The House of Representatives would hamstring the wartime
intelligence gathering of the United States if it passes the
incorrectly named "Responsible Electronic Surveillance that is
Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007," or RESTORE Act
(H.R. 3773). Will Representatives who support the bill accept
responsibility when the intelligence gap created by the bill
results in a failure to detect another terrorist attack on America
soil? This is no rhetorical question. The bill would impose a
Byzantine and unprecedentedly burdensome intelligence regime on
those charged with protecting Americans from international
terrorists and substantially impede the ability of the executive
branch to gather intelligence on terrorist threats. Lawmakers who
support H.R. 3773 should be required to clearly stake their careers
on its effectiveness.
The RESTORE Act is remarkable primarily for what its supporters
do not address. They provide little or no information on the
following points:
- Why Congress would depart from the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission by making it more difficult and cumbersome to
gather intelligence on Islamic terrorists;
- Whether there was any actual harm (rather than psychic
harm that supposedly results from potential surveillance) to any
American citizens as a result of five years of intelligence
gathering on foreign terrorists since 9/11 and, if so, what that
supposed harm was;
- Why Congress believes it has the constitutional authority, with
or without a court's assistance, to micromanage decisions about
which potential foreign enemies to gather information on, when that
power is constitutionally vested in the commander in chief;
- Why no previous President--Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, or Bill Clinton--has ever conceded that FISA or any
other regulatory regime crafted by Congress is the sole means by
which a President may collect intelligence for national security
purposes; or
- Why Americans should entrust to Congress and congressional
staff members a database containing information on every American
whose name is mentioned as part of a national security
investigation.
The Administration is right to threaten a presidential veto of
the RESTORE Act if it is not fundamentally changed. The Act is
unwise as a matter of constitutional law and policy. The current
Administration has gone much further than any previous
administration in safeguarding American civil liberties. Yet
hyperbolic privacy activists never acknowledge this and refuse to
accept sensible minimization procedures to provide further
anonymity of information that might incidentally be collected on
persons within the United States. Congress should expand and make
permanent the FISA reforms in the Protect America Act and not
hobble America's wartime intelligence-gathering abilities.
What Harm Is Being Remedied?
Privacy absolutists have to date been unable to point to any
actual harm that individual Americans have suffered because of
information collected as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program
(TSP) and similar foreign intelligence programs since 9/11. They
can point to no Americans who have been convicted unjustly, or even
prosecuted unjustly, based on information obtained through the TSP
in violation of their statutory or constitutional rights.
When the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was
enacted in 1978, Congress was at least responding to some actual
evidence of abuses of warrantless electronic surveillance of
average Americans who were not threatening national security at a
time when the United States was not in an actual (or "shooting")
war. J. Edgar Hoover's FBI had, among other abuses, conducted
electronic surveillance of American citizens whose only apparent
wrongdoing was that they were considered to be among Nixon's
enemies. It thus made sense to require court supervision of
domestic electronic surveillance of Americans who were not
supporting foreign enemies in an actual shooting war.
1978 was also near the height of the Cold War. The agents of
America's enemies were predominately embassy staff members and
other officials of Soviet and Soviet-affiliated states. FISA
permitted electronic surveillance of these potential enemy agents
within the United States without traditional warrants but with the
involvement of a new Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Two
important distinctions are relevant to today's debate over
modernizing FISA: (1) The original law did not impose any
restrictions on the then-current means of intercepting foreign
agents' communications abroad, and (2) the number of potential Cold
War agents in America covered by FISA was quite small compared to
the number of potential soldiers and saboteurs in a traditional
shooting war.
In short, acts of war on American soil by foreign agents were
not among the significant threats confronting the nation in 1978.
FISA was crafted for the Cold War, not for today's world of
secretive networks of foreign soldiers on U.S. soil planning acts
of terrorism against Americans. FISA's restrictions on domestic
surveillance were designed to prevent Watergate-like abuses, not to
hinder the executive branch's ability to gather intelligence about
wartime enemies planning to kill Americans.
