilled this requirement, lenders that fail to
require applicants to submit to a complete physical, a session with
a marriage counselor, and an employer interview could face
uncertain risks in the courts. Inasmuch as these three issues are
often factors contributing to loan defaults, they would certainly
be valid "existing circumstances" that the law would expect lenders
to uncover.
Section 201 amends the Truth in Lending Act by adding a new
Section 129B that imposes a "reasonable ability to repay" duty on
lenders by requiring the following:
(1) IN GENERAL- In accordance with regulations prescribed
jointly by the Federal banking agencies, in consultation with the
Commission, no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless
the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based
on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan
is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the
loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance,
and assessments.
and
(3) BASIS FOR DETERMINATION- A determination under this
subsection of a consumer's ability to repay a residential mortgage
loan shall be based on consideration of the consumer's credit
history, current income, expected income the consumer is reasonably
assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio,
employment status, and other financial resources other than the
consumer's equity in the dwelling or real property that secures
repayment of the loan.
This section would likely have a direct impact on homeownership
levels. Section 201(3), for example, specifies lenders must
consider "other financial resources" before making a loan, but does
that mean lenders should consider such assets a mandatory
requirement for loan qualification? Inasmuch as many borrowers
struggle to meet the downpayment requirement, this additional
burden would serve to limit mortgage credit and homeownership to a
wealthier class of borrower than has heretofore been the practice
in the United States. It would also, presumably, undermine all of
the federal programs designed to encourage homeownership among
moderate income households since few, if any, of the program
participants have a net worth of any consequence-as required for
program eligibility.
Section 202 of the bill would amend the Truth in Lending Act by
adding to the new Section 129B (discussed above) additional
language to ensure that there is a "Net Tangible Benefit for
Refinancing of Residential Mortgage Loans." Specifically, the new
provision states:
(1) IN GENERAL- In accordance with regulations prescribed
under paragraph (3), no creditor may extend credit in connection
with any residential mortgage loan that involves a refinancing of a
prior existing residential mortgage loan unless the creditor
reasonably and in good faith determines, at the time the loan is
consummated and on the basis of information known by or obtained in
good faith by the creditor, that the refinanced loan will provide a
net tangible benefit to the consumer.
This provision effectively deputizes the mortgage industry as a
quality of life police force by requiring them to pass judgment
upon what exactly it is that a borrower intends to do with any
additional monies acquired by way of a loan refinancing. If the
borrower intends to buy a new car, would the lender need to know
how many cars the household already owns, predicted major uses of
the new car, the availability of bus and trolley service in the
neighborhood, and whether the hoped-for vehicle is an extravagant
sport utility vehicle or a sturdy little pre-owned sedan? What if
the loan is to pay prospective medical bills? Would the lender then
have to judge whether the procedure is justified at this time or
whether it could be safely delayed until the cost could be met
through accumulated savings rather than debt? Again, since the
penalty to the lender of making the wrong decision is to become
chum for trial lawyers, there is every expectation that refinancing
would become unavailable for many prospective borrowers.
As currently written, H.R. 3915 would force an unprecedented
measure of caution on mortgage lenders by forcing them to acquire
much more information than has been typical in the past and thereby
intrude upon borrowers' privacy. It also would establish an
explicit series of credit standards for lenders, which could have
the effect of excluding many moderate income borrowers from the
ownership market. In sum, the enactment of H.R.3915 would delay the
housing market recovery that is now struggling to get underway.
Ronald D. Utt,
Ph.D., is Herbert and Joyce Morgan Senior Research Fellow in
the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at
The Heritage Foundation.