After the attacks of September 11, Congress enacted an
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) that set a very
different tone. Congress wisely authorized the President to use all
necessary force to defeat the terrorist entities and their allies
with whom we were now at war. This is a real shooting war, as is
demonstrated by continued military combat in Afghanistan; by
bombings in London, Madrid, Asia, and the Middle East; and by the
many foiled plots around the globe. When at war, it is a paramount
duty of the military to locate, track, and intercept the
communications of enemies--never an easy task. President Bush
assumed that grave responsibility, as has every commander in chief
during wartime. Using the National Security Agency (itself a
military agency) and following standard military protocols, he has
engaged in the traditional tasks of military intelligence. Thus has
been the duty of military commanders since time immemorial.
Although the President's authority to use the military units
Congress funds to engage in traditional military intelligence
duties flows from the Constitution, it is not inconsistent with any
statute either. To the extent that the old FISA regime would have
presented difficulties in foreign intelligence gathering, the AUMF
removed most such statutory constraints. Notwithstanding his
constitutional authority, the President sought and received
additional statutory authority in August with passage of the
Protect America Act to avoid constitutional questions and activist
court rulings.
With these laws in place, the President has undertaken his
intelligence duties responsibly. The worst that proponents of
legislation like the RESTORE Act can point to are hypothetical
abuses of information obtained through the Terrorist Surveillance
Program or incidental intrusions on non-specific, amorphous
privacies.
But most of today's privacy activists are absolutists. They
believe that every governmental access of information that they
would prefer to keep private is an injury that must be justified by
a compelling governmental interest, subjected to court supervision
(such as a warrant process), or both. Their rhetoric asserts--
incorrectly and misleadingly--that these privacy rights are
enshrined in the Constitution, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment includes the
generalized, amorphous "right to privacy" they favor.
Because the Constitution does not include any such right,
constitutional rhetoric should not be used to cloak attempts to
create such a right by statute. Decisions to create new statutory
rights are merely policy preferences. Only when they are
acknowledged as such can they be honestly and productively
discussed.
The RESTORE Act and the Intelligence
Gap
The contrast could not be starker between the nebulous,
hypothetical harms that privacy absolutists assert could result
from the incidental collection of information through electronic
surveillance programs and the concrete harms that could result from
the lack of robust foreign intelligence-gathering programs to
detect and prevent acts of domestic terrorism. U.S. intelligence
systems have improved in the past five years, but foreign enemies
show an alarming ability to adapt to these advances. There is
little reason to doubt that foreign terrorists would use a weapon
of mass destruction on American soil if they could do so. The only
question is whether the United States will be able to detect and
foil such plots in the future.
The shortcomings that led to pre-9/11 intelligence failures have
been well documented, and the RESTORE Act would only make such
problems worse. The highly regarded, bipartisan commission that
Congress charged with investigating the events and causes of the
September 11 attacks--the 9/11 Commission--identified major gaps in
U.S. intelligence-gathering on terrorist activities. The 9/11
Commission determined that the effectiveness of U.S.
intelligence-gathering was hamstrung by a "[l]ack of common
standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide."[1] The
Commission recommended that intelligence and information-gathering
procedures "should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a
better balance between security and shared knowledge" regardless of
whether such information "is collected in Pakistan or Texas."[2]
The RESTORE Act would actually widen the "foreign-domestic
divide" identified by the 9/11 Commission by reducing the sharing
of information within the U.S. intelligence community. The RESTORE
Act would multiply the difficulties involved in collecting
information about foreigners engaged in terrorist activities who
happen to communicate with persons within the United States or who
are themselves "U.S. persons." This is despite the fact that the
category of "U.S. persons" defined by FISA[3] would include an alien who
has legal residency in the United States only because he
fraudulently obtained a U.S. visa in order to carry out terrorist
activities within the United States. At the time of the September
11 attacks, all of the Islamic terrorists who murdered Americans
were arguably "U.S. persons."
Need for Modernization
The House of Representatives passed the Protect America Act of
2007 (PAA) on August 4, 2007, and the President signed it into law
the next day. Despite the disclaimers by Members of Congress who
want to create a more restrictive regime for gathering intelligence
on terrorists, the PAA passed because it had bipartisan support and
because Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell
spoke personally with approximately 260 Members. He explained why
the PAA was necessary to remedy the damage caused by an
unprecedented and seemingly erroneous decision by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court in May of this year.[4] The
decision opened an intelligence gap by effectively requiring the
federal government, for the first time ever, to obtain a FISA
warrant for any surveillance of persons located overseas if their
electronic communications (e.g., emails, cell-phone calls, and text
messages) might possibly be routed through the United States.
Because most of the world's largest telecommunications and
Internet service providers are located in the United States, this
would have required a FISA warrant for surveillance of potentially
every person located overseas. No one could know in advance whether
any communication by a person located outside the United States
might end up being routed through the United States. DNI McConnell
disclosed that thousands of individuals overseas are being
monitored for terrorist activities. Obtaining approval for each
intercept would be nearly impossible.
Each FISA application requires approximately 200 person-hours of
government attorneys' and other intelligence officials' time for
each telephone number intercepted. Only about 100 persons are being
monitored in the United States, but this alone requires the
equivalent of full-time service of ten government attorneys or
other intelligence officials just to prepare the FISA
applications.[5] Thousands of persons outside of the United
States are being monitored for terrorism-related activities. For
every thousand, 100 government officials would have to spend a year
working fulltime to prepare all of the FISA applications. This is
not the formula for a nimble and effective international
intelligence regime.
Putting the RESTORE Act's manpower demands aside, it is highly
unlikely that the FISA court would approve every application. It is
human nature for judges who have been tasked with second-guessing
intelligence intercepts to resist the notion that they are mere
rubber stamps. Yet these are traditional foreign intelligence
intercepts, undertaken during war, that no court has the
constitutional authority to review. Furthermore, judges may not
have the expertise. Military intelligence officers themselves often
do not know the value of individual intercepts until months or
years later, and ordinary federal judges are far less suited to
make that kind of determination. The intelligence gaps that would
be imposed on America's intelligence gathering if the PAA were
repealed or replaced are enormous and would make the task of
detecting and preventing terrorism even harder than it is today.
America's enemies must rejoice over their prospects when they read
proposals such as the RESTORE Act.
Members of Congress who now publicly express regret about their
vote to enact the Protect America Act should trust their original
instincts rather than be swayed by unfounded hypothetical harms or
the potential for partisan gain. A bipartisan majority recognized
in August that if Congress failed to act, it would expose tens of
thousands of Americans to a heightened risk of injury and death at
the hands of terrorists. Unfortunately, the sky-is-falling rhetoric
of privacy absolutists seems to have swayed some Members since. The
FISA "fix" they propose is pure window dressing. It is calculated
to provide political cover if the resulting intelligence gap does
result in another terrorist attack on U.S. soil. But it fails to do
the sensible thing: close the intelligence gap.
Conclusion
The Protect America Act wisely exempts intelligence gathering
targeted at persons not on U.S. soil. This makes perfect sense
because constitutional protections were never intended to extend to
intelligence gathering for national security purposes to persons
located outside of the United States. It relies on the same
minimization procedures that have always applied to reduce the
intrusion on the privacy interests of Americans who (whether
wittingly or unwittingly) communicate with suspected terrorists or
other enemy soldiers.
Congress should make the Protect America Act permanent and
enhance its provisions to provide retroactive and permanent
liability protection to American businesses that cooperate with
reasonable intelligence requests. The House of Representatives
should not impose unconstitutional restrictions on the ability of
the executive branch to carry out one of its primary,
constitutionally mandated functions: protecting Americans from acts
of war by foreign enemies.
Todd Gaziano is the
Director of, and Brian W.
Walsh is Senior Legal Research Fellow in, the Center for Legal
and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
[1]The
9/11 Comm'n Report: Final Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States 409 (2004).
[3]See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i).
[4]Although this secret court decision was never
released, it seems erroneous based on news reports citing officials
who have reviewed it. The conclusions these officials have drawn
from their review are the only available public source for
evaluating the decision's merits, and the decision thus may have
had the effect of chilling more intelligence gathering conduct than
its holding necessarily required.
[5]This
estimate assumes that a workweek is at least 40 hours and that each
government attorney or other intelligence official spends all of
his or her time working on nothing other than FISA
applications.